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INTRODUCTION: 
EAST TIMORESE POLITICS IN 
TRANSITION 
Michael Leach and Damien Kingsbury 
This edited collection examines key issues in the contemporary politics of Timor-
Leste. In particular, it focuses on democratic consolidation and the ongoing 
development of political institutions during an especially critical period for the 
young nation: the transition from more than a decade of international state-building 
assistance. It assesses challenges that have burdened the young state since formal 
independence in 2002 and considers its future prospects. Issues of particular focus 
include constitutional debates, political party formation, the operation of the 
government, decentralization, foreign policy, development, gender discrimination, 
combating corruption, security sector reform, the politics of justice, relations with 
traditional authorities, and the challenges of nation-building. In examining these 
themes, the contributors highlight the fledgling state's successes and failures as well 
as matters that remain unresolved as international state-building forces prepare to 
depart. While each theme addressed in the collection focuses on Timor-Leste's 
specific experience, these issues also pertain to many post-colonial and developing 
countries, particularly those of the southwest Pacific and sub-Saharan Africa. As the 
object of five consecutive UN missions with varying mandates, Timor-Leste is a 
critical case study of international state-building projects. In these respects, the 
Timor-Leste experience offers a model for comparative consideration across a much 
wider field. 
COLONIALISM, INDEPENDENCE, AND INTERNATIONAL STATE-BUILDING 
Timor-Leste was a late arrival on the post-colonial scene, gammg its 
independence at the tail end of the post-World War II decolonization process. First 
colonized by Portuguese Dominican priests, along with Portuguese traders and their 
descendants from nearby islands in the sixteenth century, Portuguese Timar 
remained a colonial backwater until its invasion and occupation by Japan in 1942. 
Following Japan's defeat, Portuguese Timor slipped back into colonial obscurity, 
notable mostly for the presence of occasional political prisoners who were banished 
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to the then-Portuguese Timor by Portugal's Salazar regime. Following the 
"Carnation Revolution" in Portugal in 1974, and the related and rushed process of 
decolonization, Timor-Leste began to develop its first local political parties. In 1975, 
neighboring Indonesia began to foment discord between Timor-Leste's nascent 
political parties, leading in August 1975 to a brief but bloody war between the two 
largest parties, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste (Frente 
Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente, FRETILIN) and the Timorese 
Democratic Union (Uniao Democratica Timorense, UDT). Indonesia soon after 
engaged in cross-border raids. In December 1975, just days after Timor-Leste 
declared independence, its giant neighbor launched a full-scale invasion of 
Portuguese Timar, followed by progressive occupation and forced integration of the 
province in 1976. The restoration of Timor-Leste's independence was to be put off for 
another quarter of a century. 
Resistance to Indonesia's invasion and twenty-four-year occupation led to the 
deaths of as many as 180,000 people, 1 the establishment of a disciplined 
underground resistance, and an extensive international support network. Timor-
Leste was never recognized under international law as part of Indonesia and 
remained a major diplomatic, military, and financial problem for the occupying state. 
When Indonesia came under increasing external pressure following the financial 
crisis of 1997-98, its then recently appointed president, B. J. Habibie, announced that 
Timor-Leste could vote on whether it wished to remain a part of Indonesia. On 
August 30, 1999, the East Timorese people voted overwhelmingly for independence 
in a referendum conducted by the United Nations Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET). Violence and destruction, which had accompanied the lead up to the 
referendum, broke in a storm after the announcement of the ballot results, leaving 
more than three-quarters of the population of Timor-Leste displaced and more than 
70 percent of its buildings and infrastructure destroyed. Australian-led INTERFET 
(International Force for East Timor) military forces, under the auspices of the United 
Nations, intervened, Indonesian forces departed, and the process of rebuilding the 
shattered territory and people as an independent state was begun under the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). 
As the site of one of the United Nations' first experiments in direct governance of 
a territory, and of ongoing international state-building assistance, Timor-Leste 
remains a unique case study of a double transition to independence and democracy 
through a period of direct international governance. Under its Security Council 
mandate, UNTAET exercised full legislative and executive authority from 1999-2002, 
running both the security forces and an international peacekeeping mission in 
Timor-Leste while seeking to build new governmental institutions for the emerging 
state and overseeing the formation of a constitutional assembly in 2001. The scope of 
the UNTAET mission was unprecedented in the region. While the United Nations 
had briefly administered West New Guinea from September 1962 until May 1, 1963, 
this "seat-warming" interregnum did not develop and execute policy decisions as it 
did in Timor-Leste between 1999 and 2002. The United Nations' role in Cambodia in 
1 See CAVR (Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliai;ao), Chega!: The Report of the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (Dili: CAVR, 2005). CAVR's 
estimate of the minimum total number of conflict-related deaths is 102,800. This figure 
includes both killings and deaths due to privation. The often-cited figure of 180,000 is CAVR's 
upper estimate of total conflict-related mortality. 
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1991-92, while substantial, is best described as co-administration,2 as the UN 
operated alongside a sovereign government, wielding decision-making powers in 
certain areas and primarily focused on peacekeeping.3 The year 1999 was to prove an 
important year in the practice of UN-led international state-building, as the Security 
Council endorsed three separate missions mandating the direct international 
administration of a territory.4 Of these missions, the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), in conjunction with the European 
Union, most closely paralleled the United Nation's state-building experience in 
Timor-Leste. But perhaps even more so than in Kosovo, the United Nations' role in 
Timor-Leste was notable because it had to construct the institutions of a new state 
from what was, in effect, a tabula rasa. 
Timor-Leste therefore stands as a critical exemplar of contemporary international 
state-building. Distinct from other forms of development assistance in the level of 
intervention in national sovereignty, 5 state-building is concerned with "constructing 
or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with 
physical and economic security."' 6 As Mark T. Berger notes, the policy rationale for 
contemporary international state-building missions reflects the perceived connection 
between international security and development, with a clear emphasis on the 
pathologies "failed states" present for regional or world orders. State-building 
missions are seen as an effort to maintain a stable world, or regional order, in the face 
of a range of assessed risks, from humanitarian concerns to systemic concerns over 
the spread of international crime syndicates or terrorist networks. Reflecting the 
diversity of these concerns, state-building can encompass "formal military 
occupation, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, national reconstruction, foreign aid, 
and the use of stabilization forces under the auspices of the USA, Britain, France, 
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], the UN, or another international or 
regional organization." 7 
Timor-Leste has also experienced two major periods of state-building assistance 
since independence. The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timar 
(UNMISET), in operation from May 2002 to May 2005, was mandated by the Security 
Council to provide peacekeeping forces and state-building assistance in the 
devolution of security functions to East Timorese authorities. This operation wound 
down in May 2005, with policing handed to East Timorese authorities and a smaller 
political mission, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), in place until 
August 2006. By early 2006, Timor-Leste was widely seen as a UN success story.8 
2 Erika de Wet, "The Direct Administration of Territories by the United Nations and Its 
Member States in the Post Cold-War Era: Legal Bases and Implications for National Law," Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 8,l (2004): 297. 
3 Ibid. The 1993 United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the UN High 
Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 are likewise best characterized as co-
administrations. 
4 United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), established in 
1999, was limited to two years before sovereign functions were handed over to Croatia. 
5 Julien Barbara, "Rethinking Neo-Liberal State Building: Building Post-Conflict Development 
States," Development in Practice 18,3 (2008): 308. 
6 David Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building (London: Pluto Press, 2006), p. 1. 
7 Mark T. Berger, "From Nation-Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, 
the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order," Third World Quarterly 27,l (2006): 6. 
8 Ibid., p. 20. 
Michael Leach and Damien Kingsbury 
Despite what appeared to be a sound beginning after independence in 20021 the 
political-military crisis of April-May 2006 shook erstwhile confidence in the success 
of the UN1 s first comprehensive state-building mission1 highlighting unresolved 
social divisions left from the occupation era1 which were compounded by 
competition for scarce resources and the weight of unmet popular expectations. 
Timor-Leste entered its second major period of international state-building 
assistance following independence with its key security institutions in disarray. 
Having downscaled the UNMISET mission in 20051 with the strong support of 
Australia1 the United Nations returned after the crisis in 2006 with a new 
peacekeeping mission: the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste 
(UNMIT). Authorized by the Security Council to reestablish a UN police force until 
the PNTL (Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste, the National Police of Timor-Leste) 
could be retrained and reformed, UNMIT has also played a major role in institutional 
capacity building in the formal justice sector and in electoral administration. 
Alongside UNMIT in 2006 was a new Australian-led military force1 the International 
Stabilisation Force (ISF). This represented a newer strand of thinking in regional 
state-building, as Australia and New Zealand chose not to "blue helmet" their 
military forces as they had in the previous UNTAET and UNMISET eras. Operating 
outside the structure of the UN mission under a bilateral agreement with the 
government of Timor-Leste, the ISF subsequently concluded a mutual cooperation 
agreement with UNMIT, though without an overarching coordinating body between 
the two missions. This decision was formally justified as providing "greater 
operational and logistical flexibility; proven command and control arrangements; 
and alleviation of UN budgetary pressure,'19 and allowing the UN to focus its 
contribution on state-building rather than security.10 However, the decision was also 
determined, in part1 by Australian government dissatisfaction with UN command 
structures in the earlier missions. According to an Australian Senate report, the ISF 
mission and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
instance a growing commitment to direct roles in regional peacekeeping where 
Australian "security interests" were seen to be at stake.11 
Timor-Leste's importance in comparative studies extends to its significance in 
illustrating the distinct challenges of nation-building: the processes of forming a 
cohesive "national" political community based on a unifying sense of national 
identity. The history of post-colonial state-building has often been one of attempts to 
build functional state institutions while overlooking the critical issues of national 
cohesion essential to political stability. In Timor-Leste1 as in many other post-colonial 
societies, many of the forms of national unity developed during the Indonesian 
occupation fractured in the wake of independence. Especially in contexts of weak 
economic development1 latent ethnic, regionat or social divisions may be 
9 Australian Embassy and Permanent Mission to the United Nations (press release), "East 
Timar: Recent Unrest and UN Security Council Agreement on International Security Force," 
November 3, 2006. 
10 Australian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade, Australia's 
Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations, Commonwealth of Australia (2008), p. 52, http:/ /www. 
aph.gov .au/ binaries I senate/ committee I fadt_ctte I peacekeeping I report/ report. pdf, accessed 
August 7, 2012. 
11 Ibid., p. 44. Former prime minister John Howard justified the ISF commitment as "the 
problems of weak and fragile states, especially ones on our doorstep, can very quickly become 
our problems." 
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compounded by-and sometimes recruited in-competition for scarce resources, 
producing forms of national politics characterized by intergroup contests for control 
of the state, to benefit regional or clan-based patronage networks. Timor-Leste also 
serves as an exemplar of the particular nation-building challenges in subsistence 
societies, where the integration of rural communities into "modern" economic and 
political systems regulated by the state may be minimal. Such environments are 
normally characterized by the ongoing presence of "local administrative mechanisms 
capable of operating independently from the state in accordance with the principles 
of 'traditional authority,"112 and some degree of popular perception that the modern-
state model has been "imposed" on the citizenry. Reflecting these issues, Timor-Leste 
has also become a site in which debates over new "hybrid" institutions are played 
out publicly. Despite the avowedly forward-looking attitudes of its current leaders, 
Timor-Leste remains strongly tied to its past, both through the persistence of custom 
and the memory of conflict. In the evolving process of liberal democratization, there 
have been calls for and against greater incorporation of traditional authority and 
dispute resolution, 13 especially at the local government level. 
Internationally, as a small and relatively dependent state, Timor-Leste has also 
been the focus of discussion over the growing role of China's "soft power" and 
global resource diplomacy, and over how Timor-Leste balances its two major 
neighbors, Australia and Indonesia, as well as its involvement with the global 
Lusophone community. Most notably, perhaps, Timor-Leste is a site in which the 
difficult issues of post-conflict justice and reconciliation remain a source of social 
discord, set against a recent history of systematic and widespread human-rights 
abuses. These are each critical issues that continue to inform and inflame the politics 
of Timor-Leste, as in many other post-conflict societies around the world. 
EAST TIMORESE POLITICS SINCE 2007 
While Timor-Leste has, to date, avoided the mantle of a "failed state," 
unresolved divisions within East Timorese society, together with bitter intra-elite 
political maneuvering contributed to the complete breakdown of security forces in 
2006, with open conflict between army factions and between the army and police. 
This institutional breakdown was followed by widespread youth gang violence and 
arson in Dili, primarily (though not exclusively) directed against people from the 
eastern districts living in Dili, and the resignation of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, 
who had led the FRETILIN government since independence in 2002. Though 
ultimately short-lived, the politicization of regional identity saw Loromonu (western) 
and Lorosa'e (eastern) gangs in open conflict in the streets of Dili and led to the crisis 
being widely referred to in media coverage as the "east-west" crisis.14 However, 
12 Rod Nixon, "The Crisis of Governance in New Subsistence States," Journal of Contemporary 
Asia 36,l (2006): 75. 
13 Jose Trindade and Bryant Castro, Rethinking Timorese Identity as a Peacebuilding Strategy: The 
Lorosa'e-Loromonu Conflict from a Traditional Perspective (Dili: European Union's Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism Programme, 2007). 
14 While the terms "Loromonu" and "Lorosa'e" (literally, "sunset" and "sunrise" in Tetum) 
gained currency in the 2006 crisis, there is a deeper popular tradition dating to colonial times 
of collectively referring to East Timorese from the western districts as Kaladi, and easterners as 
Firaku. See Dionisio Baba-Soares, "Branching from the Trunk: East Timorese Perceptions of 
Nationalism in Transition" (doctoral dissertation, Australian National University, 2003). 
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those studying the conflict's origins in unresolved legacies of the Indonesian 
occupation, in the politicization of the security sector, and in unmet popular 
expectations for both economic progress and justice came to accept the term 
"political-military" crisis as the most appropriate. 15 In conjunction with international 
state-builders, the East Timorese state since 2006 has attempted to address the social, 
economic, and institutional deficits that have consigned many post-colonial states to 
a cycle of internal repression and resistance. 
A key initial mandate of the UNMIT mission was to oversee the 2007 
presidential and parliamentary elections, which took place in the still-tense wake of 
the crisis, with more than 160,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in and around 
Dili, an international presence of 1,600 UN police, and an ISF military presence of 
1,000 troops. The first round of the presidential election was held on April 9, 2007. 
FRETILIN's Francisco "Lu Olo" Guterres (27.89 percent) and Jose Ramos-Horta 
(21.81 percent) emerged as the leading candidates, with a second-round runoff 
election held on May 9. The weight of the eliminated-candidates' support fell behind 
Jose Ramos-Horta (69.18 percent), who was inaugurated as the second president of 
Timor-Leste on May 20, 2007. Fourteen political parties, including two formal 
coalitions, then contested the June 30 parliamentary elections. The entry of several 
new parties was significant, especially that of National Congress of the Timorese 
Reconstruction (CNRT), led by former President Xanana Gusmao. Echoing the 
historically significant acronym of the National Council of Timorese Resistance, 
formed by Gusmao in 1998 to unite all East Timorese pro-independence factions (the 
council had previously been titled the National Council of Maubere Resistance, 
formed in 1988), the original CNRT led the independence campaign in the 1999 
referendum, then dissolved to allow for a multiparty system. The new party 
acronym CNRT thus resurrected a well-known symbol from the latter period of the 
independence struggle. With his long-term political ally Ramos-Horta winning the 
presidency, Gusmao sought to challenge FRETILIN's domination of post-
independence politics and secure the more powerful post of prime minister. The 
dissident Mudam;a (Change) group within FRETILIN supported the CNRT 
campaign. 
In line with the presidential poll, FRETILIN' s vote fell significantly to 29 percent, 
representing just over half its 2001 performance. In second place, CNRT secured 24 
percent of the national vote, polling especially strongly vote in Dili. The rise of CNRT 
clearly affected the more established opposition parties, preventing major gains on 
their 2001 performance. Seven parties or coalitions exceeded the 3 percent threshold 
to be eligible for seats in the new, smaller parliament (reduced to 65 from 88 seats in 
2001). While the former governing party, FRETILIN, emerged as the single largest 
party with 21 seats, no single party secured a governing majority of 33 seats in its 
own right. Gusmao' s CNRT won 18 seats and quickly commenced alliance 
negotiations with the Democratic Party (PD, Partido Democratico; 8 seats) and the 
social democratic coalition (ASDT-PSD; 11 seats).16 
15 For a detailed examination of developments in East Timorese politics from 2002 until late 
2006, including the political-military crisis, see Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach, 
"Introduction," in East Timor: Beyond Independence, ed. Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach 
(Clayton: Monash Asia Institute Press, 2007), pp. 1-16. 
16 The Timorese Association of Social Democrats (ASDT, Associa<,;ao Social-Democrata de 
Timar) and the Social Democrat Party of Timor-Leste (PSD, Partido Social Democrata). 
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One notable trend from the presidential elections was the emergence of three 
geographic voting blocs. The eastern districts of Baucau, Lautem, and Viqueque 
returned majorities for FRETILIN's presidential candidate, Lu Olo, while the districts 
around the capital (Dili, Manatuto, and Liquica) were Ramos-Horta's stronghold, 
and the western districts recorded their strongest votes for other opposition party 
leaders, such as Fernando "Lasama" de Araujo of PD, or Xavier do Amaral of ASDT. 
With minor exceptions,17 the pattern was repeated in the parliamentary election in 
regionalized voting for FRETILIN, CNRT, and ASDT-PSD or PD. These outcomes 
demonstrated that while political divisions in Timor-Leste were more complex than 
the claimed "east-west divide" of 2006, there was a substantial risk that FRETILIN 
would be seen to primarily represent the three eastern districts, while the parties in 
negotiation for an alliance would effectively be seen to represent the rest of the 
country.18 
With no clear mandate for any one party, and with highly regionalized party 
affiliations suggesting wider problems of national unity, President Jose Ramos-Horta 
had initially raised the prospect of a government of "grand inclusion" comprising all 
major parties. Despite initial support from PD leader Fernando "Lasama" de Araujo, 
FRETILIN and CNRT ruled out working together, the former stating its members 
would prefer to act as a strong opposition if they could not form a government. On 
July 6, notwithstanding some well-publicized criticisms of CNRT by PSD leader 
Mario Carrascalao, a post-election coalition between CNRT, ASDT-PSD, and PD was 
formally confirmed, with the announcement of the AMP (Parliamentary Majority 
Alliance) controlling 37 seats. 19 
FRETILIN argued that, as the largest party, it should be presented the first 
opportunity to form a government by testing its program on the floor of the 
parliament. As the new parliament was sworn in, the election of PD leader Lasama 
as president (speaker) of parliament over the FRETILIN candidate, by 42 votes to 21, 
strongly suggested that a FRETILIN minority government presenting its program to 
the legislature would face insuperable difficulties. This result, and the clear AMP 
coalition majority it demonstrated, determined Ramos-Horta's subsequent decision. 
On August 6, President Ramos-Horta invited Xanana Gusmao to form a government. 
Gusmao was sworn-in as prime minister on August 8, with Mudanr;a leader Jose Luis 
Guterres as deputy. PSD's veteran leader and former governor during the 
Indonesian interregnum, Mario Carrascalao, was later sworn in as a second deputy 
prime minister. FRETILIN claimed the president's decision was unconstitutional but 
dropped the threat of a legal challenge in favor of working toward a "political 
solution." FRETILIN members returned to parliament in late August and soon 
commenced work as a parliamentary opposition. 
17 The exceptions were the western district of Cova Lima, which returned a slightly stronger 
FRETILIN vote and small CNRT leads in the western districts of Bobonaro and Oecussi. See 
Michael Leach, "The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste," Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 55,2 (2009): 219-32. 
18 International Crisis Group, "Timor-Leste's Parliamentary Elections," Asia Briefing 65 CTune 
12, 2007), p. 4. 
19 The smaller party, UNDERTIM, later joined the AMP coalition, giving the alliance thirty-
nine seats. 
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The AMP in Government 
The AMP government came to office in August 2007 promising to boost broad-
based development in the areas of food sufficiency, health care, education, and 
infrastructure. On taking office, the AMP parties had anti-FRETILIN sentiment in 
common, shared the Catholic Church's endorsement, and had broadly concurred on 
the need to encourage greater levels of foreign investment. As an executive, the AMP 
government also comprised a wide range of actors with starkly different histories 
and agendas, combining national heroes of the resistance era with a host of younger 
upcoming leaders and, more controversially, some erstwhile supporters of 
"autonomy" within Indonesia occupying ministerial positions. The AMP coalition 
nonetheless itself proved durable, despite major eruptions of disunity. 
The development policies pursued by the AMP were broadly similar to those 
that had been pursued by the previous FRETILIN government, both being focused 
on the allocation of state resources to alleviate illiteracy, malnutrition, and simple 
illnesses. Aside from the far larger budgets available to the AMP administration-
itself an enduring legacy of difficult oil revenue negotiations with Australia 
conducted by the former FRETILIN government-the principle policy differences 
were the AMP government's slightly more pro-business, pro-foreign-investment 
orientation, its desire to spend more of Timor-Leste's growing petroleum revenues 
for development needs, and its inclination to countenance the idea of borrowing. In 
2007, the overriding political demands facing the incoming government remained 
those of improving the basic government services, infrastructure, and employment 
opportunities destroyed by departing Indonesian troops and their militia proxies in 
1999. Both the interim UN administration and the first post-independence 
government were perceived as having underperformed on these fronts, though both 
were operating within severe infrastructure and human-resource constraints, and the 
latter, at least, remained highly constrained by limited annual budgets. 
The AMP government's performance in implementing its program was mixed, 
and continually hampered by low levels of government capacity, which slowed the 
rollout of major infrastructure programs, including programs to increase the supply 
of potable water, provide badly needed road maintenance, and begin electrification 
of the country. Thanks to high global demand for oil, which boosted prices and 
hence government revenue, and the fact that government spending was driving 
almost all other economic activity, Timor-Leste rode out the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2009-12 unaffected. Timor-Leste' s economic situation had begun to improve, with 
an economic growth rate of around 10 percent a year for the three years to the end of 
2011, though from a low GDP base and almost entirely driven by government 
spending. However, the government was consistently unable fully to disburse its 
available funds. This lack of "absorptive capacity," particularly beyond Dili, meant 
that government spending, as the main driver of economic growth, continued to run 
at lower than optimal levels. Even in the capital, economic growth was unable to 
spark employment growth, and drove considerable inflation in the prices of both 
essential and consumer goods20• Electrification proceeded with two heavy oil 
generators to be replaced by gas-powered generators around 2015, though the 
contract process proved highly controversial, with extended delays in contract 
20 See Ministry of Finance, "Consumer Price Index-Dili Region," Issue 21, October 2011.. The 
CPI for the Dili region was estimated at 14.4 percent from October 2010 to October 2011. 
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establishment and major contract renegotiations. Notably, beyond Dili, there were 
often very few signs of any government spending, with most of the country 
remaining in a state of poverty and often decrepitude. 
Several headline development indicators were promising, including a decline in 
the overall poverty rate from 50 percent to 41 percent of the population from 2007 to 
2011. The widespread provision of subsidized rice, cash transfers, and the spread of 
health clinics supported by Cuban doctors and their medical training programs led 
to improvement in key health indicators. Infant mortality rates fell by half between 
2004 and 2011, maternal mortality rates more than halved, and average life 
expectancy increased from 58 years to more than 62 years. The country's fertility 
rates, for several years the highest in the world at just below eight live births per 
woman, moderated to just under six. Some of these gains reflected improved access 
to health care, greater food security and better crops due to the end of a debilitating 
drought, and the powerful Catholic Church quietly acknowledging that the country 
could not sustain the growth rate it had been experiencing. Literacy, however, 
remained problematic, at about 50 percent. In part, this low literacy rate reflected a 
disconnect between official and actual teaching practices and the clash of languages 
at different levels of education-Tetum or another local language at early primary 
school, Portuguese at higher levels of primary school and high school, and the 
continuing, though no longer exclusive, importance of Indonesian at university. One 
bright spot was that the literacy rate in the youth demographic was at 77 percent, 
considerably better than that of the overall population. 
Particularly in rural areas, however, many East Timorese saw only modest 
improvement in their lives. The UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty estimated 
that a majority of the 75 percent of East Timorese living in rural areas were 
"entrenched in inter-generational cycles of poverty," 21 and that some 58 percent of 
East Timorese children suffered from chronic malnutrition, with almost half of all 
children under five underweight for their age (a problem that had historically 
afflicted Timorese children). The same report claimed that income inequality had 
"risen significantly," with particularly stark gaps between Dili-where 71 percent of 
the highest income quintile resided-and rural areas. Despite large and growing 
annual budgets, just over 10 percent of the funds was dedicated to social spending in 
the key areas of education, health, and agriculture (areas heavily supported by 
international aid programs), with the majority of the budget focused on 
infrastructure funding. 
A petroleum fund worth some US$11 billion by the middle of 2012 made Timor-
Leste the envy of other smaller emerging states in the region. However, the reliance 
of annual budgets on petroleum revenues (more than 93 percent of government 
revenue in the 2012 budget) demonstrated the longer-term potential for Timor-Leste 
to suffer the "resource curse" pathologies of other oil-dependent, developing states. 
In particular, Timor-Leste's high-cost and low-skills-based economy precluded 
development of alternative export sectors. In August 2010, the AMP government 
outlined a National Strategic Development Plan for 2011-30 that, once again, 
highlighted the goals of economic diversification for the future. Other controversies 
have attended the petroleum fund, including the decision of the AMP to withdraw 
21 UN News Centrer "Not All Timorese Benefiting from Economic Gains, UN Human Rights 
Expert Says," November 18, 2011, http:/ /www.un.org I apps I news I story .asp ?N ewsID=40437 
&Cr=timor&Crl=, accessed August 7, 2012. 
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annual amounts above the Estimated Sustainable Income threshold, broadly 
calculated at around 3 percent, to prompt more rapid development, and the decision 
to relax some of the investment rules governing the fund that mandate lower risk 
investments. 
If the broad economic and development indicators highlighted the deep 
challenges facing the post-independence state, the AMP government's performance 
on entrenched social conflicts demonstrated its capacity to solve problems. The oil-
price spike of 2008 gave the government windfall gains, which it was able to use in 
the form of cash grants to buy off disenfranchised groups, including disaffected 
former soldiers, internally displaced persons, and veterans, as well as providing 
small pensions for the relatively small number of people over sixty-five. The 
provision of heavily subsidized rice also helped avert the perennial problems of 
seasonal starvation, making life easier for many Timorese. The tension that had 
pervaded Dili into 2008 disappeared with the closure of the IDP camps and the 
payment to family heads of US$5,000 to rebuild their homes. Less successful, 
perhaps, was the government's attempt to deal with entrenched and complex land 
disputes, which had led to occupations of contested land and forced evictions.22 
Following the violence that began in 2006, continued beyond the elections, and 
finally ebbed in 2008, Timor-Leste has since experienced relative stability and calm, 
and the streets of the main towns, particularly Dili, have an air of normalcy, with 
people promenading and cooking along the foreshore in the evenings and markets 
filled with produce. While the various programs aimed at displaced and disaffected 
groups brought about a sense of peace and security, criticisms that the government 
had "bought" peace, in ways which may prove unsustainable, will be tested after 
international forces withdraw. 
Despite the AMP government's relatively good performance in some areas, it has 
also attracted considerable criticism, in particular for alleged corruption, with 
persistent, though in many cases unproven, charges of large government contracts 
being awarded to AMP party officials and relatives of key ministers without full 
transparency with regard to tender processes.23 In response, the government 
established an anti-corruption commission and launched a visible anti-corruption 
campaign, including signing up to the global Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative. Despite these moves, the increasing range of budget funds not subject to 
detailed parliamentary oversight presented a further source of concern over 
transparency, with key East Timorese civil society groups arguing that the limited 
information provided on special development funds in the 2011 state budget law 
created a "dangerous precedent" that stood to "erode parliamentary authority" over 
time.24 In September 2010, in a dramatic development, Deputy Prime Minister 
22 International Crisis Group, "Managing Land Conflict in Timor-Leste," Asia Briefing 110 
(September 9, 2010), pp. 1-19. 
23 Mark Dodd, "Gusmao's $15m Rice Deal Alarms UN," The Australian, July 7, 2008, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/ news/ gusmaos-15m-rice-deal-alarms-un/ story-e6frg6t6-1 
111116839519, accessed August 7, 2012. In 2012, the former Justice Minister Lucia Lobato was 
found guilty of unlawful economic participation in a tender process and sentenced to five 
years jail. 
24 
"La'o Hamutuk Submission to National Parliament Committee C (Economy, Finances and 
Anti-corruption) regarding the General State Budget for 2011," December 15, 2010, updated 
January 10, 2011, http:/ /www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE11/LHsubComCOGE11DeclO~n. 
htm, accessed August 14, 2012. 
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Carrascalao resigned after a clash with Prime Minister Gusmao, citing issues of 
transparency and accountability and claiming that personal attacks had been made 
against him as a result of his anti-corruption work. 
Of all the dramatic developments that have wracked East Timorese politics, the 
greatest unfolded early on the morning of February 11, 2008, when President Ramos-
Horta was shot and gravely wounded by a member of Alfredo Reinado' s rebel group 
during an armed invasion by the group of the president's residence. Demanding to 
see the president, Reinado and one of his men were shot and killed by F-FDTL 
(Falintil-Fon;as de Defesa de Timor Leste) presidential guards. Returning from his 
morning walk shortly thereafter, Ramos-Horta was shot and critically wounded by 
one of Reinado' s group. This incident was immediately followed by an ambush on 
Prime Minister Gusmao' s residence at Balibar in the hills above Dili. The surviving 
members of the group involved in these incidents, including the petitioners' leader 
Lieutenant Gastao Salsinha, who later claimed the episode was part of a "negotiation 
strategy" that had gone wrong, were sentenced in March 2010 to lengthy jail terms, 
then pardoned by presidential decree in August 2010.25 
The release of the Salsinha group, which followed the release of Martenus Bere, a 
former pro-Indonesian militia leader indicted by the UN's Timor-Leste-based Serious 
Crimes Unit over the Suai massacre in 1999, and the pardon of Joni Marques, one of 
the few militia members to be convicted and jailed after the violence, reinforced 
increasing concern over what has been widely described as a "culture of impunity" 
in Timor-Leste. The Bere case, in particular, raised concerns over the operation of the 
separation of powers, as Bere, after being arrested, was released by executive order 
without judicial oversight of the process. This, in turn, had implications for the 
popular understanding of and faith in the legal process. 
Despite representing a key area of UNMITs mandate, security-sector reform 
remained an area of critical concern. After extensive rebuilding and retraining, the 
PNTL progressively reassumed responsibility for policing from their UN 
counterparts, albeit with mixed reception by the public. Many of the complaints that 
had dogged the PNTL up until 2006, including corruption and brutality, resurfaced 
as the PNTL took control of policing operations.26 Though the full handover was 
completed in early 2011, the security-sector reform agenda, so long a focus of 
international state-building assistance, was widely considered to have failed in 
several of its core goals, at least partly as a result of limited cooperation from the East 
Timorese government.27 While recommending the reduction of UN policing forces 
and noting major improvements in the security situation since 2008, the International 
Crisis Group acknowledged that latent security threats remained, most the product 
of failures to prosecute those involved in the violence of 2006 and 2008, including the 
failure to pursue United Nations Commission of Inquiry-recommended 
prosecutions for the events of 2006. 
25 In early 2011, Salsinha launched a claim on behalf of the members of his group who missed 
out on petitioner compensation payments as a result of their participation in these events. 
26 Matt Crook, "Ramos-Horta Says East Timor Finds Peace," Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, 
2010, http: I I news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/ ramoshorta-says-east-timor-finds-peace-
20100520-vman.html, accessed August 7, 2012. 
27 International Crisis Group, "Timor-Leste: Time for the UN to Step Back," Asia Briefing 116 
(December 15, 2010), pp. 1-14. 
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One of the areas of PNTL responsibility-the border-had become again a site of 
dispute between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, particularly in the enclave of Oecusse 
where there had been Indonesian military incursions into some border villages (in 
one case when Prime Minister Gusmao was about to visit the area). Other incidents 
included Indonesian naval patrols in Timor-Leste waters, allegedly to forestall 
"piracy." These incidents, in turn, put a halt to the finalization of the border between 
Timor-Leste and Indonesia. In addition, regional tension flared over Australian 
proposals to create a regional asylum-seeker processing center in Timor-Leste. The 
proposal was rebuffed quickly by the East Timorese parliament, though the 
executive government was less direct in its opposition, referring the matter to the 
regional "Bali process" forum, where the proposal was subsequently rejected. 
Tensions between the AMP government and major hydrocarbon development 
partner Woodside Petroleum over the location of a natural gas processing plant also 
continued to cause friction in the bilateral relationship, as the East Timorese 
leadership rejected Woodside's preference for a floating offshore plant, and the 
government doggedly pursued its ambition to have the plant built on the south coast 
of Timor. Prime Minister Gusmao declared he would rather see Timor-Leste go 
without the benefits of this project than to accept the offshore plant proposal. 
Though the location of the plant was a commercial decision by Woodside, Timor-
Leste' s stance could result in the lapse of its contract by February 2013, meaning 
Timor-Leste would need to find a new development partner more agreeable to its 
plans. There were some preliminary signs, however, that the parties to this $20-
billion discussion would find a mutually constructive way forward, with Woodside 
offering the possibility of establishing a smaller onshore processing center at Beaco, 
on the sou th coast. 
In early 2011, the UNDP came under sustained attack from the Timorese 
government for its draft report, which was critical of the government's performance 
on urban youth unemployment, rising rural poverty, and expenditures of oil and gas 
revenues. 28 Highlighting the ongoing challenges of energy supply, food security, and 
education and health-service provision, the report raised the ire of the Timorese 
government by also questioning its opposition to war crimes and its efforts to 
prosecute those guilty of past violence. The government considered these issues 
beyond the UNDPs brief. A short-lived furor highlighted the impatience of domestic 
political elites for the end of the long decade of state-building, after several missions. 
The UNMIT mission and its associated international policing forces were scheduled 
to be withdrawn by the end of December 2012. The stated position of the ISF was 
that it would also withdraw at that time if the situation proved stable, leaving 
Australia's separate Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) with the Timor-Leste 
Defence Force in place. 
The 2012 Elections 
In 2012, President Jose Ramos-Horta was voted out of office, to be replaced by 
the then-recently retired head of the armed forces, Taur Matan Ruak. Without the 
support of a major party, Horta received 18 percent in the election's first round in 
28 See, for example, Lindsay Murdoch, "East Timar Leaders Scathing about Crucial UN 
Report," Sydney Morning Herald, January 3, 2011, http: I I www.smh.eom.au/ world I east-timor-
leaders-scathing-about-crucial-un-report-20110102-19d22.html, accessed August 7, 2012. · 
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March, finishing behind Ruak and Fretilin' s Lu Olo. Running as an independent, but 
with the open support of CNRT, Ruak defeated Lu Olo in the second-round runoff in 
April, by an overwhelming margin of 61 percent to 39 percent. The one feature that 
Ramos-Horta and Ruak had in common was, at the time of their political 
ascendancy, they were both strongly supported by Xanana Gusmao. 
The parliamentary elections held on July 7 saw just four of the twenty-one 
parties competing win seats. Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao's CNRT performed 
strongly and finished in first position, with 36.66 percent of the national vote, 
followed by FRETILIN, with just under 30 percent. With the collapse of the former 
ASDT-PSD vote, the Democratic Party (PD) emerged clearly as the new third party, 
with 10.3 percent of the vote, and Frenti-Mudarn;a, a small breakaway party from 
FRETILIN, received 3.11 percent. These parliamentary election results gave CNRT 
thirty seats; Fretilin, twenty-five; PD, eight; and Frenti-Mudam;:a, two seats in the 
new parliament. 
As in 2007, no single party gained an absolute majority of thirty-three seats in its 
own right. However, a large number of small parties failed to clear the 3 percent 
threshold in 2012. This meant that 20 percent of the national vote-the total received 
by eliminated parties~was excluded for the purpose of seat distribution. As such, 
CNRT's 37 percent vote share brought them closer to 45 percent of the seats, putting 
them in a strong position to lead a new alliance. A week after results were known, 
the CNRT party conference announced its intention to form a governing alliance 
with PD and Frenti-Mudarn;a, suggesting continuity with the 2007 result, albeit with 
a smaller number of parties in alliance. This alliance, later to be known as the Bloku 
Governu Koligasaun (BGK, Government Coalition Bloc) would control forty seats in 
the sixty-five seat parliament. The CNRT's decision, which was televised live,29 saw a 
brief outbreak of violence by disgruntled FRETILIN party members in Dili, with 
some sixty-five cars reportedly burned or otherwise destroyed, and, more seriously, 
eight people wounded, including at least four police officers. Other incidents, 
including arson, were reported in Lautem and Viqueque. In the most serious 
incident, a young FRETILIN member was killed by police in Hera, just outside Dili. 
Though the latter episode raised ongoing questions over police violence, the post-
election environment calmed considerably within days. More broadly, international 
observers declared that the elections substantially met the international criteria for 
being free and fair, which was a notable achievement for Timor-Leste's two electoral 
bodies, running national elections without major external support for the first time. 
Notwithstanding these positives, which marked Timor-Leste as a frontrunner in a 
region noted for poor electoral administration, there were a number of minor, mostly 
technical problems with the election process, including inconsistency of ink for 
marking fingers in the first presidential round, concerns over the print quality of 
some parliamentary ballot papers, and rare occasions of party agent interference in 
the administration of the vote. Some observer reports also called for greater scrutiny 
of corporate donations to CNRT' s electoral campaign, and for clearer guidelines and 
sanctions relating to political party and campaign financing. 
CNRT finished first in all but four districts: the three eastern districts where 
FRETILIN once again dominated the poll, and the neighboring western district of 
Manufahi, where FRETILIN narrowly led the count. In general, CNRT's success 
29 FRETILIN leaders attributed the violence to what they claimed were provocative comments 
broadcast from the CNRT conference that day. 
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came overwhelmingly at the expense of small, western-based parties such as ASDT, 
PSD, and PUN, which received no seats. Overall, while the association between 
region and party affiliation remained noticeable in 2012, it had moderated since 2007, 
with FRETILIN' s vote staging a minor recovery (3.7 percent) in the western districts, 
and CNRT and PD increasing their vote shares in the eastern districts, such that the 
FRETILIN vote declined 5.6 percent in its heartland. This trend, already evident in 
the presidential elections, represented a welcome-if modest-sign that regionalized 
vote affiliations were trending away from their 2007 peak. 
TIMOR-LESTE'S POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Timor-Leste is a unitary democratic republic with multitiered governance. The 
constitution is closely based on the Portuguese model, with a directly elected 
president as head of state, a parliament having all legislative authority, and a prime 
minister as head of the executive government and cabinet. Parliamentary 
representatives are elected under a party-list proportional representation system to 
serve five-year terms. 
More broadly, it is important to appreciate the procedural separation of 
executive and legislature in the East Timorese political system. A minister does not 
need to be a member of parliament (MP), although most are, and any MP 
subsequently appointed to the executive government is replaced in the legislature 
per party lists. 30 Thus, while the prime minister requires the confidence of the 
parliament, and the executive frequently attends sittings in the legislature (and 
parliamentary committee meetings in order to be questioned), the executive does not 
have a legislative vote, as in a Westminster parliamentary system. This feature is 
made possible by Timor-Leste's party-list proportional representation electoral 
system. When a member is appointed to the executive government, a member of the 
same political party from the original list replaces that member in the legislature. 
This shift may also happen "in reverse," as evidenced by Mario Carrascalao's return 
to the legislature as a PSD member of parliament after his resignation as deputy 
prime minister in September 2010. 
Under changes to the electoral law passed in December 2006, the thirteen 
district-representative positions were abolished and the size of the National 
Parliament decreased overall from eighty-eight members to sixty-five. 31 Each party 
was required to submit a list of sixty-five candidates and twenty-five suplentes 
(reserves).32 Under the changes to the electoral system, parties or coalitions must 
reach a 3 percent threshold to be eligible for seats. This new hurdle requirement 
would rule out half the parties running in 2007, and all but four parties in 2012. 
Parliamentary seats are then distributed proportionally among qualifying parties-
based on a single national constituency-to ensure "broad representation in the 
parliamentary composition."33 
The constitution also mandates that the government enact legislation to achieve 
greater decentralization, to establish a full judicial system and other matters of 
conventional state function. As of mid-2012, Timor-Leste did not yet have a supreme 
30 Government of Timor-Leste, Law on the Election of the National Parliament, Law No. 
6/2006, 28 December, Article 15.5. 
31 Ibid., Article 10. 
32 Ibid., Article 12.1. 
33 Ibid., Preamble. 
East Timorese Politics in Transition 15 
court, so constitutional questions were in theory being addressed by the appeals 
court. The judiciary is generally regarded as a weak state institution, plagued by 
inadequate training, staffing problems, and judicial shortages, all complicated by a 
language policy which-unlike parliamentary deliberation-requires processes to be 
conducted in Portuguese, making the court system heavily reliant on cumbersome 
translation processes and, frequently, resulting in the effective disenfranchisement of 
citizens involved with the courts. The National Parliament is expected to pass 
legislation to progressively replace laws that were inherited from Indonesia and then 
adopted as interim law by UNTAET. The backlog of legislation before the National 
Parliament is, in part, a result of parliament or its committees regularly failing to 
achieve a quorum, and is also due to the lack of adequate research and staffing 
support for MPs. Issues of translation of legislation from the official Portuguese into 
languages better understood by many parliamentarians (usually Tetum) have also 
slowed the legislative process. 
Decree laws passed by the executive (sitting as the Council of Ministers) are 
issued in a wide range of standard regulatory areas and in some key policy areas, 
including the penal code and the establishment of the National Petroleum 
Authority.34 This has the effect of limiting public debate over key legislation and 
limiting parliamentary scrutiny of the executive government More broadly, 
government capacity is limited, falling away quickly beyond the ministerial and 
bureaucratic-director levels, and constrained by the central government's limited 
reach outside the major towns. Decision making is slow, and efficiency often 
depends on personal relationships. A decision by the prime minister or another 
senior minister will ensure quick action, often across departments. Implementing 
state policy through conventional bureaucratic processes is frustratingly slow and 
often unsuccessful. 
Elected district councils are intended to replace national-government-appointed 
district administrators by 2014, although some parts of the enabling legislation had 
not been passed at the time of writing. Certain local councils and authorities have 
already been established and are functioning. There are the locally elected, nominally 
non-party hamlet and village chiefs (chefe de aldeia, chefe de suco) and elected suco 
councils. Suco elections have been held twice since independence, and party political 
competition at that level has been formally proscribed since 2009. Decentralized 
funding is intended to be allocated by the central government on a pro rata basis. 
This plan to implement limited decentralization and establish district assemblies 
recognizes Timor-Leste's diverse ethnic makeup and largely rural demography. 
High turnout rates in the 2009 suco elections again reflected the strong popular 
commitment to participating in the electoral process. 
National elections have been held every five years since 2001. It is too early in the 
life of independent Timor-Leste to determine whether elections will be held more 
frequently in the future, although representatives are legally required to serve a 
maximum of five years per term. Voting is voluntary. Considering that voter rolls are 
not being adequately updated to take into account deaths, double registrations (a 
result of re-registrations that do not imply double voting), and the presence of 
nonresident East Timorese on the voter roll, the participation rate of just under 82 
34 Dennis Shoesmith, "Remaking the State in Timor-Leste: The Case for Constitutional 
Reform," Proceedings of the 17th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia 
(2008), pp. 1-19. 
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percent in the 2007 elections, as officially reported, was likely closer to 90 percent. 
Despite a slight downturn in 2012 to 75 percent (with a similar level of under-
reporting likely), enthusiasm for voting remains very high across the country. 
THE CHAPTERS 
Among the problems facing post-colonial states is that of establishing a durable 
balance between the national government and the various centrifugal forces that 
might threaten state sovereignty. The relative strengths of national and local loyalties 
represent a key polarity of this balance, which may impede long-term aspirations for 
national integration. Long-time observer of Timorese cultural life David Hicks 
examines this issue through his study of rural Timorese communities, whose 
members frequently identify more strongly as residents of those local communities 
than as citizens of the state. Hicks's central argument is that the failure to transform 
villagers into citizens indicates the existence of two political cultures of such 
disparate character that they militate against the ambitions of Timor-Leste's 
government to foster an integrated national identity. His chapter argues that a 
synthesis is necessary if the mass of the Timorese population is to be transformed 
from villagers into citizens. Hicks concludes by arguing that although each political 
culture possesses distinctive traits that might at first sight appear irreconcilable, it is 
yet possible to synthesize an integrated national political culture that draws on the 
strengths of both sources of political identity. 
Because Timor-Leste has a directly elected president and a prime minister 
accountable to the parliament, the political system is commonly described as a semi-
presidential system. However, Maurice Du verger's classic definition of a semi-
presidential system also requires that that president possess "quite considerable 
powers." 35 The relative weakness of presidential powers in Timor-Leste's system of 
government-compared with the governments of some other Lusophone states-has 
led other commentators to describe this system as a parliamentary republic, lacking 
the substantive division of executive power that typifies semi-presidential political 
systems. This debate over the character of Timor-Leste's government is examined in 
close detail in this collection, with contributions from Rui Feijo and Damien 
Kingsbury, respectively, outlining the claims in favor of interpreting the Timor-Leste 
political system as semi-presidential or as parliamentary republican. 
Rui Feijo argues for classifying the system as semi-presidential, seeing Timor-
Leste as an example of the "premier-presidential" sub-type. He argues that the East 
Timorese president retains significant powers that mark the office as more than 
symbolic, including certain constitutional powers yet to be facilitated by legislation. 
Feijo makes the case that semi-presidentialism has also allowed the creation of a 
"common house" for competing poles of power and remains preferable, in the East 
Timorese context, to the alternatives of a presidential or parliamentary political 
system. 
By contrast, Damien Kingsbury proposes that Timor-Leste's constitution defines 
its political system as a parliamentary republic, taking into account the limited 
powers of the Presidency, the exclusive responsibility of executive government to the 
legislature, and, above all, the undivided capacity of the Prime Minister to appoint 
35 Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Governmen!,'' 
European Journal of Political Research 8 (1980): 166. 
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the executive government. Since Timor-Leste's Head of State lacks executive 
authority in all but a small and circumscribed area of affairs of state, Kingsbury 
argues that overstating presidential powers can potentially undermine the stability 
of the state. 
One of the major challenges facing Timor-Leste is that of corruption, which 
Aderito Soares tackles in his chapter. Although there have been few major 
prosecutions for grand-scale corruption to date, Soares notes that the public has been 
highly critical of a perceived rise in corruption in the period following independence. 
Soares contends that these public perceptions are justified, and that forms of 
corruption exist at various levels of government and in the public sphere. There is, 
therefore, general agreement that it is timely to address the issue of corruption with a 
comprehensive anticorruption strategy, including the establishment of Timor's Anti-
Corruption Commission (CAC), of which he is head. Soares's chapter goes on to 
examine some constraints and opportunities in tackling corruption in Timor-Leste. 
The chapter highlights the rationale behind the fight against corruption, and also 
identifies the different entities that play a role in the area. Soares' s key argument is a 
warning against forms of "institutional ritualism" in the fight against corruption, 
which he sees as the inclination of governments to "form new agencies rather than 
address the actual problems." 
Andrew Marriott's chapter develops a parallel analysis to that of David Hicks, 
but from a legal rather than an anthropological perspective. Marriott argues that as a 
still-young state, Timor-Leste has not yet been able to put its turbulent history fully 
behind it. While the state and its citizens require new institutions and social 
dynamics, historical crimes remain as much a concern as contemporary injustices. 
Though the democratic architecture of the East Timorese state guarantees some 
commendable protections, he says, the ability of formal institutions to respond 
directly to the range of everyday legal needs remains limited. Some of these 
shortcomings are simply a reflection of Timor-Leste's emergence from a period of 
violence and turmoil. Other shortcomings, according to Marriott, represent 
developmental oversights or missteps, which he suggests require attention and 
correction. As comparisons between various post-colonial countries demonstrate, 
actors in the legal sphere can play an important role in the nation-building endeavor. 
In Timor-Leste, as elsewhere, a competitive multiparty system remains a 
fundamental cornerstone of democratic consolidation. In his contribution, Dennis 
Shoesmith examines political parties in Timor-Leste, analyzing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the party system and the degree of institutionalization of 
contemporary political parties. Commencing with an examination of the historical 
development of the party system in Timor-Leste, Shoesmith assesses the 
contemporary health of the party system, reviewing its basis in constitutional and 
electoral law, and some key constraints on the role of parties in the context of 
Timar' s political system. Shoesmith argues that Timor-Leste has performed 
creditably compared with many post-conflict states, exhibiting a degree of political 
stability in interparty competition. Nonetheless, his chapter identifies warning signs 
that some persistent maladies characteristic of weak party systems are emerging, 
including patron-client politics, low levels of accountability to the public, and the use 
of political parties as vehicles to extract state resources for the benefit of political 
elites. 
In his chapter, Pedro Seabra argues that Timor-Leste has become increasingly 
vocal and assertive on a range of foreign policy topics since overcoming some of the 
18 Michael Leach and Damien Kingsbury 
internal strife that scarred the nation-building process from 2006 to 2008. For Seabra, 
this assertiveness indicates the new nation's political will to enhance or diversify its 
role in the region. The potential ripple effects across the region-given the level of 
international focus on Timor-Leste, the country's strategic geographic location, and 
its significant natural wealth-are as yet unpredictable. Accordingly, Seabra starts by 
examining the current context of Timor-Leste's foreign policy, identifying the main 
external partners and foreign policy goals it has established since joining the 
international community, with a detailed focus on relationships with four key actors: 
Australia, China, Indonesia, and Portugal. Seabra then examines some instructive 
episodes in Timor's foreign-policy development that have raised concerns among its 
traditional partners, who are now confronted with an increasingly assertive and 
independent actor. 
Deborah Cummins' s and Michael Leach's chapter returns to the theme of the 
evolving relationship between traditional and modern forms of political authority, 
examining the case of local government in Timor-Leste, and the ways elected chefes 
interact with traditional authorities at the suco level. Cummins and Leach identify 
three distinct models of hybrid authority in local government: two "co-incumbency" 
models and an "authorization" model, emphasizing a separation of powers between 
traditional and modern authority. As Cummins and Leach note, the "clash of 
paradigms" between traditional and modem democratic ideas of legitimacy in 
Timor-Leste is widely considered to be an important issue for the stability of the 
young state. The balance of this relationship is likewise considered integral to 
engaging local communities in the project of nation-building, peace-building, and 
democratization. There are also critical and ongoing issues for government to 
consider in the continuing decentralization process, and in regulating aspects of 
customary law, particularly at the local level. 
Bu Wilson's chapter evaluates the security-sector reform agenda in Timor-Leste 
during the period between 2006 and 2012, including the specific process of reforming 
the national police. The political and security crisis of 2006, with its origins rooted in 
conflicts within and between the uniformed forces, highlighted the necessity of 
reforming Timor-Leste's police and military, and their respective oversight 
ministries. Yet, as Wilson notes, the reform project, which was premised on 
cooperation between international and national actors, has stumbled, faltered, and 
perhaps even failed in key respects. Wilson examines how an ill-defined project, 
contests over sovereignty, shortcomings in capacity, and incompatible international 
and national agendas have worked to produce poor long-term prospects for the 
security sector in Timor-Leste. 
In his chapter on informal security groups, James Scambary builds upon this 
theme, examining the origin and impacts of martial arts and ex-veterans' groups in 
the post-independence political landscape. Charting the historical progression of 
these groups as they evolved from resistance movements to protest vehicles, and 
their interactions with formal political actors, Scambary highlights the ongoing 
strength of these groups beyond the intense conflicts of 2006-07. Scambary argues 
that the combination of a poorly functioning justice system with an inefficient 
policing force continues to encourage a default situation in which communities look 
to informal security groups for protection, as evidenced by further outbreaks of 
urban violence in Dili between 2009 and 2012. 
Since independence, economic development has remained a major challenge for 
national policy makers and, at times, a keystone of popular dissatisfaction. Tim 
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Anderson's chapter identifies key contemporary approaches to development strategy 
and assesses their application in the case of Timor-Leste since independence. He 
contrasts the influence of market-economy approaches with those of developmental-
state models and an alternative "human development" approach, which focuses on 
developing core capabilities in areas such as education, health, gender equality, and 
participation. Anderson reviews the history of development strategy in Timor Leste' s 
National Development Plan and analyzes the approaches of the two major post-
independence governments in relation to key issues of economic stimulus, 
infrastructure development, tax policy, and petroleum revenues. In particular, 
Anderson analyzes recent debates over the management and expenditure of the 
Petroleum Fund, arguing that while diversification from low-return US bonds may 
be prudent, Timor-Leste currently lacks the financial expertise required to manage 
the funds in more volatile, higher-risk financial and equity markets. Overall, 
Anderson makes the case that the critical importance of the informal sector, and 
particularly staple-food production, has not been matched by comparable state 
investment. 
Sara Niner examines the critical theme of the contemporary politics of gender in 
Timor-Leste. Arguing from the starting point that traditional concepts of gender 
remain extremely influential in the country, Niner examines the ways these 
conceptions have been reinforced or modified by the legacies of Portuguese and 
Indonesian colonialism. She also examines the influence of militarized conceptions of 
masculine identity that emerged in the resistance era, which were echoed by recent 
popular figures such as the rebel military leader Alfredo Reinado. Noting the 
especially poor development outcomes for women in Timor-Leste, along with 
disturbing levels of domestic violence and the little acknowledged, but central, role 
of women in the resistance, Niner makes the case that gender relations remain a key 
priority in Timor-Leste's development, calling for a "national dialogue on 
masculinities and the legacy of the war." 
In his second contribution, Damien Kingsbury examines the evolving politics of 
political and financial decentralization in Timor-Leste. Using the wider regional 
history of centralization in post-colonial developing states as context, Kingsbury 
assesses the potential strengths and weaknesses of this agenda for both development 
and democratic consolidation in Timor-Leste. Principally concerned with creating 
greater responsiveness between the state and its citizens by devolving a degree of 
political and economic authority to the district level, decentralization will also allow 
for greater recognition of the diversity of Timor-Leste's society. As Kingsbury notes, 
the process of decentralization in Timor-Leste began in 2003, but with progress on a 
final model delayed at least until 2014, this agenda remains a work in progress. 
BEYOND UNMIT: CHALLENGES TO POLITICAL STABILITY 
As a recently decolonized state, Timor-Leste has faced the fundamental 
challenge that frequently besets developing-post-independence states: seeking to 
balance popular aspirations against limited state capacity. Having stumbled in 2006, 
Timor-Leste now appears to be charting a steadier course. In the short period since 
its independence referendum of 1999, Timor-Leste now stands as a state that 
embodies many of the important contemporary challenges of post-colonial 
democratization, development, and international state-building. More than any other 
country, Timor-Leste has been the product of international support. There is little 
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doubt, for example, that Timor-Leste's political institutions reflect, with degrees of 
embeddedness, the liberal character of the international community in general, and 
the United Nations in particular. 
The withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces from Timor-Leste in 2005 soon 
proved to have been precipitous, necessitating an unplanned and hasty return of 
international peacekeepers in 2006. Both domestic and international state-builders 
will have this experience in mind as external forces withdraw in late 2012, along with 
the knowledge that the Security Council is unlikely to approve another support 
mission at the scale of UNMISET or UNMIT. The period of transitioning toward full 
responsibility therefore places the focus squarely on Timor-Leste's ability to run its 
own affairs without succumbing to the type of internal conflict witnessed in 2006-7. 
Considering the turmoil of the crisis, the period since 2008 has been characterized by 
a remarkable degree of stability and real, if modest, improvements in Timor-Leste's 
human development indicators. This has facilitated the staged transition to local 
policing, completed in early 2011, and the accompanying drawdown of international 
forces, to the point in 2012 at which the UNPOL contingent had declined from 1,600 
to 1,300 and ISF numbers represented less than half their 2006 peak force of 1,100 
soldiers. 
Several major tests will confront the East Timorese state beyond the UN 
withdrawal. The most important of these will be the challenge of stimulating 
economic growth, a task constrained by the passing of the state-developmental era 
and the rise of neoliberal free-market approaches to state-building.36 As Barbara 
notes, the era of neoliberal state-building has been characterized by an aversion to 
promoting specific industry policies. Constrained in this manner, neoliberal efforts 
have generally proven ineffectual in stimulating economic development in post-
conflict states, thus undermining prospects for state consolidation.37 In his review of 
state-building missions of the 1990s and 2000s, Fukuyama identifies three distinct 
phases, suggesting that while the United Nations has a respectable track record in 
the initial stabilization of post-conflict societies, and in the development of local 
institutions for governance, it has a far weaker track record in strengthening those 
institutions to the point that enables sustained economic growth and social 
development to occur.38 
Central to this challenge will be the task of effectively managing Timor-Leste's 
oil and gas reserves. There has been considerable debate about the wisdom of 
accessing increased shares of Petroleum Fund capital to more rapidly develop local 
projects. On one hand, the injection of cash-accelerated projects has increased their 
number and reach, which has had positive social benefits. A number of observers, 
however, have expressed concern that this influx of revenue may lead to a "resource 
curse," whereby funds are squandered, corruption increases, and the funds are 
ultimately depleted without the development of alternative industries. In 
conjunction with a weak party system, the proliferation of oil and gas revenues also 
has the potential to foster the growth of patron-client politics, and the type of 
intergroup contests over control of state resources likely to exacerbate the risks 
36 Mark T. Berger and Heloise Weber, "Beyond State-Building: Global Governance and the 
Crisis of the Nation-State System in the 21st Century," Third World Quarterly 27,1 (2006): 201. 
37 Barbara, "Rethinking Neo-Liberal State Building," p. 316. 
38 See Francis Fukuyarna, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 99-104. · 
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associated with regionalized political affiliations. In particular, local NGOs warned 
that if government spending was not made more sustainable, Timor-Leste' s current 
oil wealth could be depleted within ten years, just as a massive demographic 
explosion of young adults is due to enter the labor market.39 
Another challenge likely to confront Timor-Leste will be the transition to a new 
generation of political leaders. Much of the bitter conflict within Timor-Leste's small 
political elite was intimately linked with longstanding personal alliances and feuds 
among the senior leadership of the country. While the series of "historical leaders" 
meetings40 held by members of this group have been a welcome development for 
political stability, a transition to a younger generation is inevitable and perhaps 
overdue. Aside from PD, the major political parties are still led by the older 
generation, though there is now more open discussion among members of the 
"generation of '75" about the inevitability of a hand-over of power, probably in the 
wake of the 2012 elections, with FRETILIN's 2011 congress formalizing a decision to 
transition to a younger generation of political leaders in 2017. Along with high youth 
unemployment, the "disconnect" between the political elite and younger East 
Timorese remained a background factor in latent political tensions and gang 
violence. A youth parliament launched in January 2010 and the greater (though still 
inadequate) recognition of the contribution youth resistance leaders made during the 
Indonesian occupation are welcome signs of a renewed political engagement with 
younger East Timorese. The fact that the former chief of the armed forces, Taur 
Matan Ruak, was elected president in 2012 signaled a transition beyond the oldest 
members of the generation of '75, though a transition to those raised in the 
Indonesian era would wait until at least 2017. 
A significant challenge, as noted above, lies in ongoing concerns over justice and 
the rule of law in Timor-Leste and, in particular, in reconciling popular desires for 
post-conflict justice with the government's political support for a reconciliation 
agenda. There are grave concerns that a culture of impunity for past crimes in Timor-
Leste continues to undermine social harmony. Indicative of these concerns, in late 
2009, the parliament finally discussed the Commission for Reception, Truth, and 
Reconciliation (Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconcilia\:ao de Timor Leste, 
CAVR) report on deaths and human-rights abuses between 1974 and 1999, a full four 
years after formally receiving the final report in November 2005. Throughout 2010 
and 2011, the parliament repeatedly delayed consideration of two proposed laws on 
victim reparations and the establishment of a National Institute of Memory, designed 
to "promote, facilitate, and monitor the implementation of the Recommendations" 
made by the CAVR and the bilateral Indonesia-Timm-Leste Truth and Friendship 
Commission. No progress had been made on related legislation as of mid-2012. In 
light of wider concerns over Timor-Leste's poorly functioning judicial system, in 
many, and perhaps most cases, local people in the districts had reverted to 
traditional justice systems, which allowed for greater accessibility, speed, and local 
acceptance in resolving local disputes. However, there were also concerns over the 
use of traditional justice, which remains vulnerable to abuses of power, often 
39 La'o Hamutuk, "Timor-Leste Is Going for Broke," March 19, 2012, http:// 
laohamutuk.blogspot.com.au / 2012 / 03 I timor-leste-is-going-for-broke.html, accessed August 
14, 2012. 
40 
"Breaking News: Timorese Historical Leaders Hold Closed Meeting in Maubisse," Tempo 
Semanal, August, 22, 2010, http: I I temposemanaltimor.blogspot.com.au / 2010 I 08 /breaking-
news-timorese-historical.html, accessed August 7, 2012. 
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reinforces traditional hierarchies, may be subject to inconsistent application, and 
threatens to reduce state legitimacy. How Timor-Leste reconciles the benefits and 
strengths of tradition with the requirements of a modern liberal citizenship-based 
polity will remain a key focus in the areas of local government and dispute 
resolution. 
The multifaceted issues involved in democratic consolidation will also remain a 
key focus beyond the international state-building era. Timor-Leste fulfills many of 
the conventional criteria for fulfilling democracy's procedural requirements, such as 
free and fair regular elections, free association (including forming political parties 
and the right to protest), a relatively free media, and a moderately active civil society. 
Key state institutions, including the judiciary, police and defense forces, and other 
government departments, have all been set in place. The relatively peaceful conduct 
of the three polls in 2007 and 2012 and the degree of institutional capacity 
demonstrated by the National Electoral Commission (CNE), along with the goodwill 
of the international community, augured well for the future of East Timorese 
democracy. 
However, the extent to which Timor-Leste conformed to substantive 
interpretations of democracy was debatable. While representatives were freely 
elected, the process for selecting candidates was relatively closed, and political 
leaders frequently appealed to voters on the basis of primordial loyalties rather than 
policy preferences. State institutions existed, but the notion of the separation of 
powers, for example, was compromised by occasional executive interference in 
judicial processes, a practical (as opposed to constitutional) confusion of roles 
between the president and the prime minister, the army's adoption of civil policing 
functions, an inadequate and poorly performing judiciary, a police force still known 
for its corruption and brutality, and low levels of institutional performance in the 
public service. 
This state of affairs was perhaps not surprising, given the very low level of state 
development and capacity at the outset, and the observation that democratic 
institutions tend to function best, particularly in multiethnic societies, where 
accountability and rule of law are already established.41 As such, while most of the 
procedural criteria for democratic process could be identified, as indeed they had 
been by the international community, each of these criteria required an often serious 
qualification, which, in the period leading up to the peacekeepers' withdrawal, much 
of the international community seemed willing to gloss over. 
The party system, and its ongoing development and maturation, will also pose 
challenges. With the clear exception of FRETILIN, and the possible exception of 
CNRT, political parties in Timor-Leste are overly reliant on key personalities; many 
lack wide-ranging policy platforms, sufficient depth in their districts' organizations, 
coherent internal rules, and organizational discipline. In 2006, the return of 
"resistance era" tactics of political opposition, including the systematic use of 
unemployed youth and martial arts gangs as a political resource for warring factions 
of the elite, signaled a clear warning sign for the future of East Timorese democracy. 
With the assistance of the international community, and the wise restraint shown by 
senior East Timorese leaders, the 2007 national elections in Timor-Leste marked a 
turning point, with the emergence of a genuinely competitive multiparty system in 
41 P. Collier. Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places (New York, NY: Harper-
Collins, 2009), pp. 173-76, 186. 
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Timor-Leste and, importantly, a viable and substantial parliamentary opposition 
party. Across the term of the 2007-12 parliament, the AMP government could be 
credited with resolving many of the entrenched grievances that had beset Timorese 
politics after the 2006 crisis. Conversely, FRETILIN received too little credit for its 
key role in fostering a culture of democratic parliamentary opposition in that 
period-even if its continuing rhetoric about "de facto" governments had been less 
than helpful in this regard. Rather than the heavily monitored 2012 election period 
itself, the months following the polls, and the subsequent withdrawal of state-
building forces, would prove the most rigorous test of this newfound political 
stability, and Timor-Leste's capacity to function as a fully independent and sovereign 
state. The brief but disturbing outburst of violence that followed the announcement 
of a new governing coalition in July 2012 highlighted these concerns. 
In the years leading up to the 2012 elections, East Timorese political leaders 
expressed increasingly pointed observations that Timor-Leste was a sovereign state 
that no longer needed or desired a high level of external involvement in its affairs. 
Public attacks on the UNDP, for example, reflected growing impatience within 
government circles for the departure of international state-building forces. But while 
the decade-long international presence generated some discontent in 2011 and 2012, 
Timor-Leste's experience as an emerging state was, in fact, far from unique in the 
context of the region, with the Solomon Islands approaching the ten-year 
anniversary of the regional state-building mission, RAMSI (Regional Assistance 
Mission to the Solomon Islands). In different contexts, the emerging states of New 
Caledonia and Bougainville were both in negotiated long-term transitions to 
potential independence, involving the progressive transfer of government powers, 
and referenda on full independence expected between 2014 and 2020. The southwest 
Pacific region was, in many respects, a hothouse of new experiments in international 
state-building, staged decolonization, regional autonomy, and transitions to full 
independence. Frequently judged in comparison with well-established Southeast 
Asian states and found wanting, Timor-Leste's performance, relative to more 
suitable comparisons with emerging Melanesian states, was favorable. Buttressed by 
its oil and gas revenues, and with a formidable history of determined struggle for 
independence, Timor-Leste has grounds for cautious optimism about its future. 
ADAT AND THE NATION-STATE: 
OPPOSITION AND SYNTHESIS IN 
Two POLITICAL CULTURES 
David Hicks 
This notice, which appeared in Embassy News, was issued from the Embassy of 
the United States in Timor-Leste, dated April 23, 2010, accompanied by a photograph 
of United States Ambassador Ambassador Hans Klemm helping with the 
preparation of a presumably related ritual: 
Sacred House Inaugurated in Hatobuilico 
... Uma luliks in Oecussi, Bobonaro, and Lautem are part of the same cultural 
preservation project. The total cost is $32,000. 
Uma luliks are the spiritual center of communities throughout Timor-Leste. 
Each village uses its uma lulik as a gathering place for traditional rituals and 
as a spiritual resting place for the village ancestors. The United States 
provides financial support for uma lulik preservation out of respect for the 
roots of Timorese national and cultural identity. 1 
Among the problems facing post-colonial states is that of establishing and 
maintaining coherence between the central government and centrifugal forces that 
might threaten their sovereignty. The latter commonly involves the issue of national 
loyalty versus local loyalties and central government versus local governments, a 
polarity that may impede the country attaining an effective measure of national 
coherence. A case in point is that of the post-colonial Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste where, even after eight years of independence, the majority of Timorese 
(especially the less educated) in the sukus (small communities made up of a varying 
1 
"Sacred House Inaugurated in Hatobuilico," Embassy News, April 23, 2010, available at 
http: I I timor-leste. usembassy .gov I news-events I press-releases-2010 I sacred-house-
inaugurated-in-hatobuilico-april-23-2010.html, accessed June 5, 2012. 
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numbers of villages) identify themselves more as residents of those local 
communities than as citizens of the state. The central argument in this paper is that 
this failure to transform villagers into citizens indicates the existence of two political 
cultures of such disparate character that they militate against the ambitions of Timor-
Leste' s government and the United Nations to create an integrated national identity. 
One model, based on Western values of governance and jurisprudence, is that of the 
nation-state. The other is that of the adat and comprises indigenous values. Having 
identified the existence of these two polities and shown their disjunctive 
relationship, I will argue in this paper that a synthesis is necessary if the mass of the 
Timorese population is to be transformed from villagers into citizens. I conclude by 
arguing that although each model possesses distinctive politico-cultural traits that 
might, at first, appear irreconcilable, should the government and United Nations 
modify this Western model by accommodating local adat, thus creating a syncretic 
single political culture, Timor-Leste would be given more opportunity than it 
presently has to evolve into a unified nation-state.2 
Before describing Timor-Leste's two political cultures some consideration of 
certain definitions-more particularly, an explanation of such categories as "nation," 
11state," "nation-state," "civil society/' and "citizen"-is appropriate. The terms 
11nation," "state," and "nation-state" are, of course, open to interminable semantic 
refinements, but the definitions proposed by Kingsbury reduce the possibility of 
ambiguity, and I shall adopt them in the discussion that follows. The term "nation," 
therefore will be understood to refer to "a group of people who regard themselves as 
possessing an aggregate political identity, most often based on a shared language 
(means of conceptualization) and other fundamental cultural signifiers." 3 A "state," 
on the other hand, is "the organizational territory under a political authority and 
which can (or can attempt to) claim or compel the compliance of its citizens to its 
laws." Finally, the combinatory category of nation-state implies "a nation of people 
who claim the state as their collective territorial and institutional expression (or, less 
plausibly, as an administrative territory that claims a unity of the people within its 
boundaries)."4 
2 The contemporary importance of this theme is attested to by the collection edited by David 
Mearns, which is full of pertinent insights relevant to the present article; see: David Mearns, 
ed., Democratic Governance: Reconciling the Local and the National (Darwin: Charles Darwin 
University Press, 2008). Outside of the particular region of Timor-Leste, the "Third World" 
abounds with examples of post-colonial nation-states, derived from the Western post-treaty of 
Westphalia (1848) concept of "nation-state," that find themselves vitiated by the kind of 
political strains inherent in relations between "tradition" and "the modern." In the case of 
Africa, for example, Basil Davidson, in his The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the 
Nation-State (New York, NY: Times Books/Random House, 1992), argues that the willingness 
of African governments to embrace the Western notion of the nation-state has been a prime 
factor in impoverishing the lives of citizens. Another scholar, among others who have 
sounded skeptical notes, is Eric Hobsbawm, whose Nations and Nationalism since 1780: 
Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1990) 
casts a similarly skeptical eye. And, of course, in Benedict Anderson's definition, a "nation11 
was merely an imaginary political community. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised and extended edition (London: 
Verso, 1991). 
3 Included among these cultural signifiers are common values, history, institutions, and myths. 
Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 
88. 
4 Ibid., p. vi. 
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THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THEADAT 
Despite the lapse of thirty-six years during which the Timorese people have been 
subjected to relentless pressures to change their values, villagers with whom I talked, 
during the course of several periods of research since 2002,5 appear to have only a 
shallow understanding of the verbal currency of the so-called "international 
community" ("democracy," "equality," "civil society," "citizenship," and so forth), 
and only a vague notion of what citizenship in a nation-state might mean.6 On the 
other hand, they are thoroughly cognizent of what Emile Durkheim called the 
"representations collectives" (collective representations)7 that comprise their 
indigenous culture-the Timorese refer to it as their adat, or lisan, of which each suku 
possesses its own.8 The former is a Malay term and the latter is its counterpart in the 
Tetum language. Adat is usually glossed as "customary law" but is actually 
considerably wider in its connotations: it includes rules that govern the inheritance 
of property, spouse eligibility, ritual etiquette, taboo observance (tara bandu), land-
ownership, political authority, sanctions incurred when the adat is breached, 
interpretations of the past, oral literature, and cosmology. During my first period of 
research in what was then known as "Portuguese Timor," in 1966-67,9 I cannot recall 
5 Specifically, in 2005, 2007, and 2009. 
6 The confusion also extends to social scientists, as we see by their different perspectives on 
such concepts as "citizen" and "civil society"; see, for example, Jean L. Cohen and Andrew 
Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Jean Comaroff and 
John Comaroff, "Law and Disorder in the Postcolony," Social Anthropology 15,2 (2007): 133-52; 
Marlies Glasius et al., Exploring Civil Society: Political and Cultural Contexts (London: Routledge, 
2004); John A. Hall and Frank Trentman, Civil Society: A Reader in History, Theory, and Global 
Politics (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2005); Mikael Karlstrom, "Civil Society and Its 
Presuppositions: Lessons from Uganda/' in Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa: 
Critical Perspectives, ed. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999), pp. 104-23; Michael Mann, "Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: 
Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying," Daedalus 122,2 (1993): 115-40; Adam B. Seligman, The 
Idea of Civil Society (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1992); and Gary Wilder, "Practicing 
Citizenship in Imperial Paris," in Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa, ed. 
Comaroff and Comaroff, pp. 44-71. 
7 That is, the corpus of ideas, notions, concepts, values, and institutions held or adhered to in 
common by members of society. 
8 One should perhaps use the word adat in the plural since each suku in Timor-Leste has its 
own adat. However, conventional usage justifies the use of the singular, and common usage is 
fortified by the fact that virtually all the various adats have a great deal in common. Something 
like a single, generic adat is very easily imagined and I do so here. There are 442 sukus in 
Timor-Leste according to the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated 
Mission in Timor-Leste, September 24, 2009, to January 20, 2010, p. 1. These are spread over 
thirteen districts and sixty-seven subdistricts. See Frederic Durand, Timar Lorosa'e Pays Au 
Carrefour de l'Asie et Du Pacifique Un Atlas Geo-Historique (Bangkok: Press Universitaires de 
Marne-la-Vallee, IRASEC [Institut de Recherche sur !'Asia du Sud-Est Contemporaine], 2002): 
28. 
9 The fieldwork on which this paper is based was carried out over the course of six visits I 
made to East Timor, my most recent occurring in 2009. My original research in 1966-67 was 
funded by the London Committee of the London-Cornell Project for East and South East Asian 
Studies, which was supported jointly by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the 
Nuffield Foundation. Subsequent field research was funded by the American Philosophical 
Society and the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board. I also thank the State 
University of New York for granting me a sabbatical (2004-05) and a research leave (2007) 
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ever having heard the word adat used, and it appears to have become widely applied 
only after the 1975 invasion by the army of Indonesia. Since then, however, the term 
has gained widespread popularity, and because it is also used throughout the 
Indonesian archipelago, I shall use it here instead of lisan. Although the adat may be 
likened to a body of "tradition," the term must be handled with some discretion 
since what might be understood to be "tradition" or "traditional" may actually 
include not only customs surviving from a more distant past but also alien mores 
from outside that have only recently been assimilated into the adat. 10 Timorese 
"traditional" values, therefore, cannot ipso facto be assumed to provide a window 
through which the past may be glimpsed, and even though village folk may insist 
that their customs were instituted in mythological times by their ancestors (mate 
bein), their historical source may, in reality, be external to their culture. This could 
hardly be otherwise, since Europeans have involved themselves in Timorese cultures 
since the sixteenth century. That figure known as the liurai, or "king," for instance, 
might seem to qualify as an exemplary instance of a traditional political category but 
is actually a synthesis of Portuguese innovation and indigenous tradition. The 
process whereby indigenous social and political categories assume a modified 
meaning is nothing new, therefore, and, as we shall see, is a phenomenon that 
continues today. As the epigraph for this article suggests, the traditional ritual house, 
the uma lulik, for instance, has now become engaged as part of the political dialogue 
and so has taken on a political character. Nor is it the only example of this 
phenomenon in contemporary Timor-Leste. The barlaque, a social institution 
involving marriage, has come to be looked upon by many non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) as implicated in the depreciation of women and, as such, has 
assumed the connotations of a political instrument. 
Social Rank 
Although the adat-as it has always done-is undergoing modification, one 
pervasive characteristic that still exerts force is the concept of inequality. In Timor-
Leste inequality, which finds expression in the level of prestige an individual is 
accorded, is a consequence of his or her social status. Although an individual's social 
status can be improved by personal achievement, the basis of social status is rank, 
gender, and age. A person's right to membership in a particular rank descends to 
him or her through either the father (patrilineal descent) or the mother (matrilineal 
descent),11 the most important right being eligibility for membership in a corporate 
group of a kind known in social anthropology as a /1 descent group," of which there 
during which I carried out my fieldwork. I also wish to extend my gratitude to the persons 
who helped me in a multitude of different ways in Timor-Leste while I was collecting the 
information presented here: Katherine S. Hunter, Rod Nixon, Karen Polglaze, Jose A. 
Fernandes Texeira, Nicol Seibel, Maria Rosa Biddlecombe (nee Maria Rosa da Costa Soares), 
Jose Henriques Pereira, Rosa Maria Pereira, Luis da Costa Soares, and Teresa da Luz Simoes 
Soares. 
10 Cf. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge and 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
11 Of the sixteen or so ethnic groups in Timor-Leste, all but one can be confirmed as 
subscribing to a regime of patrilineal descent, the Tetum-speaking peoples in Cova Lima and 
southern Manufahi and Manatuto, the subdistrict of Lacluta (Viqueque district), and a sing·le 
suku (Luca) in Viqueque subdistrict. Others, however, may exist. 
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are several forms. The most inclusive form of descent group is the clan (or 11house"), 
which is usually segmented into smaller units of kinship known as "sub-clans," or 
"lineages," consisting of extended families or nuclear families. Besides eligibility for 
clan membership, the bundle of rights a person inherits through either "patri-line" or 
"matri-line" also includes (in the case of a man) eligibility for any formal office that 
group controls, for example, head of clan, lineage, or sub-lineage. In a patrilineal 
system, the eldest son is considered the leading candidate for whatever official 
position his deceased father might have occupied. In a matrilineal system, he is the 
leading candidate for such a position upon the death of a mother's brother.12 Such 
ascriptions, though, are qualified by considerations that include executive capability 
and moral character, and male elders (katuas) of the group will ignore the hereditary 
claims of a son they deem unsuitable in favor of a more capable man from the 
deceased's clan. Post-marital residence after a man marries is also a factor of 
fundamental importance. Residence for the husband after marriage near the father's 
house (patrilocal residence) accompanies patrilineal descent, while residence near 
that of the wife's father (uxorilocal residence) accompanies matrilineal descent. 
Because of the rights accruing to the patrilineal descent group (or "patri-group") as 
the result of the marriage of one of its male members-that is, control of children and 
the right of the husband to remain near his father-bridewealth (or brideprice, i.e., 
the prestations the bridegroom's group gives to that of the bride) must be given as 
compensation to the wife's patrigroup. In matrilineal descent, since the ,children of 
the marriage belong to the wife's matrilineal descent group (or "matrigroup") and 
after marriage the husband must reside near his father-in-law, either no bridewealth 
is given or else the amount will be significantly smaller. However, as I describe 
below, marriage under the rules of the barlaque has entailments that far exceed the 
personal consequences of a union between two individuals and the giving of 
bride wealth. 
There are three social ranks in contemporary Timor-Leste arranged in a 
hierarchy that, in descending order of prestige, consists of the liurai rank ("royalty"), 
data rank ("aristocrats"), and ema reina rank ("commoners"). Membership in a rank is 
ascribed by descent, but social status is not inflexibly decided by rank since 
education, occupation, and wealth make it possible for someone of a lower rank to 
elevate his or her status. A data or ema reina able to converse in Portuguese or 
influential in church matters would likely command greater respect than an 
impoverished person from the liurai rank of inferior education. 
The most important figure in adat politics is the aforementioned liurai, 13 a 
category not to be confounded-though typically it is-with the category of chefe de 
suku, an administrative officer under the Portuguese and now under the government 
of Timor-Leste. In the case of a particular suku, it may be that the chefe de suku is, in 
fact, a liurai, but he may equally well be a data. When the Portuguese established 
themselves in Timor in the sixteenth century, the eastern half of the island-roughly 
12 In a matrilineal system, a person belongs to his or her mother's clan and is bound by its 
precepts. But although property (tangible and intangible) descends down the female line, 
control over it remains in male hands, and so, in practice, a man inherits from his mother's 
brother and upon death property discharges to his sister's son. 
13 The term applies to the rank itself, to families within that rank, and also to this political 
figure. As we shall see, it also has evolved another element and, so, has become even more 
ambiguous. There is a hierarchy of" authentic" liurai families within the rank of liurai, such that 
certain liurai families have more prestige. 
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today's Timor-Leste, excluding Oe-Cussi-was covered by a patchwork of territorial 
units called rai, 14 at the head of which was a figure known as the liurai, a term the 
Portuguese translated as rei ("king") and whose territories they called reinas 
("kingdoms"). These kingdoms were composed of smaller territorial units called 
sukus, which also had heads. After 1912, when the Portuguese crushed what proved 
to be the final rebellion of the kings, they abolished virtually every kingdom, 
retained the sukus, which they converted into administrative units for the purpose of 
governing the colony, and installed loyal liurais as the chiefs of the sukus (chefes de 
suku). The indigenous heads of these sukus were completely by-passed. They 
continued to function1 however1 in at least some sukus. The suku of Caraubalo in the 
subdistrict (pasta) of Viqueque district (cancelho) today, for instance, still retains its 
indigenous polity, which is that of a diarchy consisting of a figure called the makair 
fukun and another called the data ua'in.15 There were, of course, considerably more 
sukus than there had been kingdoms, and so the Portuguese recruited men who had 
not been liurais, that is, men from data families. In this reorganization of the colonial 
system of administration, all chefes de suku16-whether of liurai or data rank-were 
entitled to be known by the honorific liurai. 17 Thus, in Portuguese Timor, and later in 
Timor-Timur,18 two categories of "liurai" came to exist and occupy the office of suku 
chief: men from liurai families and men from data families. In Timor-Leste the same 
distinction continues. 
Under the Portuguese administration, even the most powerful liurai/ chefe de suku 
never exercised autocratic power, 19 as some observers have imagined, 20 and only 
with the support of the local elders (katuas) could a liurai effectively administer his 
suku. In Caraubalo suku, at least, the liurai worked closely with the makair fukun and 
data ua'in both informally and in regular sessions of the indigenous suku 
council/ court, though (unlike today's suku council) the liurai was not a member of 
it. 21 Throughout the Portuguese period, the makair fukun and dato ua'in constituted 
14 Frederic Durand's map of the Timorese kingdoms at the end of the nineteenth century puts 
the number at forty-four for Portuguese Timar. See Durand, Timor Lorosa'e, p. 55. 
15 David Hicks, Tetum Ghosts and Kin: Fertility and Gender in East Timar (Prospect Heights, IL: 
Waveland Press, 2004), p. 15. 
16 The political context of Timor-Leste differs in various significant particulars from those of 
the post-colonial nations analysed by Africanists, but the bureaucratization of the Timorese 
chiefs under the successive colonial administrations of Portugal and Indonesia was similar to 
that described for the aforementioned Bantu of Uganda by Lloyd A. Fallers, A Bantu 
Bureaucracy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1956). 
17 It is unclear whether any ema reino was appointed under the Portuguese administration. I 
suspect this would have been rare. 
18 Under the Indonesian administration, the dual political personality of the sukus became 
more complicated since only governmental apparatchiks were eligible to occupy the office of 
"liurai" or chefe de suku. 
19 Unless otherwise noted, from this point on the terms "liurai" and "chefe de suku" are used 
interchangeably. 
2° Certain FRETILIN leaders in 1974-75, and foreign commentators, it might be noted, wrongly 
claimed that the powers wielded by liurais I chefes de suku were of an autocratic nature. With 
relatively few exceptions, writers who have discussed liurais and chefes de suku have not 
realized the difference between these two sociopolitical categories. 
21 Married women lferiks) did not usually attend the council/ court meetings, which were held 
about once a month; they were expected to provide input to the macair fukun, dato ua'in, and 
katuas though their husbands. 
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the indigenous leadership of the suku since the chief was a full-fledged officer in the 
colonial bureaucracy from which the makair fukun and data ua'in were excluded. The 
Viqueque administrator (administrador) himself probably did not know the offices 
existed. The chief, on the other hand, depended on the makair fukun and data ua'in to 
see that the weekly orders he received from the administrator were carried out in the 
seven villages (povoar;i5es)22 of Caraubalo suku. In addition to acting as enablers for the 
liurai, the makair fukun and data ua'in functioned as the day-to-day grassroots 
managers of the suku, most visibly in heading the suku council/ court, the adat 
institution that has today been supplanted by a Western-style council/ court. There 
was some measure of indigenous democracy involved in the selection of a chief, in 
that married men elected the chief, but their choice was subject to endorsement by 
the colonial authorities for whom loyalty to the administration was a sine qua non, 
and the administration could discharge an incompetent or unpopular chefe de suku. 
The suku council also functioned as a court of law through which it officially 
administered the adat, the macair fukun, data ua'in, and katuas, mediating between the 
contending parties and determining what sanctions to evoke if the adat were 
breached. 
This adat model of mediation continues to claim the adherence of villagers, 23 and, 
as in Indonesian villages, reciprocity is a key element of adat, which means that 
something approaching the status quo that existed prior to an offense must be sought 
through mediation.24 This is accomplished through compensation being made to the 
injured parties. The restoration of the status quo necessitates using the services, not 
of an unknown (to the community) individual delivering judgment inflected by 
notions of guilt, intent, or innocence, but of a mediator possessing personal 
knowledge of the individuals concerned and fully aware of the social context in 
which the offence was committed, and whose function it is to negotiate a mutually 
acceptable settlement. The foreign codes of jurisprudence offer, instead, an abstract 
conception of justice administered by agents who have no stake in the community 
nor interest in communal harmony, a drawback that, in part, helps account for the 
failure of criminal laws to have as much compelling authority as the government and 
United Nations expect.25 This disconnect between the national government and the 
sukus is particularly striking with hot-button issues like "domestic violence," "sexual 
abuse," and rape, which obsess the United Nations and their fellow agencies.26 With 
the backing of the world body, the government has enacted laws designed to mete 
out Western sanctions to men guilty of such offenses, and imprisonment is regarded 
as fitting punishment. While satisfying foreigners' (foreigner is malai in the local 
language) sense of justice, this sanction fails to reconcile the parties involved or 
deliver compensation to the injured party. Worse, from the wife's perspective, is that 
22 Today, villages are known as aldeias. 
23 Murder, sedition, and other offenses classified by the colonial authorities were dealt with by 
the administration. 
24 Cf. James Siegel, Naming the Witch (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 193-
203. 
25 See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the 
period from 24 September 2009 to 20 January 2010, S/2010/85) (New York, NY: United Nations, 
2010), 41 pp. 
26 I enclose the terms "domestic violence" and "sexual abuse" within quotation marks to signal 
their imprecision as verbal tools appropriate for scholarly analysis. 
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when a socially indifferent authority commits her husband to jail, she loses her 
provider. A woman in this position sees herself as doubly abused: firstly, by her 
husband and, secondly, by the malai's notion of what constitutes justice. With adat 
justice, her husband would remain working his fields, and she would receive some 
material compensation, in the form of money, a pig, or suchlike, in an arrangement 
negotiated between her husband1 s family and her father's family. True, the wife may 
receive only part of the compensation, and advocates for Western-style gender 
equality find plenty of fodder here for criticizing a system in which the injury to the 
victim is merged into a more communal offense against her family; but whether this 
arrangement finds favor with the malais or not, that is how gender operates in terms 
rural Timorese understand. 
Gender 
Some adats provide a prominent role in public ritual for women, 27 but women's 
primary role lies in the private, domestic realm rather than in the public, political 
sphere. Womanhood is seen as defined in terms of wife and mother, and the barlaque 
is the prime vehicle through which gender values manifest themselves in political, 
symbolic, economic, and ritual dimensions and reveal most clearly how the Timorese 
define the concept of feta ("womanhood"; "woman"). Just as the uma lulik seems to 
be on the way to attaining iconic status as a material symbol of a modern Timor-
Leste, as explained later, so does the barlaque remain emblematic of traditional 
Timor-Leste. Paradoxically, in light of its centrality in Timorese culture, the barlaque 
is misunderstood by most malais and even by some educated Timorese. For both, its 
sole meaning lies in marriage.28 This, however, is far from being true. 
In the barlaque's most generic form, it involves the bridegroom's descent group, 
or sometimes only his family, giving bridewealth <Jolin) to his bride's descent group 
in exchange for a set of counter-prestations. The wife-takers give horses, buffaloes, 
goats, chickens, the golden pectoral plates worn by men, ancient war swords, and 
money. Their wife-givers counter these prestations with gifts of cloth, pigs, rice, the 
coral necklaces worn by women, and the all-important gift of the bride herself. Nor is 
the affinal relationship between wife-giver and wife-taker symbolically expressed 
only at the wedding itself. When the families celebrate births and deaths, each party 
contributes food for their communal meal consistent with the species of animal they 
exchanged at marriage-the wife-takers bringing buffalo and goat meat, as well as 
chickens, while their wife-givers bring pork. Educated Timorese and malai fault the 
barlaque on the grounds that it supposedly demeans the status of women, and they 
cast it as an institution for "buying a wife." But although the term Jolin means "price" 
27 Hicks, Tetum Ghosts and Kin. 
28 Typical is the comment by Regina Varolli who, in composing a list of undesirables in the 
lives of Timorese women (25 percent literacy, mothers averaging seven children each, and 
"only" 30 percent having access to birth control), remarks with evident disapproval, "Also in 
East Timor, traditional dowries, or 'bride prices,' remain common"; see Regina Varolli, "U.N. 
Scrutinizes Women's Rights in East Timar," Women's eNews, September 16, 2009: 1. She 
appears to assume dowries and brideprice are the same, whereas, the dowry is the money or 
property the bride's family gives to that of the husband. While the prestations given by 
Timorese wife-givers to their wife-takers might be regarded as a dowry, it would appear 
unlikely Varolli has "groom-price" in mind, dealing as she does with women's rights and not 
men's rights. 
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and "value," and an alternative term for marriage is hafolin (halo ["to make"] +Joli 
[n]), "to make the price," the bridewealth is only one of a number of prestations 
exchanged. The barlaque also includes political, ritual, and economic obligations that 
bind the two alliance parties in an enduring relationship, which before 1912 included 
mutual support in war.29 As an encompassing system of practices and values, the 
barlaque is a microcosm of Timor-Leste's most fundamental ideas about gender, 
reciprocity, politics, economics, myth, and ritual, and the barlaque joins those staple 
anthropological institutions, the potlatch of the Indians of the Northwest Pacific and 
the kula of the Trobriand Archipelago, as an exemplary instance of what the 
sociologist Marcel Mauss called a "total social phenomenon." Far from diminishing 
womanhood, therefore, the barlaque demonstrates the preeminent value placed on 
the concept of feta by empowering women to function as exclusive agents through 
which descent groups exchange economic resources, while fertility and life are 
transferred from their fathers' groups to their husbands' groups. The barlaque thereby 
installs womanhood at the heart of biological and social life, since only through their 
reproductive powers can life be transmitted to the husbands' next generation. The 
Kemak of Marobo (Ermera district)30 say that life "flows" from wife-givers to wife-
takers, and expand this image in the expression "the flow of life," a trope they put 
into action every time a barlaque marriage, birth, or death is celebrated.31 
Age 
Age under the adat assigns social status as definitively as do rank and gender, 
with older persons accorded greater respect. This hierarchy of age is observed to 
advantage within the family, in which the eldest son acts as surrogate father in the 
absence of the head of household and exercises executive and disciplinary authority 
over his siblings. While generally evoked as the repository of the highest moral 
values, especially as they involve respect and cooperation, the Timorese family is, in 
reality, a fairly volatile social unit, within which destructive forces hinging on the 
authority of age work themselves out. Fathers and older brothers at times unduly 
exploit younger members of their families, and the adat justifies this exploitation, 
since the adat requires adult sons to help fathers and brothers to help one another in 
such tasks as house-building, repairing houses, and contributing to a brother's 
bridewealth. When these prescriptions are disregarded, mutual recriminations 
provoke ill will all round. Because patrilocal residence results in adult brothers 
residing in close proximity after marriage, opportunities for confrontations occur 
frequently, and a common motif in village histories depicts a community 
29 This was true among the Atoni, of Indonesian Timor: "In the case of war the bride-receiving 
ruler could marshal the support of his bride-giver"; see H. G. Schulte Nordholt, The Political 
System of the Atoni of Timar, trans. M. J. L. van Yperen (Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk 
Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 60) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 388. 
30 Brigitte Clamagirand, "The Social Organization of the Ema of Timar," in The Flow of Life: 
Essays on Eastern Indonesia, ed. James J. Fox (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 
p.145. 
31 In an interview with a man from Mamulak village (Caraubalo suku), who learned I had not 
given bridewealth for my wife, I was informed-with politeness-that Timorese did not 
copulate like animals. Unlike malais, they gave bridewealth. 
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disintegrating following quarrels between brothers or cousins on the paternal side. In 
these histories, a typical cause is failure to lend assistance when demanded. 
THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE NATION-STATE 
The political culture of the nation-state has evolved from Timor-Leste's 
Constitution, put into effect, and the Constitution's roots are embedded, not in 
Timorese culture as manifested through local adats, but in Western political thought. 
Regardless of its foreign origins, this is the only form of polity the Timor-Leste 
government and United Nations recognize as legitimate for a nation-state and, 
accordingly, impose on the sukus in their drive to build a nation and reconstitute 
villagers as citizens. Understandably, therefore, not all Timorese are satisfied with 
the choice that has been made, and among their number are educated young people 
who can articulate their dissatisfactions in public forums. One of the most articulate 
is Jose "Josh" Trindade,32 who has recently reminded those who, it might be thought, 
need to be reminded that "the process of nation-state formation led by a few elite 
from the East Timorese diaspora and the UN relied heavily on elements of foreign 
cultures and values and undermined the cultural identity of the East Timorese." The 
"elite," as Trindade terms them, have indubitably achieved a certain degree of 
success in interjecting their values into the cultural traditions of the population, but 
their achievements have created a disjunction between what the sociologist Edward 
Shils33 famously distinguished as the "center" and the "periphery,"34-the center 
being the national government and the periphery being the sukus. It might be worth 
remarking that the Shils model has its limitations for Timor-Leste, not least being the 
fact that Timorese of the periphery by no means generally look to the center for their 
values. 
When Timor-Leste attained independence in May 2002, the new nation-state 
owed its emerging polity to the United Nations, which, acting through the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), had commenced 
laying the foundations of a civil society in October 1999. The United Nations based 
its efforts on the values of a Western notion of democracy,35 roughly corresponding 
to Max Weber's "legal authority system," 36 that is, a system of "rationality-focused" 
legal institutions. This system Weber contrasted with his "traditional authority 
system," that is, a system founded in "irrational" ancestral sanctions,37 which, in 
32 Jose Trindade, "Reconciling Conflicting Paradigms: An East Timorese Vision of the Ideal 
State," in Democratic Governance: Reconciling the Local and the National, ed. David Mearns 
(Darwin: Charles Darwin University Press, 2008), p. 165. 
33 Edward Shils, Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology, Selected Papers of Edward Shils 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1961, 1975), pp. 3-16. 
34 David Hicks, "Community and Nation-State in East Timor: A View from the Periphery," 
Anthropology Today 23,1 (2007): 13-16. Compare the use Trindade makes of the notion of the 
center in his discussion of reconciling paradigms; see Trindade, "Reconciling Conflicting 
Paradigms," pp. 160-88. 
35 United Nations, The United Nations and East Timar: Self-Determination through Popular 
Consultation (New York, NY: UN Department of Public Information, 2000), pp. 56-60. 
36 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1978), p. 227. 
37 I owe this observation to Rod Nixon, the first scholar, to my knowledge, to see the 
applicability of Weber's binary model for Timor-Leste. It is one of a number of acute insights 
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Timor-Leste, is the adat. Since Weber's "traditional authority system" is typical of 
local polities characteristically occurring at the margins of the wider national polity, 
whereas his "legal authority system" occurs at the center of the national polity, his 
two models, in this respect, are structurally coterminous with Shils's 
"center I periphery" paradigm. The contrast between the two systems is nowhere 
more apparent than in governance and jurisprudence, where the contrast appears to 
advantage in the aforementioned suku council/ court, an invention of the government 
and United Nations. Article 3 of the 2004 law on "the Election of Suco Chiefs and 
Suco Councils" sets forth the protocols under which sukus are to be governed and 
local justice administered, 38 according to the following terms: 
1. A suco council shall be composed of the suco chief, the chiefs of all villages 
comprising the suco, and the following members: 
a. two women [representante feta]; 
b. one young person from each gender group [juventude feta; juventude 
mane]; 
c. one elder from the suco. 
2. For the purposes of this law, a young person is an individual aged 
between 17 and 35 on the polling day, and an elder is an individual aged 
over 50 years on the polling day or an individual recognized by his or her 
community as a lian nain. 
Under these protocols, suku chiefs are elected by popular vote and not, as under 
the adat, by hereditary succession, and women become eligible for election.39 With 
the implementation of this system, one consequence has been the emergence of two 
political figures who provide villagers with alternative sources of authority. One is 
someone who might be called the "legal authority" (suku chief); the other, the 
"traditional authority" (liurai). The claims of adat can be so compelling that even 
those villagers who voted for the former may be more inclined to respect the 
latter and turn to him when they need advice or require assistance. In part, this 
results from the fruits of familiarity. Villagers know what they can expect from their 
adat leader, whereas, the workaday functions of the democratically elected 
incumbent are still-despite much public proselytizing by the agencies-only 
vaguely apprehended. Villagers profess not to understand what the new-style suku 
chief is supposed to do and how they are expected to relate to him. Chiefs (and 
council members, for that matter) have also been perplexed even as their job 
descriptions are still being fleshed out. Before the suku elections in Cova Lima district 
in 2009, there was a "public consultation" carried out in the subdistrict of Suai by the 
National Parliament Committee A "to explain the [latest] draft law, clarify areas of 
into the problems associated with the operation of two systems of governance in Timor-Leste. 
See Rod Nixon, Justice and Governance in East Timar: Indigenous Approaches and the "New 
Subsistence State" (Abington, Oxford, and New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), pp. 12-13. 
38 Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste National Parliament (2004) Law, " ... on the Election of 
Suco Chiefs and Suco Councils," see http:/ /www.unmit.org/legal/RDTL-Law /RDTL-
Laws/Law-2004-2.pdf, accessed July 3, 2012. 
39 At least one woman has been elected under the new order, in Taroman, in the subdistrict of 
Fatululik (Cova Lima district), where Luisa Guterres is currently chief. Interestingly, this is a 
matrilineal region. 
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confusion and gather public opinion."40 This took place seven years after 
independence, but it was nevertheless considered necessary to inform the sukus 
about "the responsibilities of the village chiefs," and although the meeting was 
attended by the subdistrict administrator, village chiefs, political party leaders, and 
NGOs, it seems suku folk were sparse on the ground. One may reasonably assume 
they remain as ignorant or unconcerned about the latest government and United 
Nations initiative as they were of previous initiatives. Uncertainties of this sort only 
add to the sense of alienation experienced by people wary of national directives they 
see as designed to seduce them from an adat in which women and young men have 
less status in public matters and cannot attain the position of village chief, become 
heads of descent groups or hamlets, or lead discussions in suku council meetings. The 
new order has radicalized their status: they now take their seats at the heart of suku 
authority.41 
Alienation between the two conceptualizations of governance is again evident in 
the domain of language, where the government and the United Nations have found 
themselves creating novel political categories when nothing comparable to suit their 
purpose exists in traditional suku polity, and redefining established categories in 
some cases where an accepted nomenclature already exists. As the Portuguese did 
with the category liurai, so have the government and United Nations done with the 
category Zia na'in. In Timorese culture, the Zia a na'in is a "teller of tales," a sort of 
bard, who besides publicly reciting myths, legends, and verses of all kinds to a suku 
audience, also possesses detailed knowledge of his suku's history and adat. As its 
human repository, a Zia na'in would be consulted by the liurai when the latter wanted 
advice about some finer points of the adat, but today the Zia na'in is no longer an 
informal storyteller/ advisor but an elected officer of a newly invented council/ court. 
The process of linguistic "massaging," undertaken in order to bring suku polity into 
line with the needs of a modern nation-state, has also resulted in the discarding of 
Tetum terms in favor of Portuguese. In the wording of Article 3, juventude (youth; 
young person), qualified where appropriate by the terms mane (male; man) and feto 
(female; woman), substitutes for the Tetum term labarik, because labarik (also 
qualified by mane and feto) can mean lad, boy, unmarried male, youth, girl, or 
unmarried female-an array of referents lacking the privileged Western connotations 
of the term "youth," which the author's language in Article 3 apparently wished to 
convey. 
In this manner, suku categories of political thought are in the process of being 
undermined as part of a policy designed to substitute international values 
(democracy, social equality, gender equality, and age equality) for suku values 
40 United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), Baseline Study on Sexual and 
Gender-Based Violence in Covalima and Bobonaro Districts, released August 13, 2009, available at 
http:/ / easttimorlegal.blogspot.com / 2009 I 08 / unmit-baseline-study-on-sexual-and.html, last 
accessed May 29, 2012. 
41 This is also true of another United Nations/Timar-Leste national government invention, the 
Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL), which includes "male youth," of course, but also 
"female youth." Andrea Molnar has reported that in Atsabe subdistrict (Ermera district), 
"where age status matters significantly in local cultural context," the "young officers do not 
have much status or the confidence of the population to solve problems." She adds that "there 
were many unkindly comments made about the young police officers by the locals ... 
particularly the female officers." See Andrea K. Molnar, "An Anthropological Study of Atsabe 
Perceptions of Kolimau 2000: A New East Timorese Religious Cult or Internal Security 
Problem?" Anthropos 99 (2004): 377. 
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(heredity, patriarchy, and control by senior men).42 Accordingly, the former suku 
council/ court, formerly entrenched in its masculine, elder, exclusivity, has now been 
displaced in favor of an institution of national government that privileges adult 
women1 male youth, and female youth. Up to a point, the government and United 
Nations have therefore succeeded in reforming the political culture, and one might 
claim that, since villagers voted, thereby apparently engaging in the spirit of things, 
these new values have really taken hold. But ethnographic evidence, as well as 
agency reports, attest to peoples' continuing non-compliance with governmental 
laws and regulations, and one might wonder, why should this be so? I suggest that 
people's defiance may be a product, not so much of an active antipathy toward malai 
notions, as such, or even simple resentment of having foreign ideas injected into their 
collective representations, but of an uncertainty about what these foreign ideas mean 
and what relevance they have in people's lives. Reports document how 
misunderstandings and ignorance of these values persist despite attempts by NGOs' 
people to propagate them. A typical example is that by the HAK Association,43 which 
remarked in a tone of apparent puzzlement: 
Ironically [sic], when it commemorated the international day for "Rural 
Women" [October 15], the Government organized a concert in Dili and 
invited an Indonesia band "Tri Macam" [the commemoration named for 
Rural Women, but women in rural areas didn't know or have any feelings 
about it]. 
A recent United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) report 
shows how difficult it is for the gender lobby to accept the adat's authority in gender 
matters.44 In a fusillade of indictments, the writers denounce the values of the very 
people they hope to make adherents of change: "Tradition, culture of silence, 
domination and inequality, ignorance of rights, the lack of law, weakness of the 
judiciary system, as well as economic dependence, are among the key factors that 
make women more vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence." This raft of 
misconceptions ("the lack of law," 11economic dependence") and presumptive 
naivety ("culture of silence," "domination," "ignorance of rights," 11weakness of the 
judiciary system") shows how poorly understood adat is by typical international 
agents. If the government and United Nations are serious about persuading the sukus 
to change, they will have to recognize the reality that local people regard their adat as 
being at least as legitimate as Western-derived jurisprudence-as, of course, it is; 
otherwise two political cultures will remain alternative options for the Timorese. 
Although some sukus appear more receptive to the claims made in support of 
42 The Procrustean term "human rights" is naturally evoked as a handy catch-all phrase when 
these three concepts require justification or simply propping up. As a practical matter, the 
notion of "human rights" is as alien to Timorese thought as it is to the thinking of most of the 
non-Western world. 
43 HAK Association for Law, Human Rights, and Justice, "Human Rights Situation 2008: Out 
of Civil Disorder towards the Challenges of Well-Being," report issued May 6, 2009 (Dili, 
Timor-Leste), p. 4; see http:/ /etan.org/news/2009/0Shakhr.htm; see under "4. Women's 
Human Rights"; accessed July 3, 2012. 
44 United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, Baseline Study on Sexual and Gender-Based 
Violence. 
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international values, the sincerity of the majority of sukus' commitment must remain 
open to question,45 since, like other Third World people when dealing with powerful 
foreign agencies, the Timorese have developed the capacity for outward conformity 
but internal resistance. One recalls that Indonesia's twenty-four years' occupation 
failed to erode suku self-identity and that the Timorese never became genuine 
Indonesian citizens despite apparently conforming to what was expected of them. 46 
The building of uma luliks today is, therefore, a particularly intriguing socio-
political phenomenon since it is an overt-and therefore unexpected-expression of 
Timorese self-assertion and non-conformity. In constructing them, villagers are 
declaring their fidelity to the ancestors, creators of the old order who built the first 
uma luliks,47 and they serve as the symbol not only of a family's oneness with its 
ancestors but also the unity of the family, lineage, clan, or suku owning it. At the 
same time, of course, the building also signals its owners' distinctiveness as a social 
group. Like the barlaque, though, uma luliks are not universally acclaimed. Educated 
Timorese, not to mention malais,48 point out that constructing uma luliks wastes 
valuable resources that should be more rationally expended on education or on 
meeting other needs of a young nation-state rather than satisfying the adat. To be 
sure, the labor involves not only the muscle power of dozens of men and women for 
weeks on end, but also craftsmen who mastermind the building's every architectural 
detail and specialists, like the Zia na'in, who ensure every detail of the adat code is 
adhered to. But it would seem that such criticism is inspired by something more than 
mere protests against waste; one detects, as well, resentment that villagers are 
affirming their self-identity as people of the adat. Building an uma lulik is a statement, 
if you will, of unapologetic parochialism that challenges the demands of the Other to 
have villagers transcend their suku mentality and embrace the wider, abstract, 
community of the nation-state. Constructing these houses, therefore, demonstrates 
something outsiders have not become accustomed to from rural Timor-defiant self-
assertion in action. At the same time, as Jose Trindade has intimated,49 uma lulik 
construction may also harbor the possibility that this phenomenon may conceivably 
be used as a model for some form of accommodation between adat and nation-state, 50 
so raising the prospects that a synthesis of the national and the parochial may not, 
after all, be implausible. 
45 For a discussion of six possible factors that may incline some sukus to be more receptive than 
others to Western values, see David Hicks, "United Nations' Values and Suku Traditions: 
Appearance and Reality," in Nation-Building across the Urban and Rural in Timor-Leste, ed. Myra 
Walsh, Damian Grenville, Januario Soares, et. al. (Melbourne: RMIT University, 2010), pp. 44-
45. 
46 The role the barlaque and uma luliks played in social life during the occupation is a topic 
deserving of a more extended discussion than is possible on these pages. 
47 Uma =building, house, descent group; lulik =sacred, set apart, prohibited. The building is 
also known as the uma lisan or uma adat. Much has been written in the past decade about uma 
luliks, which Henry Ogg Forbes first brought to the attention of the English-speaking public in 
his A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 
1885). A more recent account of this artifact may be found in David Hicks, "Afterword 
Glimpses of Alternatives: The Uma Lulik of East Timer," Social Analysis 52,1 (2008): 166-80. 
48 With apparent exceptions, such as the United States ambassador. 
49 Trindade, "Reconciling Conflicting Paradigms." 
50 The unifying nature of the uma lulik system, however, must not be allowed to obscure its 
potential for division in that it distinguishes those persons who identify themselves with· an 
uma lulik from members of other descent groups who identify with other uma luliks. 
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A SYNCRETIC POLITICAL CULTURE? 
I have argued that the political culture of Timor-Leste is actually, in fact, two 
political cultures. One, the political culture of the adat, gains its substance from a 
system of descent (predominately patrilineal) and patrilocal post-marital residence 
for a man, a hierarchy of social ranks, and a local governance in which authority 
(generally ascribed rather than achieved, and consisting more of influence to 
persuade than an autocratic power to compel) derives from the descent system, but 
is subject to democratic checks to an extent not appreciated by some commentators. 
In matters juridical, the adat requires the exchange of compensation that has been 
mutually agreed upon, and the mediation necessary to negotiate the exchange, for its 
sine qua non is a return to social harmony rather than to constitute a set of mandated 
abstractions that have little bearing on how people interact. Adat also privileges 
senior males in public life at the expense of women and younger men. 
The other, the political culture of the nation-state, promotes values at odds with 
the adat, above all those of democracy, gender equality, and age equality. That the 
disparity between the two models appears so stark after eight years of independence 
might seem to support assertions that Timor-Leste is a "failed" nation-state,51 and 
that hope of a unified nation-state is chimerical. Against this view is the history of 
the Timorese people who have for centuries revealed a capacity to absorb foreign 
ideas, a trait that suggests that an unprejudiced endeavor to reconcile these different 
perspectives on human experience might have a chance of success. Education would 
help in this attempt, since rural Timorese wish for education for their children, and, 
as these children and their parents grow aware of what advantages accrue from 
citizenship, their imaginations might gain a firmer purchase on the notions of 
"citizen" and "nation-state." But without concessions that mean something to the 
sukus, such attempts by the government and United Nations are likely to have 
limited success. No synthesis that has a chance of being sustainable is probable 
without whole-hearted endorsement by the people most affected, who will continue 
to live in their sukus after the latest crop of malais has departed. It is unrealistic to 
expect the rural Timorese to abandon their adat in toto, and so it behooves those who 
promote the national political culture to come to terms with the reality that adat plays 
a decisive part in peoples' lives. The United Nations' signal achievement was to 
make possible Timorese independence, and the Timorese are in their debt. But as 
others have observed, the United Nations failed to build on this success, and in no 
small measure this was due to the United Nations' insistence that nation-building 
means imposing the unique Western nation-state model-in a one-size-fits-all 
manner and without concessions-on countries that are unsuited to it. One 
complication for the United Nations is that its commission to "nation-build" in a way 
compatible with democracy disparages the adat as an alternative system for meting 
out justice and providing authentic governance.52 That this prejudice does not issue 
51 See the titles of three such articles (albeit the contents are more positive than the titles 
suggest): Jose Ramos-Horta, "East Timor is Not a Failed State," Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2006, 
p. A14; Paulo Gorjao and Andre Monteiro, "Is Timor-Leste a Failed State?" Portuguese Journal 
of International Affairs 1 (Spring 2009): 12-21; and Jane Perlez, /1 A Nation-Building Project 
Comes Apart in East Timor," New York Times, July 14, 2006, p. A4. 
52 Interestingly, this intolerance is inconsistent with United Nations' claims to support cultural 
diversity. 
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from ignorance is seen clearly in the UN report cited earlier. 53 The document 
contends that "the reporting of crimes to any forum outside the family structure is 
still hampered by stigma associated with such crimes [i.e., violence against women 
and children] and socio-cultural acceptance," adding that "most domestic violence 
and sexual assault cases against women are mediated [i.e., dealt with by time-honored 
adat procedures) in traditional justice forums instead of being formally prosecuted, 
despite the fact that domestic violence is not a public crime under the new Criminal 
Code." 54 "Finally," it concludes, "limited access to justice [i.e., as defined by the 
government and United Nations] contributes to a climate of impunity, having a 
negative impact on respect for human rights, in particular those of women and 
children."55 While the report's description of suku ethnography is accurate, as far as it 
goes, one wonders if the writer or writers had considered how many villagers have 
heard of the Code or, if they have, how many are willing to concede it any measure 
of compulsive hold over how they live their lives? In all likelihood1 the most that 
might reasonably be expected is that any villagers aware that the Code even exists 
would look upon it as yet another irrelevant attempt by government to interfere in 
their lives. The report, with its mixture of conceit and naivety, continues: "Only a 
small number of [law] cases are appropriately dealt with before the courts."56 In 
response to the resourcefulness the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL), the 
national police force, has displayed when faced with problems the Code has created, 
the report patronizingly contends that "the lack of understanding of new laws is 
another serious challenge faced by PNTL, frequently leading to its officers 
"mediating" between perpetrator and victim on criminal offences." 57 Who, one might 
ask, is really displaying a lack of understanding here? Another presumptive 
condescension toward the values of people living in the countryside is indicated by 
the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), which responded to 
the National Parliament passing, on May 3, 2010, the domestic violence law, with the 
remark that "further steps must be taken to change [sic] public attitudes [i.e., to 
matters of gender]." 58 Would UNIFEM like its own attitudes changed?59 
Bridging the divide separating the two political cultures requires amenability on 
the part of the United Nations1 international agencies, and government in their 
policies toward the sukus, a quality-it must be said-not much evidenced thus far, 60 
53 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste. 
54 Ibid., pp. 20-21. The italics in both instances are mine, for emphasis. 
55 Ibid., p. 21. 
56 Ibid., p. 20. 
57 Ibid., p. 13. 
58 UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women), "Domestic Violence Law Passed 
in Timor-Leste," May 6, 2010, available at http:/ /www.unifem.org/news_events/story_ 
detail.php?StoryID=1087, accessed June 5, 2012. Timorese womens' organizations, like Rede 
Feta and Fokupers, are, of course, supportive of national laws, derived from the Western 
Tradition, that are intended to corrode the customary gender hierarchy and elevate the status 
of women. 
59 This said, it may well be that UNIFEM and customary male attitudes may converge to some 
extent in the future. 
60 In light of the above discussion of the lack of effective understanding between Dili and the 
sukus, advocates of decentralization may wish to consider in a cautionary vein the implications 
decentralization might have for national unity (cf. Hicks, "Community and Nation-Stat~ in 
East Timar"). 
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except perhaps by the USAID, the Asia Foundation, and the US ambassador. Now 
that the United Nations shows signs of being somewhat less confident about its 
success in winning over sukus' populations, there could conceivably be prospects for 
an attitudinal reassessment. The same report does, after all, go on to suggest that 
"synergy between formal justice institutions and traditional justice mechanisms may 
be enhanced through the development of a draft customary law to ensure that 
customary practices are consistent with national and international human rights 
standards, particularly in relation to women and children."61 But even with this 
concession1 a grudging tone is discernible, and one notes that it is the "customary 
practices" (my emphasis) of the people of Timor-Leste that are to be made consistent 
with the national/international standards, rather than the national/international 
standards being brought more into alignment with "customary practices." Rarely 
have the malai permitted village people to make their own decisions, whether the 
former were the Portuguese, Indonesians, or-today-the United Nations, 
international agencies, and national NGOs who are incessantly pressuring the 
Timorese to do as they are told. The rousing scolding of one such organization, 
Amnesty International, last year by Jose Ramos-Horta,62 comes as a timely warning 
that some Timorese may not be as accepting as they once were of gratuitous 
interference. "I don't need lectures from experts in human rights sitting on the 381h 
floor of the UN building in New York," the president declaimed. Nor are signs of 
attitudinal change limited to a Founding Fathers of the Republic, as the writings of 
one of the educated "youth," Jose Trindade, have shown.63 
That the rural Timorese do not reflexively reject Western notions is 
demonstrated by their attitude to the Catholic Church. Referring to the findings of 
Tanja Hohe and Sofia Ospina, 64 Trindade has noted that, while Christianity is 
recognized for what it is, viz, a "foreign" institution, it is nevertheless "respected,"65 
whereas the same seems not so for the government and United Nations. "The 
population always says: 'First the traditional system, then the Church, and then the 
Government."' Catholic dogmas that at one time were alien have now been 
assimilated into the adat, and ecclesiastical experience might serve as a workable 
precedent for a syncretic model of reconciliation. It requires, however, compromises 
by the government and United Nations. Catholic missionaries, it must be conceded, 
have had centuries to reconcile their dogmas to lulik, mate bein, uma lulik, the barlaque, 
and suchlike, but their successes demonstrate that accommodation can work. Rather 
than have their opinions disregarded or reflexively deflected, suku residents of all 
61 UNIFEM, "Domestic Violence Law Passed in Timor-Leste," p. 18. 
62 Jose Ramos-Horta, "E Timor Leader Rejects Criticism," British Broadcasting Company, 
September 29, 2009, http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8228155.stm. accessed May 29, 2012. 
63 Since Ramos-Horta has acquired the reputation of a politician with a mercurial fancy for 
adopting postures seemingly designed to provoke, one cannot be at all sure if he really meant 
what he said. As a reviewer of this paper suggested, this might be "political grandstanding" 
on his part. Ramos-Horta's words were, in part, a response to the criticism that he is not as 
open to pursuing human rights issues arising out of the Indonesian occupation in Timor-Leste 
as some malais-and also many Timorese-would like him to be. It has also be pointed out 
that Ramos-Horta has himself been a prominent "importer" of Western ideas. 
64 Tanja Hohe and Sophia Ospina, Traditional Power Structures and Local Governance in East 
I;imor: A Case Study of the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (Geneva: 
Etudes Courtes 5, Graduate Institute of Development Studies, 2002). 
65 Trindade, "Reconciling Conflicting Paradigms," p. 166. 
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social categories need to be consulted and asked for specific details as to what they 
desire and what they are willing to accept rather than what malai presume to think 
they need. Traditional liurais, who often know more than other persons about suku 
matters, and village folk alike (datos, katuas andferiks)-not just the educated "youth" 
or social categories selectively privileged under international formulae 
("spokespersons," "targeted groups," and so forth)-need to be included in this 
dialogue. In a letter published in the New York Times, Professor Amitai Etzioni offers 
advice to the US government regarding Afghanistan, and his advice is relevant for 
current UN policy in Timor-Leste.66 Etzioni writes that, while competent local 
governance is important, it cannot be the sort of government Westerners 
immediately envision but something more akin to the sort of governance that 
worked for Chicago and New York City a hundred years ago. Local leaders 
(aldermen or tribal chiefs) resolved disputes "in line with local norms and 
traditions," provided a social network in return for loyalty, and, although favoring 
their cadres and relatives, also took care of everyone else. Liurai families lack the 
authority the Afghan leaders command, but their influence would lend incalculable 
weight to any attempt the government and United Nations made to gain the 
confidence of the sukus. The suku of Uma Ua'in Craik in Viqueque subdistrict 
currently illustrates the influence liurais still exercise. The Indonesian army forced 
the inhabitants of one of its villages, Uha Cae, to abandon their homes and reside in 
Viqueque town, which was located several hours' walking distance away. Today, 
any villager could return. But none has. Why? Because Viqueque is the seat of the 
suku, and1 according to the adat, the liurai must be the first person to resettle. The 
current incumbent prefers to live in the town; and so, therefore, must his villagers. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the current disinclination of the government and United Nations to 
assimilate suku traditions into the national polity, any form of political adjustment 
between the the adat and the nation-state might seem unrealistic, and the evolution 
of a hybrid model of governance and justice, remote. But that serious rethinking of 
malai attitudes may be happening could be presaged by another initiative made by 
Ambassador Klemm who, two weeks after attending the uma lulik ceremony noted 
above, reconfirmed his respect for adat when he participated in a tara bandu67 ritual in 
Bidau Santana, a suku in Dili, 1'to affirm local norms of traditional justice as part of a 
USAID-funded project on community policing being implemented by the Asia 
Foundation."68 Were steps like this followed by the government and United Nations, 
66 Amitai Etzioni, "Afghanistan's Government," letter to The New York Times, May 2, 2010, p. 9. 
67 This term refers to what is considered taboo or prohibited. As such, it shares some meaning 
with the Tetum term lulik. 
68 Asia Foundation, "Tara Bandu Ceremony Cements Community-Police Cooperation in Bidau 
Santana, Timor-Leste," in The Asia Foundation News Archives, May 20, 2010, 
www.asiafoundation.org/news?tag=timor-leste (US Embassy, Dili, Timor-Leste), accessed 
May 7, 2010. Credit is also due to USAID and the Asia Foundation. As one reviewer of an 
earlier draft of this article noted, the US ambassador's attitude may have been mere lip service. 
Indeed, that may be true, but a demonstration in public of even a contrived respect for an 
institution so rooted in customary practices, yet slighted by the majority of malais, conveyed to 
those who attended the ceremony that their values at least merited some acknowledgment by 
a foreigner. 
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suku acceptance of change might be more enthusiastic and a hybridized political 
culture assimilating both national and adat values have a fighting chance to develop. 
The educated youth also have a role to play and, as we have seen, some are willing 
to think in terms of a hybrid model of nationhood. The revival of that most 
conspicuous material artifact of adat, the uma lulik, as an ostentatious index of local 
self-identity has not been lost on modern young Timorese, some of whom have 
proposed the construction of a national uma lulik that would symbolize the nation-
state in much the manner as the uma luliks symbolize the suku. 69 Ensconced as the 
material embodiment of a syncretic conjunction of adat and nation-state, no symbol 
would be more expressive of, or better serve the interests of, a single and cohesive 
political culture in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. 
69 Trindade, "Reconciling Conflicting Paradigms," p. 181. 
SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM AND THE 
CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY 
Rui Gra~a Feij6 
National Unity does not consist of politicians rubbing shoulders with each 
other to show our teeth to the people. 
-Xanana Gusmao (June 22, 2006) 
Democratization is a dynamic process that always remains incomplete and 
perpetually runs the risk of reversal. 
- Charles Tilly 
The political experience of Timor-Leste after the country became the first new 
independent nation of the twenty-first century has been rich and varied. The choice 
of a system of government is certainly a significant milestone in its journey toward a 
consolidated democracy. This chapter will examine the controversy over the 
characterization of the East Timorese system of government and offer historical and 
theoretical insights as to why the semi-presidential system may be considered a 
positive factor, contributing to political stability and democratic consolidation. 
IS TIMOR-LESTE A (CONSOLIDATED) DEMOCRACY? 
Discussing the democratic consolidation in Timor-Leste presupposes that a basic 
characterization of the current state of affairs in the country be made explicit and 
agreed upon. One approach to this problem consists in referring the matter to a 
credible international organization. Freedom House regularly publishes a list of what 
it calls "electoral democracies," that is, polities that abide by the following criteria: a 
competitive, multiparty political system; universal adult suffrage for all citizens 
(with exceptions for restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as 
sanctions for criminal offenses); regularly contested elections conducted in 
conditions of ballot secrecy and reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of 
massive voter fraud that yields results that are unrepresentative of the public will; 
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and significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the 
media and through generally open political campaigning.1 
In the judgment of Freedom House, independent Timor-Leste has consistently 
been regarded as an "electoral democracy." This organization then rates polities 
according to two other criteria-political rights and civil liberties-that converge to 
define a narrower "liberal democracy" as polities that combine free elections with "a 
substantial array of civil liberties." "Free Countries" are simultaneously 11liberal" and 
"electoral democracies"; "Partly Free Countries" are "electoral democracies" that 
lack some features of "liberal" democracies. Timor-Leste has always been considered 
by this organization as a Partly Free Country, implying that its "democracy" exists 
but requires a positive and substantial evolution. 
Looking elsewhere for an operative definition of democracy, Jose Antonio 
Cheibub's "minimalist stance" may serve our purposes. He defines democracy as "a 
system in which government offices are filled by contested elections," and reverts to 
three main operational rules: First, the chief executive must be elected; second, the 
legislature must be elected; and third, there must be more than one party. The third 
rule about political parties is subject to a "consolidation rule," that is, the need to 
establish that the introduction of a democratic system does not lead to any of the 
following situations: a non-party rule; a one-party rule; or a permanent electoral 
domination by the winner party.2 Timor-Leste does respond positively to all these 
tests, and can thus be considered a democracy as defined by objective and basic 
rules. This, however, must not blind us to a myriad of problems that have surfaced in 
this country's recent history that may qualify this assessment. 
It is an undisputed fact that the ten years since independence have been marked 
by political instability (riots of December 2002, incidents in Lospalos in 2003, 
Catholic-inspired demonstrations in 2005) and even violence (culminating in the 
severe crisis of the second quarter of 2006 and, later on, in February 2008, in the 
attacks on the president and the prime minister). Several analysts have noticed the 
manifestation of "authoritarian temptations," 3 or seen the country on a "path to 
authoritarianism"4-perhaps too strong a characterization of the way FRETILIN 
exercised executive power. 5 The editors of the present volume also expressed their 
concern that in 2006 Timor-Leste's political system "remain[ed] immature and 
potentially susceptible to single-party dominance."6 In Portugal, Pedro Bacelar de 
Vasconcelos and Ricardo Sousa da Cunha expressed their critical appraisal in this 
manner: "In spite of undeniable merits and bold initiatives [the FRETILIN 
1 See www.freedomhouse.org I report/ freedom-world-2012/ methodology, accessed on May 
21, 2012. 
2 Jose Antonio Cheibub, Michael Alvarez, Fernando Limongi, and Adam Przeworski, 
"Classifying Political Regimes," Studies in Comparative International Development 31,2 (1996): 3-
36. 
3 Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "The Authoritarian Temptation in East Timor: Nation Building and 
the Need for Inclusive Governance," Asian Survey 46,4 (2006): 575-96. 
4 Jacqueline Siapno, "Timor-Leste-On the Path to Authoritarianism?" Southeast Asian Affairs 1 
(2004): 325-42. 
5 Rui Grai;a Feij6, "Timor-Leste: o sobressalto democratico" (Timor-Leste: The democratic 
upheaval), paper presented at the Fourth Congress of the Portuguese Political Science 
Association, Lisbon, March 6-7, 2008. 
6 Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach, eds., East Timar beyond Independence (Victoria: Mon.ash 
Asia Institute, 2007), p. 4. 
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government] did not have enough stamina to mobilize society in the construction of 
a plural and common project, to privilege conciliation over sectarian temptations and 
naked political confrontations." 7 We cannot forget that the Timorese authorities were 
compelled to call-in a united effort combining the representatives of all branches of 
power: the president, prime minister, and speaker of the House-for international 
military assistance to maintain a modicum of public order in the wake of the demise 
of the national police and the breakdown of the armed forces-surely a major 
setback in the consolidation of the new republic and its institutions. 
My claim, however, is not that Timor-Leste has managed to consolidate its 
democracy-given the nature of this process aptly expressed by Charles Tilly in the 
epigraph to this essay8-but that it has so far been able to steer the boat over rough 
seas without resorting to unconstitutional, or otherwise deviant, solutions to the 
enormous problems it has faced, no matter how a number of responsible political 
actors may have attempted to operate outside the boundaries of the constitution or to 
advance unconstitutional legislation. 
The constitution has remained in force throughout these eight years, never being 
suspended or abolished and effectively circumscribing the limits within which 
political life and the legitimate forms of competition for power should take place. 
Along with other actors, the court of appeals-acting in its interim constitutional 
capacity-has been a critical element in stopping the deployment of "authoritarian 
temptations" by ruling several bills proposed by the majority government to be 
unconstitutional. The 2007 round of elections was declared "free and fair." 9 
Presidential elections were fought in two rounds (in April and May 2007), resulting 
in a clear winner (former nonpartisan minister for foreign affairs and prime minister, 
Jose Ramos Horta). Parliamentary elections brought in a replacement of the 
incumbent government by a coalition of opposition parties led by the former 
president, Xanana Gusmao, thus enacting a practical example of a competitive 
democracy accepting a turnover of majority and government. The transition from the 
old to the new government, even if coupled with tough political fighting, was mostly 
peaceful. 
A few months into the "second cycle" of Timorese politics, all these institutions 
reacted in a constitutional manner to a serious challenge. President Ramos Horta was 
shot and seriously wounded, and forced to leave office (and the country) 
temporarily, and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao was ambushed. An interim 
president was appointed in accordance with the constitution; he eventually returned 
his power to the rightful president when Ramos Horta was ready to reoccupy his 
post. 
7 Pedro Bacelar de Vasconcelos and Ricardo Sousa da Cunha, 11Semipresidencialismo em 
Timor-Leste: um equilibrio institucional num contexto critico" (Semi-presidentialism in Timor-
Leste: An institutional equilibrium in a critical context) in 0 Semipresidencialismo nos Pafses de 
Lingua Portuguesa, ed. Marina Costa Lobo and Octavio Amorim Neto (Lisbon: Imprensa de 
Ciencias Sociais, 2009), p. 254. 
8 Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. x. 
9 Christine Cabasset-Sernedo and Frederic Durand, East Timar: How to Build a New Nation in 
Southeast Asia in the 21st Century (Bangkok: IRASEC, 2009)<AU: pages?>; Rui Grai;a Feij6, 
"Counting Votes that Count: A Systemic Analysis of the Timorese Elections of 2007 and the 
Performance of the Electoral Institutions," in State, Society and International Relations in Asia, ed. 
Mehdi Pervizi Arnineh (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), pp. 103-17. 
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In brief, the constitutional rule of law has survived in times of hardship; elections 
have been held according to the prescriptions of the constitution and internationally 
accepted rules; no political office is held, formally or informally, in defiance of the 
expressed will of the people; and changes in the holders of executive powers have 
been achieved peacefully. These transfers of power have actually been limited: 
Timor-Leste has had three prime ministers (Alkatiri, 2002-06; Ramos Horta, 2006-07; 
Estanislau da Silva, May-August 2007, and Xanana Gusmao, since 2007), and two 
presidents of the republic (Xanana Gusmao, 2002-07, and Ramos Horta, elected in 
2007) in the two electoral cycles. As such, Timor-Leste can legitimately claim the 
status of a democratic polity, even if the regime is far from achieving 
"consolidation," the term set out by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan10 and by Larry 
Diamond.11 
IS TIMOR-LESTE A "SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL" REGIME? 
Background: On the Notions of "Semi-Presidentialism" 
The emergence of "semi-presidentialism" as a tercium genus of democratic, 
constitutional systems of government, clearly individuated and distinguished both 
from "parliamentarism" and "presidentialism," is a major development of twentieth-
century political theory, 12 in spite of a continuing academic debate ranging from 
issues regarding nomenclature to the fine-tuning of its definitions. This system of 
government extends its roots back to the Weimar Republic (1919-33), under the 
influence of Max Weber, 13 but for many decades remained a nameless child with few 
siblings, 14 all of whom lived in Europe. 
In 1970, Maurice Duverger coined the term in his attempt to single out the 
novelty of the French Fifth Republic, namely the regime that emerged from the 1962 
amendment to the 1958 constitution, which introduced direct popular elections for 
the Presidency of the Republic. Duverger would expand on his proposal in his Echec 
au Roi15-during a time when Portugal had adopted a similar system of 
government-and summarized his views for the Anglo-Saxon academic world in a 
much acclaimed paper in 1980. These are the intellectual roots of this concept of a 
10 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), pp. 7-15. 
11 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Cansolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999) pp. 732-77. 
12 Lobo and Neto, 0 Semipresidencialismo, p. 261. 
13 Horst Bahro, "A influencia de Max Weber na Constitui<;ao de Weimar e o semipresi-
dencialismo portugues coma sistema de transi<;ao" (The influence of Max Weber on the 
Constitution of the Weimar Republic and Portuguese semi-presidentialism as a transition 
system), Analise Social 31,4 (138), pp. 777-802. 
14 As stated by Sartori, "In 1919 there was no notion of semi-presidentialism." See Giovanni 
Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and 
Outcomes (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1994), p. 127. 
15 Maurice Duverger, Echec au Roi (Checkmate) (Paris: Albin Michel, 1978). For a Portuguese 
translation with an exclusive preface, see Xeque-Mate-Andlise Comparativa dos Sistemas 
Pol{ticos Semi-Presidenciais (Lisboa: Edi<;6em Rolim, 1980). See also Duverger's "A New 
Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," European Journal of Political Reseatch 
8,2 (1980): 165-87. 
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particular system of government, which have been further developed in recent 
decades. 
The onset of the "third wave of democratisation" that Samuel Huntington dates 
to the Portugal's Carnation Revolution of April 25, 1974,16 constitutes a second factor 
explaining the explosion of interest in this system of government, both in academia 
and in the political arena. Whereas Spain (1975-76) and Greece (1974) made their 
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy through the more conventional 
"parliamentary" route, Portugal chose the new model-and, as democracy has 
expanded throughout the world since, the number of countries moving along this 
path has steadily increased. From an almost residual category, "semi-
presidentialism" saw its popularity grow to the point that in 2002 it represented 22 
percent of 114 democracies.17 The most recent and comprehensive survey of "semi-
presidentialism" carried out by Robert Elgie reveals that, in 2010, there were fifty-
two countries with this type of constitutional arrangement-including countries that 
cannot be considered democracies.18 More important is the fact that the popularity of 
this system derived from its appeal to young democracies, in central and eastern 
Europe, Africa, and Asia. 19 For various scholars, this is not a mere coincidence, as 
they acknowledge a positive impact of "semi-presidentialism" on "the consolidation 
and the maintenance of democracy,"20 even if no consensual explanation of the 
reasons for this trend has yet emerged. To analyze this question, it is appropriate to 
start with Du verger's classic definition of" semi-presidentialism": 
A political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the constitution 
which established it combines three elements: (1) the president of the 
republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he possesses quite considerable 
powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers 
who possess executive power and governmental power and can stay in office 
only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them.21 
This definition is composed of two objective elements (the first and the last) and a 
quite subjective one. So then, what are to be considered "considerable powers" of a 
president? There seems to be no litmus test to gauge an answer to this question. 
Attempting to solve the problem while remaining as close as possible to the original 
16 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave of Democratization (Norman, OK: Oklahoma 
University Press, 1991). 
17 Jose Antonio Cheibub, "Making Presidential and Semi-Presidential Constitutions Work," 
Texas Law Review 87,7 (2009): 1375-1407. 
18 Robert Elgie, Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p. 24. 
19 Robert Elgie and Sophie Moestrup, Semi-Presidentialism outside Europe (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2007), p. 9. I would like to stress that I shall be considering "semi-presidentialism" only as far 
as it is one particular form of democratic government. Systems of government that may 
present formal similarities but that are not framed by a constitutional regime respecting the 
rule of law (as was, for instance, the case in Angola prior to the recent constitutional revision), 
require particular analysis and should be treated separately from the context of the current 
discussion. 
20 Steven D. Roper, "Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-
Presidential Regimes," Comparative Politics 34,3 (2002): 253-72. 
21 Duverger, "New Political System Model," p. 165. 
50 Rui Gra<;a Feij6 
definition has led subsequent writers in two alternative directions. On the one hand, 
Giovanni Sartori22 has expanded on the number of conditions and proposed the 
following set of necessary characteristics: First, in a "semi-presidential" democracy, 
the head of state (president) is selected by popular vote-either directly or indirectly 
for a fixed term in office; second, the head of state shares the executive power with a 
prime minister, thus entering a dual authority structure the three defining criteria of 
which are: (a) the president is independent from parliament but cannot govern alone 
or directly and, therefore, his or her will must be conveyed and processed via his or 
her government; (b) conversely, the prime minister and his or her cabinet are 
"president-independent" in that they are "parliament-dependent," that is, they are 
subject to either parliamentary confidence or no-confidence (or both) and in either 
case need the support of a parliamentary majority.; and (c) the dual authority 
structure of semi-presidentialism allows for shifting balances of power within the 
executive, under the strict condition that the "autonomy potential" of both the 
president and prime minister executive remains. 
On the other hand, Elgie thought it possible to operationalize the concept of 
"semi-presidentialism" as a "system where a popularly elected president exists 
alongside a prime minister and a cabinet who are responsible to the legislature" -
thus eliding the question of presidential powers altogether.23 In an attempt to 
provide a pragmatic solution for a great deal of cases, Jorge Novais has suggested 
that "the most decisive power a president may have in semi-presidential regimes is 
the power to dissolve parliament."24 The existence of this power can solve the issue 
of 11considerable powers" in a positive way (that is, where it exists, presidential 
powers can be deemed "considerable"). However, the absence of this power might 
not rule out the classification of a particular regime as "semi-presidential," as the 
authority to dissolve parliament could instead be replaced by another power of 
similar effect, as was the case in Portugal between 1976 and 1982 when the president 
had the power to dismiss the prime minister, but not to dissolve parliament. 
Wide or narrow, each of these proposed definitions shares the idea that there is 
at the core of "semi-presidentialism" some form of duality of power. As Sartori puts 
it: 
The one characteristic that any semi-presidential regime must have [ ... ] is a 
dual structure of authority, a two-headed configuration. Thus, any semi-
presidential Constitution must establish, in some manner, a diarchy between 
a president who is head of the state, and a prime minister who heads the 
government. 25 
Alan Siarof argues that the critical feature distinguishing "semi-presidentialism" 
from other systems of government is the combination of parliamentary 
accountability (the definitional feature of "parliamentarism") with presidential 
22 Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, pp. 131-32. 
23 See Elgie, Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance, especially pp. 19-23, for 
a discussion of this definition. 
24 Jorge Reis Novais, Semipresidencialismo, Volume 1: Teoria do Sistema de Governo Semipresidencial 
(Semi-presidentialism, volume 1: Theory of the semi-presidential government system) 
(Coimbra: Almedina, 2009), p. 155. 
25 Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, p. 122. 
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powers, here taken in a generic sense,26 a combination that incorporates the duality 
criterion. For Siaroff and Elgie, then, the analysis of the extent of presidential powers 
is not an initial, definitional issue in terms of the basic identity of the system, but 
becomes essential on a finer analysis of varieties of "semi-presidentialism." What are 
these varieties? 
Progressing with the history of the debate, Matthew Shugart and John Carey,27 
although critics of the terminology in use, 28 proposed two models of regimes with 
directly elected presidents that, in fact, represent subtypes of a common, semi-
presidential regime. These authors, struck by the fact that in the two decades before 
their book was published, "nearly all new democracies [ ... ] had elected presidents 
with varying degrees of political authority," 29 divided regimes having a directly 
elected president into three categories. First, they defined "presidentialism" as a 
"regime type based on the ideal of a maximum separation of powers (between the 
executive and the legislative branches), and full and exclusive responsibility of the 
cabinet to the president" -thus sustaining its classic definition. They then defined 
two new and distinct forms of government combining an elected president with a 
prime minister who owes his/her power to the confidence (or at least the 
acquiescence) of parliament: "premier-presidentialism" as "a type in which the 
president has certain significant powers, but the cabinet is responsible only to the 
assembly," and "president-parliamentary" whose defining trait is "shared-or 
confused-responsibilities over cabinets between president and assembly." 30 
These two cases may be regarded as species of "semi-presidentialism," since 
they share the basic elements pertinent to the definition of this system. Both radically 
differ from "presidentialism," even if the fact that the president has a fixed term and 
cannot be removed is a point in common. In semi-presidential models, however, the 
assembly that supports the cabinet can, as a general rule, be dissolved by the 
president; or, alternatively, the prime minister supported by the assembly can be 
likewise dismissed. As such, the principle of absolute separation between legislative 
and executive that characterizes "presidentialism" does not hold in these two cases. 
26 Alan Siaroff, "Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-
Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction," European Journal of Political Research 42,3 (2003): 
290. 
27 Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design 
and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
28 Arguably, their criticism may be based on an erroneous assumption regarding a presumed 
continuum between two poles that Sartori (Comparative Constitutional Engineering, p. 124), 
Lijphart (Arend Lijphart, "Trichotomy or Dichotomy?" European Journal of Political Research 
31,1 [1997]: 126), and Pasquino (Gianfranco Pasquino, "Semipresidentialism: A Political Model 
at Work," European Journal of Political Research 31,1 [1997]: 130) have convincingly argued to be 
non-extant in Duverger's notion. 
29 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, p. 2. 
30 Ibid., p. 15. Shoesmith's argument (as referred to by Kingsbury in this volume) that the 
centrality of the president's power resides in his or her capacity to influence the composition 
of government, if understood as a "public" rather than "private" power, is certainly not 
compatible with the "premier-presidential" type, which seldom gives the president such 
power, at least openly, but would certainly conform to the second. As such, it does not seem to 
be a pertinent benchmark to exclude particular regimes from "semi-presidential" 
classification. See Dennis Shoesmith, "Timor-Leste: Semi-Presidentialism and the Democratic 
Transition in a New, Small State," in Semi-Presidentialism outside Europe, pp. 219-35. 
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For most practical purposes, the item in the list of presidential powers that can 
better be singled out to represent the distinction between these two varieties of 
"semi-presidentialism" is the power to dismiss the prime minister. When the 
president has such a power, the chances that his powers overlap and in some way 
are confused with those of the prime minister is greater than in those cases in which 
the president cannot remove a prime minister but can dissolve the assembly and call 
fresh elections. This, of course, is the central feature distinguishing forms of 
"parliamentarism" (which does not, as a rule, accept dissolution of parliament by an 
external power). In Portugal, since 1982 (when the president lost his power to 
dismiss a prime minister but gained greater capacity to dissolve parliament), the 
presidential prerogative to dissolve parliament regardless of the majority opinion 
was only used twice, 31 both times by presidents confronted with parliaments in 
which political majorities existed. The scarcity of its use (twice in twenty-eight years) 
does not diminish its centrality in the balance of power. 
Shugart and Carey are also to be credited with two other important 
developments in the understanding of the way semi-presidential regimes operate 
and can be analyzed. Instead of using long checklists of presidential powers like 
Timothy Frye's twenty-seven items, 32 they have sought to aggregate presidential 
powers into major areas, and then to divide these into "legislative" and "non-
legislative" powers. Although in theory these different powers are independent of 
the variety of "semi-presidentialism," there is a clear tendency for "premier-
presidential" regimes to offer their presidents substantial "non-legislative" powers 
(regarding the formation and the dismissal of cabinets, censure, dissolution of the 
assembly), whereas the "president-parliamentary" species shifts the balance in favor 
of extensive "legislative" powers (package veto I override, partial veto/ override, 
decree, exclusive introduction of legislation, budgetary power, proposal of 
referendums, judicial review) for the president, who actually shares these powers 
with the prime minister. 33 
Shugart and Carey also introduced a zero-to-four scale to measure each one of 
the presidential powers. This method has been scrutinized by Lee Metcalf,34 who 
proposed some revisions. Recent comparative works on "semi-presidentialism," 
31 Some might count three cases, but the first one (General Eanes in 1982) was immediately 
after the Constitutional revision and used by a president elected before that major change, 
which affects comparability. In another case (Mario Soares in 1987), the majority in parliament 
was not "hostile" to the president, and proposed to form an alternative government to the 
minority cabinet of the single largest party, which had fielded a candidate against Soares and 
had been defeated in the House by a vote of censure. In the third case (Jorge Sampaia in 2004), 
there was a majority "hostile" to the president and in support of a government whose prime 
minister was not dismissed while fresh elections were called. In the cases of other parliament 
dissolutions (Sampaia in 2002 and Cavaco in 2011), all political parties agreed with early 
elections, thus, limiting the options of the presidents who were both confronted with the 
resignation of the prime minister (first, Guterres and, in 2011, Socrates). In the case of Portugal, 
where presidents require individual, personalized endorsement and officially reduce the 
weight of their party affiliation, the category of "hostile majority" should be read with caution. 
This point holds for Timor-Leste. 
32 Timothy Frye, "A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communism Presidencies," 
Comparative Political Studies 30,5 (1996): 523-52. 
33 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, pp. 149-54. 
34 Lee Kendall Metcalf, "Measuring Presidential Power," Comparative Political Studies 33 (1999): 
660-85. . 
Semi-Presidentialism and the Consolidation of Democracy 53 
namely the one carried by Marina Costa Lobo and Octavio Amorim Neto in the 
Lusophone world, including Timor-Leste, use the revised version of the initial 
scale.35 
At this point, a new question must be addressed: What is the most appropriate 
source of information to define a political system in any given country? In 1980, 
Maurice Duverger stated plainly that "the concept of a semi-presidential form of 
government is defined by the content of the constitution." But when he passed from 
the general level to a discussion of individual country cases, he acknowledged that 
the paradox of "similarity of rules, diversity of games" called for four parameters to 
be taken into account: (1) the actual content of the constitution; (2) the combination of 
tradition and circumstances; (3) the composition of the parliamentary majority; and 
(4) the position of the president in relation to this majority. 
For political scientists, therefore, a simple examination of formal 
constitutionalism will not suffice to ground the classification of political regimes as 
semi-presidential.36 The "material constitution" encompasses established practices 
that offer a basis for actions not considered in the formal constitution,37 but more 
often it operates in the opposite direction, erasing in practice some formal powers 
granted to the president. Examples here include a range of countries with presidents 
wh,o in practice, play largely ceremonial roles, in spite of the letter of the constitution 
granting them wider powers, as is the case in Austria.38 
35 Lobo and Neto, 0 Semipresidencialismo, pp. 264-65. 
36 Empirically oriented studies soon confront what Sartori calls a "material constitution" as 
distinct from the "formal constitution." There is also an ongoing debate on the extent of 
implicit powers versus those explicitly set in the printed word of a constitution. See, for 
instance, Jose Joaquim Gomes Canotilho and Vital Moreira, Os Poderes do Presidente da 
Republica (The powers of the president of the republic) (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1991) and 
Andre Freire and Antonio Costa Pinto, 0 Poder dos Presidentes. A Republica Portuguesa em 
Debate (The power of the presidents: The Portuguese Republic in debate) (Lisbon: Campo da 
Comunica<;ao, 2005), thus reinforcing the argument in favor of historically defined studies of 
the ways power is actually exercised. "Implicit" powers are those not specifically stated in the 
listing of presidential competences but that can be derived-if only in specialr abnormal 
occasions-from generic functions as "commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces" (to what 
extent does this imply that the president be constantly informed of all government policies in 
detail? Is a presidential agreement necessary prior to any major decision? Can he or she 
actively intervene?) or as "guarantor of the normal functioning of institutions." (Can the 
president dismiss a prime minister in breach of a constitutional obligation even if supported 
by a parliamentary majority?) 
37 Sometimes this can be pushed to the limits and actually oppose the letter of the Constitution. 
One such example was President De Gaulle's decision to initiate referendums in defiance of 
the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which was not challenged either politically or legally by 
his opponents. 
38 Arguably, presidents of Timar Leste have regarded the letter of the Constitution as defining 
too narrow a scope of competences and powers in view of the "traditional" values of the land 
that they espoused. It is curious to remark that neither Xanana Gusmao nor Ramos-Horta 
were members of the Constituent Assembly and were, thus, mostly absent from the debate on 
the system of government. Their subsequent career at the very top of the Timorese political 
world, partly rooted in their past achievements, sheds light on the assumptions and political 
choices made by the international community and the UN administration under Sergio Vieira 
de Mello favoring formal procedures {party formation and elections) over the recognition of 
Timor-Leste's own political structures (such as the umbrella-like CNRT that encompassed all 
sectors of political opinion) and allowing a constituent process to go ahead without the direct 
participation of major players. This sort of option was made in a country where personalities 
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In brief, we might state that formal "constitutional engineering," or 
"constitutional design," matters greatly in the way it shapes the politicians' pursuit 
of their interests39 and, therefore, is critical to the process of classifying particular 
political systems.40 But this view cannot be separated from a historical analysis that 
identifies the "material constitution," or the entrenched political praxis, which 
combines both the formal and informal elements to provide a full picture of the 
environment in which politicians and citizens actually live, and the rules by which 
they abide 
The Case of Timor-Leste 
Most readings of the constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste will 
recognize in its articles the basic tenets of a semi-presidential form of government. In 
Timor-Leste, the president of the republic is elected by universal, direct popular 
suffrage for a term of five years. Parliament is also elected by popular vote for a 
maximum term of five years, and the majority of members of parliament-be they 
members of one party or a number of parties in a pre- or post-electoral coalition41-
have the right to appoint the prime minister, and only they can directly bring down 
the government. These two fundamental principles institute a dual structure of 
authority as a central element in the system of government, which allows for its 
classification as "semi-presidential." 
Furthermore, among other powers, the president can dissolve the assembly-a 
power, however, that requires certain precedent conditions both in terms of timing 
and circumstances. But the president does not possess the right to dismiss the prime 
minister, whose mandate is dependent solely on the confidence of parliament.42 The 
combination of these constitutional features permits us to conclude that Timor-Leste 
has adopted the premier-presidential variety of semi-presidentialism. This 
conclusion is consistent with the analysis of presidential powers according to 
Shugart and Carey's model, as revised by Metcalf, carried by the Portuguese 
constitutionalists Bacelar de Vasconcelos and Sousa da Cunha43: They rate the 
"legislative powers" of the Timorese president at 4.5 and the "non-legislative" at 4, 
making the Timorese president the one with the most limited powers in the 
do carry enormous weight-they are certainly at least as important as formal ideology or any 
single other base for distinctive political parties. 
39 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies, p. 13. 
40 Metcalf, "Measuring Presidential Power," p. 663. 
41 This issue, however, generated serious controversy in 2007 following the parliamentary 
elections due to the fact that FRETILIN won the plurality of votes but could not command 
enough support in the National Parliament to form a stable government, whereas several 
political parties that had run separately formed a post-election coalition that controlled the 
majority of seats. The Constitution does not specifically address this issue, thus leaving the 
door open both for presidential discretion and for any solution found in parliament-much 
like the Westminster parliament after the May 2010 elections. 
42 It is arguable that the very general Constitutional duty of the president to ensure the regular 
functioning of democratic institutions may empower him or her, in exceptional circumstances, 
to dismiss the prime minister (Article 112-2). 
43 Bacelar de Vasconcelos and Sousa da Cunha, usemipresidencialismo em Timor-Leste," pp. 
250-52. 
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Lusophone world.44 However, as noted above, this constitutional analysis does not 
capture the whole picture. A major factor requiring attention-mainly when dealing 
with the term in office of President Xanana Gusmao, 2002-7-is the difference 
between the letter of Timor-Leste's constitution and the actual implementation of its 
provisions. 
Consider two examples: the president is supposed to make certain decisions in 
consultation with two bodies-the Conselho de Estado (Council of State, CoS) and the 
Conselho Superior de Defesa e Segurani;a (Superior Council for Defense and Security, 
SCDS)-whose views are not binding but whose consultation is mandatory for the 
exercise of some of the president's powers, such as the dissolution of the assembly 
(CoS), the declaration of a state of emergency or state of siege (both councils), or the 
institutionalizing of the president's role as supreme commander of the armed forces 
(SCDS). The existence of those councils depended on the passing of ordinary 
legislation in parliament, which was supposed to expand the constitutional 
principles into operational organizations and establish their respective rules. The 
process took three full years, and the inauguration of both councils was only 
complete on May 20, 2005. In the meantime, the constitutional powers of the 
president were somewhat limited by the nonexistence of these constitutionally 
mandated institutions.45 
More important is electoral legislation. While the president has the power to 
determine the date of elections-both presidential and legislative, including an early 
election following a dissolution of parliament-he or she can only do so provided 
there is an electoral law.46 Thus, when the "crisis" erupted in April 2006, the 
president was actually empowered to dissolve parliament but not to call fresh 
elections-a dual solution that most established democracies would have 
attempted-because there was no electoral legislation to authorize the ballots. A 
highly problematic situation could arise out of a dissolved parliament in the absence 
of effective electoral legislation, as the constitution grants full powers to design and 
pass such legislation to parliament. In the actual case, electoral bills were passed by 
parliament when Ramos Horta was prime minister at the end of 2006, just in time for 
the president to call elections that would guarantee that the terms in office would not 
extend beyond their five-year constitutional limit. 
These two examples reveal the extent to which there was a wide gap between the 
constitution's abstract provisions and the actual pace of implementation of the 
instruments necessary for principles to be operationalized and transformed into 
actual institutions and deeds. The presidency was slow in acquiring these 
instruments-from legal provisions to human resources or financial means-to put 
the president in a position to make effective use of the powers bestowed by the 
44 A reminder: The maximum number of points is 28 for "legislative" and 24 for "non-
legislative" powers according to this scale. The existence of limited executive powers is 
supposedly typical of the "premier-presidential" variety of this system. Lobo and Neto, 0 
Semipresidencialismo, p. 267. 
45 As a mere example: President Xanana made his first official visit to the military 
headquarters only after the inauguration of SCDS, and only then was an officer appointed to 
serve in his military supporting team (Casa Militar). 
46 The first president was elected on a provisional UN regulation, and the first parliament 
resulted from the transformation of the Constituent Assembly also elected under provisional 
UN regulations that were no longer valid after the new Constitution became the Law of the 
Land on May 22, 2002. 
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constitution. In this sense/ the "material constitution" deviated from the formal one 
by limiting the actual exercise of formal presidential powers. In one respect, it 
continues to do so, as the legal framework for the use of referendums, for example, is 
yet to be produced. 
Furthermore, on the other side of the equation, both Xanana Gusmao and Ramos 
Horta have been able to engage in areas of activity that lacked sufficient support in 
the constitutional letter, but were carried out in broad daylight. Take, for example, 
the first president's creation of a team to work on the issue of "veterans"-a sensitive 
issue in a country that owes much of its independence to a network of active 
resistance fighters, whom the guerrilla leader Xanana Gusmao led and knew 
personally in great numbers. Though this issue was taken up by Prime Minister 
Alkatiri, in his government reshuffle of June 2005, by creating a special department 
to lead the process, the moral capital of Xanana loomed larger and gave the president 
ample room to determine the final shape of this particular policy. Another example 
of practical initiatives of the president was Xanana' s involvement in the creation of 
the Museum and Archive of the Resistance-an initiative of high symbolic 
importance, arguably an expression of his duties in the realm of consolidating 
national unity and identity, but easily bordering on a demonstration of rivalry with 
government competences in cultural policies. 
Ramos Horta has considered it his duty to offer a sort of "emergency aid" to 
cases of particular hardship that are brought to his attention. He created a team that 
provides responses to such appeals within one month, and sets plans that cannot last 
longer than six months-with more serious and lengthy cases channeled to the 
government for normal procedures. This represents a revised version of a similar 
initiative that was deemed to be in breach of the constitution by the Court of Appeal, 
which is now legitimized by mandated support from the government's own budget 
(but effectively managed by the staff of the presidency). Both cases reveal a systemic 
tolerance for some executive duties to be carried out by the president, regardless of 
the restrictions that the letter of the constitution imposes on the president's powers 
in this domain-an extension of powers justified in various ways. Ramos Horta 
stated in an interview that 
no Constitution, no Law can restrain or forbid a President to have opinions 
and to set up projects in favour of the poor ... In African or Asian countries, 
where poverty is still enormous, and where the President or the King are 
regarded as the "Father of the Nation" in a very patriarchal society, and 
where the Government has no capacity to be everywhere in this struggle 
against poverty and in the process of healing the wounds of society, and 
respond quickly to the most blatant needs of the people, the President of the 
Republic must intervene and give some help, complementing the action of 
the government and diffusing the political and social tension that may grow 
against the government.47 
47 In November 2009, I was fortunate to conduct two long interviews (about two hours each) 
with former President Xanana and current President Ramos-Horta, focusing on the nature and 
the workings of the Timorese political system. Those interviews were completed in 2011 and 
2012, at a time when a third interview was conducted with former prime minister Alkatiri. 
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In this sense, the other face of the "material constitution" is one that includes those 
powers of the president that enhance the president's image as a paternal figure and, 
thus, tend to grant the president legitimacy to intervene beyond the scope of the 
constitutional text. Both the factors that enhance and those that limit the powers of 
the president in practice do not subvert the essential matrix of Timor-Leste's 
government system: the existence of a duality of powers between president and 
prime minister. 
These points regarding the power and prerogatives of the president of the 
Republic would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the case of prime ministers. Although it is 
often assumed that executive powers not specifically allocated to the president fall in 
the realm of the prerogatives of the government, the powers of prime ministers in 
"semi-presidential" regimes are not unlimited. The political dividing line often 
results more from a balance of power between the two than from any exegesis of the 
constitution, be it 11formal" or 11material." Thus, it is also true that there are examples 
of the prime minister overstepping the constitutional line and behaving in a 
questionable manner.48 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that presidential powers-such as the 
power to dissolve parliament-need not be actually exerted to be considered in these 
assessments. With this in mind, the constitutional foundations of the governmental 
system should remain our main, though not exclusive, source justifying the 
classification of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste as a 11semi-presidential" 
polity. Both Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos Horta-having both been 
president and prime minister at different times-have expressed their opinion on 
this issue, confirming their understanding that this is the best definition of the 
Timorese regime.49 
SEMl-PRESIDENTIALISM: HELP OR HINDRANCE TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF TIMORESE 
DEMOCRACY? 
The increasing number of semi-presidential experiments in democratic transition 
and consolidation requires particular corresponding attention from scholars. Of 
course, relationships between specific systems of government and the wider process 
of democratic consolidation are multiple and complex,50 and certainly not 
determined by these constitutional choices alone. Karl Popper's notion of 
"propensity,"51 or weighted probability, can be summoned to frame our discussion. 
This notion seems to be echoed in Lobo and Neto's concept of "suggestive 
associations," 52 a possible way to frame relationships between the choice of a 
48 As an example, I would argue that the decision taken under Alkatiri's government to sack 
almost one-third of those who served in the armed forces at a time when the President of the 
Republic and Commander in Chief was out of the country, and without granting his 
acquiescence for such a dramatic action, reveals a very narrow conception of presidential 
powers without constitutional basis 
49 Interviews with the author, November 2009. This is not simply a question of supporting the 
current system, which might be expected (though neither was a member of the Constituent 
Assembly), but a question of how best to characterize it. 
50 Novais, Semipresidencialismo, p. 194. 
51 Karl Popper, A World of Propensities, (Bristol: Thoernmes, 1990). 
52 Lobo and Neto, 0 Semipresidencialismo, p. 271. 
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t System and the survival of young democracies, potential cause-and-govemrnen 
effect relationships still open to debate. 
Sophie Moestrup conducted a s.urvey o~ countries involved .in demo~ratization 
processes in recent decades, assessmg the impact of the adoption of this form of 
government on the breakdown of young democracies, that is, assessing whether this 
form of government exerted an eventual negative impact on democratic 
consolidation. She concluded that "semi-presidential regimes are not more or less 
likely than either presidential or parliamentary regimes to suffer democratic 
breakdown through coups or otherwise." 53 The results of Moestrup's empirical test 
are important, not so much for these associations or correlations, but because they 
stress how urgent it is for scholars to move beyond theoretical hypotheses and focus 
on the actual, historically situated political processes of particular regimes. 
Of direct relevance to the case of Timor-Leste is Steven Roper's argument that in 
premier-presidential regimes (deemed to be more stable than president-
parliamentary regimes54), "[t]here appears to be a relationship between presidential 
power and cabinet instability."55 To the extent that Timar offers a historical example 
of an attempt to consolidate a democratic regime with a "premier-presidential" 
variety of semi-presidentialism,-and under this umbrella, one that is less generous 
with presidential prerogatives-Timor-Leste will remain an important case study. 
Theoretical Assumptions 
Examining the likely impact of semi-presidentialism upon democratic 
performance from a western European perspective, Gianfranco Pasquino has 
identified several "advantages and disadvantages of semi-presidentialism."56 Among 
disadvantages, he includes two possibilities. First, there is the risk of a turn to 
"hyper-presidentialism," wherein the accumulation of executive and legislative 
power occurs via the coincidence of majorities in presidential and parliamentary 
elections. This risk seems to be greater in "president-parliamentary" varieties of 
government, in which the overlap between the president's and the prime minister's 
authority is more likely to occur (and the risk for confrontation is residual). Second, 
there is the likelihood that political and institutional clashes may erupt between the 
president and the prime minister when the parliamentary majority is not committed 
to the president, leading to a paralysis of the decision-making process or even to a 
constitutional crisis. Again, "premier-presidential" varieties seem less prone to fall 
into this trap, as the respective roles of president and prime minister are more clearly 
distinguished in regard to "executive" powers-those which more often potentiate 
the conflict. The latter disadvantage seems to carry a convincing argument inasmuch 
as it is widely echoed as the original sin of "semi-presidentialism." 
53 Sophie Moestrup, "Semi-Presidentialism in Young Democracies: Help or Hindrance?" in 
Semi-presidentialism outside Europe, p. 40. 
54 See Elgie, Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance, for a defense of this 
thesis, including updated references. 
55 Roper," Are All Semi presidential Regimes the Same?" p. 254. 
56 Gianfranco Pasquino, "The Advantages and Disadvantages of Semi-Presidentialism: A West 
European Perspective," in Semi-Presidentialism outside Europe, pp. 14-29. 
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On the positive side of the coin, Pasquino calls our attention to the fact that 
"semi-presidentialism" has been credited with helping democracies to contain and 
dismiss undemocratic challenges by significant political actors against "the rules of 
the game," given the likelihood that some form of Arendt Lijphardt's "consensus 
democracy"57-a combination of decision-making effectiveness and a fair amount of 
agreement among the political elites-will prevail in a system that does not live by 
the "winner takes all" rule, thus retrieving Sartori's argument in favor of a flexible 
system. Pasquino's defense of the "relative advantage" of "semi-presidentialism" is 
corroborated by Novais, for whom "flexibility" translates into a better equilibrium 
and division of powers, a greater capacity to integrate different political and 
institutional actors, and an enhanced tendency to overcome blockages.58 
Different Views of the Timorese Experience 
The debate over Timor-Leste's choice of a system of government predates the 
2002 constitution. In fact, it has its roots in the time of the resistance movement, and, 
in particular, after the creation of the CNRT in 1998, when a new political unity 
platform emerged and produced developments both before and after the referendum 
of 1999. Secondly, this choice bears on the evolution of thinking on this issue among 
the leadership of FRETILIN, as the most structured political force, during the period 
between 1999 and the moment when the Constituent Assembly-amply dominated 
by this party-was called to cast its vote. Unfortunately, no systematic work has 
been done so far to shed light on what remain obscure pages of political history. 
Though we are not yet able to address the issue of the key political decisions on 
the nature of the government system from inside the Timorese political elite, an 
alternative way can be pursued by looking at what has been written by political 
commentators and analysts. Back in 2001, James Mackie suggested that the adoption 
of a semi-presidential system of government "may well be more suited to East 
Timor's needs than a purely presidential or parliamentary system," arguing that "if it 
can be combined with the sort of consensual type of legislature advocated by 
Lijphardt it could conceivably deliver better governance than any of the other 
Southeast Asian political systems."59 This line of argument had been sustained by 
various other authors right up to the present, a recent example being Bacelar de 
Vasconcelos and Sousa da Cunha, who argue that "semi-presidentialism" contains 
inherent virtues "in the equilibrium of the system of government and in the control 
of executive power [which are] decisive in the full implementation of the principle of 
the separation of powers." 60 
57 Arendt Lijphart, Democracies-Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-
One Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984). 
58 This argument echoes Robert Dahl's notion of "polyarchy"; see Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: 
Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971). See also Novais, 
Semipresidendalismo, p. 139. 
59 J. A. C. Mackie, "Future Political Structures and Institutions," in East Timar: Development 
Challenges for the World's Newest Nation, ed. Hal Hill and Joao M. Saldanha (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), p. 205. 
60 Bacelar de Vasconcelos and Sousa da Cunha, "Semipresidencialismo em Timor-Leste," p. 
237. 
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The extended roll of Portuguese scholars writing on this issue and assuming 
positive valuations is, of course, inseparable from the fact that Portugal was among 
the first countries in the last quarter of the twentieth century to adopt "semi-
presidentialism/' giving the scholars ample opportunity to participate in early 
debates;61 and from the widespread belief that Portugal may have played a critical 
role in the expansion of semi-presidentialism in the Lusophone world. In fact, 
Portuguese scholars, mainly from the Law School of the University of Lisbon, were 
active players in the constitutional reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s in 
Lusophone Africa.62 However, Timor is a different case. The leading constitutional 
expert who served in the UN administration, Pedro Bacelar de Vasconcelos, raised 
objections to the overall process and resigned before the elections for the Constituent 
Assembly. The Portuguese legacy was nevertheless felt in an indirect way. 63 The 
argument I have presented elsewhere, and that I briefly recall here, is that the 
"Portuguese legacy" was convened insofar as it presented a practical solution that 
served the interests of, at least, the party that dominated the constituent assembly, 
and since this party had a clear majority, its power could be extended in parliament 
for the first electoral cycle, but no longer, for the party lacked the force of a allied, 
charismatic leader, and, in fact, the most potentially effective leader was a political 
competitor and had to be reckoned with. Too much power to the president could 
offset the parliamentary majority; too little might drive the popular leader to operate 
from outside the system, creating a strong external pressure. The delicate balance 
was best translated into a "semi-presidential" system that would both express the 
principles of division of powers and institutional cooperation and offer a practical 
way to implement checks and balances and foster consensual policies. 
But consensus about the merits of "semi-presidentialism" in young democracies 
was not to be the key note in analyses of Timor-Leste. Soon after independence, 
critical voices were making themselves heard. Dennis Shoesmith is probably the 
most consistent advocate of this stance, arguing that "the semi-presidential system in 
the new state has institutionalized a political struggle between the president, Xanana 
Gusmao, and the prime minister, Mari Alkatir," which "has polarized political 
alliances and threatens the viability of the new state." He added, "The fault line 
established by a semi-presidential system complicates the already formidable task of 
establishing an effective and at the same time democratic system of government." 64 
This negative view of the impact of this form of government upon the consolidation 
of democracy has continued to surface regularly as Timor-Leste emerges as a country 
61 See Maurice Duverger (sous la direccion de), Les Regimes Semi-Presidentiels (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1986). 
62 The influence of the Portuguese Constitution on the fundamental laws of those countries 
"can be understood thanks to the presence of Portuguese jurisconsultants in their elaboration 
as well as the cultural proximity of many of those countries' jurists who had been formed in 
Portuguese universities." Jorge Bacelar Gouveia, As Constitutir;oes dos Estados de Lingua 
Portuguesa (The constitutions of Portuguese-speaking countries), second edition (Coimbra: 
Almedina, 2006), p. 19. 
63 Rui Grai,;:a Feij6, "Weaving New Institutions, Translating Political Grammars: A Critical 
View on Timorese Political Institutions and the 'Portuguese Legacy,"' in Paulo Castro Seixas, 
Translation, Society and Politics in Timor-Leste (Porto: Universidsade Fernando Pessoa, 2010). 
64 Dennis Shoesmith, "Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System, Asian Survey 43,2 
(2003): 231, 252. 
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hampered by recurrent problems attributed1 11in part1 to the semi-presidential 
constitutional structures."65 
True1 Shoesmith recently seemed to move away1 in part1 from his early1 critical 
stance when arguing the case to 11remake the state'' in Timor, although he still 
maintains that "the experience of the six years of independence strongly suggests 
that the current constitutional model is flawed and that there is a case for 
constitutional reform." 66 In the shorter term, his proposals were intended to clarify 
and strengthen the role of parliament. It seems that his concerns now impinge more 
on the relation between parliament and executive government than on the balance 
between this prime ministerial and presidential powers. In this sense, Shoesmith's 
proposal for a greater parliamentary role in the political life of Timor does not 
seriously question the fundaments of the semi-presidential system. Also, he seems to 
have shifted the burden of responsibility for the problems of democracy in Timor 
from "the political struggle at the centre of power" to the view that 11the defining 
variable for both semi-presidentialism and political democracy is the relative 
incapacity of the state to adequately perform basic state £unctions"67-which is a 
supportable view, if one essentially independent of concerns relating to the operative 
system of government. 
Moreover, the conclusion that "semi-presidentialism" has generated or 
institutionalized political confrontation at the core of the state sustained in the earlier 
texts by Shoesmith, can be revised in light of the chronology. By 1998, most of the 
movements and personalities involved in the resistance against Indonesia's 
occupation had come together under the umbrella of CNRT. But the history of Timor 
after 1974 is one marked by bitter rivalries (culminating in a brief civil war in August 
1975) that permeated the core of the resistance. Jose Mattoso offers a moving history 
of the harsh years, and a background for the split between Xanana and FRETILIN, in 
the mid-1980s, on strategic grounds.68 Shoesmith himself provides an account of the 
"historical legacy" and the depth and scope of divisions that existed prior to the 
referendum.69 Political divisions (and, equally important, conflicts between 
personalities who were to survive the struggle for independence and translate these 
rifts in the formation of political parties and other socially relevant organizations, 
often with blurred ideological definitions)1 therefore1 predate the adoption of the 
government system-they were not generated by it. While Shoesmith acknowledges 
that the leadership was divided prior to independence1 the view that these tensions 
were "institutionalized" can also be challenged. An alternative view would 
acknowledge that these institutions were set up in such a way as to bring preexisting1 
deep political rivalries and in-fighting inside the boundaries of constitutionally defined 
settings-rather than ignoring their existence or attempting to repress their 
65 Benjamin Reilly, "Semi-presidential Democracy in East Asia," in East Asia Forum, 
www.eastasiaforum.org I 2008I11I08, accessed on April 24, 2012. 
66 Dennis Shoesmith, "Remaking the State in Timor-Leste: The Case for Constitutional 
Reform," paper presented to the Seventeenth Biennial Conference of the Asia Studies 
Association, Melbourne, July 1-3, 2008, www.cdu.edu.au/ creativeartshumanities/profiles/ 
documents/ conference_paper_july _2008.pdf, accessed June 28, 2012. 
67 Shoesmith, "Timor-Leste: Semi-Presidentialism," p. 234. 
68 Jose Mattoso, A Dignidade: Kanis Santana e a Resistencia Timorense (Dignity: Kanis Santana 
and the Timorese resistance) (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 2005). 
69 Shoesmith, "Divided Leadership," pp. 235-46. 
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manifestations. These arrangements facilitated contact between alternative power 
bases and imposed, to a certain degree, restraints upon the political actors, and were, 
therefore, a positive element in the process. 
Representative systems need to deal with political rivalry within their walls, not 
by systematic exclusion. The claim that "semi-presidentialism" contributed to 
institutionalizing political conflict within the system, rather than allowing it to 
survive and challenge the regime from the outside, should, in fact, be read as a 
compliment rather than as a criticism. The years of Xanana's presidency illustrate 
this point, although a systematic analysis with objective benchmarks is still to be 
done. If one were to analyze the modus operandi of Xanana's presidency-including 
the institutional relations with the prime minister and his government (measured by 
vetoes, public criticism, or other indices), the mediator role he was called to perform 
and the ad-hoc committees he sponsored (all of which included representatives of 
government), or the ways in which he reached out to wider sectors of society1 both in 
his formal institutional capacity (appointments to the Council of State) and 
informally-one would certainly agree with Sven Simonsen1 who has noted that "it 
is first and foremost President Xanana Gusmao who has gone to great lengths in 
efforts to pacify political relations." 70 
Although one cannot deny the existence of rivalry and friction, these tensions 
were mostly contained within the boundaries of the constitution. Up until 2006, 
President Xanana had offered active support to the government, including at the 
time of the riots of 2002; he had vetoed no law other than with the backing of the 
Constitutional Court (he later "pocket vetoed" the Penal Code/1 which would only 
be passed by President Ramos Horta in 2010); he mediated the conflict associated 
with the demonstrations led by sectors of the Catholic Church in 2005 without 
expressing any intention to give in to pressures of that kind; he may have publicly 
criticized certain ministers (such as Rogerio Lobato), but he did not raise obstacles to 
their continuation in government even at a time of reshuffle, and so on. 
Of course, the events of 2006 brought in a new conjuncture. But then Xanana' s 
legal duty to "guarantee the regular functioning of the institutions"-shattered by 
the collapse of the security and armed forces, both under government direct 
responsibility-called for new forms of action in a situation in which hundreds of 
thousands of Timorese were living in a most precarious situation. The resignation of 
the prime minister-not associated with a dissolution of the FRETILIN-dominated 
National Parliament-was obtained through political rather than institutional means: 
Alkatiri preferred to offer his resignation when confronted with the likelihood of 
Xanana's resignation, as the president had lost confidence in the prime minister but 
was not explicitly entitled to use a dismissal power, though his prerogatives allowed 
him to dissolve parliament. 72 
70 Simonsen, "Authoritarian Temptation," pp. 580-81. 
71 
"Pocket veto" is an expression used in cases when a president stalls a piece of legislation 
without either approving or formally refusing to sign it for a period longer than the one 
prescribed in the Constitution. In this case, the purpose was to force government officials to 
reconsider the terms of the bill, which changes the prime minister tacitly agreed to redraft. 
72 In my view, Article 112-2 could be evoked to contemplate the dismissal of Alkatiri in June 
2006 because, as I understand it, this provision contemplates two situations: the "previous 
cases," which are explicit (Article 112-1), and "when it becomes necessary to guarantee the 
regular functioning of democratic institutions." This reading is not universally accepted, as 
some argue that the copulative "and" refers to a necessary second condition to be read in· 
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WHAT IF ..• ? A COUNTERFACTUAL EXERCISE 
Hidden behind the criticisms of 11semi-presidentialism" lie implicit alternative 
theses: that either "presidentialism11 or "parliamentarism" would be better suited to 
respond to the needs of Timor-Leste.73 A brief counterfactual exercise may illuminate 
the merits or otherwise of these alternatives.74 
The choice of a government system was made by the Constituent Assembly in 
2002. Momentarily moving back in time to those days, what were the key 
characteristics of the Timorese political landscape that would inform the decision to 
be taken? I would sum these up in five points. First, Timor-Leste had never 
experienced genuine democratic government, as late Portuguese colonial rule (unlike 
British, French, or Dutch rule) coincided with one of the most durable authoritarian 
regimes in Europe, and the forced integration in the Indonesian Republic also 
represented an experience in authoritarianism. Second, the country lacked most of 
the ingredients identified in the literature as marking the basis for an endogenous 
drive toward democracy, which was, to a substantial degree, brought in from the 
"outside," partly by the returned elite who had lived in the diaspora and partly by 
the imposition of conditions imposed by the "international community" to insure the 
continuation of aid. Third, Xanana, as the leader of the guerrillas for two decades, 
was popular with the people and could easily win an election should he decide to 
run. He was also highly regarded among leaders within the international 
community. Xanana, however, never organized his supporters as a political party, 
and thus lacked the ability to influence some elections (like the legislative ones). 
conjunction with, not as an alternative path to, the first element of the sentence. My argument 
is that the conditions set in Article 112-1 are valid per se, independent of their implication on 
the "regular functioning" of institutions (for instance, a prime minister's permanent state of 
incapacity, if declared, implies ipso facto dismissal from the job). Pedro Bacelar de 
Vasconcelos recently expressed a similar view in his detailed commentary of the Timorese 
Constitution; see Pedro Bacelar de Vasconcelos, Constituifao Anotada da Republica Democrdtica 
de Timor-Leste (Braga: Direitos Humanos-Centro de Investigat;ao Interdisciplinar, 2011), pp. 
362-63, available at www.dh-cii.uminho.pt/ crdtl_anotada_final.pdf, accessed June 28, 2012. 
73 For the sake of this argument, I am leaving aside a third, radical hypothesis that had already 
been discarded by the time the Constituent Assembly discussed the system of government, 
which consisted of an agreement amongst the Timorese elite, with the necessary backing from 
the "international community," for an extended "transitional period." This extended period 
might take place under the aegis of CNRT, which had anticipated a ten-year-long "transitional 
period" in its 1998 platform, prior to the launching of a constitutional experience. This option 
was based on assumptions stressing the need for consensual and inclusive policies that would 
delay the emergence of competitive politics. See Bacelar de Vasconcelos, "A Transit;ao em 
Timor-Leste, 1999-2002" (Transition in Timor-Leste, 1999-2002), in Timor-Leste, da Nai;ao ao 
Estado, ed. Rui Centeno and Rui Novais (Porto: Afrontamento, 2006), pp. 57-71. 
74 The methodological basis for this exercise can be found in Philip E. Tetlock and Aron Belkin, 
Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and Psychological 
Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); P. E. Tetlock, Richard N. Lebow, 
and Geoffrey Parker, Unmaking the West: "What If" Scenarios that Rewrite History (Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008); and Hermfnio Martins, "Tempo e Explicat;ao: Pre-
formac;ao, Epigenese e Pseudomorfose na analise socio-politica" (Time and explanation: 
Preformation, epigenesis, and pseudomorphosis in social analysis) in Portugal: Uma Democracia 
em Construr;ao, ed. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, Marina Costa Lobo, and Rui Grac;a Feij6 (Lisbon: 
Imprensa de Ciencias Sociais, 2009). 
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Fourth, provisions for the election of the Constituent Assembly allowed it to evolve 
into a national parliament without fresh elections, freezing the power balance for six 
years and allowing FRETILIN, which had emerged as a majority party claiming far 
more members than a group of smaller, divided, thinly structured political parties, to 
maintain control of parliament in the first legislature.75 Fifth, relations between 
Xanana and FRETILIN were far from harmonious, reflecting high tensions among 
the leading politicians, tensions that were inherited from the resistance period and 
were fueled by the political manuevering that eventually led to the dissolution of 
CNRT and the emergence of open political competition under the aegis and 
approving eye of the United Nations. 
Given the array of political forces in 2002, the following scenarios might have 
been possible. First, a "presidentialist" system might have been chosen, in which the 
president would be popularly elected and exercise sole executive responsibility, 
without being responsible to the legislature-and both the terms of office for the 
president and the parliament would be fixed and unchangeable (other than by the 
resignation of the president or an impeachment procedure). The election of Xanana 
as president would confront him with a parliament dominated by FRETILIN for the 
entire span of his term. Given that those two legitimacies and several key elements of 
public policies were not convergent, the risks of stalemate and rising political 
confrontation would have been higher than the tension that characterized the actual 
relations between Xanana as president and Alkatiri as prime minister under 
Timorese "semi-presidentialism." 
The risk also existed that a popular president in a country with weak institutions 
(backed by an unstructured mass of voters and an undeveloped party system) would 
be tempted to apply his charismatic appeal to sidestep parliament's likely 
obstruction, and to step to the far margins of his constitutional competence. A 
systematic polarization of both camps would make it more difficult for the image of 
a "common house" to emerge, let alone to gain roots. It is hard to envisage how, in 
this context, the alleged "effectiveness" associated with presidentialism could 
overcome the increased danger of persistent confrontation or stalemate. 
Sartori has acutely remarked that most of those who praise presidentialism 
based on the US experience fail to understand that "the American system works in 
spite of its Constitution, hardly thanks to its constitution," and it requires three 
conditions to keep delivering good results: absence of ideological principles, weak 
political parties, and locally oriented public policies.76 All three elements are clearly 
absent in Timor-Leste, where FRETILIN is a strong and ideologically marked 
political party (all others being both weaker, if not for other reasons in terms their 
shorter history, and less ideologically marked), and the national level overshadows 
all local considerations except in the fact that locally based politicians, with more or 
less visible links to traditional forms of sociocultural organization, aspire to intervene 
in the national arena through parties with extremely unbalanced results. 77 
75 Anthony L. Smith, "East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation," Journal of 
Democracy 15,2 (2004), pp. 145-59; Dwight Y. King, "Timer's Founding Elections and the 
Emerging Party System," Asian Survey 43,5 (2003), pp. 745-57. 
76 Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, p. 89. 
77 Rui Grac;a Feij6, "Elections and Social Dimensions of Democracy: Lessons from Timor-
Leste," in Timor-Leste: How to Build a New Nation, ed. Cabasset-Semedo and Durand, pp. 123-
38; and Feij6, "Counting Votes that Count." 
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Alternatively, the adoption by the Constituent Assembly of a model based on a 
parliament alone, giving the president no more than a ceremonial role (and perhaps 
establishing a president who was not chosen through direct, popular election), that 
is, a solution grounded on the principle of "winner takes all" and the condition that 
the "winners" would be judged by the people in the next election, would likely have 
led to the reinforcement of the tendency shown by FRETILIN to "go it alone." These 
conditions would have reduced incentives for the parliament to adopt any form of 
"consensus policies," and, in the extreme, would have excluded from all but the most 
formal political games important sectors of the opposition-in and out of parliament. 
The "path to authoritarianism" in various shades, sensed by Simonsen, Jacqueline 
Siapno,78 or Bacelar de Vasconcelos and Sousa da Cunha, which could easily have led 
to the permanent domination of parliament by the winning party, would have been 
open; this sort of parliamentary "authoritarianism" characterized Mexico throughout 
most of the twentieth century or, perhaps more to the point, Mozambique's 
experience of FRELIMO' s permanent domination after the country adopted a 
multiparty system. Bearing in mind the weakness of the judicial system in Timor-
Leste, there could be little confidence in the theoretical model of checks and balances 
under parliamentary regimes. One can only wonder how the 2006 crisis would have 
ended without the intervention of a directly elected president. 
In this case, a "mostly ceremonial" definition of the role of the president would 
have increased the likelihood that Xanana would have declined to run for office, 79 
thus keeping his prestige and popularity-and his followers-outside the political 
institutions, with devastating power to criticize from the outside and to erode the 
government's institutional capacity to respond to popular demands. Alternatively, 
electing a president who could rapidly become a "prisoner in the palace" could 
tempt a frustrated chief executive to engage in a populist drive, by sidestepping the 
legal definition of his or her mandate and calling into question, rather than 
consolidating, the choices of the Constituent Assembly. In sum, the goal of "reducing 
the intensity of the expression of political conflict and restricting it to peaceful 
institutionalized channels," a goal and measure of democratic consolidation, 
according to Richard Gunther, Nikoforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, 80 
would certainly not have been facilitated by the decision to institute a parliamentary 
system of government. Conversely, the confusion between a critique of government 
and a critique of "the system" would be much easier to pass on to the masses of 
Timorese citizens. 
78 Jacqueline Siapno, "Timar-Leste-On a Path to Authoritarianism?" Southeast Asian Affairs 1 
(2006): 325-42. 
79 Pedro Bacelar de Vasconcelos reports that on the last day of the electoral campaign for the 
Constituent Assembly, Xanana gave public assurances that he would seek a presidential 
mandate regardless of the system of government that the representatives of the Timorese 
people chose (Bacelar de Vasconcelos and Sousa da Cunha, "Semipresidencialismo em 
Timar," p. 233). Xanana later declared in an interview with me (Dili, November 2009) that his 
decision was made much later and under serious international pressure, which might, in fact, 
presume a more prominent role for the president in the political balance. 
80 Richard P. Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds., The Politics of 
Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 9. 
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Moreover, Timor-Leste's weak party system is a key factor in our appraisal of the 
government system. As Sartori notes, 81 to be effective, "parliamentarism" requires 
that political parties be adapted to parliamentary life, that is, be socialized (through 
failure, long experience, and adequate incentive) to be cohesive and disciplined 
organisms. The real question seems to be which political attitude better suited the 
goals of consolidating democracy in 2002: to marginalize, outlaw, suppress or even 
repress historically rooted dissent that defied a majority of votes in one single 
election; or to try and incorporate differences of political opm10n in a common 
"house." And which political system better suited the accomplishment of a 
preferable attitude? 
These two scenarios suggest that the capacity to integrate different sectors of the 
political elite, with independent views, conflicting interests, and diverse forms of 
legitimacy,82 into commonly accepted institutional arrangements with checks on the 
power of each player and power sharing-even with its attached danger of 
institutionalized confrontation-should be favored over the alleged "efficiency" of 
majority rule. "Semi-presidentialism" has, at its core, a dual structure of authority, 
unbound to fixed terms (as parliament may be dissolved early) and a capacity for 
flexible combinations and power arrangements between the holders of the two main 
political seats. These features allow this system of government to be more open and 
inclusive, and they attract to the institutional circle wider sectors of political society 
than any of its rivals. 
CONCLUSION 
Rather than reflect on the merits of a specific type of government system in 
abstract, this chapter has sought to examine Timor-Leste's choice of a system of 
government in the specific historical context of its quest for democratic 
consolidation.83 It has been argued that the overwhelming requirement of a system of 
government in this particular historical case would rest on its capacity to be inclusive. 
Apart from its capacity to deliver "effective goods" and foster "behavioral" and 
"attitudinal" democracy, the system should be judged by its contribution to 
implement "constitutional" democracy, that is, a situation in which "governmental 
81 Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, p. 94. 
82 See Kelly Cristiane Silva, "Suffering, Dignity and Recognition: Sources of Political 
Legitimacy in Indepenedent Timar," in Timor-Leste: How to Build a New Nation, pp. 139-55. 
83 The fact that Timor-Leste had skipped a classic "transition" period, having existed for three 
years under a "UN Kingdom" (Jarat Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor," Survival 
42,3 [2000]: 27-39) marked by "benevolent despotism" (Joel C. Beauvais, "Benevolent 
Despotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East Timar," International Law and Politics 33 
(2001): 1101-78; Samantha Powell, Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save 
the World [London: Allen Lane, 2008]), or "benevolent autocracy" (Simon Chesterman, 
"Building Democracy through Benevolent Autocracy," in The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: 
Between Ideals and Realities, ed. Edward Newman and Richard Rich [New York, NY: United 
Nations University Press, 2004]), would suggest this process be protracted and shaken by 
some features of the leap-frogged stage like political confrontation, bargaining, and 
translating. The collapse of the CNRT in late 2000, only two and a half years after its creation 
as a national platform of unity, had revealed the depth and scope of divisions among different 
currents of opinion that would seem to constitute a stubborn feature of the political landscape. 
See Rui Gra<;a Feij6, Timor-Leste: Paisagem Tropical com Gente Dentro (Timor-Leste: Tropical 
landscape with people inside) (Lisbon: Campo da Comunica<;ao, 2006). 
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and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become 
subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, 
procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process."84 The role of 
democratic institutions is not to avoid a vast array of possible problems-as 
sometimes seems to be assumed by those who replace analysis with long lists of a 
nascent government's difficulties and shortcomings-but to confine the responses to 
them within commonly defined and accepted boundaries. As Simonsen has pointed 
out, "exclusionary politics and win/lose outcomes in political disputes would seem 
to be counterproductive in relation to the goal of (re)building national unity among 
East Timorese."85 
Sartori and Pasquino stress that "semi-presidentialism" is a flexible system that 
brings to the core of political life the expression of the notion of checks and 
balances-a consideration that both former President Xanana and current President 
Ramos Horta are keen to emphasize as the main virtue of a system they both believe 
is well suited to the actual needs of their country, and which, in their view, should 
not be questioned in its basic tenets for at least another two presidential terms. 86 It is 
a system that responds to different configurations of political alignment and 
parliamentary and presidential bases of power without ever losing its individuality 
among government systems. 
A key element in the debate ought to be the role of political parties. It seems 
inconceivable that "presidentialism" or "parliamentarism" could operate 
democratically without relying on the hegemony of political parties over political 
life. Yet Timor-Leste does not fit this picture-nor, indeed, do several other young 
democracies, in which figures with great moral authority are politically active and 
use their prestige and capacity to influence public policies in ways that are not 
necessarily mediated by political parties.87 The powers and prerogatives of 
presidents vary greatly in these situations, as do public perceptions of their role, 
even within the "semi-presidential" group of countries alone. 
In the case of Timor-Leste, one key attribute of the designed system-which may 
be regarded as a practical expression of its inherent flexibility-is its capacity to be 
inclusive, that is, to create ways through which a vast array of sectors can find a place 
in public life. Take for instance the diverse range of presidential appointments to the 
Council of State.ss These are clear illustrations that the construction of trust, and the 
distribution of roles across party lines-so critical to building democracy as a 
84 Linz and Stepan, Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 6. 
85 Simonsen, "Authoritarian Temptation," p. 595. 
86 Interviews with the author in November 2009. 
87 The most obvious example is the Catholic Church of Timor Leste, whose leaders and a great 
number of members publicly comment on and influence political debate, but refuse to take 
part in state organizations, even those of a consultative nature, such as the Council of State, 
other than in ad hoc committees. 
88 President Ramos-Horta's five appointees to the Council of State were: an independent 
member of the three governments supported by the FRETILIN majority between 2002 and 
2007; a member of one of the political parties that could not elect a single MP, but as a group 
polled over 10 percent of the votes; a woman from the Oecussi district to demonstrate gender 
as well as regional sensitivity; the rector of the university, inherited from Xanana's previous 
appointments; and the president of the National Electoral Commission. Add to those five the 
appointment of Ana Pessoa, for many the second-in-command in Mari Alkatiri's government, 
to the important post of attorney general. 
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"common house"-has been facilitated by the choice of this specific system of 
government Dual authority may lead, at one point or another, to some form of 
confrontation; but the fact that this system can delineate hierarchical order and 
specific powers to both president and prime minister, and, more importantly, can 
oscillate in giving one or the other a more prominent role when required, while 
remaining sensitive to power shifts expressed in elections, can truly be considered, as 
Sartori believed, to possess virtues of "institutional witchcraft," helping to create a 
common house for political actors of different or diverging persuasions. That is what 
the consolidation of democracy primarily requires. 
THE CONSTITUTION: 
CLARITY WITHOUT CONVENTION 
Damien Kingsbury 
As the state of Timor-Leste has begun to consolidate, there has been considerable 
debate about how to understand its constitution. This debate has been primarily over 
the role and powers of the president and the terms and conditions whereby political 
parties can form government. This debate is not merely academic or theoreticat for it 
has a direct impact on how Timor-Leste political society organizes itself, how 
decisions are made, and who wields power. This is particularly important given the 
state's fragility and its demonstrated capacity for internal political violence. 
The unpacking and interpretation of a constitution is usually undertaken by the 
state's senior judicial entity, such as a constitutional or supreme court. Without such 
adjudication, there can be considerable disagreement or misunderstanding about 
how to understand what a constitution actually implies in terms of what is and is not 
acceptable political behavior. Constitutions also often function alongside convention, 
or a generally agreed set of political behavioral norms (especially in more established 
states) that are not specified in the constitution yet may become established and 
accepted practice. 
This chapter argues that the constitution of Timor-Leste is clear on the role and 
powers of the president and on the formal requirements for being able to form 
government. Within this, the chapter argues that the Timor-Leste Constitution1 does 
not define Timor-Leste as a /{semi-presidential" political system, similar to some 
other Lusophone countries in which the president shares executive decision making 
with the prime minister and other ministers. Rather, the constitution defines Timor-
Leste as a parliamentary political system, in which all executive power is held by the 
prime minister and his ministers but some reserve powers are held by the elected 
head of state. This is a critical distinction in times of political upheaval, during which 
the president and the prime minister might hold differing views on how to address 
particular situations. 
While interpreting the constitution has usually been allocated to the judiciary, 
because the state did not yet possess a judiciary capable of offering sound-and, as 
importantly, final-constitutional interpretation, such debate continues. Moreover, 
1 Assemblia Constituinte Timor-Leste (Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timar), 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 2002. 
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where some, usually more established, states will have also adopted a set of practices 
as convention (e.g., "twinning," whereby if a government member is unintentionally 
absent from parliament one member of the opposition party will abstain from the 
proceedings), Timor-Leste has not established such conventions. In relation to the 
allocation of powers, some observers have suggested that, while the constitution may 
be understood in a particular way, the practice has been for it to be implemented in a 
manner that is different from the way it is formally articulated. In this case, while the 
president might not formally have executive authority, if he or she exercises such 
authority and it is followed, then the convention of its existence is established. This 
chapter argues that, while the president has (rarely) acted beyond his constitutional 
authority, this has not always been followed by others; the president's actions have 
been ignored by the government. When the president has acted beyond the 
constitutional scope of the presidency, it has been as a result of a lack of 
understanding of constitutional limitations, and it has been opposed by the prime 
minister and other ministers of the day. In that sense, the convention has not been 
established in Timor-Leste. 
As this was written, a Supreme Court of Timor-Leste, which has responsibility 
for constitutional interpretation,2 had not yet been established, the highest court 
being the Court of Appeals. As the highest available court, the Court of Appeals had 
technical authority over Supreme Court matters until a Supreme Court was 
established, 3 but despite "advising" twice on constitutional matters (whether the 
president should sign a law on amnesties, and pardons for war crimes), the Court of 
Appeals had not made binding determinations. 
While there is now judicial expertise in Timor-Leste, in its early years, such 
judicial expertise was largely in the hands of international jurists while local jurists 
completed judicial training programs. 4 Such jurists were likely to interpret the 
Timor-Leste constitution according to their own political and judicial experiences. 
For example, a Portuguese jurist could be expected to understand the Timor-Leste 
constitution set against the experience of the similar Portuguese constitution and 
within the context of a European civil law tradition. A jurist from a Westminster 
parliamentary background would probably have a different interpretation of any 
particular law, given the British government's basis in common law. Given that 
Timor-Leste has followed the Portuguese civil law system, interpretations by 
Portuguese or Lusophone jurists might be thought to be more accurate. However, all 
interpretations of the new constitution and an evolving legal code remained subject 
to debate, not least because interpretations were largely undertaken by nonnationals, 
though one would expect the resolution of these questions by the Timorese 
themselves to be considered as a principle criterion for adjudication on matters of 
such significance to the state. Importantly, too, assumptions about the similarities of 
the Timor-Leste constitution to the Portuguese constitution, while broadly correct, 
may be incorrect in specific instances; the Timor-Leste and Portuguese constitutions 
are much alike, but they are not identical. 
2 Ibid., Section 124.2. 
3 Ibid., Section 164.2. 
4 United Nations Development Program, 11Establishment of the Judicial Training Centre in 
Timor-Leste: Building Legal Capacity of the Newest Nation in the Asia-Pacific Region," 2009. 
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POLITICAL MODELS 
On the question of the Timor-Leste political model, a number of observers of 
Timor-Leste politics have described it as a "semi-presidential" system, rather than as 
parliamentary (with an elected head of state, a "parliamentary republic").5 That the 
president of Timor-Leste is directly elected (as opposed to being indirectly elected, 
such as via the parliament) has been claimed to enhance the authority of the office, 
allowing the president scope to act in ways not defined by the constitution. It has 
been further extrapolated that the direct election of the president also means that 
Timor-Leste has a semi-presidential political system. The direct election of the 
president, and the authority that the chief executive can assume from that process, 
have formed the basis of arguments against the direct election of the president in 
other proposed parliamentary republics (e.g., Australia). Critics have raised concerns 
that a directly elected president (one chosen to replace, for example, a monarch or his 
or her representative, such as a governor-general) might claim a popular mandate. 
Ireland, however, which has a directly elected president, retains a purely ceremonial 
presidency. 
What is important to note here is that Timor-Leste's constitution details the 
powers ("competencies") of the president in a clear and internally consistent and 
logically coherent manner. In this respect, the powers of the president are similar to 
and derive from those available in constitutional monarchies (parliamentary 
democracies that formally have a monarch as head of state). Such powers commonly 
include appointing a government on the basis of a parliamentary majority, the 
swearing in of ministers, ratification of legislation, and, in some cases, powers of 
commutation of criminal sentences. In a number of cases, a constitutional monarch is 
also an arbiter of constitutional matters (such as the removal of a government), 
although this role can usually be challenged through a supreme court. Finally, a 
constitutional monarch is also commonly the nominal head of the armed forces. Such 
a position might otherwise have an arbitrating quality in cases of internal dispute 
(e.g., the monarchy in Thailand). 
In that republics characteristically elect the head of state, as opposed to having a 
hereditary head of state, the position of president is, in effect, that of an "elected 
monarch." This is consistent with the development of modern republicanism, which 
followed the refusal of the United States' first president, George Washington, to be 
made "king" of the United States. In collaboration with Thomas Jefferson, John 
Adams, and Benjamin Franklin, Washington instead drafted a constitution that 
placed political authority, over which an elected president would preside, in the 
hands of the citizens. 
This political model displaced hereditary monarchic sovereignty, through which 
the sovereignty of the state was manifested in the person of the monarch, and 
established, in its place, popular and changeable sovereignty. As a replacement 
model for a monarchy, the United States' republican system effectively established 
the president as an "elected king," with similar powers to that of a monarch (i.e., a 
late eighteenth-century style monarch, not a modern constitutional monarch), 
including the power to appoint nonelected ministers. 
In that a republic is defined by a form of government in which state sovereignty 
is invested in the citizens of the state, those citizens are represented by the 
5 See, for example, in this volume, Rui Gra<;a Feij6, "Semi-Presidentialism and the 
Consolidation of Democracy." 
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government on their behalf (from res publica, "public thing/ wealth"). Through the 
assumption of popular sovereignty, a republic1 thus1 has an elected individual as the 
head of state. In most cases1 the head of state in a republic is identified as a president 
as is the case of Timor-Leste. If the president is also the head of government, the 
system is a "presidential republic," in which the president appoints ministers 
(sometimes "secretaries") and the legislature passes laws, in line with a classical 
"separation of powers" between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. This 
trias politica is referred to in the Timor-Leste constitution, Section 69, although its 
reference to "interdependence" between the state's "organs of sovereignty" qualifies 
the separation of powers in Timor-Leste's case. 
The primary distinction between Timor-Leste's parliamentary republican system 
and presidential republicanism, though, is that Timor-Leste's head and executive of 
government derives from the parliament ("parlamento nacional" 6), while the role of 
the presidency is circumscribed by the constitution. The status of Timor-Leste as a 
parliamentary republic derives from Section 92 of the constitution, which identifies 
Timor-Leste's parliament as "the organ of sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of 
East Timor that represents all Timorese citizens and is vested with legislative 
supervisory and political decision making powers" (original Portuguese: "O 
Parlamento Nacional e o 6rgao de soberania da Republica Democrdtica de Timor-Leste, 
representativo de todas as cidadaos timorenses com poderes legislativos, de fiscaliza<;ao e de 
decisao polltica"). This explicit reference to parliamentary "sovereignty" and 
"legislative supervisory and political decision making powers," along with a range 
of other constitutional references1 distinguishes this system from presidential 
republicanism, making it clear that Timor-Leste has a parliamentary political system. 
Similarly1 Section 1 of the constitution, and numerous sections thereafter, that 
refer to the president as the head of state, as well as to Timor-Leste by name1 make 
clear that the state is also a republic. By definition, then, Timor-Leste is a 
parliamentary republic7 (as opposed to other forms of republic, e.g., autocratic, 
people's, socialist, communist, Islamic). By way of characterization, parliamentary 
republics are organizationally close to constitutional monarchies, in which the 
authority of the head of state is circumscribed by the allocation of political authority 
to the parliament (legislature), which also appoints the executive (ministers) through 
the exercise of the parliamentary majority. In this system, the president has a largely 
ceremonial, rather than constitutionally politically active, role. Some observers have 
noted that because Timor-Leste's president has the (limited) power of veto over 
legislation, this implies that the president wields an executive or discretionary 
decision making function and, thus, qualifies Timor-Leste as a semi-presidential 
system. This logic does not1 however, follow. 
The president does have the power of veto over legislation, but this is ordinarily 
a ceremonial or "rubber stamp" function, in which the head of state approves 
legislation passed by the government of the day. The president can refer legislation 
for constitutional review, requiring it to be clarified by the senior judiciary 
competent to adjudicate on constitutional matters. This power is noted in the 
constitution and is consistent with the patterns in most other parliamentary 
democracies, including that of Portugal, upon which Timor-Leste's constitution is 
6 Assemblia, sections 92-101. 
7 See Arend Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), for characterizations of government types. · 
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based. In theory, the president can also simply veto legislation, although this is less 
likely to occur without constitutional review. That is, other than in highly unusual 
circumstances, the qualification of legislation devolves not, functionally, to the 
president but to the constitutional or equivalent court. Moreover, should the 
parliament again vote in favor of the legislation, the president is obliged to enact it 
within eight days. 8 
Section 85 of Timor-Leste's constitution provides for the promulgation (85A) and 
the right of veto (85C) of legislation within thirty days of the legislation having been 
passed. This power of promulgation and veto is consistent with constitutional 
monarchies and other parliamentary republics, in particular being closely related to 
the presidential powers available in the parliamentary republics of Portugal, in 
which the president has even more circumscribed powers, and of Ireland. Further, 
the constitution of Ireland (Bunreacht Na hEireann9) identifies that state not as semi-
presidential, but as a parliamentary republic. In particular, the Irish constitution 
clearly identifies the elected president's role as almost entirely ceremonial. The few 
claims to Portugal's status as such rest on debate over whether or not the powers of 
the president can be considered "extensive." Since 1983, in particular, such powers 
have been significantly circumscribed and are largely ceremonial.10 
While the term "semi-presidential system" has been used by some observers to 
describe Timor-Leste' s political system, 11 this could be characterized as referring to 
what some have seen as the practice or behavior of an individual president, on 
occasions, rather than to the president's constitutional authority. Particularly when 
Xanana Gusmao was president, there was a degree of overlap between his elected 
and constitutional position and the authority he held as the former leader of the anti-
Indonesian resistance. That is, in keeping with the styles of political leadership in 
some other conflict and immediate post-conflict environments, Gusmao enjoyed 
charismatic legitimacy rather than formal or "rational-legal" legitimacy. 
The term semi-presidential, however, was given currency to explain Gusmao' s 
leadership style and given intellectual substance when the term was formally 
defined by the French political scientist Maurice Duverger to describe the French 
Fifth Republic, 12 who characterized the president in such a system as enjoying 
"considerable" executive powers. According to Ben Reilly1 "Semi-presidentialism is 
an increasingly popular constitutional model that combines a directly elected 
president with significant powers as well as a prime minister chosen by the 
8 Assemblia, Article 88.3. 
9 Bunreacht Na hEireann, Article 13. 
10 See Octavio Amorim Neto and Marina Costa Lobo, "Portugal's Semi-Presidentialism 
(Re)Considered: An Assessment of the President's Role in the Policy Process, 1976-2006," 
paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 
MA, August 28, 2008; see also Darko Simovic, "The Definition of Semi-Presidential Regime-
Reformulated," paper presented to VII World Congress of the International Association of 
International Law, Athens, June 11-15, 2007. 
11 See the chapter by Feij6 in this volume. See also Reilly 2008, A. Smith, "East Timor: Elections 
in the World's Newest Nation," Journal of Democracy 15,2 (April 2004): 145-59; and D. 
Shoesmith, "Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System," Asian Survey 43,2 (2003): 231-
52. 
12 M. Duverger, Echec au Roi (Check the king) (Paris: A. Michel, 1977); M. Duverger," A New 
Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," European Journal of Political Research 
8,2 (1980): 165-87. 
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legislature."13 The defining element here is Duverger's use of the word 
"considerable" and Reilly's use of the word "significant," neither of which could be 
divined from the Timor-Leste constitution. 
As outlined by Duverger, in particular in his seminal 1980 account, a semi-
presidential system has a constitution that combines these qualities: 1) the president 
is elected by universal suffrage, 2) the president possesses quite considerable powers, 
and 3) the president has, opposite him or her, a prime minister and ministers who 
exercise executive and governmental power and who maintain their offices through 
enjoying the confidence of a majority of the parliament.14 Timor-Leste's constitution 
conforms to the first of these criteria, which is also consistent with some conventional 
parliamentary systems. However, it does not conform to the second criterion-that 
the president "possesses quite considerable powers" -the most critical defining 
element of a semi-presidential system. Further, Timor-Leste' s constitution only 
conforms, in part, to the third criterion. Reilly's interpretation of the meaning of 
semi-presidentialism is, then, correct. However, Reilly's identification of Timor-
Leste' s president as having "significant powers" is not. 
According to Duverger' s definition, semi-presidential political systems function 
in France, Finland, Russia, Pakistan, and some African states (including Portugal's 
former colony Mozambique). This system has also become popular in some 
transitional political societies, such as those of Eastern Europe. In that Mozambique 
has a semi-presidential system, it allows significantly greater powers to the president 
than does the Portuguese constitution.15 In particular, the president of Mozambique 
has the authority to make decrees (Article 144b), to appoint and dismiss ministers 
and other officials, 16 and to "guide foreign policy." 17 These divisions of power and, in 
particular, power in relation to foreign policy, are much closer to those that typify 
the two classical semi-presidential systems, France and Finland. This does not find 
an equivalence in Timor-Leste. 
The powers enjoyed by presidents in semi-presidential systems commonly 
include actual, as opposed to nominal, authority over the defense forces (e.g., France) 
and in the area of international relations (e.g., Mozambique, while in Finland 
executive authority is vested in the directly elected president, who must nonetheless 
enjoy the confidence of the parliament). Dennis Shoesmith, 18 however, has described 
Timor-Leste as having a semi-presidential system because the presidency, along with 
the government, the parliament, and the judiciary, are considered "organs of 
sovereignty" (Section 67), which follows Portugal's constitution, Article 113. Section 
92 of the Timor-Leste Constitution states, however, that "the National Parliament is 
the [not '1 an"] organ of sovereignty." 19 That is to say, the parliament of Timor-Leste is 
the singular organ of sovereignty, not just one among others. Under the constitution, 
the parliament does not allocate "legislative supervisory and political decision 
making powers" to other "organs of sovereignty.11 The constitution of Timor-Leste 
13 B. Reilly, "Semi-Presidential Democracy in East Asia," East Asia Forum 8 (November 2008). 
14 Duverger, "A New Political System/' p. 8. 
15 Constituic;ao da Republica de Moc;ambique (Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique), 
2004. 
16 Ibid., articles 160.lc, 160.2, 161a. 
17 Ibid., Article 162. 
18 Shoesmith, "Divided Leadership,"p. 231. 
19 Emphasis added. 
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also differs significantly from the Portuguese constitution in that it reverses the onus 
of a range of "competencies/' or capacities, between the parliament and the 
president, such as the authority to call a referendum (which in Portugal resides with 
the parliament, which must propose the referendum to the president).20 
Given that Portugal is sometimes considered to be a semi-presidential system 
and, further, that the Timor-Leste constitution is based on that of Portugal, this 
would seem to add weight to the argument that Timor-Leste's system is also a semi-
presidential system. However, there is no consensus about whether the Portuguese 
political system is semi-presidential or parliamentary, especially after the 
considerable and further diminution of the Portuguese president's power in 1982 
and that office1 s subsequent loss of executive office.21 
It is worth noting, too, that Shoesmith later significantly modified his 
understanding of Timor-Leste's political system, away from the ''semi-presidential" 
model, stating, 
Under the constitution, the presidency has limited powers. A key indicator 
of institutionalised Presidential power in a semi-Presidential system is the 
ability (or lack of it) of the President to influence the appointment of cabinet 
ministers. The President does not have these powers in Timor-Leste. 
Constitutionally, the President does not play a role in the actual government 
of the state.22 
Despite identifying the constitutional limitations upon the presidency, Shoesmith 
continued to assert that the Timor-Leste system is semi-presidential because of the 
potential influence that a president can exercise beyond his or her formal powers. 
That is, Shoesmith agreed that the Timor-Leste political system was not semi-
presidential in terms of presidential powers, but that sometimes Timor-Leste's 
presidents acted in a manner that exceeded these constitutional powers, a practice 
that, in turn, justified the use of the term. 
Similar to-but not the same as-the Portuguese system, under the Timor-Leste 
constitution, the presidency is largely a ceremonial position, with only nominal 
authority over the armed forces, which formally devolves to the parliament, 23 and 
having the circumscribed power of veto of legislation and the power to appoint 
governments within circumscribed constitutional rules. These powers are similar to 
those enjoyed by ceremonial presidents in a number of other parliamentary 
republics, such as Ireland, as well as constitutional monarchies. That is to say, the 
president of Timor-Leste does not enjoy executive powers as such. 
To illustrate this point about a president exceeding the office's constitutional 
authority and the extent of constitutional powers, the 2010 discussions about the 
20 See Assembleia da Repubicla (Constitution of the Republic), Republic of Portugal, 2005, articles 
138, 139, 140, 141. 
21 See Neto and Lobo, "Portugal's Serni-Presidentialism (Re)Considered," who argue in favor 
of it being understood as a semi-presidential system. See also Simovic, "The Definition of 
Semi-Presidential Regime-Reformulated," who argues that it is a parliamentary republican 
system. 
22 D. Shoesmith, "Remaking the State in Timor-Leste: The Case for Constitutional Reform," 
paper presented to the Seventeenth Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of 
Australia, Melbourne, July 1-3, 2008. 
23 Assemblia 2002, Section 95.1.o. 
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placement of a natural gas processing plant involved the government and, assuming 
resolution, would be voted on by the parliament. Under sections 95.2.B, 95.3.F and 
96.1.H of the constitution, such discussions would not formally include the 
president. However, the president said that he believed he had the authority to 
"decide" on the matter. This reflected a tendency of President Ramos-Horta, as of his 
predecessor, Xanana Gusmao, to wish to have an active say in the day-to-day affairs 
of state, ambitions that reflected their charismatic status and not their constitutional 
authority as such. Gusmao's period as president, from 2002 to 2007, was similarly 
marked by his testing (and sometimes exceeding) the limits of constitutional 
authority. There is little doubt that both presidents, in what might be understood to 
be their long-standing and genuine concern for the people of Timor-Leste, wished to 
ensure that major decisions of the state accorded with their respective perceptions of 
the national interest. However, there was no constitutional authority granted to the 
President to "decide" on matters such as the Greater Sunrise issue, discussed below. 
By way of comparison, such authority is also not granted under the Portuguese or 
Mozambican constitutions. It is possible that the president, in each case noted above, 
misread the constitution in relation to this matter (and others), or perhaps did not 
remember reading the constitution, or, disconcertingly, had not read it completely or 
had read it and then ignored it. Specifically, Section 87 (d) of the constitution allows 
the president to conduct negotiations and oversee processes with regard to 
international agreements. However, this section specifically states that such 
negotiation and supervision must be undertaken in consultation with the 
government. 
President Ramos-Horta had said that he wanted more information on the 
controversial Woodside Petroleum Greater Sunrise LNG agreement before 
"deciding" and expressed disappointment that he had not received a formal report 
on the issue from the Malaysian company Petronas.24 This reference would merely 
reflect his own lack of understanding of his role if it did not have further 
implications. In this case, however, Woodside Petroleum, believing that the 
president correctly understood his Constitutional powers, targeted him to convince 
him of the appropriateness of its plan for the controversial project. 25 The Timor-Leste 
government, however, was both unhappy with Woodside's approach-Prime 
Minister Xanana Gusmao refused to meet with Woodside CEO Don Voelte-and 
with the president for having met Voelte and thereby having exceeded his 
constitutional capacity .26 
The government was deeply unhappy with the president's unconstitutional 
intervention-without consultation-which hampered the process of negotiating the 
Greater Sunrise project, via Timor-Leste's regulator, the National Petroleum 
Authority. This then raised concerns about a lack of transparency and due process: 
the former because the agreement looked like an unconstitutional back-door deal 
and the latter because due process did not allow for an unplanned visit for a private 
24 Radio Televisaun Timor Leste, news report, May 13, 2010. 
25 Andrew Burrell, "Ramos Horta 'Premature' in Rejecting Sunrise Proposal," The Australian, 
May 1, 2010, p. 15. Woodside executives said they wanted to build a $5-billion floating 
processing platform in the Timor Sea, while the government of Timor-Leste said it wanted the 
gas from the Greater Sunrise Field to be processed on shore in Timor-Leste. 
26 Tempo Semanal, "Exclusive: President Jose Ramos Horta Meets Woodside and Lao 
Hamutuk's Charlie Scheiner on Greater Sunrise/Woodside," May 25, 2010, p. 1. 
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meeting. The view within the government was that it was "completely unacceptable" 
for both Voelte and the president to bypass the established mechanisms. 27 To 
overcome his lack of constitutional authority in this field, in meeting with Voelte, the 
president called a Council of Ministers meeting, which under Section 105 of the 
constitution would be convened and chaired by the prime minister; such a meeting is 
intended to be held only for emergencies and is not meant to include the president. 
The anger of the government at the president's unconstitutional intervention was 
reflected in the fact that no one from the government responded to the president's 
call to attend the Council of Ministers' meeting.28 The government's concern with the 
president over-stepping his constitutional authority reflected not just its commitment 
to the constitutional principle, but its perception of the real problems that can arise 
when the president acts outside his constitutional authority and, thus, creates 
problems, in this case with what was potentially one of Timor-Leste's largest 
economic decisions. 
In a similar and perhaps even more disturbing manner, in the face of political 
disturbances following his appointment of Gusmao's (Parliamentary Majority 
Alliance) government, in August 2007, Ramos-Horta overstepped the president's 
constitutional authority by ordering army units to Los Palos and Viqueque in 
response to an internal security matter. The president undertook this action-
ordinarily an area of responsibility of the police-without consulting the 
government, though consultation is required except during a state of emergency, 
according to Section 85 of the constitution.29 A private rebuke of the president by the 
government was, in that matter, gentler than the rebuke that followed his handling 
of the Greater Sunrise affair.30 
Finally, in July 2010, the Australian prime minister, Julia Gillard, asked President 
Ramos-Horta if he would consider having Timor-Leste sponsor an Australian 
asylum-seeker detention center-a place where claimants to refugee status in 
Australia could be processed on other than Australian shores. The president said he 
supported the idea, although later qualified that by saying he did not think it was 
appropriate to detain asylum seekers and that perhaps they could be allowed to be 
free inside of Timor-Leste. 
Again, however, the president misunderstood his own authority in this area, 
while the Australian government similarly misunderstood his authority. President 
Ramos-Horta had not 11consulted" with his parliamentary colleagues before making 
his announcement, and his comments held no constitutional weight. He was rescued, 
however, two days later when Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao said that he was 
prepared to listen to Australia's request. This softening of what had, in the weeks 
prior to this issue's emergence, been a much tougher stance by Gusmao, was a 
diplomatic gesture, on the part of Gusmao, toward the then recently installed 
Australian prime minister. There was little doubt, however, that such a gesture 
27 This information is based on confidentially sourced information from the government of 
Timor-Leste, May 2010. 
28 Tempo Semanal, "Timar Leste Fight for Pipeline Horta Fight Xanana and Alfredo," May 25, 
2010; Tempo Semanal, "Ramos Horta Meets Woodside," p. 1. 
29 ICG, "Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform," Asia Report 143 (2008), International Crisis 
Group, Dili, p 16. 
30 This information is based on confidential information from the government of Timor-Leste, 
September 2007. 
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would have had a significant practical price attached to it if it were to have been 
given substance. In any case, the matter constituted another example of the president 
stepping beyond the bounds of his authority and into areas he felt he could comment 
upon but over which he had no real constitutional power. 
The blurring of fields of competency of state officials (or "organs of 
sovereignty") is not unusual in relatively new states, as political actors seek to carve 
out areas of actual, as opposed to constitutional, competency, and to establish 
convention and precedents. Further, it happens that political leaders who have 
established their influence before a nation's constitution is formalized, who then take 
on a constitutional role, find that their prior achievements enhance their authority in 
practice, if not legally. This is consistent with the transition from charismatic-political 
authority to rational-legal political authority, and the blurring of boundaries between 
the two during the transition process. That was clearly the case under Gusmao' s 
presidency and can, in part, explain Ramos-Horta's own transgressions of 
constitutional boundaries. As a result, the purpose of a particular political role, 
defined by a relatively new constitution, may become confused. 
It was clear in late 2000, before Timor-Leste's draft constitution was formalized, 
that Gusmao preferred a political model with an executive presidency, with himself 
installed as president.31 Gusmao's preference for this style of leadership was reflected 
in his frustration when the role of president to which he aspired was diminished to 
become largely ceremonial. Ramos-Horta has also since said, as president, that he 
would prefer to be President under the enhanced "French" model. 32 
By way of contrast, FRETILIN supported the implementation of a parliamentary-
republican model, largely consistent with that of Portugal, in part because the 
executive-presidential model too closely resembled the government of Indonesia and 
was potentially subject to individual abuse. This response was dictated, in part, by 
the legitimate concern that the personality and style of a president who was granted 
so much centralized authority could tempt that president to claim increasing powers 
and become autocratic. In part, too, the decision to opt for a parliamentary-republic 
model, in which the presidential role was largely ceremonial1 reflected conflict 
between Gusmao and FRETILIN under the leadership of Mari Alkatiri. This model 
was, then, intended to exclude Gusmao from the day-to-day affairs of running the 
state. The parliamentary-republican outcome was successful largely in politically 
sidelining Gusmao, a situation that created much angst for Gusmao and led him, 
arguably, to overstep the bounds of his constitutional competence. Indeed, his 
frustration with the ineffectiveness of the presidency was precisely why, at the first 
opportunity in 2007, he created a new political party as his personal political vehicle 
and campaigned to become prime minister, in effect swapping positions with his 
close colleague, then prime minister, Jose Ramos-Horta. Gusmao confirmed at this 
time that, despite the fact that he had sometimes transgressed its bounds, the role of 
the president was effectively ceremonial and that this had caused him considerable 
political frustration. 33 
For the Timor-Leste president to have a more active role in political affairs, 
stretching the interpretation of competencies as granted under the constitution, 
31 Damien Kingsbury, "The New Timor: A Xanana Republic?" Jakarta Post, December 16, 2000, 
p.9. 
32 ICG, "Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform," p. 16. 
33 Personal conversation, Dili, July 2007. 
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conventions to this effect would need to be established with the agreement of the 
government and the general public over a period greater than the term of one 
presidency. However, in 2010, Timor-Leste's Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP) 
government opposed the president's extra-constitutional activities, especially in 
relation to his discussions with the chief executive officer of Woodside Petroleum, 
Don Voelte, over the Greater Sunrise natural gas processing arrangements, as 
described above.34 Moreover, the previous FRETILIN government had been critical 
of then President Xanana Gusmao's transgressions of his constitutional authority. In 
this sense, then, there appeared to be no government support, on either side of 
Timor-Leste's politics, for the extension of presidential powers through the 
establishment of a new convention. 
FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT 
Although the actions of both of Timor-Leste's presidents have raised eyebrows, 
if not serious concern, one power that the president does have, granted in the 
constitution, is to decide on and appoint the government. It was interesting, then, 
that the most controversial constitutional issue in 2007 was the appointment of the 
AMP government. Following Timor-Leste's near state failure in 2006, it became clear 
that all parties to that conflict, including the government, the president, the 
opposition, the armed forces, and the police, all needed to function in a lawfully 
consistent manner. The state institution that mattered above all others, in this 
respect, was Timor-Leste' s constitution, as it was this document that outlined the 
roles, rights, and responsibilities of each of the respective parties to that conflict. In 
short, respect for the provisions of the constitution by all parties was inviolable, 
especially in ensuring a framework for a return to rule of law. After the crisis eased 
following the intervention of international troops and police, the constitution 
continued to be respected, if tested by the institutions that it is expected to define 
and, in many cases, restrict. 
Mari Alkatiri, the former prime minister, who resigned on June 21, 2006, claimed 
he had been the victim of a "coup." However, his resignation and the appointment of 
a new cabinet during the period prior to the 2007 elections was constitutionally valid. 
FRETILIN party members continued to dominate the cabinet, and, as the majority 
party in parliament, indicated that there had not been a coup but rather a 
conventional political accounting for the events of 2006,35 in which the political 
leader accepted responsibility for a major failing of government. Many who 
sympathized with the prime minister, both within Timor-Leste and internationally,36 
voiced significant criticism of Australia, and, to a lesser extent, the United States, for 
wanting to remove Alkatiri as prime minister. As the shambles of Timor-Leste 
continued to unfold throughout 2006, and foreign observers and politicians bayed 
increasingly loudly and frequently for the political blood of Alkatiri, they appeared 
34 /1 AMP Coalition Suspects Horta in Meeting with Woodside Delegations," Suara Timor 
Lorosae, May 10, 2010. 
35 Max Lane, /1 Analyzing East Timorese Politics: Tentative Starting Points," July 7, 2006, 
http: I /blogs.usyd.edu.au/ maxlaneintlasia/ 2006 I 07 / analysing~east_timorese_politi.html, 
accessed April 24, 2012. 
36 Within Timor-Leste, such criticism tended to come from FRETILIN party members. 
Internationally, criticism derived from individuals who were sympathetic to FRETILIN. 
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to forget some of Timor-Leste's constitutional facts, not to mention diplomatic 
niceties. Despite Alkatiri being widely condemned as "arrogant, dismissive of 
genuine concerns, and nepotistic," he remained at this time the democratically 
elected leader of the National Parliament, Timor-Leste's parliament legislature. 
Under the constitution, it is not possible for the prime minister to be sacked or his 
government removed other than through a vote of no confidence by a majority in the 
parliament. 
At this time, it appeared that when parliament resumed there could indeed be a 
successful vote of no confidence in Alkatiri's leadership, in which case he would 
have been obliged to resign as prime minister. The view that there could be a vote 
against Alkatiri within FRETILIN was later given substance by the subsequent split 
within the party, in which anti-Alkatiri Mudanca ("change," or "reform") members 
voted with non-FRETILIN members. Alkatiri recognized that the rising tide against 
him was probably unstoppable, bowed to pressure, and resigned voluntarily. It had 
been a rough political tussle-deadly for some37-but Alkatiri had accepted that his 
continuation as prime minister was no longer tenable. Respect for the constitution 
remained intact. 
The scheduled 2007 elections were held in accordance with the constitution. In 
this contest, FRETILIN saw support for its candidate, Francisco "Lu-Olo" Guterres, 
rise in the second round of polling to 31 percent of the vote,38 but it was Jose Ramos-
Horta who won the presidency. The parliamentary elections soon after reflected that 
trajectory, with FRETILIN again losing about half its vote, polling a consistent 29 
percent, with Xanana Gusmao's CNRT receiving 24 percent of the vote, the rest being 
divided among minor parties. Prior to the elections, Gusmao had been in talks with 
other parties about a coalition government, but they failed to reach any formal 
agreement as each party expected to do well in the vote and thereby a number of 
ministerial positions. 
Following the elections, Alkatiri tried to put together a coalition of parties but 
failed to achieve a majority. He then appealed to President Ramos-Horta to be 
allowed to form a minority government on the basis that FRETILIN had won a 
plurality of votes. Alkatiri argued that parliament should resume with FRETILIN in 
a position of power so that the party would be able to test itself against a vote of 
confidence. This request reflected convention in a number of Westminster 
parliamentary democracie,s in which a government failing to win a majority of seats 
but with no other party being representing a majority, is given the first opportunity 
to form a majority coalition, regardless of whether another party has a greater 
plurality (but no absolute majority). Timor-Leste does not, however, follow a 
Westminster parliamentary system, and rather than embark on what appeared to be 
further political instability, Ramos-Horta asked Gusmao if he could present him with 
a confirmed majority coalition, to which Gusmao replied that he could. 
When the Majority Parliamentary Alliance government of Xanana Gusmao was 
sworn in by President Ramos-Horta on August 8, 2007, it was a logical outcome of 
the result of the parliamentary elections. Appointed as prime minister, Gusmao had 
formed a majority coalition and was therefore able to command a majority in 
37 Thirty-five people were killed in the violence at this time. 
38 FRETILIN did not contest the 2002 presidential elections, so popular support for the party's 
candidate is measured against its parliamentary standing, which in 2002 represented 57.4 
percent of the vote. FRETILIN's first-round vote was 29 percent. · 
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parliament. A majority in parliament remains the conventional democratic 
requirement. Yet FRETILIN was deeply opposed to the formation of this government 
and launched a campaign intended to discredit it. At one level, this could have been 
regarded as conventional oppositional parliamentary politics, except that FRETILIN 
did not accept the legal status of the AMP government, consistently referring to it as 
11 de facto." 
While there was considerable material progress in Timor-Leste, notably in Dili, 
under the AMP government, the country still faced many challenges. One of the 
biggest problems faced by the government, especially in its first year of office, was 
FRETILIN's continued insistence that the AMP government was not a legally 
constituted government, and the political instability and occasional violence that 
such challenges to the AMP engendered. As outlined in a public statement on 
September 6, 2007, FRETILIN spokespersons Sahe da Silva and Jose Teixeira, each of 
whom had a bachelor's degree in law from an Australian university, quoted part of 
Section 106.1 of the Timor-Leste constitution to support their claim that the 
appointment of Gusmao as prime minister was unconstitutional. They claimed he 
had been appointed in error as the result of an incorrect translation of the original 
Portuguese text into English. The pair said that the constitution, accurately 
translated, read that "the Prime Minister shall be designated by the most voted 
political party or alliance of political parties with a parliamentary majority and shall 
be appointed by the President of the republic." They then went on to declare that 
FRETILIN was declared by the National Electoral Commission (CNE) as the "most 
voted party," based on the fact that it had won the largest single plurality of votes. 
"This means that it [was] only FRETILIN that [could] appoint a prime minister as it 
was the most voted political party, i.e. the party with the most seats in the National 
Parliament," they said, even though this extrapolation did not necessarily follow and 
was not stated in the constitution as such. The pair went on to argue, somewhat 
confusingly, that the phrase "parliamentary majority," in this Section, did not refer to 
an absolute majority. They noted that Section 88.2 referred to an "absolute majority" 
in relation to promulgating laws and Section 109 used the term in relation to 
rejecting a government's program, but not in relation to the designation of a prime 
minister. As a result, they inferred that an absolute majority was not necessary for 
the designation of a prime minister, and that (simple) "majority" had a different 
meaning from "absolute majority." But this interpretation was incorrect. 
Translating Section 106.1 of the Constitution, it reads in Portuguese: 
0 Primeiro-Ministro e indigitado pelo partido mais votado OU pela alianc;a 
de partidos com maioria parlamentar e nomeado pelo Presidente da 
Republica, ouvidos os partidos politicos representados no Parlamento 
Nacional. 
Although the translation required some minor adjustment between the languages, 
which resulted in more controversy1 translated for meaning (as well as accuracy) it 
read in English as follows: 
The Prime-Minister is designated by the party with more votes or the 
alliance of parties with a parliamentary majority and nominated by the 
President of the Republic, listening to (or taking account of the views of) the 
political parties represented in the National Parliament. 
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This means that the prime minister represents either the party with the most votes, 
assuming that there is no simple majority and no "alliance" (coalition) or, explicitly, 
that the prime minister represents the alliance of parties with a parliamentary 
majority. It is possible within a parliamentary democracy for a prime minister to lead 
a minority government, and this is, in principle, allowed for under Section 106.1. 
However, the establishment of a minority government is conditional upon majority 
support, hence, any majority alliance automatically trumps an attempted minority 
government. 
The draftees of the Portuguese version of the constitution neglected to mention 
in Section 106.1 the option of a simple single-party majority of the type that allowed 
FRETILIN to form the first government (although this exists in the Timor-Leste 
government-published-English version of the constitution). FRETILIN did not have 
this majority, either as a single party or in alliance with other parties. By contrast, the 
AMP coalition presented itself to the president as a ready-made majority, able to 
command the confidence of the parliament. In the absence of the convention 
mandating that the previous government, in a case when no one party has a 
majority, be allowed the first opportunity to form a government, the president was 
correct to refer to the "or" element of Section 106.1 of the constitution, where 
adopting the second part of 106.1, referring to an alliance of parties constituting a 
parliamentary majority, was a clearly available option. 
Given that Section 106.1 referred to a "most voted party," this would imply a 
party with the single largest bloc of votes, which would have been FRETILIN. 
However, the word "or" which led into the second clause of Section 106.1 offered an 
alternative method of designating a prime minister, based on "an alliance of political 
parties with a parliamentary majority." The inference drawn by distinguishing 
between a "majority" and an "absolute majority" was that, somehow, a "majority" 
actually meant a "plurality," which could be other than an absolute minority of seats 
in parliament but holding a greater vote than other parties, hence referring back to 
the first clause of the sub-Section containing the phrase "most voted." It was, of 
course, possible to have a minority government, assuming no majority government 
was available. But this was not the case in 2007. 
The alternative interpretation, and that which was accepted by President Ramos-
Horta, as well as the Portuguese government on whose constitution the Timor-Leste 
constitution was based, was that the second clause-"or alliance of political parties 
with a parliamentary majority and shall be appointed by the President of the 
republic" (my emphasis)-refers to an alliance of parties forming a simple 
parliamentary majority. This was consistent with widespread democratic practice, 
and with the constitution, and was a workable political model. In contrast to 
FRETILIN's interpretation, the meaning of Section 106.1 would have been better 
understood to say that a government could be formed by a party that held a majority 
in its own right, although a minority government could be established if an alliance 
of other parties was unable to form a majority, with the second clause not being 
applicable. 
Not only did FRETILIN object to being prevented from forming a minority 
government, it also objected to the fact that the AMP government alliance was 
formed after the election, rather than before, even though there was no constitutional 
requirement for AMP to have set up its coalition before the vote. There was an 
option, under Article 20 of the Law 6/2006 on the Election of the National 
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Parliament, for parties to form coalitions for the purpose of presenting a single list of 
candidates for election to National Parliament. But, unlike FRETILIN's supposition, 
this "may" option was not a requirement, nor did it preclude the formation of an 
alliance after an election. 
"The real test of the strength of the Government," FRETILIN claimed, "is 
whether it can gather the support to pass its budget and program by absolute 
majority in the National Parliament." Yet, prima facie, FRETILIN could not have 
done this, as it was explicitly opposed by a majority of members in alliance. 
Similarly, the FRETILIN spokespersons noted that there was no specific provision in 
the constitution "which [said] that a post election coalition with an absolute majority 
in the National parliament [had] the right to form government." They were correct in 
this; the constitution simply said the alliance of parties was required to have a 
majority; the AMP government had this majority. 
If a political party can claim the largest plurality (largest party, but without a 
majority) in Timor-Leste's parliament, but it does not control a majority of the votes 
in that body, this only guarantees that, under convention, the president will, first, ask 
the leader of that party if he or she is able to form a government, which, as noted, 
must establish that it can enjoy the confidence of the majority of the parliament. If the 
leader of that party cannot form such a government, the task of establishing a 
government then devolves to the next biggest party, and so on. If no party can form a 
government based on the confidence of the parliament, fresh elections are held. 
Michael Clegg39 made similar points in his analysis of the constitutional validity 
of the president's appointment of the AMP government. According to Clegg, when 
read within the context of the rest of the constitution, Section 106.1 "clearly means" 
that the president first asks the party with the most votes if it has a parliamentary 
majority, and, if it does not and cannot make an alliance to obtain a majority, the 
president consults all parties elected to parliament. As Clegg notes: "The President 
then asks each other party, in order of votes, if it can make an alliance that has a 
majority and appoints as prime minister the person nominated by the alliance of 
parties that has a parliamentary majority." This was the course of events followed by 
the president in 2007 prior to coming to a decision about the appointment of Timor-
Leste' s new government. 
CONVENTION 
As earlier noted, just ten years from independence at the time of writing, it was 
still too soon in Timor-Leste's independent history for the nation to have securely 
established its own political convention. However, following independence, there 
was some movement toward a degree of convention, which, if continued, would 
begin to implant and codify these conventions. The first area in which convention 
could become established was in the limitation-not the extension-of the powers of 
the president. In one sense, this was just compliance with the terms of the 
constitution. However, given the manner in which the first and, in particular, the 
second post-independence presidents conducted themselves, it was not always clear 
that such constitutional clarity would prevail. Both the first and second post-
independence governments were clear about the circumscribed powers of the 
39 M. Clegg, "The Constitution of Timor-Leste: Appointment of a Prime Minister," IFES 
(International Foundation for Electoral Systems) White Paper, July 2007. 
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presidency, to the extent that a convention began to develop around this response, 
and this convention, based on precedent was likely to dictate that the president 
retain a largely ceremonial role and not have executive authority in the day-to-day 
affairs of the state. This limitation, then, reflected the status of the president as 
envisioned by the framers of the constitution when they set down the various 
"competencies" as a means of intentionally limiting presidential powers (as well as 
the short- to medium-term political reach of Xanana Gusmao). 
In relation to the appointment of a government, in that there was the beginning 
of a convention, it too reflected compliance with the constitution. This was by adding 
to the balance of fairness by interpreting the constitution as requiring the president 
to approach the leader of a party with a plurality (but without a majority) to see if he 
or she could form a governing majority. It did not, however, establish a precedent 
beyond or outside of the constitution, which may have become convention, to allow 
a party with a plurality of votes, but without a majority in parliament the option of 
forming a minority government, as requested (or demanded) by FRETILIN, even 
where a majority coalition was available. 
The convention, then, that appeared to be in the process of gaining acceptance, 
determined that Timor-Leste' s parliament would not adopt or grant powers other 
than those articulated by the constitution. It could be argued that, without a supreme 
court able to interpret or adjudicate on constitutional issues, there has not yet been 
an opportunity to determine what, precisely, the constitution implies in Timor-Leste. 
However, most of the answers to such questions are available within the constitution 
in terms that are sufficiently clear. It may be possible to refer some constitutional 
matters to a supreme court (or the Court of Appeals prior to the establishment of a 
supreme court) for adjudication, such as the protocols surrounding the appointment 
of a government. But beyond FRETILIN (and, in particular, beyond a small clique in 
its central committee), there was widespread national and international agreement 
that President Jose Ramos-Horta's understanding of his obligations under the terms 
of the constitution were correct. 
It remained to be seen, however, whether the president would be equally precise 
and reliable when assessing the competencies of his own office in relation to the 
constitution. But he and the people of Timor-Leste could be reasonably assured that 
the government of the day would ensure that a person whose office was intended to 
be largely ceremonial would, short of a catastrophe of the type that afflicted the state 
in 2006, perform as a figurehead of state and not as an active, day-to-day participant 
in its affairs. 
COMBATING CORRUPTION: 
AVOIDING 
''INSTITUTIONAL RITUALISM'' 
Aderito de Jesus Soares1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since Timor-Leste's independence in 2002, there has been increasing 
apprehension about corruption. Although substantiated cases of grand-scale 
corruption are still few in number, the public has been very critical about this 
perceived rise in corruption. Such public apprehension is understandable, given that 
many allegations are yet to be followed up legally, and citizens understand what 
damage corruption can do to a country (experiences of corruption in other countries 
around the world demonstrate why Timor-Leste should be alarmed). Vulnerability 
to corruption in Timor-Leste is high, given that almost 95 percent of its revenues 
come from oil and gas. Oil can be a blessing, but in many developing countries it is a 
curse, as many oil-rich, developing nations have experienced rampant related 
corruption. 
In 2009, Timor-Leste was ranked 146 out of 180 countries by Transparency 
International in its corruption-perception index.2 This was a worrying assessment, 
even though the index relies only on international experts' perceptions of corruption 
and is not based on hard evidence. Timor-Leste's ranking improved to 127 in 2010, 
much better than a year before, although it dropped again in 2011 to 143.3 Slightly 
different from this assessment was a Management Systems International-United 
States Agency for International Development (MSD-USAID) report, published in 
2009, which stated that "petty corruption [in Timor-Leste] is widespread, though 
perhaps is not yet systemic," and that while there were allegations of large-scale 
1 I wish to thank Chris Kearney for proofreading this chapter, and, especially, Michael Leach 
for his comments and the final editing of this paper. However, I am responsible for the paper. 
2 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2009, http:/ /www.transparency.org/ 
policy_ research I surveys _indices I cpi I 2009 I cpi _ 2009 _table, accessed April 24, 2012. 
3 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2010, http: I I www .transparency.org I 
policy _research/ surveys_indices I cpi I 2010 I results #table, accessed April 24, 2012; and 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 20111 www.transparency.org/ 
country#TLS, accessed June 27, 2012. 
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corruption, these remained "unsubstantiated."4 The first corruption perception 
survey conducted in Timor-Leste in 2011 showed that while 57 percent of 
respondents considered corruption to be a serious issue, it did not rank highly when 
compared to many other problems facing the developing country. Corruption was 
ranked very low (0.7 percent) when compared with issues like unemployment (36.6 
percent), poverty (20.8 percent), political instability (9.0 percent), crime (1.6 percent), 
and poor healthcare (1.5 percent).5 Regardless of the different conclusions of these 
reports, there is no doubt that corruption exists in Timor-Leste, at various levels of 
government and in the public sphere in general. There is, therefore, general 
agreement that it is timely to address the issue of corruption with a serious and 
comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, one such strategy being the establishment of 
Timor's Anti-Corruption Commission (Comissao Anti-Corrup<;ao, CAC). 
This chapter examines some constraints and opportunities in tackling corruption 
in Timor-Leste. Following the introduction, I will discuss the rationale behind the 
fight against corruption. Then, I will delineate and describe the various entities that 
play a role in the area of combating corruption within the context of "institutional 
ritualism." Finally, I will describe the role of Timor-Leste's Anti-Corruption 
Commission. 
THE REASON FOR COMBATING CORRUPTION WORLDWIDE 
Corruption is an economic problem, and it is a crime-specifically, a white collar 
crime-as well as being a moral problem6• It is always tricky to give an exact 
meaning of corruption.7 The United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC), to which Timor-Leste is a party, does not propose any standard definition 
of corruption. Instead, UNCAC delineates types of crimes within the context of 
corruption. Chapter III of UNCAC, entitled "Criminalization and Law Enforcement," 
describes type of crimes such as bribery of national public officials, bribery of foreign 
public officials and officials of public international organizations, embezzlement, 
trading of influence, and abuse of function. 8 
In Timor-Leste, corruption is regulated by the new penal code, which was 
adopted in 2009. Prior to that, Timor-Leste used the Indonesian Penal Code as well 
as Indonesia's anti-corruption law. 9 There are seven types of corruption that are 
identified in Timor-Leste's 2009 penal code. These include passive corruption for an 
illicit act, passive corruption for a licit act, active corruption, embezzlement, 
4 USAID-MSD, Corruption Assessment: Timor-Leste (2009), pp. 2-3, http://pdf.usaid.gov I pdf_ 
docs/PNADQ697.pdf, accessed June 27, 2012. 
5 Corruption Perception Survey 2011, CAC, February, 2012 at http://cac.tl/wp-
content/uploads/2011 /11/CP-Survey-Report_TLll-12.pdf, accessed June 27, 2012. 
6 Mark Granovetter, "The Social Construction of Corruption," in On Capitalism, ed. Victor Nee 
and Richard Swedberg (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 154. 
7 Oskar Kurer, "Corruption: An Alternative Approach to Its Definition and Measurement," 
Political Studies 53 (2005), pp. 222-39. 
8 
"Criminalization and Law Enforcement" in United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
Chapter 3 (2003 ), www .unodc.org I documents I treaties /UN CACI Publications I Convention/ 
08-50026_E.pdf, accessed April 24, 2012. 
9 Undang-Undang Anti Korupsi (Anti-Corruption Law), UU No. 31/1999, later amended with 
UU No. 20, 2001. 
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embezzlement of use, abuse of power, and economic participation in business.10 
Some observers argue that it was more useful to use the Indonesian anti-corruption 
law than the 2009 penal code, as it encapsulates a broader definition of corruption, 
giving more room to law enforcement to carry out its mission in curbing corruption. 
By July 2010, lawmakers had presented a draft proposal of an anti-corruption law for 
debate in the National Parliament. 
Even though there is no commonly accepted, standard definition of corruption, 
some international institutions have been trying to propose their own generic 
definitions. Transparency International defines corruption as "the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain." This is similar to the World Bank's definition of corruption, 
"abuse of public power for private benefit." 11 A classic definition was proposed by 
Robert Klitgaard: "Corruption= Monopoly+ Discretion - Accountability." 12 It is not 
the intention of this paper to deal with the definition of corruption, however, it is 
only if we understand corruption in a broad sense that we will be able to find a 
solution to it.13 
On the adoption of UNCAC in 2003, Kofi Annan, the then secretary general of 
the United Nations, affirmed that "corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by 
diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government's ability to 
provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign 
investment and aid."14 Annan' s affirmation to some extent reflects the phenomenon 
of corruption worldwide. The importance of combating corruption has been shown 
clearly in the establishment of anti-corruption agencies in many developing 
countries over the last twenty to thirty years, as well as agreed-upon common action 
plans. For instance, some twenty-nine countries in the Asia-Pacific region have 
agreed on the common Asian Development Bank-Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (ADB-OECD) Anti-Corruption Initiative action plan, 15 
and many of these countries have created anti-corruption agencies, including Timor-
Leste and Cambodia, which established theirs in 2010. It must be noted, however, 
that some of these agencies were established prior to the adoption of UNCAC. For 
instance, Hong Kong's Independent Commission for Anti-Corruption (ICAC) was 
established in the 1974;16 Singapore's Corrupt Practice Investigative Bureau (CPIB) 
was established in 1950. 
10 The Penal Code of Timor-Leste (2009) defines in detail various types of corruption in articles 
292-99, www.laohamutuk.org I econ/ corruption/ CodigoPenalEn.pdf, accessed June 27, 2012. 
11 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, September 1997, 
p. 8, wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector I anticorrupt/ corruptn/ corrptn.pdf, accessed April 
24, 2012. 
12 Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 
p. 75. 
13 Laura S. Underkuffler, "Defining Corruption: Implications for Action," in Corruption, Global 
Security, and World Order, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation and 
American Academy of Arts and Science, 2009), pp. 27-47. 
14 Kofi Annan, "Statement on the Adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption," New York, NY, October 31, 2003, www.unodc.org/unodc/ 
en/ treaties I CAC/background/ secretary-general-speech.html, accessed April 24, 2012. 
15 See www.oecd.org I pages I 0,3417,en_34982156_34982385_1_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed June 
27, 2012. 
16 Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, pp. 98-100. 
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It is commonly accepted that corruption in developing countries is rampant. This 
does not mean that developed countries are free from corruption. The difference is 
that in developed countries there are generally sufficient mechanisms to deal with 
the problem, while developing countries tend to lack credible mechanisms as well as 
the political will to deal with it. Experience shows that many former dictators in 
developing countries exploited their own people and their countries' natural 
resources, turning themselves into very rich leaders, while their own people were 
mired in poverty.17 For instance, during his more than thirty-year rule, the late 
president of Indonesia, Suharto accumulated between 15 billion and 35 billion US 
dollars, while the late president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, accumulated 
between 5 billion and 10 billion US dollars. 18 In efforts to respond to this ominous 
reality, there have been growing numbers of initiatives at the local, national and 
international levels designed to curb corruption. 
DAY-TO-DAY EXPRESSIONS IN TIMOR-LESTE AS ''TECHNIQUES OF NEUTRALIZATION" 
People in Timor-Leste perceive there to be a high level of corruption in their 
country. This perception has given rise to some common expressions associated with 
growing allegations of corruption. Among these expressions is "kasih-uang habis 
perkara,'1 which is a play on the acronym for KUHP (the Indonesian penal code, or 
Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana); the popular phrase means "the matter is 
finished once you have given the money." In Tetum, there is "keta haluha ami nian 
serveiza" ("don't forget our beer"), "nia ita nian ema rasik sa" ("come on, s/he is one of 
our own, therefore we should look after him/her"), and "bui-hois" and "mau-hois" 
(the words for corrupt female and male public officers). Hois literally means to 
squeeze, so bui-/mau-hois suggests the one who squeezes or milks the public purse. 
"Keta haluha ami nia kolen" ("our efforts should be rewarded11 ) might be spoken by a 
public officer to a businessman after winning a tender. The most common excuse is 
"ita sei iha prosesu aprendizagem" (1'we are still in the process of learning [so let's be 
tolerant about these mistakes, including corruptiod']). On many occasions, some 
leaders use this expression to defend themselves when they have made mistakes in 
governance1 and have failed to make any real effort to learn from and fix those 
mistakes. 
All these expressions reflect a subtle consciousness of corruption shared by all 
sides, namely, by the potential contractors, the public in general, and public officers. 
Corruption can damage any of these citizens, but at the same time, if at all possible, 
they are trying to benefit from it. This characterization applies not only to a civil 
servant's big bosses, who may get a huge bonus from a contractor, but also to more 
junior staff who might be assisting the contractor at the administrative level. They 
might get a fancy mobile phone or a good laptop computer as a kickback from some 
profitable deal, or some cartons of beer for a family wedding party or traditional 
ceremony, where expensive alcoholic drinks are required, or perhaps some building 
materials. Such junior staff might say, "But I only got a mobile phone, not a big 
bonus like katuas or ferik," referring to his or her boss. This common response reflects 
an effective double-standard in people's relatively lax attitudes to petty corruption, 
17 Inge Amundsen, Political Corruption (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute U4 Issue 6, 2006), p. 3, 
www .u4.no I publications I political-corruption I downloadasset/ 64, accessed June 27, 2012. 
18 Ibid. 
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while the public still demands that large-scale corruption be punished. Susan Rose-
Ackerman notes that, in Nigeria and Ghana, "ordinary people condemn corruption 
at the elite level, but they themselves participate in networks that socially reproduce 
corruption." 19 While I do not compare the level of corruption in Nigeria and Ghana 
with that in Timor-Leste, the perspective expressed here is relevant to Timor-Leste. 
This culture of gift-giving, as in the case of wantoks in Melanesia, seems to be 
correlated to a Timorese tradition of thanking people for their help. Offering 
something, even something very small, as a way of showing appreciation for any 
assistance given is quite common in Timor-Leste. Culturally, this is appropriate as 
there is no specific word or words for "thank you" in Tetun and other languages in 
Timor-Leste. The word "obrigado," or thank you in Portuguese, is a loan word, not 
Tetun, although it has been used for generations now. Therefore, people traditionally 
did not show appreciation with words, but with some gesture or gift. The problem is 
that once this tradition is brought into a modern liberal democracy, it can lead to 
corruption. Traditionally, gift-giving is used in an open relationship as a genuine 
gesture, within a kinship system. However, once it occurs in the context of a huge 
government contract, for example, it can be very problematic, as the once genuine 
traditional gesture of appreciation can very easily become a corrupt practice. 
Some of the Timorese public, especially members of the middle class who 
currently enjoy elements of development, try to justify why corruption occurs in 
Timor-Leste. The common justification is that Timor-Leste has inherited a legacy of 
both institutional and informal corruption from its former colonizer, Indonesia. It is 
true that, during the Indonesian era1 corruption was rampant at all levels of society. 
Tahu sama tahu literally means "we know each other," implying that everyone knows 
that everyone else is involved in corruption. During the years when Indonesia ruled 
Timor-Leste, corruption involved both civilian and military authorities as well as the 
general public. There is another local expression that reflects how decision making in 
the day-to-day administration of the state can ignore legal standards and procedures1 
therefore potentially resulting in corruption-the maun bo'ot culture. Maun bo'ot 
literally means "big brother," and, according to Timorese culture, a maun bo'ot is a 
senior and respected person. A maun bo'ot figure usually has strong leverage because 
of past experience as a former resistance leader or a former clandestine leader. In 
post-independence Timor, the phrase maun bo'ot is also often used to refer to those 
who lead state institutions. A maun bo'ot could also be someone who is richer than 
the average Timorese. In daily administration, a maun bo'ot will tend to make 
decisions based on his personal judgment and use his discretionary power, instead of 
following the existing rules of procedure. Because a maun bo'ot wields this strong 
leverage, his subordinates will not question or challenge any of his decisions. This 
phenomenon of maun bo'ot conforms to Klitgaard's classic definition of corruption 
noted earlier: 
Corruption= Monopoly+ Discretion- Accountability.20 
19 Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State," Research Paper No. 409, 
Yale Law Journal Online 120 (November 9, 2010): 125-40, http://yalelawjoumal.org/the-yale-
law-journal-pocket-part/ international-law I corruption:-greed,-culture,-and-the-state I 
2° Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, pp. 98-100. 
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This common justification implicitly conceals its own sort of menace, as it effectively 
dissuades the Timorese from reflecting on their own mistakes. Timorese try to use 
"the techniques of neutralization" -to borrow Gresham Skyes and David Matza's 
terminology, 21 to say that corruption is not really a Timorese phenomenon but, 
rather, it is part of a legacy inherited from the Indonesians. Mark Granovetter 
elaborates further on the techniques of neutralization with what he calls the 
"principles of neutralization," which he recommended be used for analyzing 
corruption cases. He defines "neutralization" as "an account that acknowledges the 
causal connection between a payment and a service1 or that items have been 
appropriated as a result of the position held, but implies that given the particular 
circumstances, no moral violation has occurred." 22 So, some Timorese try to 
rationalize the existence of corruption by saying that it is a foreign import, and that 
corruption, especially petty corruption, is not morally wrong. 
Another justification for low-level public servants' involvement in corruption is 
the argument, "Why shouldn't we take the money, when the katuas and ferik (i.e., the 
big bosses) keep taking it?" This attitude is intensified by Timor's dire economic 
situation and the related hardships faced by its citizens; a typical junior public 
servant earns just US$150 a month1 which makes living difficult. Lastly, there is the 
"hakfodak factor." Hakfodak, a Tetum word, means to feel shocked by and 
unaccustomed to certain conditions. In this context, the phrase relates to the shock of 
Timor being open to capital investment, and to the fact that many Timorese were 
unaccustomed to gaining and holding high public positions before independence. 
This is an interesting development where, all of a sudden, many former resistance 
leaders with no experience in the public sector become leaders of state institutions. 
They have credentials from the resistance era, but lack the experience and knowledge 
to run these liberal democratic institutions.23 Some perform well and try to adjust 
their limited experience in the public sector, but some are simply hakfodak-or 
shocked and unaccustomed-by and to their new position. Those in this category 
behave as if they can do whatever they want, including engaging in corruption. They 
are staggered by their new status as public figures running state institutions. For 
them1 this is the opportunity to get whatever they can get, to use what they can to 
gain political leverage1 and to accumulate money while they are in power. They are 
smart at reading the weaknesses of the system. This has not only happened to public 
servants but1 sadly, to some journalists and some representatives of NGOs as welt 
even though these are the people who should act as whistleblowers to help expose 
and stop corruption. Some from these sectors also suffer from the hakfodak factor. 24 
The emergent urban elites are also quite hakfodak, because there is a lot more cash 
available, through government tenders, than ever before. The increased inflow of 
revenue from Timor' s oil and gas production exacerbates the problem. Although 
21 Gresham M. Sykes and David Matza, "Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of 
Delinquency," American Sociological Review 22,6 (1957): 664-70. 
22 Granovetter, "Social Construction of Corruption," p. 154. 
23 Peter Blunt, "The Political Economy of Accountability in Timor-Leste: Implications for 
Public Policy," Public Administration and Development 29, (2009): 94. 
24 It is commonly known that many local journalists prefer to cover those stories for which an 
interested party might offer them money, prepaid phone cards, or some other valuable benefit 
or bribe. It is also known that many local NGOs have problems of corruption such as failing 
properly to discharge their financial duties to their donors, or even committing corruption 
within their own NGO. 
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corruption is not yet systemic in Timor-Leste1 the day-to-day practices as described 
above are worrisome. 
Various studies have shown that strong kinship linkages in society can 
contribute to an increase in corruption. Research in Nigeria shows that1 while 
corruption has become a major obstacle for development with the public suffering as 
a consequence1 concomitantly1 the majority of the population is involved in or at 
least benefits from corruption in their daily lives.25 Daniel Smith observes that the 
links between culture and corruption in Nigeria create an ambivalent attitude on the 
part of the public: "They are acutely aware of its consequences and ambivalent about 
their own role in its perpetuation." 26 Comparing such experiences and learning from 
them may help Timor-Leste in developing its own strategies for tackling this serious 
issue. 
A VOID INSTITUTIONAL RITUALISM 
Facing public and international concern1 the government of Timor-Leste has 
taken several steps to address the issue of corruption. There are several main 
institutions that share the mandate of combating corruption. These can be divided 
into two categories, namely, independent state bodies and executive bodies. The 
former includes the Provedor de Direitus Humanus e da Justi~a (PDHJ), an 
ombudsman-type body; the Office of Prosecutor General; and the recently 
established Anti-Corruption Commission (CAC). The latter includes the Inspectorate 
General, the National Police (PNTL), and some other institutions, such as the Office 
of Vice-Prime Minister on Administration and Good Governance, with some minor 
powers to deal with corruption. The Banking and Payment Authority (BPA)1 now the 
central bank, also has some role in preventing corruption, especially in relation to the 
issue of money laundering. An anti-money-laundering law was passed by the 
parliament in December 2011. It is hoped that a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) will 
be established as a consequence. 
In addition, by July 2010, there were proposals from the government to establish 
an audit court as well as the Criminal Investigation Police (PIC). In the constitution 
of Timor-Leste, there has always been a mandate to establish an audit court.27 The 
institution of this court was established by parliamentary vote in July 2011, with 
auditors completing their training in early 2012. This will be an important institution, 
with an auditing function to oversee state expenses in particular. This development 
is especially important given that Timor-Leste lacks an independent or external 
financial audit body. 
The powers of the PIC, however, are less clear-cut. The proposed organization 
takes as its model Portugal's Polfcia Judiciaria (Judicial Police) and has the function 
of carrying out all investigations of criminal matters, including corruption cases. 
According to a draft law for a Timorese PIC, this force will be supervised by the 
minister of justice. Some have criticized the proposal because it appears as if the 
minister of justice would be "empire-building," including arming the PIC's officers 
25 Daniel Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
26 Ib"d .. 1 ., p. Xll. 
27 Article 129 of the Timor-Leste's Constitution on Tribunal Superior Administrative, Fiscal e de 
Contas (Superior Administrative Court of Tax and Audits). 
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with weapons and guns, in order to carry out criminal investigations. There is a view 
within some sectors of Timor-Leste society that this is an unnecessary step and not 
timely, as it would damage the continuing fragility of the PNTL. There was quite 
strong opposition to this law from some prominent individuals, including the 
PNTL's deputy commander and the prosecutor general. Many worry that 
establishing the PIC would create tension by hijacking all the investigative powers of 
the PNTL's Criminal Investigation Unit This has been an issue in Portugal itself, as 
there have always been tensions between the Judicial Police and other police bodies, 
such as the Republican National Guard (GNR) and the Public Security Police (PSP). 
Therefore, in Timor-Leste, there is a strong view that energy should be directed at 
reinforcing the PNTL, especially the criminal investigation unit, instead of building a 
new institution such as the PIC. 
Apart from its continuing mandates for human rights investigation and good 
governance, in the past, the PDHJ had the power to investigate corruption cases. 
However, this mandate was abolished following the enactment of the Anti-
Corruption Commission law in July 2009. From the establishment of the PDHJ in 
2005, there were at least thirty-eight corruption cases handed over by the PDHJ to 
the office of the prosecutor, but there has been only minor follow-up by the 
prosecutor. The prosecutor, in defending this scant record of convictions, has argued 
that there was not enough strong admissible evidence resulting from PDHJ's 
investigations. Many PDHJ investigations were, indeed, weak in terms of finding 
admissible evidence. According to the PDHJ, however, the authorities offered them 
no cooperation during their investigations, making it difficult to get proper 
information and evidence for submission to the courts. Representatives of PDHJ also 
admitted that they had limited investigative powers. Indeed, it is true that PDHJ can 
only conduct general investigations and that it has no specific power to conduct 
criminal investigations in corruption cases. The organization also lacks a staff of 
prosecutors with special expertise in fighting corruption. 
As a result of this dilemma, in the past, the two institutions-PDHJ and the 
prosecutor's office-have attacked each other publicly through the media. This 
conflict has led to some positive developments, with several high-level corruption 
cases being sent to trial by the office of the prosecutor. This included the case against 
then Deputy Prime Minister Jose Luis Guterres involving charges of illicit 
enrichment and abuse of power. Interestingly, the Indonesian-era anti-corruption 
law mentioned above was used for the case against Guterres.28 In August 2011, the 
Dili District Court dismissed all accusations against Guterres that had been brought 
by the prosecutor. This decision was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The 
Guterres case illustrates the need for enhanced professionalism with regard to 
investigative institutions and prosecutors. Another important case from 2011 was 
that of Ruben Braz, the Dili district administrator who was accused of embezzlement 
and abuse of power. In September 2011, Braz was sentenced to jail for three years by 
a Dili District Court judge. 
According to the constitution, the public prosecutor's office is the central 
institution that possesses the power to prosecute all criminal acts, including 
28 Guterres's case sparked debate among those representing all political points of view. 
Members of parliament from the AMP government accused the prosecutor general of 
politicizing the case by pushing it to trial while ignoring other cases provided by the PDHJ 
over the last couple of years. 
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corruption. The sad reality is that, in the last ten years the prosecutor has faced a 
huge case backlog. To some extent, this problem has been resolved, since the 
appointment of a new public prosecutor in 2009, though mainly through the shelving 
of many cases. However, there are still corruption cases from the past that need to be 
prosecuted. One of the most high-profile cases reached a conclusion in June 2012 
with the conviction of former Justice Minister Lucia Lobato on charges of unlawful 
participation in a tender process.29 
This growing number of institutions established by the government, on the one 
hand, shows the government's seriousness in tackling corruption. On the other hand, 
when we analyze these initiatives and their significance, we must take care to 
account for what I call "institutional ritualism": an inclination by governments to 
form new agencies rather than address the actual problems. John Braithwaite and his 
coauthors have developed further the Mertonian concept of ritualism into several 
categories, including rule ritualism, objectivity ritualism, documentation ritualism, 
protocol ritualism, random sampling ritualism, scientific ritualism, legal ritualism, 
technological ritualism, participatory ritualism, and market ritualism.30 These 
categories of ritualism have been used to analyze nursing homes practices in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Similarly, the concept of 
ritualism, especially rule and participatory ritualism, can be adapted to analyze state 
efforts to deal with post-independence corruption. For Braithwaite and his 
coauthors, rule ritualism happens when decision makers prefer to "write a rule 
instead of solving the problem," while participatory ritualism signifies feigned 
participation that tends to "alienate the supposed participant."31 
Authorities have a very strong tendency to enact more laws in order to respond 
to social problems. To be straightforward, however, this chapter suggests the 
creation of another type of ritualism to characterize Timor-Leste's situation: that of 
"institutional ritualism." Institutional ritualism is the tendency to create a new 
institution while losing focus on resolving the problem. Worse still, institutional 
ritualism can also create confusion and overlaps among institutions that are 
supposed to be in charge of resolving the problem. Governments that demonstrate 
"institutional ritualism" sometimes ignore the reality facing the country, for 
example, the limited human and financial resources available to support the new 
institutions. Institutional ritualism has been a trademark of many developing 
countries in responding to the social problems they face. It also has been a very 
"sexy" trend encouraged, in part, by many international donors that support these 
developing countries. Since its independence, Timor-Leste has become a laboratory 
for institutional ritualism-partially sponsored by a number of external advisers and 
rich donor agencies. 
The push for the minister of justice to establish the PIC is a good example of 
institutional ritualism. Instead of reinforcing the established criminal investigation 
unit in PNTL, the minister, apparently in a rush to initiate this new institution as 
29 The specific charge in Portuguese is "Participaqao econ6mico em neg6cio," which is classed as 
an abuse-of-power offence. This was widely (and inaccurately) translated in the English-
language press as a charge of "maladministration." 
30 John Braithwaite et al., Regulating Aged Care: Ritualism and the New Pyramid (Northampton, 
MA: Edward Edgar Publishing, 2007), p. 221; see also Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and 
Social Structure (New York, NY: Free Press, 1968). 
31 Braithwaite et al., Regulating Aged Care, p. 221. 
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soon as possible, introduced the law for establishing the PIC. Institutional realism 
has led to tensions in other cases as well, as demonstrated by the conflict between the 
offices of the vice prime minister and the minister of finance that occurred in 2010, 
regarding procurement. Procurement is a crucial issue, given that about 75 percent of 
Timor-Leste's state budget is executed through the procurement system. Instead of 
reinforcing the old procurement system under the minister of finance, the prime 
minister appointed a vice prime minister to oversee procurement, and also 
transferred procurement responsibilities to the vice prime minister's office. A 
Procurement Technical Secretariat (Secretariado Technico de Approvisionamento, 
STA) was established under the Vice Prime Minister's Office, but after seven months, 
it became clear that this was not working. So, in August 2010, the Council of 
Ministers suspended the procurement mandate of the Office of Vice Prime Minister.32 
Following this development, the vice prime minister stepped down. 
Following the vice prime minister's resignation in early September 2010, there 
was a fundamental lack of clarity concerning the status of the government's 
procurement system for a number of months. Only in mid-2011 was there an effort to 
unify procurement laws. Following that effort, the finance ministry launched a 
government-wide procurement portal in August 2011, with the hope that it would 
enhance transparency in the procurement process. 
TIMOR-LESTE'S ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION 
In order for the government's anti-corruption efforts to be widely effective, any 
new agencies nominally instituted to reduce corruption in Timor-Leste should not 
threaten or have overlapping mandates with those of the newly established Anti-
Corruption Commission (Commissao-Anti Corrup<;;ao, CAC). This is important in 
order to avoid more institutional ritualism and to ensure that the government has a 
real opportunity to focus on the problem at hand. 
Spurred by public frustration over the perceived growth of corruption, the 
National Parliament of Timor-Leste approved Law No. 8/2009, establishing Timor-
Leste' s Anti-Corruption Commission. The establishment of CAC was part of the 
administrative-reform agenda of the Fourth Constitutional government under Prime 
Minister Xanana Gusmao.33 Apart from the establishment of CAC, this agenda 
included the establishment of the Public Service Commission in 2009.34 Many public 
commentators supported the establishment of CAC and many others criticized it. 
Some argued that Timor-Leste did not need any specific institution to deal with 
corruption. They also argued that the PDHJ had to be strengthened, as it had some 
limited power to investigate corruption cases. Opponents doubted that CAC would 
be effective, given that its mandate only includes investigative powers and no 
prosecutorial power. Supporters of the new commission argued that Timor-Leste 
needed a specific institution to deal with corruption, citing the example of 
32 Secretary of State for the Council of Ministers, "Statement Regarding the Office of the Vice 
Prime Minister Mario Carrascalao," September 2, 2010, http:/ /timor-leste. 
gov.tl/?p=3762&1ang=en, accessed April 25, 2012. 
33 Xanana Gusmao, "2008: The Year of Administrative Reform," Government of Timor-Leste, 
Dili, transcript of speech delivered May 8, 2008, http:/ /timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/ 
uploads/2009 /10/20080508_pm_reform_administracao_en.pdf, accessed June 27, 2012. 
34 See Law No. 7 /2009, adopted by the National Parliament on July 15, 2009, www.unmit.org-/ 
legal/RDTL-Law /RDTL-Laws/Law%207-2009.pdf, accessed June 27, 2012. 
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Indonesia's Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK). They also argued that the PDHJ's 
twin mandates, to protect human rights and combat corruption, could be 
incompatible, given the possibility of human rights infringements in the process of 
investigating corruption cases. Most importantly, PDHJ was only granted the 
authority to carry out administrative investigations, not criminal investigations, so 
that it was important that the CAC be designated to investigate criminal cases of 
corruption. Supporters also argued that corruption is an extraordinary crime, so it 
needed an extraordinary institution to deal with it. 
The law gives a very strong investigative mandate to CAC, though it has no 
prosecutorial power. Article 4 states that CAC has two broad mandates, namely 
prevention of corruption and criminal investigation of corruption. CAC' s powers are 
categorized into two groups. Firstly, in terms of crime prevention, CAC' s mandate 
includes the power to gather and analyze information on the causes of corruption 
and on the prevention of corruption; to raise public awareness; and to advise any 
institution or public entity on ways to prevent and combat corruption. Secondly, in 
terms of criminal investigation, CAC' s mandate includes the power to conduct 
inquiries and carry out investigative inquires as delegated by the public prosecutor; 
to receive reports of crimes; to seek those responsible for the commission of crimes; 
to investigate evidence or reports of acts that may constitute a crime; to identify and 
arrest people; and to carry out necessary notifications directly or through another 
police authority.35 
As for the debate over prosecutorial power, I would argue that, for the time 
being, CAC does not need a specific prosecutorial power. Indonesia's KPK operates 
in a very different environment, in which what might be described as the "judicial 
mafia" is still powerful throughout Indonesia.36 Therefore, the KPK needs the power 
to prosecute in order for it to work effectively. The KPK cannot rely on Indonesia's 
corrupt prosecutor's office or the national police. That is not the case for Timor-Leste. 
Although capacity is still limited, the justice sector is not as corrupt as it is in 
Indonesia. There are still many clean young judges and prosecutors in the courts of 
Timor-Leste. So, these reliable public officials only need to be supported. CAC's 
presence can be complementary and can add ballast to the prosecution of corruption 
cases in the court. 
However, the door has not been closed on the question of CAC having 
prosecutorial power in the future. The granting of these new powers would have to 
be accomplished through a constitutional amendment. It will be important to wait 
and see how these various institutions deal with corruption cases in the future. Their 
effectiveness and respective roles will no doubt be debated further in Timor-Leste, 
just as similar debates have been ongoing in other countries, such as Malaysia, 
regarding the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACA). Just recently, 
MACA has proposed a constitutional amendment in order to grant it prosecutorial 
powers.37 On the other hand, experience also shows that some other anti-corruption 
commissions in Asia have been successful without having prosecutorial powers. The 
Independent Commission for Anti-Corruption (ICAC) Hong Kong is a good example 
35 Ibid., Article 5. 
36 The Indonesian judiciary is widely acknowledged to be deeply corrupt, and in 2004 was 
cited as the most corrupt institution in Indonesia. 
37 
"PM to Consider Proposal on Prosecution of Corruption Cases to be Determined by 
MACC," Malaysian Digest, August 29, 2010. 
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of this kind of success story. ICAC Hong Kong has no prosecutorial power, but it 
possesses a very strong investigative mandate. ICAC also conducted large-scale 
campaign and education programs. 
For the time being, however, the CAC has to carry out its task in the context of 
the system that exists currently in Timor-Leste. There is no doubt that the 
commission will need to set up good cooperation and coordination with the office of 
the prosecutor general. The success of the commission will be determined by many 
other factors including strong political will and support from the government, 
adequate financing, strong public support, and, most importantly, a public 
commitment to the upholding of the rule of law. This last issue has been a true 
challenge for many developing countries, including Timor-Leste. All of these factors 
are critical if the country's government and citizenry wish to avoid institutional 
ritualism, for any new institutions may fail if they are not given sufficient power and 
support. 
Following the election of its commissioner in February 2010, CAC finalized its 
first round of recruitments in November 2010. CAC's vision is to achieve "a 
democratic Timor-Leste with a strong culture of rejecting corruption in the interest 
and prosperity of the people." Its mission is "combating corruption through 
prevention, education, and investigation." Following recruitment of a staff that 
included ten investigators, the investigators were given six weeks of training. CAC 
then started criminal investigations in February 2011. By October 2011, CAC had 
investigated ten cases and submitted them to the prosecutor's office to be brought to 
trial, provided that the prosecutor was confident that the cases were based on strong 
admissible evidence. 
INVESTIGATION VERSUS PREVENTION AND EDUCATION CAMPAIGNS 
Many Timorese have become frustrated as they have observed the growing 
number of allegations of corruption, but relatively few corruption cases have been 
brought to justice. However, public frustration should not be the main reference 
point used by the CAC as it develops a strategy for combating corruption. There is 
no doubt that the CAC will concentrate on carrying out investigations as prescribed 
by the law. The CAC's mission, which is clearly set out in its founding law, 
comprises two important tasks: preventative action and criminal investigation. 
Although it is clear that the CAC must work in both these areas, the public tends to 
focus on the investigative aspect only. The public wanted to see some "big fish" 
investigated first, before focusing on other strategies of prevention and public 
education. This same approach was reflected in some political leaders' statements, 
which have contributed to the relatively poor awareness of the importance of 
educational and preventative strategies in dealing with corruption. This desire to see 
the "big fish" dramatically prosecuted and the related tendency to ignore the many 
"little fish" engaged in petty acts of corruption recalls the dualistic attitude shown in 
some of the common Timorese expressions described above. 
This public tendency to focus only on grand corruption investigations and 
prosecutions reflects a misunderstanding of the strategies needed to combat 
corruption in Timor-Leste. While acknowledging the importance of carrying out 
investigations, we have to also look seriously at how to educate the public on this 
issue. CAC also has to take preventative action in every state institution in order to 
combat corruption. In short, these strategies should not compromise each other; 
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instead, they should be complementary. Given the small size of the population and 
the small bureaucracy that Timor has at the moment, a comprehensive preventative 
strategy, involving all stakeholders, would make a lot of difference to the country in 
the future. 
It is imperative to establish, from the outset, a multipronged strategy to tackle 
corruption. Aside from its ongoing criminal investigation, CAC therefore embarked 
on a massive prevention campaign in 2011, including preventive activities carried 
out in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, especially the customs department. 
Several workshops involving hundreds of custom officers were conducted by CAC. 
Several public meetings were also conducted targeting officers from the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Tourism and Trade. These meetings with public servants 
were important in order to raise general awareness about corruption. These exercises 
were expected to result in the adoption of anti-corruption plans within each 
respective institution in the near future. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the importance of having different institutions to deal 
with the issue of corruption, but it has also highlighted the fact that establishing such 
institutions might create institutional ritualism, instead of actually resolving the 
problem. Timor-Leste still needs to avoid this phenomenon. This chapter also argues 
that Timor-Leste needs to develop a holistic approach to preventing corruption, as 
reflected in the CAC's mandate in the areas of prevention, campaigning and 
education, and criminal investigation. Education and campaigning are imperative to 
change people's perceptions and attitudes, as exemplified by the common 
expressions discussed above. It is clear that CAC and other state institutions will not 
be able to tackle corruption unless they do so as part of a national movement to 
combat corruption. We shall have to wait and see whether the new endeavor to 
combat post-independence corruption is successful in Timor-Leste in the years to 
come. 
THE JUSTICE SECTOR: 
ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES, 
AND COMPARISONS 
Andrew Marriott 
INTRODUCTION 
Although Timor-Leste, along with Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and others, has come 
to be viewed as something of a laboratory for international law, its domestic 
jurisdiction has generally drawn less attention. Many of the challenges it now faces 
in this regard have been seen before, broadly in the context of post-conflict 
development. Indeed, great benefits may now be derived from greater access to, and 
understanding of, innovations and best practices tested in comparable settings. This 
is not, however, license to import supposed solutions without consideration and 
adaptation to Timor-Leste's unique circumstances. 
Those representing international agencies engaged in Timor-Leste, post-
independence, understandably viewed crimes contravening established global 
norms as an urgent justice sector priority. Aid appears to have been directed 
accordingly. Despite curtailed, and diplomatically fraught, processes, a number of 
prosecutions of war crimes and crimes against humanity were completed through to 
sentencing and subsequent detention. While these select legal victories may 
reasonably be seen by some as helping to salve the wounds left by Timorese 
occupation and resistance, the need for justice extends further. 
A mere decade into its renewed existence as a sovereign state, Timor-Leste is, 
unsurprisingly, yet to put the wrongs of recent history fully behind it. With the 
increasingly complex and industrious lives of its citizens requiring new institutions 
and establishing new dynamics, however, injustices perpetrated in the present day 
are as much of a concern. Though the democratic architecture of the Timorese state 
encompasses some commendable protections, the ability of formal institutions to 
respond directly to the range of everyday legal needs remains limited. 
Some of these shortcomings are simply a reflection of Timor-Leste's emergence 
from a period of violence and turmoil. Others may represent developmental 
oversights or missteps that require attention and correction. With the public demand 
for access to (state-sponsored) justice growing in step with the investment in national 
identity, pressures on legal institutions will surely increase. Accordingly, as "no 
peace without justice" is as durable a maxim for post-conflict recovery as presently 
100 Andrew Marriott 
exists, it follows that swift and assiduous support to the justice sector will be needed 
in order to avoid a possible spillover of community tensions. 
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
In development terms, Timor-Leste is in the midst of a transition. The immediacy 
of aid provision under the auspices of humanitarian emergency has now largely 
been replaced by longer-term recovery and reconstruction goals. Practically, en 
masse delivery of items needed for survival has ceded the spotlight to less easily 
quantifiable issues of democratic governance. Especially in the context of a global 
financial crisis that has seen private philanthropy diminish and foreign aid budgets 
subjected to greater scrutiny, donor preference for the provision of readily monetized 
outcomes, reportable by the unit, appears further entrenched. In the justice sector, 
where gains are incremental and difficult to analyze discretely, conditions for 
attracting support are less than optimal. 
The often nebulous nature of justice-sector development is here compounded by 
institutions the local norms and processes of which are still forming. Courts were a 
feature of colonial administration and subsequent occupation in Timor-Leste, but 
then, as now, they were predominantly a distant phenomenon, invoked only in rare 
instances.1 In addition to the District Tribunal, and Court of Appeal, in Dili, courts 
now operate (albeit irregularly) in the regional centers of Suai, in Covalima; 
Pantemakassar, in the exclave of Oecusse; and Baucau1 in its eponymous district. For 
a nation of just over a million citizens, at last estimation, 2 this may seem an adequate 
distribution of services. Factoring in the remarkably diffuse, rural, and remote 
population, however, means that many citizens remain practically outside of the 
court's reach and, conversely, lacking meaningful access to formal justice. 
Given such a limited scope of operations, it is hardly surprising that national 
surveys, conducted sequentially post-independence, reveal a relatively low 
awareness and comprehension of formal justice mechanisms.3 In isolated 
communities, there may be no functional understanding at all. Even where courts are 
present or in close proximity, they are still finding their place in the complex 
network of communitarian dynamics and bounded interactions that typify more 
traditional Timorese society. Where regional identities remain strong, and the 
dividends of the nation-building process are yet to filter comprehensively out, local 
ownership of state-sponsored legal institutions remains weak. 
Regrettably, the performance of courts has, to date, done little to bolster 
confidence in the formal justice system. Aside from the logistical difficulties involved 
in presenting a case, district courts outside of Dili operate on notoriously flexible 
schedules and are often subject to substantial delays. In Oecusse, for example, the 
court typically hears matters only three or four days out of the month. Parties 
traveling-at great expense and sometimes risk-to contribute to a hearing have 
been known to be turned away from this supposedly permanent legal fixture rather 
1 Tanja Hohe and Rod Nixon, Reconciling Justice: "Traditional" Law and State Judiciary in East 
Timar (Dili: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), p. 19, available at www.gsdrc.org/ docs/ 
open/DS33.pdf, accessed April 25, 2012. 
2 World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), p. 3. 
3 The Asia Foundation (TAF), Law and Justice in East Timar: A Survey of Citizen Awareness and· 
Attitudes Regarding Law and Justice in East Timar (Dili: TAF, 2008), p. 39. 
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than cause the court an hour's delay. Conversely, district courts may take eighteen 
months or more to bring a case to trial, during which time an informal solution has 
often been brokered.4 
The principal cause of these shortcomings can perhaps be expressed in terms of 
resourcing. A centralized bureaucracy, elaborate procurement processes, and long 
supply chains all combine to complicate the business of running a legal institution. 
Although this situation is improving with the oversight and assistance of 
international development partners, many court offices and associated buildings are 
still without even basic amenities, such as regular power. Moreover, the erratic 
attendance of already sparse personnel continues to be a hindrance to courtroom 
operations. Despite regulations requiring judicial actors and other court staff to 
maintain a consistent presence at their assigned district base, and the construction of 
well-appointed residences for their benefit, many still, in effect, commute from Dili.5 
A roster of ongoing training and meetings is relied upon in such circumstances to 
provide a rationale for officials eager to return to the capital, leaving district court 
schedules to languish. 
Other features of the justice system, though arguably performing well given the 
constraints, similarly demonstrate failings. The two presently operating prisons, in 
Dili' s suburban area of Becora, and in Gleno, Ermera district, house just over two 
hundred detainees. Though conditions are not considered by international observers 
to be especially poor for the region, there are not separate holding facilities for 
juvenile offenders, nor for the vast number of those in pre-trial detention-a 
situation that can persist for months or even years.6 Prison security is also in question 
following a series of high-profile escapes. Prosecutors and public defenders are few, 
and based mostly in Dili, meaning that investigation of a crime is far from 
expeditious, as much case preparation is delegated to (usually untrained) local police 
members. Likewise, communication between an accused and his or her mandated 
legal representation is often long delayed and thereafter infrequent. 
Private lawyers are increasingly being called upon, especially in district 
locations, to serve in both prosecutorial and defense roles. Although their training 
was not meant to prepare them for such duties, these individuals have a greater rural 
and remote presence than do lawyers in public institutions and, due to their 
community ties (as distinct from their state-employed brethren, whose posts are 
often assigned with little regard to such heritaget they often enjoy a greater degree 
of community acceptance. Additionally, aid programming has increasingly led to 
private lawyers being employed as legal aid providers, whose job often encompasses 
awareness-raising as much as courtroom representation. 7 Though legislation passed 
in 2008 introduced a staged system of accreditation and regulation for the legal 
profession, there remains a great deal of variation in the quality of legal services. 
With the formal system so impaired, it is hardly surprising that older, 
indigenous methods of dispute resolution remain in operation. These may provide a 
4 Laura Grenfell, "Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law in Timor Leste," Leiden Journal of 
International Law 9 (2006): 318. 
5 Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), Overview of Justice Sector 2006-2007 (Dili: 
JSMP, 2008), p. 11. 
6 Leanne Mitchell, Who'll Save the Youth? (Dili: International Committee of the Red Cross, 
2007), p. 1. 
7 JSMP, Overview of Justice Sector 2006-2007, p. 12. 
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more immediate and socially durable solution to a range of conflicts, often deriving 
legitimacy from elements of local cosmology. These benefits, however, must be 
balanced against criticism that such custom often diverges from human rights 
principles in respect of its treatment of women.8 Furthermore, loss of key personnel 
due to conflict, recent rural-urban migration, and the importation of foreign social 
norms are all alleged to be weakening the credibility of this traditional system. Some 
have claimed customary law to be increasingly arbitrary and subject to partisan 
capture.9 For all these complaints, informal modes of justice remain far more familiar 
and so more liable to be chosen as a recourse by the majority of Timorese. 
CURRENT LEGAL DISCOURSE 
Given a comparison between formal and informal justice systems that generally 
reflects poorly on state-sponsored institutions and processes, the incorporation of 
custom in Timor-Leste's justice system has become a live political issue. During the 
period of United Nations administration, and intermittently thereafter, there have 
been attempts made to utilize local knowledge and authority in sentencing, to 
achieve a more enforceable and fitting community-focused outcome. While such 
restorative approaches are now gaining a substantial following in other jurisdictions, 
policy makers in Timor-Leste have, over the post-independence period, previously 
viewed direct integration warily.10 
Some commentators have suggested that disappointment with the scope and 
service of the courts has prompted something of a return to traditional methods.11 
Despite a range of complaints, there remains a high degree of trust in local 
leadership and in the modes of dispute resolution locally employed. With two justice 
systems in operation, and the government associated with the lesser favored option, 
that government can be expected to recognize that it faces a potential political 
liability. Accordingly, the formerly disreputable realm of custom is presently 
undergoing a degree of civic rehabilitation, with a view to bringing it more under the 
aegis of the state. 
While there is merit in seeking to draw on practices that are already familiar and 
trusted, care will need to be taken to ensure that the government is neither seen to 
condone outcomes at odds with its human rights obligations nor that it is coopting 
local networks. To replace credibility derived from a sense of place, and of 
belonging, with a license granted by a remote central power would very likely erode 
the locally understood validity of decision making based on customary practices and 
authority. 
One draft law currently under consideration by the parliament proposes just 
this. Furthermore, this project appears to proceed from flawed assumptions that 
customary law is homogenous across the country, and that selective use may be 
8 Hohe and Nixon, Reconciling Justice, p. 67. 
9 David Mearns, Looking Both Ways: Models for Justice in East Timar (Sydney: Australian Legal 
Resources International, 2002), p. 52. 
10 Simon Butt, Natalie David, and Nathan Laws, Looking Forward: Local Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms in Timor-Leste (Dili: Australian Legal Resources International for the Asia 
Foundation in Timor-Leste, 2004), p. 36; Andrew Harrington, "Institutions and the East 
Timorese Experience," East Timar Law Journal 7 (2006): 9. 
11 Ewa Wojkowska, Doing Justice: How Informal Justice Systems Can Contribute (Oslo: United' 
Nations Development Programme, 2006), p. 18. 
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made of certain elements with the remainder discarded.12 Requiring that local 
communities conform with national legislation can be a coercive policy tool. 
Education, although slower to produce results, may conversely meet with greater 
public acceptance and preserve vital routes of dispute resolution. Trials conducted 
by civil society actors in Oecusse, for example, show that traditional leaders are 
receptive to incorporating human rights norms in their determinations, and to 
facilitating referral to the formal system where necessary.13 
One area in which some degree of synthesis may be useful is in respect of case 
backlog. This has consistently been an area of embarrassment for the formal justice 
system, with in excess of four thousand cases reported, by various sources, as 
pending. Some of these date from the period of the 2006 crisis, and some from still 
earlier times. This general situation is often cited by commentators, and especially 
political detractors, as reducing the courts' responsiveness to current community 
needs.14 
Since many such cases deal with alleged nonviolent property crimes and 
associated crimes of opportunity, there is a chance to implement a more measured 
response. The notion of a diversion program is gaining support from some quarters 
of government. This would likely entail carefully vetted defendants voluntarily 
pleading guilty in order to avoid a custodial sentence and, instead, undertaking 
community service as imposed (under certain conditions) by local leaders and elders. 
As well as reducing pressure on the courts, this option would also promote 
awareness and ownership of the formal system and, so, deserves attention. 
In a strongly communitarian society such as Timor-Leste, reintegration of 
offenders is a high priority. This is true at both local and national levels. Rightly or 
wrongly, the work of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Reception 
(known by its Portuguese acronym, CAVR) in facilitating the return of pre-
independence-era combatants to their respective communities-a process referred to 
locally as acolhimentu (reception)-is widely viewed as a success. The report of the 
commission stands as an extensive testament to the hardships of occupation, the 
desperation of the independence struggle, and the violence that preceded Timor-
Leste's reemergence as a state. The report also offers a detailed list of 
recommendations toward a more complete resolution of conflict.15 
Political pragmatism, alongside practical difficulty, has long delayed 
consideration of these recommendations and caused them to be largely overlooked. 
Timor-Leste' s post-independence leaders, no doubt keen to preserve the fragile 
peace enjoyed by their new nation, have seemingly been loath to provoke further 
displeasure from Indonesia. Given the shared border between Timor-Leste and 
Indonesian West Timor, as well as increasing trade links and a clear historical 
antipathy to negotiate, the relationship has evidently required compromise, and a 
12 United Nations Development Program, Report of the Consultation Workshop on Customary Law 
(Dili: UNDP, 2009), p. 2. 
13 Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Justice Not Served by Truth and Friendship Commission 
(Dili: JSMP, 2008), p. 2. 
14 JSMP, Overview of Justice Sector 2006-2007, p. 15. 
15 Dionisio Baba-Soares, "Nahe biti: The Philosophy and Process of Grassroots Reconciliation 
(and Justice) in East Timar," Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 5,1 (2004): 10; Jose Trindade 
and Bryant Castro, Rethinking Timorese Identity as a Peacebuilding Strategy: The Lorosa'e-
Loromonu Conflict from a Traditional Perspective (Dili: The European Union's Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism Programme, 2007), p. 23. 
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deft diplomatic touch. This has sparked criticism that justice has become a casualty 
of realpolitik. Certainly, calls for international justice have lately been given little 
evident priority by Timorese leadership. 
Despite sharing some characteristics with the earlier CA VR, the jointly Timorese 
and Indonesian Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) came under fire for 
supposedly embodying this spirit of political compromise. With the diplomatically 
fraught objective of settling on an agreed narrative of the conflict, hearings of the 
CTF were understandably controversial. From the Timorese perspective, some felt 
that victims were subject to inappropriate scrutiny whereas sentenced perpetrators 
were availed of an opportunity to exculpate themselves.16 The fairness of the process 
aside, the CTF's report (cautiously prepared by an international team of researchers) 
made many of the same recommendations as the CA VR, adding to public pressure to 
see these inconsistencies addressed. 
At the time of writing, a series of proposals built around the recommendations of 
the CAVR report are being considered by the parliament's Commission on Judicial 
and Constitutional Affairs. Besides suggestions for a nationwide series of memorials 
honoring participants in the independence struggle, and for improved education 
addressing this episode of Timorese history, the chief concern is reparations. With 
the memory of recent government-administered payments to internally displaced 
persons, and pensions to the elderly and to veterans likely lingering in the public 
mind, the prospect of further disbursements is eagerly awaited. Debate over the 
source of funds (perhaps involving international interests), and the framework for 
their administration is, however, likely to delay the advent of such monies. 
This desire to see past crimes fade into history is evidenced elsewhere in the 
current political landscape. Enthusiastic-and controversial-use has been made of 
the constitutionally-afforded Presidential Pardon. Notably, in 2008, over eighty such 
pardons were announced to coincide with the May 20 national celebrations of the 
restoration of independence. Of those pardoned at this time, several had been 
serving sentences for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The release of one 
particular individual, Joni Marques, former leader of the Indonesian-backed Team 
Alpha militia whose exploits in Lospalos district were among the most brutal of the 
conflict, caused much disquiet. Given that the trial of Marques and nine of his fellow 
militiamen was the first post-independence prosecution (and one of quite few) 
concerned with crimes against humanity, this response is perhaps not surprising.17 
Commentators noted that eligibility criteria for the pardons appeared to have been 
generously interpreted, and some pointed to the possible influence of Catholic 
teachings on forgiveness and confession. 18 
The parliamentary power to authorize amnesties may also soon be invoked. A 
draft law is, at the time of writing, being circulated and would, in its current form, 
seem intended to close off many avenues for justice through international law. 
Distinct from the presidential power to grant clemency after the passage (and partial 
service) of a sentence, amnesties of this kind could afford certain exemptions from a 
person's liability to stand trial. Dispute may be expected to center on the period of 
16 JSMP, Justice Not Served By Truth, p. 1 
17 Judicial System Monitoring Programme, The General Prosecutor V. Joni Marques and Nine 
Others (The Los Palos Case)-A JSMP Trial Report (Dili: JSMP, 2002), p. 38. 
18 Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Crimes Against Humanity Perpetrators Released (Dili:. 
JSMP, June 20, 2008), p. 1. 
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time during which activities took place for which amnesty may be granted. Input 
from the international community will likely skirt this issue, given the probability of 
embarrassment for many senior politicians who are not only veterans of the 
independence struggle but also of preceding, violent infighting between partisan 
interest groups. 
There are limits to this prevailing attitude of forgiveness. President Jose Ramos-
Horta has publicly declared his willingness to pardon (under prescribed conditions) 
those alleged to have been directly involved in the February 11, 2008, confrontation 
in which he was injured. As appeals against conviction are ongoing, this preemption 
of judicial outcome has drawn criticism on separation-of-powers grounds.19 
The same forbearance has, however, not been shown to another of those accused 
of planning the attack. The sometime partner of rebel leader Alfredo Reinado (who 
was killed in the exchange of fire on February 11), Angelita Pires, was brought to 
trial despite claims of insufficient and contradictory evidence.20 Pires having been 
acquitted, it appears the prosecutor-general's office has reportedly taken the highly 
unorthodox step of indicating to Pires' s counsel an intention to appeal. Whereas 
pardon and amnesty provisions have prompted concerns about impunity, the 
seeming disparity of treatment perceived as occurring in this case, compared with 
other similar cases, has caused some to question whether prosecutions might also, in 
some instances, be subject to political direction. 
ACHIEVEMENTS TO DATE 
Discussions of the rule of law in Timor-Leste can focus overly on the 
shortcomings of the system. It bears remembering that in just over a decade of 
renewed independence, Timor-Leste has made significant progress toward 
establishing a modern and democratic justice sector. However qualified or tempered 
by imperfect practice, these tentative steps-taken in the most trying of 
circumstances-merit a certain acclaim. In particular, the constitution itself is worthy 
of positive regard. Admittedly bearing the marks of international assistance, it even 
so retains a distinctly Timorese character, incorporating judicious reference to 
custom and to the supportive role of the Catholic Church during the resistance era. 
Remarkably, for a political system that has evolved in part from a guerrilla 
movement, Timor-Leste's constitution largely frames instruments of state to reflect 
inclusive and egalitarian values. Though its drafting does not preclude all ambiguity, 
it nonetheless provides a firm legal foundation for an emerging democracy. The 
popular mandates that determine the respective powers of president and prime 
minister have been cited as an interpretive fault line, particularly in light of historical 
antagonism between certain of the respective office-bearers. 21 Whatever may be 
inferred from political dynamics and expressions of policy, the constitution of Timor-
Leste declares an intention to take its lead from the (predominantly Western) 
tradition of representative, and responsive, governance. 
19 ABC News, "Ramos-Horta Welcomes Assassination Attempt Trials, Mulls Pardon," ABC 
News Online, March 5, 2009, p. 1, available at www.abc.net.au/news/2009-03-05/ramos-horta-
welcomes-assassination-attempt-trials/1608910, accessed May 16, 2012. 
20 Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Overview of Justice Sector 2009 (Dili: JSMP, 2010), 
p.47. 
21 Dennis Shoesmith, "Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System," Asian Survey 43,2 
(2003): 231-32. 
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Human rights are well enshrined in Timor-Leste's organic laws. An extensive 
suite of protections and guarantees is listed throughout the constitution and echoed 
in specific statutes. As with most jurisdictions, these must be considered primarily as 
hortatory statements. The practical effect of a right to housing, for example, is belied 
by the country's continued poverty. Similarly, research suggests that, where the 
Catholic Church has become bonded to Timor-Leste's modern creation myth, 
freedom of religion is not always a well understood, or even welcome, concept. 22 
Timor-Leste is also extensively subscribed to treaty law. In some instances, this 
merely reiterates constitutional safeguards, but in others (as in the proclaimed stance 
on arms use and proliferation) it practically extends the array of obligations owed by 
the government, not only to its citizens, but also to the rest of the world. Timor-Leste 
became signatory to a wide range of treaties shortly following independence, leading 
some to question the degree to which this may have been more out of a desire to be 
seen as a legitimate state power than a clear accord with the principles of 
international law documented within the agreements. Anecdotally, some senior 
government officials have expressed a view that Timor-Leste's observance of treaty 
law is, at least in part, an artefact of international pressure and ought to be 
interpreted in light of national interest-a position, of course, not unheard-of in the 
developed world. 
Having inherited, by quirk of history, a set of laws that reflect neither local 
conditions nor best practice, Timor-Leste continues the difficult process of producing 
a domestic statute book. The first legal act of the United Nations Transitional 
Administration (UNTAET), post-independence, was to decree that all laws 
previously operating in the jurisdiction continued to be applicable except where 
inconsistent with the United Nations mandate-as with the death penalty. Although 
this reinforcement of existing laws was an interim measure intended to assist 
peacekeeping efforts, this perpetuated many features of a legal system that had been 
a means of oppression. 
Some Indonesian statutes that have, in their originating jurisdiction, long since 
been repealed or redrafted, linger on as "legal revenants" in Timorese courtrooms. 
As a rule, these reflect an explicitly Islamic morality and an authoritarian bent that 
punishes any slight to state power or circumvention of hierarchy. While the most 
egregious of these laws have now been replaced by Timorese legislation, some 
examples persist, typically in less trafficked areas of law. Moreover, as the majority 
of Timorese legal practitioners were educated in this system, their interpretation and 
understanding is still somewhat colored by its precepts. In the main, however, 
Indonesian law has gradually been overtaken, such that Timorese law bears 
decreasing similarity to the statutes governing its neighboring jurisdiction. 
Today, most civic activity is regulated under Timorese law. Immigration, 
commerce, traffic movement, and the terms of political office are all, inter alia, direct 
expressions of domestic legislation. Although some have criticized the distinctly 
Lusophone flavor of many new laws, and the influence over drafting maintained by 
certain international advisers, nonetheless parliamentary members of the 
Commission on Judicial and Constitutional Affairs have undertaken active 
legislative development and scrutiny. 
22 Belun, Religious Identity and Conflict in Timor-Leste: An EWER Program Policy Brief (Dili: Belun, 
2009), p. 3. 
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A recent legal milestone was reached with the passage of the Timorese Criminal 
Code in late 2008. Drafts had been circulated since 2003, but had encountered 
resistance on two main points. Criminal defamation, used elsewhere in the region to 
discourage and punish critics of the government, was a holdover from Indonesian 
law and (aside from its incompatibility with freedom of speech) undeniably a 
powerful political tool.23 Bowing to pressure from local civil society and the 
international community alike, this offense was finally removed, but not before the 
minister of justice had threatened its eleventh-hour use against an investigative 
journalist. 
As well as updating the range of offenses to reflect technological advances, more 
modern social mores, and the increasingly transnational nature of crime, the 
Timorese Criminal Code does markedly improve legal remedies for women. While 
these provisions will, hopefully, soon be bolstered by a dedicated domestic-violence 
law, the legal code does recognize-for the first time in Timorese law-rape within 
marriage, and shifts the existence of a prior relationship between perpetrator and 
victim from a mitigating to an aggravating factor.24 
Monumental legislative fixture though it is, the Criminal Code does contain-at 
least to an international audience-some regrettable inequities. With the Catholic 
Church a much-consulted stakeholder in public policy, it is hardly surprising that 
the decriminalization of abortion should provoke such a hard-fought battle. Whilst 
advocacy from local women's groups and the international community succeeded in 
seeing the Criminal Code pass with exceptions for abortion when necessary to save 
the mother's life, a swiftly passed amendment soon made even this exception a 
practical impossibility. 25 
While international input to the justice sector remains substantial, Timorese 
personnel are gradually taking on a greater responsibility in key court roles. Given 
that so few local legal professionals remained in Timor-Leste following the conflict, 
initially all but a few positions were taken on by foreign personnel, generally under 
the auspices of the United Nations. Claims continue to be made that there is an over-
reliance on external expertise, but this trend is now reversing. Timorese judges now 
preside over hearings, Timorese prosecutors prepare cases, and Timorese public 
defenders represent clients. Though such individuals remain relatively few (weighed 
against the needs of the system), their presence is rightly a source of national pride. 
The capacity of local court actors has been the subject of some contention. When, 
post-independence, individuals with legal experience were invited to undertake 
United Nations-sponsored training, all infamously failed the subsequent 
examinations. Although embarrassing for the participants, this result reveals poor 
planning at least as much as a steep learning curve.26 Lessons conducted in 
Portuguese were reportedly not well understood by most of the Timorese students, 
and language classes undertaken alongside legal coursework did little to increase 
23 Warren Wright, "Criminal Defamation in East Timor-A Miscarriage of Justice," East Timar 
Law Journal 5 (2009): 1-2. 
24 Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Draft Penal Code Needs Final Adjustment (Dili: JSMP, 
2008), p. 1. 
25 Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Abortion Reform Still Needed: Article 141 of the East 
Timar Penal Code Must Comply with Constitution and International Law (Dili: JSMP, 2009), p. 2. 
26 Carolyn Graydon, ''Local Justice Systems in Timor-Leste: Washed Up, or Watch This 
Space?" Development Bulletin 68 (2005): 67-68. 
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their comprehension. Later efforts have utilized mentoring and on-the-job training, 
apparently to greater effect than by employing the parallel class methodology. 
With the first cohort of Timorese court actors taking their place, attention is 
increasingly focused on introducing new local personnel into the system. Four 
universities now offer a law program-admittedly with varying degrees of 
consistency-and a process for legal accreditation has been established. Those 
fortunate enough to have secured a sought-after place at the Legal Training Centre 
undergo a two-year program (incorporating language training) that will authorize 
graduating students to take up roles in prosecution, in defense, and on the bench. 
The Centre's heavily Portuguese-influenced curriculum has drawn some 
negative commentary, with opponents claiming that it further entrenches linguistic 
(and class) divides. 27 Certainly the character of legal education may merit attention, 
and greater assistance may be needed to ensure a supply of qualified personnel 
sufficient to meet the country's legal needs. The establishment of a national training 
scheme, however, with its objective of furthering Timorese ownership of, and 
engagement with, the formal justice system, stands as an important accomplishment. 
NEXT STEPS 
Despite substantial additions, such as the Criminal Code, there remain some 
notable absences from the Timorese statute book. With such lacunae precipitating an 
uncomfortable reliance on the outmoded and mistrusted Indonesian laws persisting 
from pre-independence times, there are both practical and political reasons to 
introduce overriding legislation. Especially in a post-conflict context, legislation may 
render the results of disputes more consistently predictable, a condition that, over 
time, would actually diminish the likelihood of parties entering into such disputes-
this phenomenon is at the heart of rule-of-law theory. 
With these imperatives in mind, it is no surprise to find the Timorese parliament 
with a busy legislative agenda. There are so many draft laws competing for attention, 
however, that there is now a risk that the fundamentals of the legal system may be 
neglected (or ignored as too contentious) in preference to politically favored topics. 
Though the criminal law has now largely been settled, civil law (that is, the body of 
laws regulating private disputes between citizens as opposed to those in which the 
State is a party) remains incomplete. Some associated civil procedure has been 
agreed upon, and passed into law, but without the substantive code in place, there is 
simply nothing to apply. For the time being, such disputes may be resolved by 
reference to an odd admixture of Timorese process and preceding Indonesian law, 
though in practice civil matters receive short shrift in the courts. As the Timorese 
economy grows, and a greater emphasis is placed on trade and commerce, the need 
for clearer governance in the private sphere will become even more apparent. 
The passage into law of the Criminal Code, meanwhile, has not unequivocally 
raised the bar for the entire justice system. There remain, of course, some areas of 
particularly troubling practice. Not the least of these is in respect of juvenile justice. 
Having acceded, without reservation, to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
and its Optional Protocols (which allow for enforcement mechanisms), the 
27 Judicial System Monitoring Programme, The Private Lawyers Statute: Overview and Analysis 
(Dili: JSMP, 2008), p. 8. 
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government of Timor-Leste has explicit obligations in this area and so will require 
dedicated legislative structures to ensure their proper implementation. 
Juvenile justice comes into starkest relief in detention. Though the prison 
population is relatively small, and the proportion of juveniles among this population 
smaller again, there nonetheless remains a live concern.28 Best practice (and treaty 
law) mandates not only that incarceration ought to be a last resort in the sentencing 
of juveniles, but also that any custodial term be served separately from adult 
inmates. In Timor-Leste, this is regrettably not the case. Though civil society ensures 
a degree of support and oversight to youth in prison, this situation risks further 
marginalizing already vulnerable individuals, and on compassionate, as well as 
legat grounds, ought not persist. Accordingly, a draft law in circulation at the time 
of writing merits immediate consideration. 
The passage of legislation is, of course, not the end of the matter when it comes 
to reform of the justice system. The passage of a witness protection law in Timor-
Leste, though signaling a laudable governmental intent, is yet to be noticeably 
translated into practice. As a result, victims and witnesses to crime are not well 
served by legal institutions. Survivors of sexual assault and domestic abuse are 
regularly kept by police together with their aggressors.29 This phenomenon is 
addressed by the legislation, but without extensive training and socialization, no 
change in behavior can realistically be expected. 
Witnesses, whether they are survivors of criminal acts or not, are typically 
reluctant to participate in courtroom hearings. Though technically the legal 
provisions are now in place to safeguard anonymity and personal security, in 
practice there is no such guarantee. In a close-knit society such as Timor-Leste, these 
measures would be difficult to deliver under the best of circumstances. Another 
factor diminishing the likelihood of testimonial evidence is the delay in reaching a 
hearing date. Since a case may take many months, or even years, to come to trial, 
there may be intense and sustained pressure on witnesses to accommodate a more 
immediate solution, however imperfect. Accordingly, it is often the case that in the 
course of a trial, because a determination has already been made according to custom 
and within the community, witnesses will be noncompliant and pretend no 
knowledge of facts to which they had previously sworn. Such cases are usually then 
dismissed for want of evidence. 
Not all of the pressing issues facing Timor-Leste's justice system resolve 
exclusively to legislation. Many are, in fact, a question of process and of emerging 
professional culture. One of the principal impediments to improved public 
understanding and ownership of the courts is the difficulty of gaining information 
from them. This is, admittedly, a widely observed problem, affecting many sectors. 
The absence of a clear channel for engagement with legal institutions, however, and 
for the provision of data to inform policy and improve access, risks denying citizens 
an outlet for their conflicts and so upsetting the community's fragile peace. 
At least part of this obstruction derives from a lack of role clarity among court 
staff. With the parameters of their employment, and the content of their jobs, not 
adequately delineated or understood, the exchange of even basic information is often 
curtailed from fear of inadvertent error. This hinders attempts toward greater 
28 Mitchell, Who'll Save the Youth?, p. 1. 
29 Aisling Swaine, Traditional Justice and Gender-Based Violence (Dili: International Rescue 
Committee, 2003), p. 3. 
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transparency and accountability and, moreover, makes for a typically frustrating and 
alienating experience among those attempting to navigate the system. The 
experience of civil society monitors suggests that, as with so much in Timor-Leste, 
obtaining pertinent facts often requires a personal connection, enough to 
counterbalance concerns over the extent of proper authorization. Training is needed 
on the distinctions between public documents and confidential information, 
certainly, but perhaps the greater need is in inculcating a working ethos in the courts 
that better reflects service to the community. 
The present scarcity of hard data from the justice system is, of course, not solely 
a problem that results from tentative personnel. Inconsistent reporting and filing 
processes not only hinder access to specific case results, but also disallow 
aggregation and analysis of data. Such data might be used by government as 
empirical evidence in the formation of policy, but also by judicial actors as precedent 
in determining appropriate responses to a recurring legal problem. In both respects, 
more comprehensive and up-to-date information would help to make the legal 
system more responsive and less arbitrary. 
There remains a great deal of debate over the introduction of a computer-
assisted-case-tracking system. Despite a great deal of financial and practical support 
from the international community, elements within the justice sector appear resistant 
to this innovation, perhaps fearing the greater oversight and stricter enforcement of 
protocol that such a system would allow. Legitimately, concerns have been 
expressed about the importation of software packages from other jurisdictions 
without alterations and amendments to account for the unique features of the 
Timorese context. Whatever the rationale, delays in the introduction of such a 
measure effectively leave the justice system without a consistent frame of reference 
for analyzing its own successes and failures, and deny opportunities for well-
founded innovation and improvement. 
To make necessary changes, the justice system must also be adequately 
resourced. This is not only a matter of budgeting to reflect emerging and projected 
needs but also of ensuring efficient procurement and logistics. This is a constraint 
faced across the entire suite of state-sponsored service provision, with departmental 
budgets regularly under spent. The problem of disbursing allocated public funds 
has, in fact, been recognized to the extent that ministers are lately subject to a system 
of ranking by the political executive according to their ability to translate their 
portfolio budgets into measurable outputs.30 
Though the situation is improving, courts still face shortages, especially at 
locations outside Dili. Despite budgeting for generators to be installed at all court 
buildings, as well as prosecutorial and defense offices-where these exist-many 
such buildings remain without backup power and other basic amenities. 
Requisitioning for even simple fixtures such as chairs and light globes has 
historically proven complex. Admittedly, Timor-Leste's geography can often impede 
the delivery of goods and the extension of services, but with assistance from other 
sectors also filtering out to the districts, some further investments and improvements 
might perhaps be implemented. Certainly it does not build public confidence in the 
courts to have them so undersupplied. 
30 ABC News, "Timar Advisory Body Calls For Budget Amendments," ABC News Online, July 
22, 2008, p. 1, available at www.radioaustralia.net.au I international/ radio I onairhighlights I 
timor-advisory-body-calls-for-budget-amendments, accessed May 16, 2012. 
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Resourcing shortfalls in the courts affect the levels of personnel, as well as 
material, resources. With a small corps of prosecutors and public defenders who are 
often recalled to Dili, and many on the bench being expatriates with obligations 
elsewhere, cases are regularly postponed for a lack of key staff. In some instances, 
private lawyers may be called upon to fill in, though their training does not always 
provide a firm grounding for these specific roles. Though membership of the 
fledgling legal professional body, the Asosiasaun Advogadu Timor-Leste (AATL), 
puts the number of local practitioners at just over one hundred, relatively few 
conduct work involving courtroom representation.31 In part, this reflects a common 
experience of legal education in other jurisdictions and difficulty in adapting such 
learning to the Timorese system. 
Legal education now occurring within Timor-Leste presents its own set of 
problems. Although four universities now claim law programs, in practice the 
curriculum in at least some institutions is inconsistent and lectures irregular. With 
there being so few established Timorese lawyers, and those individuals being 
consequently sought after, academic commitments are often held hostage to the 
scheduling dictates of other employment. The peculiarities of such education are 
compounded by the vagaries of an accreditation system that has certified successive 
cohorts of law graduates who are unprepared to function in the profession. While 
this may, in part, reflect fluctuating standards of teaching, it likely also reflects 
variance in the language of instruction-Portuguese seemingly being most well 
regarded.32 
Whatever the cause of withholding accreditation from certain legal courses, the 
effect is to perpetuate a shortage in the number of qualified court actors and, 
meanwhile, a proliferation of quasi-legal brokers and facilitators. With the passage, 
in 2008, of a law regulating the legal profession, completion of a mandated two-year 
practical training course has become the sole route to official standing (though a 
grace period for compliance is, at the time of writing, yet to elapse). Entry into this 
Legal Training Centre is thus highly competitive, and annual intakes are limited to 
between sixteen and thirty students.33 
With the duration of this extra level of instruction so long, and class size so 
small, qualified personnel will be in limited supply for some time to come. In the 
meantime, international advisors and functionaries will become further entrenched, 
risking perceptions that Timor-Leste's legal system remains under foreign control 
and leading to decreased Timorese investment in the courts. Regularization of the 
accreditation system for tertiary education in law, relaxation of some requirements 
for professional registration, and increased resourcing to extend participation in 
practical training would all assist in ensuring that public demand for justice services 
may be better met. 
LONGER-TERM CHALLENGES 
While some of the issues faced by Timor-Leste's justice system may be 
immediately addressed by way of legislation, as well as clarification of process and 
31 JSMP, Private Lawyers Statute, p. 5. 
32 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Social and Economic Development Brief-Timor Leste (Manila: 
ADB, 2007), p. 22. 
33 JSMP, Private Lawyers Statute, p. 8. 
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attendant campaigns of education, some will inevitably require a subtler shifting of 
institutional culture. One of the more insidious developments in the country's 
rapidly shifting legal terrain concerns the very means by which change is decided 
upon. Rather than staging open and extensive consultation among the public and 
key stakeholders, the government tends to draft legislation independently, which 
then precipitates reform and becomes the focus of debate.34 This narrows debate to 
the terms considered within the document, and because of the somewhat exclusive 
nature of legal language, can also hamper involvement from the full range of 
invested participants. 
Much consultation on proposed legal change is focused on Dili. This not only 
risks skewing the response to public consultation by reflecting predominantly urban 
concerns but also shifts the demographic of stakeholders and active participants in 
debate. In particular, there is likely to be a far higher representation of international 
interests involved in consultations centered in Dili. This may produce, in the public 
mind, an unfortunate perception that the machinery of government is geared to take 
into account foreign views to a greater extent than those of its actual constituency. 
Development partners such as the United Nations, who shoulder a considerable 
amount of the responsibility for authoring legislation, are increasingly seeking to 
engage with local civil society and with the community at large. Short timelines for 
drafting legislation and limited resources for raising public awareness, however, 
both appear to constrain these commendable attempts. Conversely, a lack of 
coordination among members of civil society can often hinder communication and 
slow consensus building. 
The drafting of new laws post-independence all too often employs-without 
appropriate alteration-provisions from other jurisdictions, thus worsening 
perceptions that foreign powers have co-opted the shaping of Timorese law. While a 
degree of international comparison is necessary to insure best practice, and may 
result in useful innovations, the reflexive importation of external models entails 
some risk. Although there is a range of legal issues requiring urgent response, and 
recourse to already established legislative structures may seem efficient, this kind of 
legislative transplantation can rarely be done without careful examination of context. 
In Timor-Leste, the system of checks and balances within which legislation is 
typically situated is yet to be fully realized. The absence in Timorese law of a statute 
defining legal terms and providing guidelines for the reading of other acts of 
parliament, for example, leaves judicial process open to inconsistencies until 
precedent is settled. Direct importation of legal norms and policy responses into the 
body of Timorese law, therefore, risks failing to constrain statutory interpretation 
adequately, producing unintended and potentially negative consequences. Also, 
mismatches between the reality described by the law and that experienced by the 
public may further erode confidence in legal institutions. 
While there are a number of experienced international drafters employed by 
government and, promisingly, a cohort of Timorese drafters now being trained, 
caution must still be exercised to ensure that the true character of Timorese life and 
society is reflected in the law. Given the patchwork of legal influences that Timor-
Leste has inherited, discerning the interrelation of laws requires a keen legal eye, and 
likely also considerable local understanding. Accordingly, as the building blocks of 
34 JSMP, Overview of Justice Sector 2009, p. 2. 
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the country's justice system are laid, care (and time) must be taken to avoid the need 
for later reconstruction. 
A source of much contention in nearly every area of policy is that of language. 
One of two official languages, along with Tetum, Portuguese is now taught at 
primary and secondary levels and is therefore enjoying a resurgence. It nonetheless 
remains a minority language and historically associated with elites. Tetum enjoys a 
far wider acceptance and understanding, though other local languages remain 
common, especially outside urban centers. This diversity, however vital, represents a 
considerable challenge to the establishment of accessible modes of formal justice. 
Overreliance on Portuguese poses risks for both law making and courtroom 
practice. Laws are commonly drafted in this language, with versions in Tetum (and 
often English) usually produced some time later or not at all. This has created an odd 
situation whereby parliamentarians have been known to abstain from voting on key 
legislation because it has not been provided, or explained, to them in a language they 
can understand. For the same reason, it can often be difficult to educate members of 
the public on their own legal rights and remedies, and more difficult still for (mostly 
Indonesian-trained, and Indonesian-speaking) lawyers to interpret, argue, and apply 
statute. Clearly, where the body of law is practically inaccessible to the majority of 
the citizenry, those citizens may raise questions about their government's democratic 
legitimacy. 
Language difficulties diminish both the accessibility and efficiency of court 
hearings. Since most judicial actors are either international contractors or the product 
of Lusophone education, Portuguese is almost universally spoken at the bench. 
Court staff, including prosecutors and defenders, tend more commonly to be 
upwardly mobile Timorese and, so, to use Tetum. The parties, especially outside of 
Dili, seem mostly to communicate in their local language. Accordingly, in the Baucau 
district court, for example, testimony may be translated from the local Macassae into 
Tetum and thereafter from Tetum into Portuguese. Much is lost in translation, 
especially given legal requirements for precision. Translators are heavily relied upon, 
and have in some areas taken on an unusually participatory role. Such individuals 
may paraphrase or condense testimony, editorialize on its content, and even pose 
questions to the parties. Obviously, this process is hardly in keeping with the best 
conceptions of due process. Above even these concerns, however, is the fact that 
translation through three languages (a practice that this is, fortunately, decreasing at 
some courts where Tetum is now more widely used) inordinately prolongs the 
duration of hearings. Formal justice thus becomes not only less comprehensible but 
also less timely. While the gradual introduction of Timorese nationals as judicial 
actors will undoubtedly improve the process on these grounds, much institutional 
credibility stands to be lost in the interim. 
The legal profession itself is subject to some division along linguistic lines. Some 
practitioners (often associated with elite interests and families formerly invested with 
authority during colonial times) undertook legal education in Lusophone 
jurisdictions, whether Portugal, Macau, Brazil, or Mozambique. Given the justice-
sector preference for Portuguese, this minority has, reportedly, found steady and 
lucrative employment in government and with its development partners. Most 
Timorese lawyers, however, were trained in Indonesia, where a large proportion of 
them were simultaneously involved in pro-independence activism. This group has 
generally found it difficult to sustain a legal practice upon returning to Timor-Leste. 
This disparity, along with broadly observed differences of class and political 
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background, has hampered efforts toward the development of a unified and well-
coordinated legal profession. 
Indonesian-speaking factions of practitioners complain that their Lusophone 
colleagues are deliberately producing an unnecessarily complex legal culture in 
order to protect and further entrench elite advantage. Portuguese-speaking lawyers 
have been known to retort that their detractors, for all their egalitarian critique, have 
not enjoyed the same standard of education and are simply envious of the associated 
status and financial benefits that accrue to those trained in Portuguese-language 
programs. With the truth likely somewhere in between, one indisputable fact is that 
the field as a whole suffers from the perception that it lacks a cohesive ethos of 
professionalism. 
With such dissent among the ranks, it is hardly surprising that the AATL, as a 
bar-association prototype, has yet to mobilize the collective potential of the 
profession. While many lawyers are, as respected members of their communities, 
involved in legal awareness raising and dispute resolution, this broad project 
appears to be happening in an ad hoc and unrehearsed fashion. Professional 
guidelines and training materials might render such activities more consistent and 
effective. 
Given such isolated practice, and the lack of collegial spirit, the purpose of 
professional membership in the AATL remains disputed. Continuing education has 
been mooted, but this responsibility has, to date, largely fallen to international actors. 
Advocacy is a sensitive topic, with so many reliant on government for their 
employment and therefore disinclined to criticize the system publicly. With 
regulation of lawyers soon to be enforced, 35 further internal contest can be expected 
before a coherent professional culture emerges. 
Apart from the status that their education generally brings, part of the reason 
that lawyers are called upon to explain legal concepts (and often provide political 
commentary as well) is simply that there is often no alternative source of 
information. While attempts at distributing legal bulletins to local administrators 
have intermittently been made through the agency of the Ministry of State 
Administration, in general, civil society has been more consistent in its outreach 
functions. Notably, local radio stations have proven effective in disseminating up-to-
date information about legal rights and responsibilities, and they have reached a 
broader audience than is typically engaged through official channels. 
Continued need for such measures underscores the limited presence of the 
formal justice system outside of urban centers. Although a shift toward locally led 
community policing is gradually extending the reach of the state, police members 
receive little training on legal process, and so are rarely good ambassadors of the 
system. Misunderstandings and provisional responses may therefore coalesce into 
precedent. This is particularly evident in respect to gender-based violence, where 
widespread tolerance for elements of custom that are sometimes taken to license a 
degree of violence against women and children belies official positions in respect of 
human rights. While human rights terminology may be expressed and reproduced 
across Timor-Leste in more formal settings, it nonetheless contains relatively new 
ideas that may sometimes clash with preexisting norms. For a genuine 
understanding of human rights to integrate with the dynamics of Timorese society 
35 JSMP, Private Lawyers Statute, p. 7. 
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will take not only time but also a concerted effort at education, perhaps through the 
national curriculum. 
Remote and rural communities suffer even more acutely from a lack of formal 
legal services. Though in recent times there have been some causes for optimism, 
these are more often a result of individuals acting responsibly than the result of any 
state-sponsored, coordinated program. Judicial actors in some district jurisdictions 
have, of their own accord, begun developing a "circuit court" schedule to facilitate 
attendance of parties at hearings.36 Private lawyers too, many of whom have signed 
on with international sponsors as contracted legal aid providers, are espousing a 
commitment to greater professional mobility and coverage of more remote locations. 
With transport outside regional capitals often unreliable and always costly, this is a 
substantial concession to the practicalities of rural Timorese life. Despite these 
commendable first steps, however, obdurate geography and political caprice remain 
sizeable obstacles to a truly inclusive national justice-sector strategy. 
The political executive must also do its part to bolster public confidence and 
safeguard the integrity of the formal justice system. High-profile cases, such as those 
concerned with individuals accused of involvement in the February 11, 2008, attacks 
on the president, focus public attention and, accordingly, may be instructive as 
models of due process. Unfortunately, there is also a risk that the progress of these 
cases and their political reception may add to perceptions that there is a dual-track 
legal system, wherein persons of standing may be accorded an advantage. Since the 
public has already shown a degree of rancor in response to the pardoning of 
controversial pro-Indonesia militiamen, and corruption investigations into senior 
government ministers yet to bear fruit, the justice system is sensitive to concerns over 
impunity. 37 
Equality before the law is an idea central to democratic notions of justice, and so 
must be reinforced in the public consciousness. Especially with a more immediate 
avenue of dispute resolution often available through custom (however imperfect), 
formal justice cannot afford to be seen to play favorites if it is to secure Timorese 
confidence. The independence of the judiciary, as expressed in "separation of 
powers" doctrine, must be accorded due respect. Regrettably, there have been some 
troubling exceptions in recent times that suggest less than complete adherence. The 
issuing by the president of "letters of passage" to rebel leader Alfredo Reinado who, 
at the time, had a court-issued warrant out for his arrest, indicates a degree of 
discord.38 The preemption of the court's decision in the case of alleged February 11 
conspirator Gastao Salsinha by the president, who indicated a willingness to offer 
Salsinha pardon, is another such example.39 
Perhaps the most egregious failure to observe the integrity of the justice system 
can be seen in the capture and release of Martenus Bere. The former leader of the 
Laksaur militia, Bere is wanted in connection with a series of alleged crimes against 
humanity, most notoriously relating to the Suai church massacre on September 6, 
1999. On that occasion, attacks by the militia on people sheltering in the Ave Maria 
36 JSMP, Overview of Justice Sector 2006-2007, p. 12. 
37 Amnesty International (AI), We Cry for Justice: Impunity Persists Ten Years On in Timor-Leste 
(Jakarta: AI, 2009), pp. 3-4. 
38 Donald Greenlees, "East Timor's Road Ahead Is Clouded by Uncertainty," New York Times, 
February 13, 2008, p. 2. 
39 ABC News, "Ramos-Horta Welcomes Assassination Attempt Trials, Mulls Pardon," p. 1. 
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church resulted in as many as two hundred deaths.40 Despite this, Bere entered 
Timor-Leste in late 2009 to visit family, was recognized by local people and 
subsequently detained, awaiting trial. Appearing to bow to pressure from Indonesia, 
the prime minister gave orders through the Ministry of Justice for Bere to be released 
by prison officials and transferred to the Indonesian embassy for return to that 
country. As the United Nations, local civil society, and the families of the Suai dead 
were quick to point out, this not only contravenes the government's legal duties but 
also denies justice for those affected by Bere' s alleged actions. The prime minister's 
response, in a speech delivered in Suai, proposing that justice needs to be a 
secondary concern in light of the need for development1 41 is decidedly less than 
heartening. 
POST-COLONIAL COMPARISONS 
Timor-Leste is not alone in grappling with this suite of post-conflict justice 
issues. The legacies of war, and of colonization, have scarred many nations, whose 
efforts at recovery and reconstruction are ongoing. Tragic as this situation 
unquestionably is, there nonetheless exists an inherent opportunity for constructive 
cross-pollination of ideas. Criticism that the United Nations and others have perhaps 
been institutionally predisposed to reproducing a uniform legal model across 
transitional justice contexts does, conversely, warn against minimizing the 
uniqueness of respective cultures of dispute resolution.42 Though most organizations 
are now resiling from that former one-size-fits-all bias in post-conflict justice 
support,43 this trend ought not to serve as a bulwark against fruitful comparison. 
One point of divergence from the experience of other post-colonial states lies in 
Timor-Leste's recent experience of occupation. While Sierra Leone, following its 
period as a part of the British Empire, devolved into civil strife, and Cambodia's era 
of French rule was (though not immediately) succeeded by the horror of the Khmer 
Rouge, arguably neither bore the marks of wholesale invasion. The persistence, and 
coherence, of colonial legal cultures is still very pronounced in the latter countries. 
This can outwardly be seen in the continued insistence, in the tropical heat of Sierra 
Leone, on courtroom attire of wig, gown, and jabot-a mode of dress increasingly 
out of favor in its originating jurisdiction. Likewise, an anachronistic reverence for 
the Napoleonic Code is still in evidence among senior Cambodian practitioners. 
Such affectations and touchstones signal the emergence of the legal profession as 
an identifiable social presence. With such collectivization often comes a system of 
inclusion and exclusion. Timor-Leste's loose coalition of lawyers could do well to 
note, and guard against, this phenomenon. In Cambodia, political allegiance has a 
very strong correlation to professional membership, with entry into courses of 
tertiary education, and later acquisition of legal posts, both reportedly dependent on 
40 Geoffrey Robinson, East Timor 1999: Crimes against Humanity (Los Angeles, CA: United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2003), p. 228. 
41 JSMP, Overview of Justice Sector 2009, p. 36. 
42 Stephen Golub, "Rule of Law and the UN Peacebuilding Commission: A Social 
Development Approach," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20,1 (2007): p. 48. 
43 United Nations Development Program, Access to Justice Practice Note (New York, NY: UNDP, 
2004), p. 2. 
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partisan connections (and money).44 While it is not impossible to evade such 
obligations, those whose practices thrive financially are widely acknowledged to do 
so by means of political patronage. Explicitly pro-government factions for a long 
time appeared to control the bar association, but an increasingly vital civil society 
element has threatened this status quo. The recent election of a renowned public-
interest lawyer as president of the bar prompted an uncharacteristically blunt 
response from government, which, through the (dubious) authority of the 
responsible ministry, blocked the appointment.45 Issues of independence accordingly 
remain sensitive. 
In Sierra Leone, tribal heritage is the analog. With the Freetown-based Krio 
privileged in access to education under the British, Krio dominance of the 
professions has continued into independence. Although there is now some 
representation of other tribes at both bench and bar, their engagement is still rare 
enough to be remarked upon. Lecturers and administrators of the country's sole law 
college are all Krio and, as gatekeepers of the profession, have come under fire for 
discriminating against those of differing tribal background.46 Similarly, alleged 
collusion between lawyers and judicial actors has been blamed for impeding the 
establishment of legal practices by, for example, Mende and Temne practitioners, 
who must compete for clients against established, Krio-dominated chambers. While 
demographic change will eventually shift these dynamics, for the time being, the law 
is almost exclusively the province of a tribal elite. 
There is yet time to halt the formation of such an exclusionary culture within 
Timor-Leste's justice system. Its mosaic of colonial, occupation-era, and indigenous 
influences does not give the upper hand unequivocally to any one group. The risk is, 
however, already apparent that language of instruction may come to serve in this 
context as a shibboleth in the same way that partisan allegiance or tribal heritage do 
elsewhere. Divisions between Lusophone and predominantly Bahasa Indonesia-
speaking practitioners threaten to derail attempts at producing a representative 
professional body and coordinating inputs to education and policy. Further 
emphasizing the use of Tetum as a common language of the courts would go some 
way to producing a more open and inclusive legal culture. 
Greater use of a shared language might go some way to erasing the dividing 
lines within Timor-Leste's justice system, but it will not directly counterbalance 
emerging political associations. The experience of other post-colonial contexts 
suggests that, as the law becomes recognized as a useful political tool, two outcomes 
are likely. The first is that legal actors come increasingly under pressure to conform 
to political doctrine. This is seen in the incarceration of key members of the bar in 
Zimbabwe,47 and of civil-society legal activists in Cambodia.48 Conversely, as lawyers 
44 Cambodia Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (COHCHR), Continuing 
Patterns of Impunity in Cambodia (Phnom Penh: COHCHR, 2005), p. 20. 
45 United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Seventh Session, Agenda Item 10: Report of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia (New York, NY: 
UNHRC, 2008), p.11. 
46 Vivek Maru, "Between Law and Society: Paralegals and the Provision of Justice Services in 
Sierra Leone and Worldwide," Yale Journal of International Law 31(2006):451. 
47 International Bar Association (IBA), "Outrage at the Arrest of President and Executive 
Secretary of the Law Society of Zimbabwe/' IBA Press Release, June 6, 2002, p. 1, available at 
www.ibanet.org/ Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=6a9b60b7-3385-4cce-8713-5e313a5cd9b4, 
accessed May 16, 2012. 
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rise in status and gain resources, there is a risk of political co-option, or at least 
acquiescence. The claims from some segments of the Sierra Leonean judiciary that 
they ought effectively to be exempt from anti-corruption legislation because any 
accusation against them would bring the system into disrepute suggest a similar 
example.49 
The role of advocacy, as a function of legal practice, is still an uncertain one in 
Timor-Leste. Many qualified practitioners are employed directly by the state as 
prosecutors or public defenders, and so feel disengaged from the profession in an 
independent sense. Private lawyers thus form the majority of those identifying with 
a legal collective. This group, however, encompasses wildly divergent views, with 
the activist background of some members an influence, and the employment of 
others by government requiring caution. The prevailing mind state, then, has been of 
confusion. Though the 2008 law regulating the profession includes an unusually 
clear mandate to speak out against perceived injustices,50 the AATL, and its 
individual members, have to date proven reticent to contribute to critical public 
debate, other than to reiterate published government positions. Especially with 
judicial independence seemingly subject to executive predation, there is a need for 
the legal profession to operate as a watchdog against political excesses. 
With institutions across transitional justice contexts historically taking limited 
account of local conditions, a considerable responsibility has been vested in legal 
personnel to communicate knowledge of formal processes. Lawyers and other court 
actors, traversing their roles as representatives of state infrastructure and as 
members of the community in their own right, have become unwitting players in the 
nation-building exercise. In Timor-Leste, with relatively few consistent channels for 
the transmission of information from the national to the local, lawyers are translators 
of "foreign" concepts into the vernacular and, often by association, ambassadors for 
the program of government. Other post-colonial jurisdictions have sought to 
capitalize on this informal expertise by outsourcing legal awareness-raising to the 
profession, and by expanding on problem-solving authority through licensed 
avenues of mediation and arbitration. While such measures (though already 
beginning) will, in Timor-Leste, require extensive training and probably dedicated 
legislation to take root, they also promise to foster a more fluid and inclusive 
approach to formal justice. 
lNTERNA TIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
While the period of post-independence UN administrative command has given 
way to the authority of the Constitutional Assembly and successive Timorese 
governments, the continuing role of the international community in justice has been 
difficult to pin down. The government of Timor-Leste, in its various incarnations, has 
previously been comfortable in devolving much of its technical responsibilities in 
policy development, consultation, and drafting to the United Nations (and other 
international organizations, to a lesser extent). Recently, however, it has begun to 
48 Lee Berthaulme and Yun Samean, "Yeng Virak is Released from Prison on Bail," Cambodia 
Daily, January 12, 2006, p. 1. 
49 Mohamed Sesay, "In Defence of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Sierra Leone," Patriotic 
Vanguard, September 3, 2009, p. 2. 
50 JSMP, Private Lawyers Statutes, p. 10. 
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take a more proactive stance, though seemingly not always with the purest of 
intentions. As the specter of corruption has loomed larger over Timor-Leste's 
political arena, resistance to international oversight has been more evident.51 
With investments to recover and treaty obligations to uphold, the international 
community serves (albeit only persuasively) as a checks-and-balances mechanism on 
government action. While some have criticized its apparent reticence to take 
Timorese leadership to task, there are inevitably diplomatic considerations to weigh. 
Furthermore, the United Nations, in particular, has occasionally departed from its 
customary caution and delivered a rebuke against perceived justice-sector missteps. 
The Bere case, for example, prompted the expression of "grave concerns" from the 
United Nations52 in respect of impunity and derogation from international law. 
The actions and practices of the international community are themselves1 of 
course, not always above reproach. With adviser and contractor salaries lucrative 
even by developed-world standards, there has reasonably been speculation that such 
individuals are not overly keen to build the capacity of their local peers and so to 
hand over responsibility. Some government figures have gone so far as to claim that 
international advisers have ingratiated themselves inside ministries in order to 
advance foreign (and allegedly corporate) agendas. The reliance, in the justice 
system, on Lusophone expertise has left some bemoaning a relatively small pool of 
potential applicants, and led to concerns over collusive and nepotistic hiring. 
Within the UN system especially, anxiety has been expressed over the risk of 
depleting the legal profession in smaller, Portuguese-speaking states such as Cape 
Verde, many of whose lawyers are drawn to Timor-Leste by the lure of profitable 
consultancies. Recourse to other jurisdictions in this way has, over time, built up 
discrete expatriate communities within legal institutions. Portuguese nationals are 
reportedly well represented among the judiciary, Cape Verdeans in the prosecutor-
general' s office and Brazilians in public defense. While the drip-feed of Timorese 
practitioners into the sector will undoubtedly assuage this reliance over time, there 
remains an interim risk of insular, exogenous cultures becoming entrenched in an 
already factionalized justice system. 
The vagaries of funding cycles and shifting institutional priorities have also seen 
criticism leveled at the international community as a whole. In the context of a global 
financial crisis, aid budgets have shrunk and private philanthropy decreased. 
Accordingly, donors and implementers alike are under pressure to show measurable 
results. In the justice sector, where progress is typically subtle and incremental, gains 
are not so easily quantified. The rubric of security-sector reform, encompassing 
police and armed forces, is seemingly gaining traction as a marketable alternative,53 
potentially at the expense of continued focus on thorny problems of law. 
51 United Nations Independent Comprehensive Needs Assessment Team (ICNA), The Justice 
System of Timor-Leste (New York, NY: United Nations, 2009), p. 9. 
52 JSMP, Overview of Justice Sector 2009, p. 36. 
53 International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste (Dili: 
ICTJ, 2009), p. 12. 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite the avowedly forward-looking attitude of its current leaders, Timor-
Leste remains strongly tied to its past, both through the persistence of custom and 
the memory of conflict. Public acceptance of formal justice will accordingly depend 
on institutional capacity to offer a timely and durable alternative to traditional 
dispute resolution, and the practical mandate to pursue historical injustices free from 
political intervention. Extension of appropriate resourcing and acknowledgement of 
judicial independence would both represent substantial milestones for Timor-Leste 
as an emerging democracy. 
As post-colonial comparisons show, actors in the legal sphere can play an 
important role in the nation-building endeavor. Especially with language policy so 
fraught, care will need to be taken in order to ensure that Timor-Leste's nascent legal 
culture develops in as egalitarian and inclusive a fashion as possible. This will likely 
require greater recourse to Tetum as a shared idiom, and increased efforts to 
incorporate the views and needs of citizens outside of more easily traversed urban 
centers. Only then can Timor-Leste's justice system legitimately claim to represent its 
people. 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Dennis Shoesmith 
INTRODUCTION 
A competitive party system is the indispensable condition for a consolidated 
democracy. Political parties are the indispensable agents of democratic 
representation. As Moisei Ostrogorski observed well over a century ago, "Wherever 
this life of parties is developed, it focuses the political feelings and active wills of its 
citizens."1 This chapter reviews the development of a multiparty system in Timor-
Leste and the capacity of that system to deliver effective political representation. This 
will involve, first, a comparative discussion of the origins of contemporary party 
politics from the emergence of FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste 
Independente, Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste) and its rivals in 
1974 and 1975 and, then, a critique of the multiparty system in operation since 
independence in 2002. I will argue that, while Timor-Leste has a functioning 
multiparty system, the electoral system, which is one of voting for closed party lists 
in a single national constituency, encourages the proliferation of small parties and, 
since 2007, the apparent necessity for coalition governments. The claim to be tested is 
that this tends to undermine coherent political representation in the National 
Parliament. Further, I will argue that the aggressive pursuit in recent years by the 
current prime minister of an ambitious strategy of state-led development, funded by 
large withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund, is changing the dynamics of national 
politics, encouraging a style of political patronage that may further weaken party 
representation. 
New states, and particularly new states that have emerged from episodes of 
major conflict, find establishing a robust party system highly problematic. In 
common with almost half of the world's post-conflict states,2 Timor-Leste has 
experienced a pattern of recurrent political crises, a condition that tends to provoke 
political extremism rather than to support democratic pluralism. Following the 
failure of the initial experiment with multiparty politics, the trend among first-
1 Moisei Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties (London: Macmillan, 
1902). 
2 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom, Post-Conflict Risk (Oxford: Centre for the 
Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, 2006). 
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generation African new states was toward one-party and dominant party systems.3 
The former Portuguese colonies in Africa were no exception, typically adopting 
Marxist-Leninist ideologies and creating one-party systems that allowed the party 
leadership to capture the state apparatus in each case,4 leading to a confluence of 
party and state, characteristic of communist regimes. Multiparty politics has 
returned to a number of African post-colonial states since the 1990s, but very few 
have achieved open, competitive democracy. In this context, Timor-Leste, since 
independence, has achieved some success in the transition to democratic 
consolidation. It is not yet, however, a consolidated democracy where "democracy is 
the only game in town." 5 Indeed, Timor-Leste is described variously as a "flawed 
democracy" and "partly free." 6 The issue here is whether the multiparty system 
promotes or undermines the transition to full and free democracy. 
ORIGINS 
The historical development of political parties in Timor-Leste went through three 
stages. The first was the establishment in Portuguese Timor in 1974-75, following the 
Carnation Revolution and the overthrow of the dictatorship in Portugal. The second 
was the twenty-four-year period of Indonesian occupation and the resistance 
struggle waged by FRETILIN. The third stage is the current development of 
multiparty politics since independence. 
One-party rule was a real possibility in Timor-Leste in the first phase of political 
development. In 1974, following the overthrow of the dictatorship in Portugal, the 
governor in Portuguese Timor called for the establishment of political parties in 
preparation for an end to Portuguese rule. The most successful of these, FRETILIN, 
began in May 1974, as the ASDT (Associai;ao Social Democratica Timorense, 
Timorese Social Democratic Association). It immediately attracted widespread 
support from young educated Timorese and "conditional" support from Timorese 
university students pursuing studies in Lisbon. The students' reservation was that 
social democracy was a bourgeois doctrine that did not represent the real interests 
and aspirations of the common people.7 In 1975, ASDT moved to a more radical 
position, was renamed FRETILIN, and adopted the 11revolutionary African 
nationalism" of its mentor, FRELIMO (Frente de Libertai;ao de Moi;ambique, 
Liberation Front of Mozambique). 
3 G. M. Carter, African One-Party States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962); Giovanni 
Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Colchester: ECPR Press, 1976, 2005). 
4 Octavio Amorim Neto and Marina Costa Lobo, "Between Constitutional Diffusion and Local 
Politics: Semi-Presidentialism in Portuguese-Speaking Countries," paper presented at 
American Political Science Association's Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, July 10, 2010, 
available at http: I I ssrn.com I abstract=1644026, accessed July 2, 2012. 
5 Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 5. 
6 Democracy Index 2010, Democracy in Retreat-A Report from the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2011), Table 2, p. 4 (East Timor ranked 42 of 167 countries), http:/ I graphics.eiu.com/ 
PDF /Democracy _Index_2010_ web.pdf, accessed August 6, 2012; Freedom in the World 2011, 
Freedom House, table "Combined Average Ratings-Independent Countries," at 
www.freedomhouse.org I report/ freedom-world I freedom-world-2011, accessed August 6, 
2012. 
7 Jose Ramos-Horta, Funu, Unfinished Saga of East Timar (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1987). 
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FRETILIN's principal rival, also founded in 1974, was UDT (Uniao Democratica 
Timorense, Timorese Democratic Union). UDT was founded by Mario Carrascalao, 
whose political experience was as a member of the Portuguese Timor branch of 
Accao Nacional Popular (ANP, National Popular Action), described by Jose Ramos-
Horta as "a sort of fascist action group, the only political party allowed in Portugal." 8 
UDT favored a continued association with Portugal. It attracted conservative support 
from professionals and Portuguese-speaking assimilados (assimilated persons) and 
from some influential traditional chiefs (liurai). UDT opposed integration with 
Indonesia. As it became clear that Portugal had no interest in retaining East Timor, 
Mario Carrascalao, and his brother Joao Carrascalao, changed the UDT platform to 
support independence but under their conservative control. There was a brief but 
violent civil war between UDT and FRETILIN in August 1975 in which FRETILIN 
prevailed. On November 28, 1975, the FRETILIN leadership unilaterally declared 
independence from Portugal and briefly governed as the Democratic Republic of 
East Timor (RDTL, Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste) until the Indonesian 
military invasion nine days later (see Ramos-Horta's firsthand account9). 
All the indications were in late 1975 that, if it had continued in power, FRETILIN 
would have demanded an exclusive right to rule, following the precedent of 
FRELIM0.10 In negotiations with the Portuguese government in 1975, FRETILIN 
demanded "recognition of FRETILIN as the only legitimate representative of the 
people of East Timor."11 In the resistance struggle, the Marxist faction in 1977 took 
control of the FRETILIN Central Committee. It imposed a Leninist model of the 
vanguard party under a secretary-general presiding over a Department of Political 
Orientation and Ideology and a Central Committee.12 The party was renamed the 
FRETILIN Marxist-Leninist Party (Partido Marxista-Leninista FRETILIN, PMLF). 
The armed struggle against Indonesia was to be a "protracted people's war" guided 
by Marxist-Leninist ideology as defined by Mao Zedong. Relentless action by the 
Indonesian military made this strategy unsustainable.° 
In exile in Mozambique, the FRETILIN leadership was aware that where 
multiparty systems had been established in Africa, they had failed. New post-
colonial states were confronted with rebellion, insurrection, civil war, and military 
takeovers. 14 One-party regimes, military juntas, or personal dictatorships were the 
prevailing pattern.15 FRELIMO provided the FRETILIN leaders with a working 
model of a revolutionary, one-party regime. The Indonesian occupation, however, 
8 Ibid., p. 29. 
9 Ibid., p. 25-28. 
10 Jill Jolliffe, East Timar, Nationalism and Colonialism (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 
1978). 
11 Bill Nicol, Timar, the Stillborn Nation (Melbourne: Visa, 1978), p. 79. 
12 Ben Kiernan, Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia: Documentation, Denial and Justice in 
Cambodia and East Timar (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008). 
13 Ibid., p. 172. 
14 Stephen Brown and Paul Kaiser, "Democratisations in Africa: Attempts, Hindrances and 
Prospects," Third World Quarterly 28,6 (2007); Sola Akinrinade, "Single or Multi-Party System: 
What Option for Africa?" (Africa Economic Analysis 2000), www.afbis.com/ analysis/ 
party.htm, accessed April 25, 2012. 
15 John lshiyama and John James Quinn, "African Phoenix? Explaining the Electoral 
Performance of the Formerly Dominant Parties in Africa," Party Politics 12,3 (2006): 319-20. 
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precluded the possibility of installing such a regime in Timor-Leste. At the same 
time, the leaders in exile lost control of their revolutionary force, the armed 
movement, FALINTIL (For\as Armadas de Liberta\ao National de Timor-Leste, 
Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor-Leste). By the 1980s, FALINTIL 
was conducting a defensive guerrilla war increasingly independently of the 
FRETILIN leadership. FALINTIL's commander, Xanana Gusmao, as president of the 
political coalition created in 1986, the National Council of Maubere Resistance 
(Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Maubere,CNRM), effectively removed FALINTIL 
from FRETILIN's control. On December 7, 1987, Gusmao condemned the Central 
Committee for "enormous and excessive political errors" and promised that 
FALINTIL would not permit the installation of a leftist regime.16 The separation 
between Gusmao and the FRETILIN Central Committee has divided East Timorese 
national politics ever since. 
By the late 1980s, the African pattern had begun to change. In the post-Cold War 
era, international donors applied pressure on a number of African states to liberalize 
their political systems.17 Multiparty politics reappeared.18 FRETILIN' s leaders 
observed this process firsthand in Mozambique when, in the early 1990s, FRELIMO 
abandoned Marxist-Leninism, introduced a new constitution, and installed a 
competitive multiparty system. From a position of strength, FRELIMO won the first 
parliamentary elections in 1994 and continued ruling over a de facto one-party 
regime legitimized by a multiparty elections. 
FRETILIN, in this instance, had anticipated its mentor. It repudiated its Marxist 
constitution in 1984 and formally withdrew its claim to be the sole legitimate 
representative of the East Timorese people in 1987.19 By 1998, when FRETILIN drew 
up a constitutional model for an independent Timor-Leste, it sanctioned a pluralist, 
multiparty system, subsequently the basis for the national politics of the new state 
when the constitution was promulgated in 2002. FRETILIN's leaders, probably with 
the Mozambique experience in mind, assumed that the East Timorese people would 
support the party that had won the struggle for independence, recognize that 
FRETILIN was the party historically entitled to govern, and accept that the party 
would permanently preside over a "dominant party" system. 
FRETILIN's conversion to multiparty democracy, in any case1 was a condition of 
the international intervention in Timor-Leste in 1999. The unquestionable 
requirement was that the new state would be a liberal, multiparty democracy. In 
2000-2002, the United Nations was involved in the creation of the Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste in a direct and unprecedented way. During its short period 
of sovereignty, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNT AET) began the process of installing a liberal democratic state system. 20 The 
continuing UN presence after independence was premised on the assumption that 
pluralist multiparty democracy was the only political system that would operate in 
16 Sarah Niner, Xanana, Leader of the Struggle for an Independent Timor-Leste (North Melbourne: 
Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2009), p. 112. 
17 Brown and Kaiser, "Democratisations in Africa." 
18 Ishiyama and Quinn, "African Phoenix?" 
19 Pat Walsh, "From Opposition to Proposition: The National Council of Timorese Resistance 
in Transition," Back Door Newsletter on East Timar (November 8, 1999). 
20 Oliver P. Richmond, "De-Romanticising the Local, De-mystifying the International 
Hybridity in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands," Pacific Review 24,1 (2011). 
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Timor-Leste. In government, FRETILIN instituted that system. Law No. 3/2004 on 
Political Parties and Law No. 6/2006 on the Election of the National Parliament 
established the liberal democratic system required by the constitution and expected 
by the international community. 
MULTIPARTY POLITICS IN PRACTICE 
At first, FRETILIN' s expectation that it alone should govern was realized; as the 
majority party in the Constituent Assembly after the 2001 elections, FRETILIN 
assumed the government of the RDTL when the Constituent Assembly was 
transformed, in May 2002, into the first National Parliament. In government, Prime 
Minister Alkatiri exhibited little tolerance for the political opposition.21 With fifty-five 
of the eighty-eight seats, FRETILIN formed a single-majority government, against a 
fragmented opposition of some eleven parties with between two and seven seats 
each. FRETILIN members of the National Parliament tended to be contemptuous of 
the opposition parties, dismissing them as "irrelevant."22 This situation was reversed 
after the 2007 parliamentary elections. A coalition of four parties then formed a 
government and FRETILIN, with twenty-one of the parliament's sixty-five seats (the 
largest single party bloc of seats), formed a disciplined opposition. 
The record of democratic multiparty politics in Timor-Leste since independence 
is a mixed one. In comparative terms, Timor-Leste has been relatively successful in 
establishing a working multiparty system. This is despite major episodes of political 
crisis, most seriously the breakdown of state order in 2006. In 2007, national elections 
delivered a change of government, a significant achievement for a new, post-conflict 
state. Certainly, the party system may not have survived the crisis of 2006 without 
the intervention of an international peacekeeping force, but the 2007 national 
elections were held and a new government did assume office. If Timor-Leste does 
not yet have a fully mature, consolidated multi-party system, it has made significant 
progress in that direction. 
There are, however, organizational and systemic constraints that hinder the 
consolidation of a mature party system. These include the limited role of the 
National Parliament in the formal and informal political system. The parties 
themselves, with the exception of FRETILIN, struggle for organizational coherence. 
The key political actors, most notably the current prime minister, Xanana Gusmao, 
tend to operate as individuals rather than as party leaders. Again, Mari Alkatiri, 
former prime minister and continuing secretary-general of FRETILIN, is the 
exception. His personal authority is institutionalized in his party's highly centralist 
organizational structure. It is his position as party secretary-general that confirms his 
authority. In a single national electorate, parties struggle to establish reliable 
constituencies in the districts and sucos (villages). The first (FRETILIN) and fourth 
(Parliamentary Majority Alliance [Aliarn;a para a Maioria Parlementar, AMP]) 
constitutional governments have each struggled to ensure stable, effective, and 
representative government in the context of weak state capacity, entrenched rivalries 
within the national elite, and episodes of serious civil unrest, rebellion, and 
communal violence. 
21 Damien Kingsbury, "Political Development," in East Timar: Beyond Independence, ed. Damien 
Kingsbury and Michael Leach (Clayton: Monash University Press, 2007), p. 20. 
22 Interviews in Dili by the author, April 2006. 
126 Dennis Shoesmith 
FRETILIN, publicly, did not accept its loss of power following the 2007 
parliamentary elections (although it acted as a normal opposition in the National 
Parliament). Its successor, the Parliamentary Majority Alliance government, is an 
uncomfortable coalition of parties with long-standing differences. Xanana Gusmao, 
former leader of the resistance movement, first president at independence, and now 
prime minister in the AMP government, inclines to operate as the charismatic leader, 
operating independently of his own party, the National Congress for Timorese 
Reconstruction (Congresso Nacional da Reconstruc;ao Timorense, CNRT). His 
attitude toward his other coalition partners has often been overbearing and, in the 
case of the PSD (Partido Social Democrata, Social Democratic Party of East Timor), 
has demonstrated elements of outright hostility (this is discussed below). Despite 
serious fractures within the coalition government, the FRETILIN opposition resisted 
the temptation in 2010 to exploit these divisions to force a vote of no confidence in 
parliament and provoke an early election. 
Within its institutional limitations, the party system provides some response to 
public interests. Parties do offer real choices, governments can be elected into and 
out of office, and alternative public policy programs can be put before the electorate. 
The indications are that the national elections in 2012 will take place and that 
political parties (and their leaders) will participate in the election within a system of 
accepted rules. A free and generally accepted outcome of the 2012 elections will 
substantially advance the democratic consolidation of the new state. Much more 
uncertain is the larger challenge for political parties, in government and opposition, 
to promote shared values and norms in an emerging civil society. In terms of the 
debate on the "New Institutionalism," the party system in Timor-Leste is semi-
institu tionalized.23 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS 
Over the past decade, the East Timorese have developed a fairly robust 
engagement with the electoral process. The electoral history of Timor-Leste began in 
July 1975, when the Portuguese Decolonization Commission organized local 
elections to select liurais (chiefs) to form an executive council to prepare for a 
constituent assembly that was planned for October 1976. Most of those elected were 
FRETILIN members or FRETILIN supporters, although the degree of that support 
was a matter of contention.24 As residents of an Indonesian province from 1976, 
under direct and severe military control, the East Timorese experienced most 
intensely the authoritarianism of the New Order regime. Given their country's 
history of colonialism and occupation, the East Timorese were unfamiliar with 
democratic participation when they were finally given the opportunity to decide on 
their political future with the end of Indonesian rule.25 
The ballot on autonomy or independence held on August 30, 1999, was, with the 
partial exception of the local elections in 1975, the first experience for the East 
Timorese of a free democratic expression of their political will. The result was an 
23 Karol Soltan, Eric M. Uslaner, and Virginia Huafler, "New Institutionalism: Institutions and 
Social Order," in Institutions and Social Order, ed. Karol Edward Soltan, Eric M. Uslaner, and 
Virginia Haufler (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1998). 
24 Sarah Niner, Xanana, Leader of the Struggle, p. 47. 
25 Ibid., p. 220. 
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overwhelming rejection (78.5 percent) of the Indonesian offer that East Timar retain 
autonomy while remaining in Indonesia. The violence and destruction inflicted by 
the militias and the Indonesian army as punishment for that outcome provoked an 
urgent international response, the deployment of the International Force in East 
Timor-INTERFET-and the transition to the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timar. UNTAET organized elections for an eighty-eight-
member constituent assembly, which were held in August 2001. 
The 2001 Constituent Assembly elections were contested by sixteen parties and 
five independents.26 By far the best organized party, FRETILIN, was easily the most 
serious contender. Alkatiri went into the campaign confident his party would win by 
a landslide. In the event, FRETILIN won forty-five of the seventy-five seats decided 
by nationwide proportionality and the thirteen district seats, a total of fifty-five of the 
eighty-eight seats. FRETILIN' s 57.3 percent share of the vote was well below its 
predicted 80 percent support. 
The Democratic Party (Partido Democratico, PD) won seven seats in the 
Constituent Assembly with 8.7 percent of the vote. Established in June 2001, PD 
gained support from young political activists from the student and youth 
movements and included some ex-FRETILIN and resistance members. Led by 
Fernando "Lasama" de Araujo and Mariano Sabino Lopes, PD appealed to East 
Timorese who had resisted Indonesian rule but felt that FRETILIN, controlled by the 
1975 leadership returned from exile, discounted their contribution to the struggle. 27 
They were encouraged in their opposition to FRETILIN by Xanana Gusmao, who 
attended their rallies during the campaign. 
On the political spectrum, PD occupied the center left. The Social Democrat Party 
occupied the center right. PSD was led by Mario Viegas Carrascalao. Carrascalao was 
the founding leader of the Timorese Democratic Union party, founded in 1974, and 
FRETILIN's opponent in the 1975 civil war. 28 He had been appointed as governor of 
the province under the Indonesians from 1992. PSD gained 8.18 percent of the vote, 
giving it six seats. The Timorese Association of Social Democrats, with 7.84 percent, 
won another six seats. ASDT was regenerated in April 2001 by Francisco Xavier do 
Amaral. He was the original president of the short-lived Democratic Republic of East 
Timor in December 1975, and was a founder of FRETILIN, but was expelled for his 
later negotiations with the Indonesians, particularly the military. He was formally 
reaccepted by FRETILIN, but decided not to rejoin the party. His ambition was to see 
the original RDTL government restored. The party takes its name from the 
organization that preceded FRETILIN in 1974. Another five parties accounted for 
another 11 percent of the vote in 2001, with thirteen seats between them.29 
Political parties in Timor-Leste represent, of course, modern systems of politics 
that have to operate within traditional social systems that coexist with-and tend to 
appropriate-modern political institutions at the suco and aldeia (hamlet) levels (see 
Cummins and Leach, this volume). Local communities operate according to 
26 Dwight Y. King, "East Timor's Founding Elections and Emerging Party System," Asian 
Survey, 43,5 (2003): 747. 
27 King, "East Timor's Founding Elections"; see also Gavin Ryan, Political Parties and Groupings 
of Timor-Leste, second edition (Sydney: Australian Labor's International Projects Unit, 2007), 
pp. 21-22. 
28 Ramos-Horta, Funu. 
29 King, "East Timor's Founding Elections," pp. 745-57. 
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traditional belief systems (lisan). The state and its political leaders somehow have to 
bridge the gulf between politics based in Dili and politics based in the local 
community. 
Despite their inexperience with free elections, East Timorese voters in 2001 held 
clear preferences. They may not have understood the purpose of a Constituent 
Assembly, but they wanted a strong president, and, mistakenly, believed the election 
would provide this. 30 A survey of voter knowledge carried out by the Asia 
Foundation in 2001 found that 61 percent thought the 2001 election was for the 
presidency.31 While 54 percent of respondents were interested in politics, there was 
little clear understanding of democracy. (None of those polled identified elections as 
a characteristic of a democratic country). A significant majority of 64 percent 
believed political party competition was a bad thing and that it could provoke 
violence.32 Given such concerns, voter participation in 1999-2001 was very high: 98 
percent in the 1999 referendum and 91 percent in the Constituent Assembly 
elections. 33 
In 2002, East Timorese were able to vote for a president. Xanana Gusmao 
received 82.7 percent of the vote. His only competitor, Francisco Xavier do Amarat 
conceded that he contested the election simply "to give Xanana someone to run 
against." 34 Within weeks of assuming the presidency, Gusmao put FRETILIN on 
notice that he would use his limited constitutional powers, but his considerable 
personal standing, to subject the Alkatiri government to critical scrutiny.35 
East Timorese again went to the polls in 2004-05 to elect local (suco) councils. 
Candidates were required to belong to one of the national political parties. FRETILIN 
won 60.62 percent of the local government positions with 56.98 percent of the vote. 36 
At the same time, independent candidates won 134 (or 30.3 percent) of the 442 
positions of chefes de suco (village chiefs), highlighting the importance of personal 
politics at the local level.37 In the suco elections held in 2009, changes to the electoral 
law forbade candidates for chefes de suco and suco council positions to have 
affiliations to a political party. Despite this, Alkatiri claimed that FRETILIN 
candidates attracted 55 percent of the votes and, together with FRETILIN allies, won 
more than 70 percent of voters' preferences. Although candidates were forbidden to 
identify their party affiliations, voters knew candidates' party affiliations. Arguing 
30 Ibid., p. 749. 
31 The Asia Foundation, East Timar National Survey of Voter Knowledge (Dili: Asia Foundation, 
May 2001), p. 4. 
32 Ibid., p. 3. 
33 King, "East Timor's Founding Elections," p. 747. 
34 Xavier do Amaral had been chosen by FRETILIN as president of the RDTL in 1975. In 1977, 
when the revolutionary faction took control, Xavier do Amaral was expelled from FRETILIN 
and placed under arrest. He revived ASDT as a rival, "third way" party in 2000. Although, 
from 2007, ASDT was a member of the governing AMP coalition, ASDT has broken with 
Prime Minister Gusmao and negotiated an agreement with the FRETILIN opposition. 
35 Dennis Shoesmith, "Timor-Leste: Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System," Asian 
Survey 63,2 (March/ April 2003), pp. 231-52. 
36 Michael Leach, "The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste," 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 55,2 Gune, 2009): 219-32. 
37 Andrew McWilliam, "Customary Governance in Timor-Leste," in Democratic Governance in 
Timor-Leste: Reconciling the Local and the National, ed. David Mearns (Darwin: Charles Darwin . 
University Press, 2008), p. 138. 
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that the outcome of the local elections represented a rejection of the AMP parties, 
Alkatiri called for the AMP government to resign and hold an early election.38 
FRETILIN's claims were probably exaggerated. Incumbents tended to retain their 
position in 2009 as chefe de suco, and a majority of incumbents from the 2004-05 local 
elections were aligned with FRETILIN. The result was often an endorsement for a 
capable chefe in office, rather than of FRETILIN as a national party. A survey of 
voters undertaken in five districts immediately before and after the October 2009 
vote found that voters did know the candidates for chefe quite well, including their 
political affiliations, but the general view was that the ban on political parties was an 
improvement on the earlier local elections. The survey results did not suggest that 
the vote was an endorsement of FRETILIN and a repudiation of the AMP 
government at the national level.39 
FRETILIN's share of the vote nationally was 29 percent, a steep fall from the 57 
percent it attracted in the 2001 Constituent Assembly elections. This represented, 
however, the single largest bloc of votes, delivering to FRETILIN twenty-one seats in 
the new sixty-five-seat parliament. Its nearest rival, CNRT with 24.1 percent of the 
vote, held 18 seats. FRETILIN could only form a government if the party was able to 
negotiate a coalition with other parties. 
ASDT formed a coalition with PSD to contest the 2007 elections. The ASDT-PSD 
support base was highest in Aileu (47.3 percent), Ainaro (29.13 percent), and 
Manufahi districts, the heartland of the Mambai-speaking East Timorese. In the 
"eastern" districts, ASDT-PD attracted 12.51 percent of the vote in Lautem, 5.94 
percent in Viqueque, and 4.6 percent in Baucau.40 As a Loromonu coalition, ASDT-
PSD was unwilling to consider joining a coalition government led by FRETILIN. 
The election campaign was marred by violent incidents, including the killing of 
two CNRT activists in Viqueque.41 Post-election violence followed the president's 
announcement authorizing the CNRT-led coalition to form a government as the 
Parliamentary Alliance. The violence was most intense in Baucau,42 a city that was a 
major FRETILIN stronghold. The violence in Baucau and Lautem, and in Manatuto 
(which has a mixed population of FRETILIN supporters and opponents)1 reflected 
political frustration and rejection of the election outcome by FRETILIN voters. 
The key factor in determining the outcome of the 2007 parliamentary elections 
was Xanana Gusmao's decision not to seek reelection as president but to form a new 
political party, the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (Conselho 
Nacional de Reconstrw;ao de Timor, CNRT) and to seek control of the government as 
prime minister. The acronym CNRT was deliberately chosen to recall the umbrella 
organization, the National Council for Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional de 
Resistencia Timorense, also abbreviated CNRT), created by Gusmao at the National 
38 Mari Alkatiri, "East Timor Opposition Claims Success in Village Polls," Agence France Press 
(AFP) (October 16, 2009), reprinted in East Timar Law and Justice Bulletin (October 17, 2009), 
http:/ / easttimorlegal. blog spot. com/ 2009/10 I east-timor-opposition-claims-success-in.html, 
accessed August 8, 2012. 
39 David Mearns and Dennis Shoesmith, unpublished survey of voter attitudes in selected 
sucos in Alieu, Maliana, Ermera, Baucau, and Manatuto, conducted from October 6-10, 2009. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Leach, "2007 Elections in Timor-Leste." 
42 TLV A (Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment), "Electoral Violence in Timor-Leste: 
Mapping Incidents and Responses," Issue Brief No. 3 Gune 2009). 
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Timorese Convention held in Peniche, in Portugal, in April 1998. The original CNRT, 
which included FRETILIN as well as UDT, was dissolved to establish a multiparty 
system in advance of the 2001 elections.43 
The new party's secretary-general, Dionisio Babo Soares, an academic with a 
doctorate in anthropology from the Australian National University, was 
instrumental in drawing up a comprehensive party platform for the CNRT. Rejecting 
the "right to rule" mentality of FRETILIN, the CNRT promised transparent and 
accountable government and a program of economic development, decentralization, 
and reconstruction: 
We began this election the way we will finish this election, on a unilateral 
promise to stop the current undemocratic nature of the parliament, establish 
a sound democratic government on all levels that is regulated through 
checks, balances, and systemic regulations in line with other internationally 
acclaimed democracies. We promise to decentralize government to the 
district, local, and village level, and while we put this in place we will ensure 
that services are delivered. We will build a modern, progressive and 
democratic state where the peoples' voices are heard.44 
Of the eight parties that won seats, reaching or exceeding the 3 percent threshold to 
be eligible for seats, two originated in the 1974-75 era: FRETILIN and the Association 
of Timorese Heroes (Associai;ao does Her6is Timorenses [Klibur Oan Timor 
Asuwain, KOTA]). PSD, through its leader, Mario Carrascalao, was in line of 
succession from UDT, FRETILIN's opponent in 1975. FRETILIN, ASDT-PSD, PD, and 
the AD alliance (KOTA-PPT [Partido do Povo Timar, People's Party of Timor]) all 
held seats in the previous parliament. The important newcomer was CNRT. 
With no party receiving a majority of the vote, only a coalition could form 
government, though Alkatiri argued that FRETILIN should form a minority 
government. Both FRETILIN and CNRT opened negotiations with the minor parties. 
Gusmao was able to persuade ASDT-PSD and PD to form a post-election coalition, 
but no agreement had been reached on the formation of a government when 
parliament was sworn in on July 30. In electing PD leader Lasama as president of 
parliament over the FRETILIN candidate by forty-four votes to twenty-one1 the 
legislature made it clear that FRETILIN could not expect its support if it were to 
attempt to govern in its own right. 45 On August 6, President Ramos-Horta invited 
Xanana Gusmao to be sworn in as prime minister and form a government. FRETILIN 
declared that the new government was unconstitutional and called for a campaign of 
civil disobedience. 
Presidential elections were held a third time in 2012. In the first round, in March, 
the FRETILIN candidate, Francisco "Lu Olo" Guterres, received 28.7 percent of the 
vote, followed by guerrilla leader and former commander in chief of the army, Jose 
Maria Vasconcelos (Tuar Matam Ruakt with 25.7 percent. Ramos-Horta, with 17.5 
43 Leach, "2007 Elections in Timor-Leste," p. 224. 
44 Dionisio Babo Soares, "CNRT Campaigns on Solid Policy for the Reconstruction of East 
Timor" Qune 25, 2009), available at the East Timor Students' Association blog, http: I I groups. 
yahoo.com I group /ETSA I message I 7110, accessed August 8, 2012. 
45 Leach, "2007 Elections in Timor-Leste," pp. 227-28. 
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percent, was eliminated.46 Ruak's candidacy was supported by Xanana Gusmao and 
the CNRT and, in the second round in April, Ruak won the presidency with 61.2 
percent of the vote against Lu Olo' s 38.7 percent. All three presidential elections-in 
2002, 2007, and 2012-were won by "independent" candidates, although Ruak 
benefited from the CNRT endorsement. 
In the July parliamentary election, CNRT, with 36.6 percent of the vote, increased 
its seats in parliament from 18 to 30. FRETILIN, with 29.8 percent, increased its 
parliamentary seats from 21 to 25. PD, with 10.3 percent, held eight seats, and the 
new party, Frenti-Mudarn;a, with 3.1 percent, won two. PSD and ASDT, with a 
combined total of eleven seats in the old parliament, failed to win a single seat.47 
There were violent incidents in both the presidential and parliamentary elections. 
The most serious violence was in July, when, following the election, during live 
television coverage of a CNRT conference, delegates denounced FRETILIN and 
announced their intention to form a coalition government with PD and Frenti-
Mudanc;a, excluding FRETILIN from any role in government.48 
AN UNSTABLE COALITION 
The parties that made up the AMP coalition government were uncomfortable 
partners This, in part, reflected long-standing personal rivalries between leading 
political actors in the coalition who belonged to the generation of 1975. In turn, the 
instability of the AMP coalition was a consequence of the imperfect institutional 
grounding of the coalition parties themselves. The leading party, the CNRT, despite 
the efforts of its party secretariat, has operated more as a political vehicle for its 
leader, Xanana Gusmao, than as a source of political direction in its own right. The 
other, smaller parties that made up the Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP), also 
revolved around their respective leaders rather than operating as autonomous 
political organizations. Interviews with senior party officials of the PSD, the PD, and 
the CNRT in 2010 confirmed that they were aware of the need to strengthen the 
organizational clarity and discipline of their parties. The major parties have women 
and youth movements and, with varying success, have attempted to build a solid 
support base in the districts and subdistricts.49 Regional and national party 
conventions by FRETILIN, the CNRT and the smaller parties in 2011 and 2012 
positioned them to compete in the July 7, 2012, parliamentary election. 
The AMP coalition was an uneasy partnership from the beginning. While the 
four parties shared in their common opposition to FRETILIN, and generally occupy 
the center and the center right of the political spectrum, they lack a coherent and 
46 Tribunal de Recurso (Court of Appeal), Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Proclamation 
Proc.01/PEP/Geral/2012/TR, April 23, 2012, available at: http://www.cne.tl/includes/ 
publications/Rezultadu%20definitivo%2Dsegunda%20volta%20eleizaun%20presidenciaLpdf, 
accessed August 8, 2012. 
47 Secretario Tecnico de Administra<_;ao Eleitoral (Technical Secretariat for Electoral 
Administration, ST AE), Dili, July 2012. Provisional Results of the Parliamentary Election 2012, 
available at: www.stae.tl/elections/2012/rezultado/parlamentar/, accessed August 8, 2012. 
48 Sarah Everingham, "Violence as East Timor Moves towards Coalition Govt," PM, ABC 
Radio (Australian Broadcasting Corporation), July 16, 2012. 
49 Interview with Marita Magno, secretary-general of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), Dili, 
August 25, 2010. 
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stabilizing policy agenda.50 Published party platforms of the CNRT, PSD, and PD 
include the expected commitments to development and social progress, to the rule of 
law, and to democratic governance. Rhetorical agreement on broad objectives, 
however, did not equate to actual mutual political commitment. The alliance is 
founded on convenience and the distribution of political offices rather than a specific 
and shared political agenda. 
When FRETILIN was in government, there was a convergence between a 
disciplined party agenda and the agenda of the prime minister. The FRETILIN party 
constitution requires that a FRETILIN prime minister must be simultaneously 
secretary-general of the party. Marf Alkatiri' s role as leader of the FRETILIN 
government was conditional on his position as leader of the party. Under the 
coalition arrangements for the AMP government, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao 
has been the leader of the largest party in the coalition, the CNRT, but his control of 
government is personal, rather than determined by his office in the CNRT. He acts 
on his own initiative, although there are party rules requiring him to consult the 
party's National Political Council and the secretary-general on every significant 
political-policy decision. The CNRT secretary-general has conceded that the prime 
minister prefers to operate independently of his party machine.51 Gusmao began as 
he meant to continue: He personally drew up the final party list of CNRT candidates 
at the last moment before the 2007 elections.52 
Gusmao sees his role as the leader, not as a member of a team of ministers 
representing their own political parties. He is alleged by his opponents to be 
"contemptuous" of his coalition partners. 53 He has certainly demonstrated a 
willingness to humiliate publicly coalition members of his Council of Ministers. 
Serious tensions in the AMP coalition appeared by early 2008. Francisco Xavier do 
Amaral announced on May 5, 2008, that his party, ASDT, would leave the coalition 
because of "nepotism and corruption" and establish a "solid coalition" with 
FRETILIN to build "the next constitutional government of East Timor."54 ASDT 
contested the 2007 elections in coalition with the PSD, securing five seats alongside 
the PSD's six. The agreement with FRETILIN was actually to consider an alliance to 
contest the 2012 elections; in the meantime, ASDT has continued to support the 
government in practice.55 
Divisions between the prime minister and PSD have been even more 
acrimonious. In 2010, the prime minister recalled the country's ambassadors to Dili 
to attend the Development Partners meeting, scheduled to begin on April 7. This 
action overrode Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa's order that the ambassadors 
should remain at their posts. The foreign minister sent a text message to the prime 
50 Leach, "2007 Elections in Timor-Leste," p. 229. 
51 Dionisio Babo Soares, Secretary-General of CNRT, interview with the author, Dili, August 
24, 2010. 
52 Interview with Dionisio Babo Soares, interview with the author, Dili, June 25, 2009. 
53 Interview with Jose Teixeira, Dili, August 26, 2010. It should be noted, however, that while 
Teixeira might be correct in this assessment, he is a regular spokesman for and former minister 
of FRETILIN, so his views are not unbiased. 
54 Patrick O'Connor, "East Timar: Xanana Gusmao's Coalition Government in Crisis," Reuters, 
June 11, 2008, available at World Socialist Website, http:/ /www.wsws.org/articles/ 
2008/jun2008/ dili-jll.shtml, accessed August 6, 2012. 
55 Leach, "2007 Elections in Timor-Leste," p. 230. 
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minister's office, threatening to resign. Da Costa is chairman of PSD and was one of 
three PSD ministers in the AMP government. Gusmao attacked the text message as 
immature, "intolerable," and "intimidating." At a meeting of the Council of 
Ministers on March 31, which da Costa did not attend, the prime minister called on 
the foreign minister to act quickly on his threat to resign. On April 13, PSD leaders 
warned that the party would leave the AMP government if Gusmao expelled da 
Costa. The next day, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers that da Costa did attend, 
the prime minister launched a long personal attack against him. Da Costa was forced 
to apologize. The meeting was open to media, and the attack was filmed and later 
made available on the Internet.56 The public release of the video, through the state 
radio and television corporation, RTTL (Radio-Televisao Timor-Leste), was a 
deliberate move to humiliate da Costa and force his resignation, which he declined to 
do. 
Subsequently, charges of corruption were laid against da Costa, involving 
allegations that he had signed off on the appointment in 2006 of the wife of then 
RDTL ambassador to the United Nations, Jose Luis Guterres, to a well-paid position 
with the embassy in New York. Guterres belongs to Mudan<;a, the faction that broke 
away from FRETILIN in 2006 and supported the CNRT in the 2007 elections. 57 He 
was made deputy prime minister in the AMP government. He was also charged with 
corruption. Da Costa finally appeared before the Dili District Court, which on 
November 23 dismissed the case against him. 
The prime minister simultaneously pursued the founder and elder statesman of 
PSD, Mario Carrascalao. In 2009, Carrascalao was appointed second deputy prime 
minister for state administration, with responsibility to oversee measures to combat 
corruption. A dispute arose between the second deputy prime minister and the 
prime minister over a contract for road infrastructure. Carrascalao's allegation was 
that three million dollars had gone missing as part of the referendum package 
infrastructure program for which the Ministry of Finance was responsible. 
In August, the Council of Ministers removed by a decree the powers given the 
deputy prime minister to oversee government procurement. On September 2, the 
secretary of state for the Council of Ministers issued a statement condemning the 
deputy prime minister's "erroneous and misleading" assertions regarding the roads 
contract. On the same day as the Council of Ministers' statement, the prime minister 
used a public consultation in Dili to attack the deputy prime-minister, calling him 
"stupid" and a "liar." 
This person who has been making statements about these three million 
dollars in the Ministry of Finance is a stupid person and does not have an 
understanding of the system. 58 
56 Augusto da Silva, Jr., "This Zacarias da Costa Story Tells a Thing or Two about Timor Leste 
Politics," Timar Hau Nian Doben (April 20, 2010), http:/ /timorhauniandoben.blogspot.com.au 
I 2010 I 04 I this-zacarias-da-costa-story-tells.html, accessed July 2, 2012. 
57 FRETILIN Mudan\a (Change) was renamed Frenti-Mudan\a in 2011 in order to gain 
registration for the 2012 elections. 
58 
"Xanana' s Calling Mario Carrascalao Stupid Shows Emergence of a Crisis of Trust in AMP 
Government," Tempo Semanal, September 3, 2010. 
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The prime minister ridiculed Carrascalao' s record as an "Indonesian propagandist" 
while Gusmao was leading the independence struggle: "I do not accept that some 
people who before made a lot of money from the spilling of our blood, today come 
and yell criticism at me." 
On September 8, Carrascalao resigned. In his letter of resignation, addressed to 
the prime minister, Carrascalao listed twenty-nine issues of corruption and bad 
government. He protested that the prime minister had not made himself available for 
consultations with his deputy prime minister, that he had only managed one cordial 
meeting with him in August, but that at a later meeting of the Council of Ministers 
the prime minister had "screamed at [Carrascalao] loudly,"' when Carrascalao 
protested against misinformation included in a speech by the prime minister. The 
personal attack at the Dili public consultation was deliberate and intended to 
humiliate him: 
At the age of seventy-three, this is the first time anyone has ever called me 
"beikteen" [stupid] or "bosokteen" [liar] ... the PM of an AMP government 
supported by the PSD, will not have the opportunity of repeat [sic] these 
insults or slander as he did.59 
Despite these attacks against its two most prominent leaders, the PSD did not 
leave the government coalition. According to Secretary-General Marito Magno, the 
PSD strategy is to stay with the government until the 2012 elections and then 
reconsider its alliances.60 PSD reportedly did hold talks with FRETILIN in 2010 on a 
possible agreement but any plans for an alliance were put on hold until 2012. Alkatiri 
has refrained from taking advantage of the divisions in the government to turn the 
parliament against it and perhaps force an early election. FRETILIN was 
concentrated, instead, on preparing for July 2012.61 
Meanwhile, the prime minister has made it clear that he had no interest in 
maintaining the governing coalition. In 2010, in a speech during a CNRT national 
congress, Gusmao challenged his own coalition partners, declaring, "We have 
experienced living together with alliance parties and also other parties. It is enough 
for us." After the 2012 elections, CNRT would rule as a single governing party, he 
promised.62 The Dili Weekly observed in an editorial that the prime minister's 
strategy was to strengthen the CNRT' s popularity. Gusmao toured all the sub-
59 Carrascalao, resignation letter to His Excellency Mr. Kay Raia Xanana Gusmao, printed in 
"Former Vice Prime Minister Mario Carrascalao Resignation Letter: English Translation," 
Tempo Semanal, September 8, 2010. 
60 Interview with the author, Dili, August 25, 2010. 
61 A more cynical view circulating in Dili is that there is a more mundane and practical 
explanation for the survival of the coalition. Under the provisions of "Monthly Life Pension 
and Other Privileges for Former Members of Parliament" rules (National Parliament, Law No. 
1/2007), members of parliament who first sat beginning in July 30, 2007, in the National 
Parliament would become eligible for a lifelong pension, equivalent to their full parliamentary 
salary, after forty-two months of consecutive service. This benefit came into operation in 2011 
for MPs first elected in 2007. The collapse of the government and an early election before then 
would have put at risk their lifelong pension. 
62 Gusmao, quoted in editorial titled "CNRT the Only Rulling [sic] Party in 2012," Dili Weekly, 
no. 104 (October 2010), p. 3. 
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districts in 2011 to promote the National Development Strategic Plan and distributed 
contracts for local infrastructure projects. He announced pensions for veterans, 
seniors, and the disabled; and he announced a referendum package and funding 
programs for roads, education, and health. 63 
FORMAL PARTY POLITICS 
Party systems operate within formal and informal contexts. The balance between 
formal and informal political processes is a good indicator of the extent to which the 
political system has been institutionalized. The relative capacity of the state to 
provide stable, as well as representative, governance is conditional on 
institutionalized political competition. Leaders whose power is personal and 
independent of a representative party weaken long-term political stability and 
undermine state capacity. 
The formal, multiparty political system in Timor-Leste is broadly defined by the 
constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 2001, by supplementary 
legislation (Law No. 3 /2004, Political Parties), and by an electoral system operating 
on proportional voting for closed party lists in a single, national electorate. (Electors 
vote for a single party list of candidates who gain a seat according to their order on 
the list and the percentage of the vote the party attracts.) The Fundamental Principles 
of the Constitution include recognition of universal suffrage and a multiparty system 
(Section 7.2). Section 65 of the constitution enjoins that the conversion of votes into a 
mandate "shall observe the principle of proportional representation" (Section 65.4). 
Broad rules for the election and composition of the National Parliament are set out in 
Section 93 of the Constitution. 
Law No. 3/2004 provides that the purpose of political parties is to 
"democratically participate in the life of the country and to contribute to the 
formation and expression of the political will of the people" (Section 1.1). Their role 
includes the definition of government programs (Section 2 (c)). They are to "critically 
appraise the actions of the government and the public administration" (Section 16 
(e)). 
The electoral system may appear unusual to those familiar, for instance, with the 
Westminster system and its plurality of single-member electorates. Section 93.3 of the 
constitution requires that "the law shall establish the rules relating to constituencies, 
eligibility conditions, nominations and electoral procedures." These rules were 
encoded in Law No. 6/2006, the Law on the Election of the National Parliament. Law 
No. 6/2006 rules that "there shall be only one single constituency in the election of 
the National Parliament, corresponding to the entire national territory, 
headquartered in Dili" (Article 9). Members of parliament "shall be elected through 
pluri-norninal lists, presented by political parties or party coalitions, and each voting 
citizen shall be entitled to one single vote in the list" (Article 11). Lists of candidates 
must include at least one woman per every group of four candidates (Article 12.3). 
Both the single, national electorate and closed, proportional party lists are 
established by legislation and not by constitutional requirements. Presumably both 
63 Ibid.; and see also Dennis Shoesmith, "State-led Development or 'Runaway State-building'?" 
in New Research on Timor-Leste, ed. Michael Leach, Nuno Canas Mendes, Antero B. da Silva, 
Bob Broughton, and Alarico da Costa Ximenes (Hawthorn, Vic.: Swinburne Press, 2012). 
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could be rescinded and replaced by alternative electoral and voting systems. Party-
list systems have advantages: They provide better opportunities for the legislature to 
include a range of party representations, with a place in the parliament for smaller 
parties, and they can ensure (as the Timor-Leste system does) that women candidates 
are given a proportion of the seats in the legislature. The disadvantages include the 
result that the link between representatives and constituencies is entirely broken-
members of parliament represent everyone and no one. Party leaders can decide who 
appears where on their party lists, ensuring that otherwise unpopular or 
compromised candidates can be assured of a place in the legislature. Parties become 
heavily centralized because aspiring parliament-members are dependent on the 
party leadership for any hope of election. 64 
INFORMAL PARTY POLITICS 
The informal political system is defined by the personal authority of a handful of 
national leaders whose careers began in the 1970s. Mari Alkatiri and Xanana Gusmao 
operate as leaders in their own right with the important difference that Alkatiri's 
personal power is grounded in his office as secretary-general of FRETILIN, while 
Gusmao' s authority is identified with the charismatic individual and not with his 
position in CNRT. In making the transition from president to prime minister, 
Gusmao inevitably had to engage in the daily grind of party politics, but his instinct 
remained patently presidential. 
The informal political system is still shaped by the origins of party politics in the 
1974 to 1975 era. Ramos-Horta, president until 2012; Gusmao, former president and 
the prime minister since 2007; and Alkatiri, former prime minister and the FRETILIN 
Secretary-General, as well as a number of other significant political players, all 
belong to that generation. Political rivalries are long-standing and ideological as well 
as personal. The rivalry between Alkatiri and Gusmao led to a final split in the 1980s 
and culminated in the crisis of 2006, when President Gusmao forced Alkatiri to 
resign the prime ministership.65 
The institutional framework of the state has not provided the most encouraging 
environment for the development of robust multiparty politics in Timor-Leste. In 
common with a number of former Portuguese colonies, Timor-Leste adopted a 
broadly Portuguese model of the state, a semi-presidential system in which political 
parties operate within the parameters of an elected president, an elected national 
legislature, and a government-the Council of Ministers-which operates separately 
from the National Parliament and can issue its own decree laws. 
Octavio Amorim Neto and Marina Costa Lobo provide a comparative discussion 
of party systems in a set of Lusophone states: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, Sao Tome, Principe, and Timor-Leste.66 They argue that there is a 
Lusophone "brand" of semi-presidentialism (Brazil, alone, has a presidential 
system). This sets the broad parameters for the way the party system interacts with 
heads of state, heads of government, and parliamentary majorities. In contrast to 
64 Andrew Heywood, Politics, third ed. (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 263. 
65 International Crisis Group, Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis, Asia Report No. 120 (October 10, 
2006). 
66 Neto and Costa Lobo, "Between Constitutional Diffusion." 
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Mozambique (the state system most familiar to key members of the FRETILIN 
leadership due to their twenty-four years of exile there), actual power in Timor-Leste 
is concentrated in the prime minister. East Timor has one of the lowest levels of 
constitutional presidential powers in the Lusophone set of states.67 The president 
lacks the crucial power to appoint or dismiss the prime minister and cabinet. The 
president has limited power to dissolve parliament {Section 86f). Neto and Lobo rank 
Timor-Leste's presidency a the weakest constitutionally, relative to other Lusophone 
semi-presidential systems. FRETILIN, in control of the Constituent Assembly that 
decided Timor-Leste' s Constitution, deliberately limited Presidential powers based 
on the calculation that Gusmao, regarded by them as a serious political enemy, 
would win the presidency.68 
While the formal arrangement of political institutions and institutional processes 
do not, of themselves, determine the way a political system works in practice, these 
formal arrangements do make a difference. "Presidential-parliamentary regimes/' 
where cabinet ministers are dependent upon a powerful, directly elected president, 
obviously weaken the role of political parties, particularly when a president is not 
reliant on party support. "Premier-presidential regimes" concentrate legislative 
power in the government. How this power is then distributed between the political 
executive and the legislature varies. Premier-presidential regimes may or may not 
strengthen the role of the parliament and the parties that populate it. Timor-Leste is 
identified here as a premier-presidential regime (see the Feijo and Kingsbury 
chapters in this volume). 
In terms of Steven Roper's comparative analysis of premier-presidential 
regimes,69 legislative powers in Timor-Leste are the prerogative of the political 
executive and the parliament. However, when presidential power is assessed beyond 
the formal aspects of the constitutional role, Timor-Leste emerges with a much 
stronger presidency, according to the measurements, rating a high 7 on the Siaroff 
Scale of Presidential Power.70 Both President Gusmao (2002-07) and then President 
Ramos-Horta (2007-12) acted to expand the non-legislative powers of the 
presidential office. Their formidable personal standing has meant that the 
constitutional weakness of the presidency may disguised the actual role of the 
president who, while excluded from day-to-day government, can exercise significant 
influence in some areas of general policy direction. Jose Maria Vasconcelos (Taur 
Matan Ruak, "Two Sharp Eyes"), elected president in April, 2012, and who is the 
former head of the defense force and a former senior guerrilla leader, evidently sees 
the presidency as a force in government. 
During the FRETILIN government (2002-07), parliament and the opposition 
parties were relatively impotent, sidelined by a government in control of a centralist 
party in control of a parliament that was, in any case, overshadowed by the Council 
of Ministers. Government and party were under strict discipline by the party 
secretary-general/ prime minister, Mari Alkatiri. Parliament has become more 
67 Ibid., p. 16. 
68 Paulo Gorjao, "The Legacy and Lesson of the United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timar," Contemporary Southeast Asia 24,2 (August 2002). 
69 Steven D. Roper, "Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Sarne? A Comparison of Premier-
Presidential Regimes," Comparative Politics 34,3 (April 2002), pp. 253-72. 
70 Reproduced in Neto and Costa Lobo, "Between Constitutional Diffusion," Table 3. 
138 Dennis Shoesmith 
assertive since the 2007 elections, but its powers remain limited by a state system that 
concentrates power in the political executive at the expense of the legislature. 
THREATS TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: ''RUNAWAY STATE-BUILDING" 
By and large, Timor-Leste has so far escaped the threat of retreating into an 
"illiberal" (or solely procedural) democracy. The experience of new party systems in 
the post-communist states of eastern Europe confirms that this is a real danger: Weak 
party systems manipulated by self-serving political elites disempower constituents. 
Political parties in illiberal democracies do not represent public interests.71 Conor 
O'Dwyer has identified "runaway state-building,"72 driven by patronage politics, as 
a characteristic of party politics in these new, post-communist states. Parties operate 
as vehicles of personal advantage rather than as autonomous agents of popular 
representation. Patronage creates a population of clients dependent upon state 
patronage. State capacity remains underdeveloped where the state is merely an 
arena for self-interested contests between competing patron-client networks. Patricia 
Young and Anna Grzmala-Busse have drawn on O'Dwyer's work to uncover a 
pattern by which leaders use parties in post-communist eastern Europe to employ 
11 direct extraction of state resources" to support clientalism. 73 A similar pattern 
developed in Latin America.74 Competition between rival elite political actors, of 
course, does not equate to democratic politics. The associated argument is that 
clientalist politics and consequent low accountability to the constituency vitiate state 
capacity through poor and corrupt governance.75 
Uncontrolled or unfocused state-building is a potential problem in Timor-Leste, 
and there are some recent indications that this sort of state-building may be 
beginning to happen. The tempting source of government largesse is the Petroleum 
Fund. Timor-Leste is "the most petroleum-dependent country in the world, with 95 
percent of state revenues coming from petroleum receipts." 76 As Timor-Leste moves 
into a pre-election environment, the prime minister drew heavily on the Petroleum 
Fund to distribute largesse to the subdistricts and sucos. By late 2011, the fund had 
accumulated some US$9 billion. The prime minister explained his strategy for the 
fund in a speech delivered in 2010.77 Previously, government had adopted a 
71 Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics, An Introduction, eighth 
ed. (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 224-255. 
72 Conor O'Dwyer, Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
73 Patricia T. Young, "Political Parties and Democratic Governance in Romania," paper 
presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Toronto, September 2009; 
Anna Grzmala-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-
Communist Democracies (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
74 Barbara Geddes, The Politician's Dilemma (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994). 
75 Young, "Political Parties in Romania." 
76 La' o Hamutuk, "Timar is Getting Closer to the 'Resource Curse,"' submission to Committee 
C, RDTL National Parliament, regarding the Proposed State Budget Rectification for 2010 
(June 16, revised June 22, 2010). 
77 Xanana Gusmao, "Speech by His Excellency the Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao 
on the Occasion of the Petroleum Fund Management Seminar," Dili Convention Centre, 
Mercado Lama, Dili, May 10, 2010, available at http:/ /timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/ 
uploads/ 2010 I 06 /Speech-Petroleum-Fund-Management-Seminar-10.5.101.pdf, accessed April· 
25, 2012. 
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"prudent and simple investment strategy" for the fund; now, he said, was the time to 
move on from this "limited" and "conservative" strategy and diversify and 
maximize the fund. He announced that 
... if the needs of the country require fast and sustainable growth, we have to 
invest in basic infrastructure, and for this to be possible, we need to unblock 
the mistaken policy of savings in order to invest those revenues in the best 
way.7s 
The fund underwrites the prime minister's very ambitious National Strategic 
Development Plan, "On the Road to Peace and Prosperity." According to the 
strategy, Timor-Leste will join the ranks of upper-middle-income countries by 2030.79 
In 2010-11, the government reviewed the fund's investment strategy and introduced 
amendments to the Petroleum Fund Law that expanded the limits on annual 
withdrawals from the fund from 3 percent to 5 percent. Some withdrawals from the 
fund could now be made without parliamentary authorization. 80 The government 
then decided to increase the proportion of the Petroleum Fund invested in the 
international share market, raising the limit from 10 to 50 percent, a move that was 
opposed by the Consultative Council for Petroleum Fund and was made at a time of 
serious instability in global share markets. A former Australian adviser to the CCPF, 
Dr. Tim Anderson, warned that "substantial changes proposed for East Timor's 
Petroleum Fund law will expose the nation's finances to high risk and open the door 
to corruption."81 The National Parliament approved the proposal for greater 
flexibility in investments from the Petroleum Fund in August 2011. The prime 
minister exercises increasing discretion over special project funds such as the 
Decentralisation Development Package (Pakote Dezenvolvimentu Desentralizadu, 
PDD) and the earlier referendum package (Pakote Referendum, PR) of the previous 
year. PR funding was not included in the state budget and was not subject to 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
Despite efforts to contain corruption, Timor-Leste continues to score poorly on 
international corruption indicators.82 The resignation of Deputy Prime Minister 
78 Xanana Gusmao, "Speech by His Excellency the Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao at 
the start of the Timor-Leste and Development Partners meeting," Dili, April 7, 2010, p. 19. 
79 National Strategic Development Plan, 2010. The final version of the strategy was presented 
to parliament in 2011, and published as Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030, 
available at: http:/ /www.tls.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Home_NATIONAL_STRATEGIC_ 
DEVELOPMENT_PLAN_2011-2030.pdf, accessed July 2, 2012. 
80 La'o Hamutuk. "Regarding the Proposed General State Budget for 2012," submitted to 
Committee C: Economy, Finances and Anti-Corruption, National Parliament, RDTL (October 
21, 2011 ), www .laohamutuk.org I econ I OGE12 I LHSubComCPNOJE2012En.pdf, accessed 
April 25, 2012. 
81 Tim Anderson, "East Timor's Petroleum Fund Is in Danger," Timar Hau Nian Doben, July 7, 
2011, http: I I timorhauniandoben.blogspot.com.au/ 2011I07 I east-timors-petroleum-fund-in-
danger.html (accessed July 2, 2012) and reprinted in Green Left Weekly, July 17, 2011. 
82 Transparency International, 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, available at: 
http:/ I cpi.transparency.org/ cpi2011 / (accessed July 2, 2012), ranked Timar Leste as 
143rd out of 183 countries, that is, the 40th highest index of perceived corruption. See 
also USAID, Corruption Assessment: Timor-Leste, Washington, DC, September 15, 2009. 
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Mario Viegas Carrascalao in September 2010 was provoked, according to the deputy 
prime minister, by "corruption, nepotism and collusion . . . with the corrupt 
protecting one another, in an increasingly sophisticated way."83 This affair will be 
discussed further below. The inability to control patronage politics provided some of 
the most serious challenges to Asia's new and restored democracies in the 1980s and 
1990s, as the Philippines and Indonesia vividly illustrated. The capture of democratic 
politics by family dynasties through patron networks, so characteristic of local and 
national politics in the Philippines, has not developed to that extent in Timor-Leste. 84 
However, the potential for "money politics" to subvert the party system is evident as 
the recent generous and loosely regulated disbursement of government funds for 
local development programs suggests. 
THREATS TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: THE "EASTERN"-''WESTERN" DIVIDE 
National, much more than locat elections reflect the political geography of a 
Timorese electorate that votes in elections for the National Parliament across a 
significant east-west divide. The origins of this divide are debated.85 That it provokes 
inter-communal violence was evident in the house-burning and gang fighting during 
the political crisis of 2006. Some explain this persistent division by arguing that 
regional differences acquired a new political edge during the Indonesian 
occupation.86 After independence, "westerners" (Loromonu or Kaladi) were perceived 
by some FRETILIN supporters as having a history of collaboration with the 
Indonesian invaders. "Easterners" (Lorosa'e or Firaku) were, according to this view, 
the true resistance supporters. Prime Minister Gusmao, in a provocative speech in 
March 2006, addressed the "loromonu-lorosa'e" issue, identifying it as a political 
problem that had long existed in the Timor-Leste defense force, the F-FDTL 
(FALINTIL-Forcas de Defesa de Timor-Leste, FALINTIL-Defence Forces of Timor-
Leste) and that needed very careful resolution.87 In January, 159 soldiers had 
presented a petition to the president and the chief of the defense force claiming 
discrimination by eastern-originating officers against personnel from western 
districts. The "Petitioners" staged a strike, leading to the dismissal of 595 soldiers 
(one-third of the F-FDTL), which provoked a full-scale rebellion. 
The parliamentary elections held on June 30, 2007, and in July 2012 clearly 
reproduced the eastern-western divide. As Michael Leach observed, "Highly 
regionalised party affiliations [suggested] wider problems of national unity." 88 In 
83 Mario Viegas Carrascalao, "Letter to His Excellency Mr. Kay Raia Xanana Gusmao, Prime 
Minister of the Government of the RDTL," September 6, 2010, reproduced in Tempo Semanal, 
September 8, 2010. 
84 Alfred W. McCoy, ed., An Anarchy of Families, State and Family in the Philippines (Quezon City: 
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994); Jose F. Lacaba, ed., Boss: 5 Case Studies of Local 
Politics in the Philippines (Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1995). 
85 See Shawn Donnan, "East Timor's Ethnic Violence Puzzles Analysts," Financial Times (June 
10, 2006). 
86 Jose Trindade and Bryant Castro, "Rethinking Timor Identity as a Peacebuilding Strategy: 
The Lorosa'e-Loromonu Conflict from a Traditional Perspective" (Dili: European Union Rapid 
Reaction Mechanism Programme, 2006). 
87 Xanana Gusmao, Message to the Nation on F-FDTL, Palace of the Ashes, Dili, March 23, 
2006. 
88 Leach, "2007 Elections in Timor-Leste," p. 227. 
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2007, FRETILIN won in only four of the thirteen districts, including their three 
eastern strongholds. The party gained 46 percent of the vote in Lautem, 60 percent in 
Viqueque, and 62 percent in Baucau. In the other nine districts, FRETILIN' s vote 
ranged between 8 percent in Ainaro to 28 percent in Covalima, where it strongly 
outperformed the Democratic Party (PDt with 20 percent, and CNRT, with 15 
percent.89 In 2012, FRETILIN again won in only four of the thirteen districts: Baucau 
(51.3 percent); Lautem (43.8 percent); Viqueque (59.5 percent), and Manufahi (31.8 
percent, just ahead of CNRT's 31.3 percent). 
THREATS TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: PARTY FRAGMENTATION 
The proliferation of small parties since independence, alongside the survival or 
parties and leaders from 1974 to 1975, determine the character of multiparty politics 
in Timor-Leste. The proportional voting system, which offers the single, national 
electorate pluri-nominal party lists from which to choose their representatives, 
encourages the divergence of multiple parties; this procedure contrasts with plurality 
voting systems that encourage the convergence of multiple parties into a two-party 
system.90 A party must reach a threshold of 3 percent of votes cast to be entitled to a 
seat in the National Parliament.91 There were twelve parties represented in the 2002 
National Parliament, nine in the National Parliament elected in 2007 and twenty-two 
parties registered to contest the 2012 election by July 2011. With the exception of 
FRETILIN and perhaps the CNRT, parties struggle to establish reliable constituencies 
across the thirteen districts, sixty-five subdistricts, and 442 sucos. FRETILIN remains 
the broadest, nationally established party, but, as noted earlier, its support is 
concentrated in the three eastern districts. 
States aspiring to democratic consolidation require broad-based political parties 
operating in government and opposition. Timor-Leste's multiparty system and the 
proliferation of small parties pose challenges to coherent governance. 92 Two-party 
systems usually deliver clear, national policy choices and usually deliver a clear 
rotation of power. Two-party systems tend to converge on the political center in 
order to attract an outright majority to form a government. "Catch-all parties" seek 
to consolidate their support with a broad constituency, rather than depend upon 
sectoral groups or special interests. Timor-Leste has adopted a proportional 
representation (PR) system that works against convergence on the center. There is a 
degree of political fragmentation. Some parties in the National Parliament represent 
quite local or minority interests. KOT A defends the status of the liurai families, the 
customary rulers. UNDERTIM (Unidade Nacional Democratica da Resistencia 
Timorense, National Democratic Unity of Timorese Resistance), which is in the 
governing coalition, is a veterans' party with links to a folk religious movement. The 
trend elsewhere in Southeast Asia has been away from PR to plurality. Indonesia, in 
contrast to East Tirnor, introduced electoral laws in 1999 and 2004 that radically 
89 Faustino Cardoso, Eleisaun Parlamentar Sira (Dili, National Electoral Commission, 2010). 
90 Maurice Duverger, "Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System," in Party Politics and 
Pressure Groups (New York, NY: Thomas Y. Cromwell, 1972), pp. 23-32. 
91 Law No. 6 /2006 on the Election of the National Parliament. 
92 Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Upset, eds. Politics in Developing Countries: 
Comparing Experiences with Democracy, second ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 
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reduced the number of parties registered to contest parliamentary elections, 
requiring that they demonstrate a significant presence in at least two-thirds of the 
' . 93 country s provmces. 
Multiparty systems tend to produce short-lived or unstable coalition 
governments, even in stable democracies. Italian coalition governments in the latter 
part of the twentieth century averaged terms of less than one year.94 In post-conflict 
new states, such as Timor-Leste, the risk of political instability and fragmentation is 
real in a multiparty system that produces uneasy coalition governments. The 
question is whether a successful democratic system can function if the party system 
is diffuse and fragmented. Multiparty politics in neighboring Papua New Guinea 
have been described as ineffectual: "Politically the nation has no real party system, 
merely shifting alliances of support in Parliament for the country's leading political 
figures." 95 Although it has a more disciplined party system, Timor-Leste faces a 
similar risk to that faced by the multiparty system of Papua New Guinea: "disorderly 
democracy" and political "dysfunction."96 
CONCLUSION 
Party politics remains alive and fairly well in Timor-Leste. This is a creditable 
outcome given the record of most other post-conflict states. In terms of Scott 
Mainwaring and Timothy Scully's four criteria for party system institutionalization, 
Timor-Leste has achieved a degree of political stability in interparty competition.97 In 
opposition, FRETILIN has refrained from taking advantage of serious divisions in 
the coalition government to provoke a political crisis. The parties have some degree 
of local organization outside the capital city, although, in the cases of the minor 
parties, support is localized in just a few of the thirteen districts. Parties and elections 
are generally considered legitimate and operate within an accepted system of rules. 
The degree of rule stability and organizational discipline within parties is less 
certain, perhaps with the exception of FRETILIN. The country, with help, has 
managed one national election that resulted in a change of government, and the 
prospects for an orderly national election in 2012 are promising. The competitive 
party system allows the East Timorese electorate to support those leaders and those 
93 Benjamin Reilly, "Democratisation and Electoral Reform in the Asia-Pacific Region," 
Comparative Political Studies 40,11(November2007), pp. 1350-71. 
94 Daniel Diermeier, Hiilya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo, "Coalition Governments and 
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parties they perceive to best grasp and represent their interests, although there is 
evidence that many voters are alienated from Dili politics.98 
There are, however, significant constraints on the party system that have been 
identified in this discussion. These constraints include the weakening of the role of 
the National Parliament by the proliferation of small parties and an electoral system 
that denies representative accountability to the local electorate, and which, in 2007 
and 2012, did not deliver one party a majority to form a government in its own right. 
The 2012 parliamentary election did reduce the number of parties in the national 
parliament from eight to four, with a much stronger CNRT, but whether the coalition 
formed in July 2012 is effective depends on the compliance of PD, which now clearly 
exercises the balance of power. Based on an assessment of the past, we can predict 
that coalitions of political parties may be unstable and lacking in political clarity. 
Dysfunctional multiparty politics in Papua New Guinea represent a warning to 
Timor-Leste's political leaders that they should consider electoral reform that 
restrains the proliferation of small parties, in large part because such parties are able 
to claim exaggerated, disproportionate bargaining power if they gain representation 
in parliament, where coalition governments must be negotiated. 
The parties themselves require stronger organizational development and less 
dependence upon a handful of leaders who remain the survivors of 1975. There are 
signs that "runaway state-building" and associated patronage politics are emerging 
and that this trend is accelerating in the leadup to the 2012 elections. In an economy 
dependent solely upon petroleum revenues, political parties in government and their 
leaders will find it difficult to resist the opportunity to buy support in the name of 
"development," which has previously produced the political element of the 
"resource curse" in other energy rich, but otherwise poor, countries. The politics of 
patronage, such as those experienced in the post-communist states of eastern Europe 
and elsewhere, undermine representative party politics and threaten to implant and 
foster illiberal multiparty systems. Reform of the party system may not by itself 
ensure the consolidation of democratic governance in Timor-Leste, but without it 
that consolidation will remain problematic. 
98 David Hicks, "Centre and Periphery in Contemporary Timor-Leste," paper presented at the 
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THE NEED FOR A RESHAPED 
FOREIGN POLICY 
Pedro Seabra 
INTRODUCTION 
Having apparently overcome some of the internal strife that scarred the nation-
building process in 2006 and 2008, Timor-Leste now appears to be experiencing a 
period of relative political stability and social order, albeit with several unresolved 
issues still looming on the horizon. Nonetheless, in this rather steady context, Timor-
Leste has become increasingly vocal and assertive on a range of topics with 
significant potential implications for the country's foreign policy agenda. This 
indicates an existing political will to enhance or diversify its role in the region, with 
sometimes unpredictable results. The potential ripple effects across the region-
given the level of international focus, Timor-Leste's strategic geographic locations, 
and its vast but still mostly untapped natural wealth-are also unforeseeable, 
warranting greater attention and analysis. 
Accordingly, as Timor-Leste's assertiveness grows, new questions and doubts 
will also arise with regard to the intended course the country seeks to pursue in the 
coming years. With that in mind, this chapter will start by examining the current 
context of Timor-Leste' s foreign policy, identifying its main external partners and the 
goals it has set since officially joining the international community, with a detailed 
focus on relationships with four key actors: Australia, China, Indonesia, and 
Portugal. A study of the relationships with these countries-while not exhausting 
Tim or's foreign policy agenda-will allow a better understanding of Timor-Leste' s 
current foreign policy positioning in the world. This chapter will then examine some 
particular and instructive episodes in Timar' s foreign policy development that have 
raised concerns among its traditional partners, now confronted with this 
independent actor. Finally, a prospective analysis will be offered, highlighting the 
country's options in the middle term and potential courses of action to be taken, 
particularly with respect to these key four relationships. Conclusions will then be 
drawn regarding Timor-Leste's current regional stance and what lies ahead for the 
Southeast Asian nation in terms of its still-nascent foreign policy. 
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STARTING FROM ZERO 
After the destructive post-referendum violence in 1999 subsided, United Nations 
(UN) multinational forces were suddenly in charge of a massive program of state-
building, seeking to create the institutions necessary to a democratic and stable 
state-despite the common belief that international assistance would be needed for 
years to come. 1 
As the newest inexperienced player in the international arena, Timor-Leste 
quickly found itself in the position of having to formulate a foreign policy that would 
simultaneously guarantee its worldwide recognition as a viable state, which was 
therefore, worthy of continuing international assistance, and, also, establish the 
country as a credible actor in the regional setting-all this, while not neglecting its 
nearest neighbors. The challenge for the Timorese leadership was thus considerable, 
especially given the meager resources available and the various choices that had to 
be made concerning where to allocate them. Opting to balance significant 
international donors with historically and culturally important affinities, while 
investing in a secure and stable regional scenario, constituted a bold and ambitious 
agenda. But given Timor's own context, the decision was, in itself, inescapable, as the 
country's variety of needs demanded considerable heterogeneity with respect to 
sources of international support. 
In that sense, a careful diversification of the country's foreign policy goals was 
duly required, despite the constraints that could impede those seeking to follow such 
a path. Indeed, despite the various commitments of the international community on 
the ground, certain international hurdles still threatened to jeopardize prospects of 
internal and regional stability. Right from the start, relations with Indonesia were 
bound to hold the key. After more than two decades under Indonesia's authoritarian 
rule and the tumultuous and violent independence process, Timor-Leste was faced 
with the necessity of establishing a working bilateral relationship with its former 
ruler, if the new nation was ever going to succeed internally or externally. 
Understanding this challenging scenario, and in the interest of state survival, Timor-
Leste' s authorities-including the most prominent independence leaders, such as 
Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao, Jose Ramos-Horta, and Mari Alkatiri-
recognized the necessity of normalizing ties with Indonesia. In this new relationship, 
the human rights violations perpetrated by the Indonesian military were considered 
the most sensitive issue. Indeed, already in 2001 and still under the UN 
administration, a Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR, 
Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconcilia\:ao) was established with the aim of 
investigating human rights violations during the Indonesian-ruled period, from 1974 
1 Through UN Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1246 (1999), the United Nations Mission in 
East Timor (UNAMET) was established on June 11, 1999, to organize the national referendum 
and to lead the peacekeeping mission known as International Force East Timor (INTERFET). 
The peacekeeping mission was authorized by UNSC Resolution 1264 (1999) and deployed on 
September 20, 1999, to restore local order. With the backing of UNSC Resolution 1272 (1999), 
on October 25, 1999, the United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timar (UNTAET) was 
established and would be succeeded, in May 17, 2002, by the United Nations Mission of 
Support in East Timar (UNMISET)-the two were authorized by UNSC Resolution 1410 
(2002). Afterwards, through UNSC Resolution 1599 (2005), the United Nations Office in Timor-
Leste (UNOTIL) was installed on May 20, 2005. In the wake of the 2006 crisis, UNSC 
Resolution 1704 (2006) led to the deployment of the United Nations Integrated Mission in 
Timor-Leste (UNMIT). 
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to 1999.2 Likewise, under international pressure, Indonesia set up a human rights 
court to investigate Indonesia's own military accountability for the atrocities of 1999. 
Predictably, both attempts essentially failed to meet every generalized 
expectation. The CA VR came to produce a 2,500-page-final report recognizing that 
the occupation was directly responsible for the deaths of an estimated minimum of 
102,800 East Timorese, but the Timorese government fell short in following the 
CAVR's recommendations for further action. For its part, the ad hoc Indonesian 
court indicted eighteen individuals, but only one was actually convicted-the former 
East Timorese militia leader Eurico Guterres. A sense of widespread frustration was 
then felt by both the Timorese population and by the international community as it 
became clear that justice would have a hard time being served. 
In the interest of dealing with this issue while protecting bilateral relations, 
Timor-Leste and Indonesia then created in 2005 a bilateral Truth and Friendship 
Commission (CVA, Comissao de Verdade e Amizade) with the goal of turning the 
page on their troubled common history, and setting the tone of their relationship for 
years to come. But since the TFC had no indictment or prosecution powers1 it was 
widely considered a toothless and ineffective instrument that "instead served to 
render some already conclusive truths inconclusive." 3 From the start, it was clear that 
the East Timorese government was more interested in rebooting relations and 
appeasing its neighbor than actually digging up, once again, the past crimes that 
could jeopardize the objective of achieving good relations between the two countries. 
The constant visits to Timor-Leste and Indonesia from both countries' respective 
highest authorities evidenced this same concern and motive. The visit by Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2005 to the Santa Cruz Cemetery-where 
in 1991 more than 250 protesters were shot and killed by Indonesian troops-
exemplified, and symbolized, these shared attempts to reinforce ties between both 
parties. 4 Likewise, after he assumed office in May 2007, President Ramos-Horta' s first 
state visit abroad was to Jakarta. Afterwards, when former President Suharto died in 
January 2008, Prime Minister Gusmao and other senior Timorese officials proved 
once more their intentions to seek full reconciliation by traveling to Indonesia to pay 
their respects. The humanitarian assistance provided by Timor-Leste to the victims of 
the 2004 tsunami that hit Indonesian shores was, equally, considered symbolically 
important for the relationship. 
On the other hand, Timor-Leste also had to deal with Indonesia's fears of its 
former province becoming a staging ground for other regional powers and of a 
diminished role reserved for Indonesian influence. But even those apprehensions 
were somewhat laid to rest when the East Timorese government declared its 
intention to seek full membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)5-as opposed to joining the Pacific Islands Forum, a goal once envisioned 
2 Paulo Gorjao, 11The East Timorese Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation: 
Chronicle of a Foretold Failure?11 Civil Wars 4,2 (2001): 143. 
3 Megan Hirst, 11Too Much Friendship, Too Little Truth-Monitoring Report on the 
Commission of Truth and Friendship in Indonesia and Timor-Leste," report from International 
Center for Transitional Justice, 2008, p. 37. 
4 
"Yudhoyono Prays at Site of Dili Massacre," Associated Press, April 9, 2005, available at 
www .smh.com.au I news/World /Yudhoyono-prays-at-site-of-Dili-massacre I 2005 I 04/ 09I111 
2997218540.html, accessed September 20, 2010. 
5 ASEAN currently consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar (Burma). 
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by then Foreign Minister Jose Ramos-Horta in 1999.6 Indeed, by choosing the former 
multilateral institution over the latter-which includes Australia, New Zealand and 
the majority of the Pacific islands-Timor-Leste exhibited its self-proclaimed 
allegiance to Southeast Asia while demonstrating the nation's willingness to 
participate in the region's leading integration process. It is not as if Timor-Leste 
entirely closed the door to the possibility of belonging to the Pacific Islands Forum, 
but it did provide some clues as to the country's intentions in the region. For all 
intents and purposes, Timor-Leste saw its future as primarily tied to developments 
in Southeast Asia, even though it also signaled an intention to join as many 
international forums as it could, to better secure its longer-term diplomatic relations. 
The potential for opening new relations with vibrant and prosperous economies, as 
well as for contributing to a neighborly stability, were considered the main reasons 
behind the push to join ASEAN. Nonetheless, this particular goal has so far been on 
hold, as Timor-Leste has been limited to observer status in ASEAN since 2002 due to 
a number of structural constraints in the accession process and to some members' 
doubts about Timor-Leste's ability to meet the organization's requirements. Burma, 
in particular, appeared to be blocking Timor-Leste's bid to joint the organization in 
the first years, in response to Timor-Leste's public support of Aung San Suu Kyi as 
Burma's rightful leader and its ongoing criticism of Burma's military regime. In this 
context, Timor-Leste's membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum, granted in 2005, 
although officially understood as a first step to membership in ASEAN, ended up a 
mere consolation prize while the country waited for further developments on this 
front. 
But while Indonesia and ASEAN are crucial to Timor-Leste's security and 
political stability, the country's foreign agenda also grants considerable attention and 
focus to its other predominant neighbor, Australia. Given Australia's contribution to 
the latter stage of the independence process-through both its leadership of the 
INTERFET (International Force East Timor) forces and its bilateral aid program, 
larger than any other country's-and the close geographic proximity of the two 
countries, Australia has come to regard Timor-Leste as a country situated within its 
sphere of influence, which has occasionally caused some bilateral tensions. One 
particular difficult issue concerns the exploration of the vast natural resource 
reserves lying beneath the Timor Sea and previously regulated by the Timor Gap 
Treaty of 1991 between Australia and Indonesia-later replaced by the Timor Sea 
Treaty when the newly independent Timor-Leste became a contracting party in 2002. 
While it was possible to work out an agreement regarding the sharing of the 
proceeds from the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA), itself a result of the 
latter treaty, the same cannot be said about the efforts to come to an agreement 
regarding sovereignty and the establishment of a definite maritime boundary 
between Australia and Timor-Leste; resolution of this latter issue has been essentially 
deferred for fifty years in recognition of the likely revenues that both parties can 
draw in the interim period. 
Additionally, beyond the significant amounts of development aid it has 
provided to Timor-Leste in the past decade-AU$930 million (US$933 million) from 
6 Nuno Canas Mendes, "Dilemas identitarios e fatalidades geopoliticas: Timor-Leste entre o 
Sudeste Asiatico e o Pacifico-Sul" (Identity dilemas and geopolitical fatalities: Timar Leste 
between Southeast Asia and South Pacific), in Understanding Timor-Leste, ed. Michael Leach et 
al. (Hawthorn: Swinburne Press, 2010), p. 37. 
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1999 to 2010 in official development assistance (ODA), coupled with an annual aid 
budget in 2011-12 of just over AU$80 million-Australia also continues to play a 
decisive role in Timor-Leste's internal security. In the wake of the 2006 crisis, 
peacekeepers were once again needed to pacify the country, and Australia promptly 
contributed 1,000 men, 390 of whom are still stationed in Timor-Leste, alongside a 
small policing force working closely with the United Nations. 
For its part, Portugal retains a historical and continuing bond with Timor-Leste. 
Since the Indonesian invasion in 1975, and especially through the 1990s, Portugal has 
argued Timor-Leste's case and became a decisive actor in securing the referendum 
leading to independence. Furthermore, during the series of UN-led operations, 
Portugal consistently stood out as the second highest contributor of troops on the 
ground, behind Australia, actively participating in the nation's stabilization. In 2006, 
as violence erupted, Portugal contributed 126 members of the National Republican 
Guard (GNR, Guarda Nacional Republicana) to the peacekeeping effort.7 
Furthermore, Portugal has also maintained its international commitments, having 
disbursed more than €400 million (US$525 million) in aid from 1999 to 2006 while 
allocating another €60 million (US$79 million) through the latest Indication 
Cooperation Program for 2007-10. Particular investments have been made to support 
the teaching and learning of the Portuguese language throughout the country. 
Timor-Leste's prompt insertion into the Community of Portuguese-speaking 
Countries (CPLP) was considered another way of gaining international recognition 
for the young nation, as it implied that Timor-Leste had established alliances with 
interested regional powers, like Brazil and Angola, and influential multilateral 
organizations, like the European Union, through Portugal.8 
China has also increasingly positioned itself as an increasingly close partner for 
Timor-Leste, even though it has provided significantly lower aid amounts when 
compared to Western donors (less than US$53 million from 1999 to 2009). It was the 
first country officially to recognize Timor' s independence, at a time when Beijing and 
Jakarta did not have diplomatic relations, and since then China has gradually 
become an invaluable help for local plans of reconstruction and development.9 
Indeed, the construction of the presidential palace, the foreign ministry, and the 
military residential quarters in Metinaro are just a few visible examples of Chinese 
presence in Timor-Leste, showcasing a growing foreign influence in the country. 
Considering its aid and assistance efforts, coupled with other contributions-such as 
scholarships and training programs for civil servants or, for example, the donation of 
8,000 tonnes of rice during the 2009 food crisis-China is sending a clear public 
message regarding the seriousness of strengthening bilateral ties with the tiny but 
strategically important Southeast Asian state. 
It is also worth mentioning some of Timor-Leste's other important partners in 
international aid, of which the country is still a significant recipient, though the scale 
of such assistance does not match that provided by the countries described above. As 
7 Reinaldo Saraiva Hermenegildo, "O Papel da GNR em Timor-Leste: Um contributo para a 
Polftica Externa de Portugal" (The role of GNR in Timor-Leste: A contributor to Portugal's 
foreign policy), Revista Militar (2008): 783-812. 
8 Jose Palmeira, "O potencial de Timor-Leste na geopolftica da CPLP" (The potential of Timor-
Leste in CPLP geopolitics), in Understanding Timor-Leste, ed. Michael Leach et al. (Hawthorn: 
Swinburne Press, 2010), p. 43. 
9 Ian Storey, "China's Inroads Into East Timor," China Brief9,6 (2009): 7. 
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an important player in the international process back in 1999, the United States has 
consistently disbursed funds in support of local development and sustainable state 
structures, totaling more than US$300 million since 2000. The European Union (EU) 
has provided close to €47 million (US$62 million) in emergency assistance and is 
currently following through its Country Strategy Paper/National Indicative 
Programme for 2008-13 with another €63 million (US$83 million) focused on 
stabilization and dialogue, fighting poverty, and humanitarian support. For its part, 
Japan continues to play a vital role as a major donor, having contributed with ¥15 
billion (US$181 million) between 2002 and 2009, while currently cooperating in 
training local police officers in Timor. It is equally worth mentioning the role of Cuba 
as a significant provider of medical aid, either through the presence of Cuban 
doctors on the ground or through hundreds of scholarships provided for East 
Timorese students to study medicine in Cuba. Finally, one cannot leave out Malaysia 
and New Zealand-which have actively contributed to the country's security 
throughout the past decade through the provision of police and soldiers-as Timor-
Leste's remaining relevant foreign partners with an interest in its development and 
security, partly because both of these nations recognize the regional fallout that 
could potentially result from a deteriorating situation in Timor-Leste. 
INCREASINGLY VOCAL 
Among Timor's external partners, it is the relationship with Australia that has 
most frequently commanded attention in recent years, with a series of episodes 
straining ties. First and foremost, both countries' attention is focused on the Timor 
Sea, and especially on the Greater Sunrise block, where oil and natural gas reserves 
are estimated at 5.13 trillion cubic feet and 226 million barrels, respectively. Unlike 
the remaining area-regulated by the above-mentioned Timor Sea Treaty of 2002-
this particular section is under the Sunrise International Unitization Agreement 
(Sunrise IUA) and the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea 
(CMATS), signed in 2003 and 2006, respectively. Although the Sunrise IUA initially 
foresaw that proceeds from the Sunrise block would be unevenly distributed (with 
the lion's share going to Australia) for the sake of speedy development and 
exploitation, the CMATS treaty amended those disproportionate assignments, 
essentially providing that any revenues from this particular area were to be shared 
fifty-fifty between Timor-Leste and Australia. 10 To that end, a joint-venture 
consortium-led by Australian Woodside Petroleum (with a 33.4 percent investment 
share) and including ConocoPhillips (30 percent), Royal Dutch Shell (26.6 percent), 
and Osaka Gas (10 percent)-was formed to expedite the planning and consequent 
extraction of the natural resources under water. 
However, in January 2010, the intended plan was stopped when Woodside 
disclosed its intention to go ahead with the building of a floating platform to process 
the untapped liquefied natural gas (LNG) available in the Greater Sunrise block-a 
choice confirmed the following April, with a combined announcement by all Sunrise 
joint-venture partners. This option was immediately and bluntly opposed by Timor-
Leste1 s government, which said it preferred to see a new LNG processing plant built 
10 The CMTAS also put on hold any claim to sovereign rights and did not establish any local 
seabed boundary, the final definition of which was postponed until the treaty's expiration in 
fifty years, more precisely, in 2057. 
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on its southern coast, near Suai, as it had insistently indicated throughout the 
negotiation process. In its defense, Timor-Leste officials pointed out that an LNG 
floating platform had yet to be tested-it would be the second of its kind in the 
world-and that the technological risk may not pay off in terms of costs and benefits, 
especially when considering the geographic adversities of the surrounding Timar 
Trough. Furthermore, Timor-Leste also argued that the establishment of an onshore 
plant would help fight its 30 percent unemployment rate, with the consequent 
economic and social benefits that one could expect from such a massive project at a 
local level. In addition to all this, Woodside' s move was branded by the Timorese 
government as reflecting an unacceptable level of "arrogance" because it had not 
taken into consideration Tim or's interests in this matter .11 
As for the Australian government, it was accused of not pulling its weight in 
influencing one of Australia's major companies in the pursuit of a commonly 
beneficial solution, even though it had clearly stated that the decision about the 
location of the LNG processing plant was a purely commercial one, that the previous 
agreement stipulated the most economically viable option, and that the Australian 
government would not interfere in private commercial decisions. On the other hand, 
Woodside's position was that the cost of laying a pipeline from the gas field to 
Timor-Leste's south coast was prohibitive as well as technologically unfeasible. 
Angered by these developments and apparently willing to test bilateral relations, 
Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao took this opportunity to dig deep into the past and 
escalated his rhetoric when, during an international donors' conference, he accused 
Australia of sacrificing the lives of 60,000 Timorese in World War II and secretly 
plotting in 1963 for Indonesia to take over what was then Portuguese Timor.12 Given 
the visible military contribution to Timor-Leste's security and the high level of effort 
and aid allocated to the island by Australia, this declaration raised considerable 
official concern in Australia and was widely seen as further fueling bilateral tensions. 
But if the bilateral relationship was already rocky, a change in leadership in the 
Australian government added another seemingly difficult topic to the agenda. 
Among new Prime Minister Julia Gillard's policy ideas was the possibility of 
building a regional "asylum-seeker processing center" in Timor-Leste. For his part, 
then Deputy Prime Minister Mario Carrascalao promptly declared that Dfli was 
"nobody's puppet."13 The fact that Gillard only initially discussed her intentions with 
President Ramos-Horta and not with Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, who held the 
real authority, did not assist her case. While the proposal grew into one of the major 
debating points in the Australian federal elections, the subject attracted extra 
regional concern, as other countries-such as Indonesia, which hosts around 14,000 
refugees from Afghanistan who were intercepted on their way to Australia-worried 
about the lack of consultation in a matter that inevitably affected the entire region. 
Timor-Leste's positioning then became crucial, with Gillard actively seeking a 
11 Xavier La Canna, "East Timor May Derail Woodside Project," Australian Associated Press, 
April 30, 2010, available at http: I I news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-business I east-timor-
may-derail-woodside-project-20100430-tyvc.html, accessed September 20, 2010. 
12 Lindsay Murdoch, "Gusmao Lashes Australia for Duplicity," Sidney Morning Herald, April 9, 
2010, available at www.smh.eom.au/ world/ gusmao-lashes-australia-for-duplicity-20100408-
rv6e.html, accessed September 25, 2010. 
13 
"E. Timor Deputy PM Rejects Australian Asylum Fix," Agence France-Press, July 14, 2010, 
available at http: I I www .asiaone.com IN ews I Latest+ News I Asia I Story I A1Story20100714-
226961.html, accessed September 22, 2010. 
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compromise that she could present to her constituents as an effective solution to 
what was, fundamentally, a domestic Australian political problem. 
Amid these disputes, another episode attracted media attention because of its 
alleged geostrategic implications. On May 20, 2010, Timor-Leste finally received the 
two Chinese Shanghai III patrol boats-Jaco and Betano, designed in the 1960s and 
equipped with 30-millimeter cannons-bought two years prior through a US$28 
million contract with Poly Technologies, a defense company with close links to 
China's People Liberation Army (PLA). Officially, these vessels are needed to police 
illegal fishery activities in Timor-Leste's exclusive economic zone-illegal fishing 
deprives the state of an estimated US$45 million a year in revenues-and to provide 
some security assurance against smuggling and drug trafficking along 870 
kilometers of coastline.14 Further seeking to fix Timor-Leste's lack of naval 
capabilities, Portugal had already donated two ageing Albatoss-class patrol vessels-
Atauro and Oecussi-back in 2002, armed with twenty-millimeter cannons, though 
the growing need for repairs to these old boats and the US$500,000 a year required to 
keep them running probably weighed heavily in the country's decision to renew its 
fleet. Although Timor-Leste's reasons for purchasing the patrol boats were 
understandable, the fact that the Chinese-made vessels were apparently ill-suited for 
the maritime conditions common in the Timar Sea, combined with the presence of a 
Chinese crew to man the boats while their Timorese counterparts are trained, have 
served to increase regional wariness of China's growing influence in the country. 
This wariness was intensified when, on August 24, 2010, at the beginning of the 
construction on the vast complex of the Ministry of Defense and Security and of the 
headquarters of Timor-Leste's Defense Forces (F-FDTL, Falintil-Fon;as de Defesa de 
Timar Leste)-backed yet again by US$8.9 million in Chinese funding-Prime 
Minister Gusmao took the opportunity to declare that Timor-Leste was "firmly 
committed to incrementing bilateral cooperation in the military area with friendly 
countries that provide us with uninterested support. Our Chinese brothers and 
sisters are clearly part of this group." Through such words, warnings were sent out 
that it would not be legitimate for anyone to "seek to constrain our options," which 
was then understood as a clear message to Gusmao'sAustralian counterparts.15 
Timor-Leste's newfound confrontational posture was not only brought to bear 
on its dealings with the Australian government or Australian companies. Although 
on a different level, another example concerned the situation of Timor Telecom-
majority held by Portuguese Portugal Telecom (PT)-which, in 2002, invested in the 
nascent nation in return for the monopoly over local telecommunications for fifteen 
years. Accordingly, Portugal Telecom was caught off guard when on May 15, 2010-
seven years before the contract's expiration-Deputy Prime Minister Jose Luis 
Guterres announced that the sector would be liberalized by 2011 in a bid to fulfill one 
of Xanana Gusmao' s main electoral promises, to reduce the high cost of 
14 Nuno Cana Mendes, "The Dragon and the Crocodile: Chinese Interests in East Timar," 
Portuguese Journal of International Affairs 1 (2009): 8. 
15 Xanana Gusmao, "Address by His Excellency the Prime Minister on the Occasion of the 
Turning of the First Stone for the Construction of the Ministry of Defence and F-FDTL 
Headquarters Building," August 24, 2010, available at http:/ I timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/ 
uploads/2010/08/Lan%C3%A7amento-da-1%C2%AA-pedra-do-MD-e-QG-F-FDTL-24.8.pdf, 
accessed October 30, 2010. 
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telecommunications.16 Timor Telecom's strategic plan of investments, disclosed just 
six months prior to this news, was thus put on hold, awaiting further official 
clarification. 
The relationship between Indonesia and Timor-Leste, despite all the goodwill 
rhetoric of the Timorese leadership, has also faced some hurdles along the way. First, 
the definition of their commonly shared border has proven difficult to agree on, even 
though the necessity of a comprehensive agreement on the issue has topped the 
bilateral agenda for years. Indeed, while Indonesia still continues to go slowly on 
tackling the final demarcation of their territory, Timor-Leste also does not appear 
capable of pushing forward with a consensual compromise that its neighbor can 
accept. The situation is even more critical with regard to the Oecusse enclave, located 
within Indonesian West Timor, and the inherent challenges regarding the regulated 
and unregulated movement of people and goods across the border. 17 Meanwhile, 
local tensions increased throughout 2010, fueled by small skirmishes and veiled 
threats from the Indonesian military, persistently confronted with ongoing civil 
construction by East Timorese citizens in supposedly "neutral" areas at the 
undefined border. Even if limited and rather sporadic, these incidents threatened to 
taint the current rapprochement process, especially given the apparent lack of 
political will from both sides finally to move forward with establishing a clear 
demarcation. 
Furthermore, the latent ramifications resulting from the murky handover of 
former Laksaur militia leader Maternus Bere to Indonesian authorities in 2009 are 
still felt within East Timorese civil society. The daunting pressure that Indonesia 
applied to the Timorese leadership in order to achieve Bere's release and freedom 
soured the supposedly renewed relationship and, in that sense, reminded the 
country of the ongoing issues with its neighbor and how obstacles from their 
common past still keep appearing to impede a mutually respectful working 
relationship. When coupled with other unclear decisions-like the release in 2008 of 
another militia leader, Joni Marques, who saw his thirty-three-year-prison sentence 
commuted-it is commonly agreed that the memories of the Indonesian occupation 
period still continue to disrupt prospects for establishing good will between the two 
nations. 
WHAT LIES AHEAD 
With so many "combat fronts," one is left to speculate as to whether the above-
mentioned episodes indicate Timor-Leste's intention to modify seriously its foreign 
positioning and adapt the balance of its international relationship- perhaps to 
garner more regional attention to its owns interests in the long run-or whether 
these actions have merely been part of the nation's evolution, as it learns to assert 
itself as a truly independent country; if the latter theory is true, then perhaps these 
actions are ultimately not of concern. However, even though these episodes appear 
16 
"East Timar Government to Liberalize Telecommunications by Start of 2011," Macauhub, 
May 12, 2010, available at www.macauhub.eom.mo/en/news.php?ID=9414, accessed on 
September 22, 2010. 
17 International Crisis Group, "Timor-Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian Border," Asia Briefing 
104 (May 20, 2010): 4. 
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disconnected from each other, it is impossible to deny their sequencing in time, as if 
substantiating a growing trend in Timor-Leste, calling for the revision of its foreign 
policy options. The choices that will be taken in the future on a number of important 
issues will undoubtedly help clarify the issues at stake, and provide a realistic guide 
to better understand Timor' s aspirations in the world at large. 
The case of the Greater Sunrise exploration is the most pressing. Indeed, 
according to CMATS Article 12, if a development plan is not approved by 2013, or if 
extraction does not take place by 2017, then either Australia or Timor-Leste could 
cancel the existing arrangements and thus "set the project back decades, undoing all 
the [progress of the] strained negotiations." 18 The CMATS treaty is widely viewed as 
having been forced upon the Timorese leadership by former Australian Foreign 
Minister Alexander Downer, who threatened to withhold a final agreement on 
Sunrise's income-which would have blocked any likely revenues and strangled 
Timor-Leste's incipient economy-if the CMATS were not approved by Timor-
Leste's parliament. But, in any given scenario, Timor-Leste's consent will always be 
required before the site can be developed. While there have been semi-official 
approaches to other potentially interested companies, to date none has taken up 
Timor-Leste's option of being an alternative development partner.19 Additionally, if 
the Timorese government insists on consistently and publicly presenting its case as a 
"David/impoverished nation vs. Goliath/ruthless Australian mega-corporation," it 
increasingly runs the risk of being perceived as an unfriendly or unreliable business 
partner and site for potential international investment. Indeed, the tense relationship 
with Woodside and, to a lesser extent, with Portugal Telecom, may end up proving 
counterproductive for the foreign investment the country so desperately needs. In 
the case of Woodside, the change in the company's executive leadership has 
provided an opportunity to renew negotiations over the development of the Timor 
Sea Greater Sunrise field, although at the time of writing there was no indication of a 
substantive shift of position by either party. 
On the other hand, the Australian proposal to set up an asylum-seeker 
processing center amounted to nothing more than a poorly conceived and executed 
policy that created an unnecessary hurdle in the relationship between Timor-Leste 
and Australia. As events unfolded, it soon became clear that such a project was 
essentially "dead in the water," as explicit East Timorese opposition made the 
proposal impracticable at every level.20 Hopes that negotiations could provide an 
acceptable solution, either under a bilateral agreement or under a regional 
framework-such as the Bali Process, for example21-were also quickly discarded as 
it became clear that Timor-Leste would not grant final approval and support for the 
center. In that sense, once the fiery rhetoric was over, the quiet abandonment of the 
project allowed for a certain amount of breathing room in the bilateral relationship. 
However, the fast escalation in political acrimony throughout this entire episode 
18 
"The Greater Game of Greater Sunrise," Petroleum Economist, September 22, 2011: 4. 
19 In the beginning of 2010, Malaysian Petronas was frequently pointed out as the frontrunner 
for an exploration alternative, but it has, since then, detached itself from the process. 
20 
"Dead in the Water," The Economist, April 1, 2011, available at www.economist.com/blogs/ 
banyan/2011I04/ australias_processing_centre, accessed October 2, 2011. 
21 The Bali Process, involving more than fifty nations (including Australia, Indonesia, and 
Timor-Leste), was established in 2002 as a regional diplomatic grouping to combat 
transnational crime and people-smuggling. 
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serves as an acute example of how Timor-Leste and Australia are easily susceptible 
to unexpected flare-ups. 
Be that as it may, if Timor-Leste truly seeks to maintain a fruitful working 
environment with its neighbor, reiterated accusations against Australia of "bullying" 
tactics are likely to bear little fruit. 22 As a recognizable preponderant actor in the 
region, Australia is bound to assume an overreaching and regionally protective 
attitude regarding smaller neighbors, of which Timor-Leste is unavoidably one; 
indeed, its security, stability, and cohesion have already been upgraded to a national 
strategic interest in Australian defense policy,23 and it is not too far-fetched to assume 
that "a smaller, less intrusive but better coordinated aid, policing and military 
assistance program" linking the two countries will eventually be needed.24 As easy 
as it is to rebuff what can be seen as Australia's over-protective stance, Timor-Leste 
recognizes how intertwined its present and future stability is with its neighbor's 
willingness effectively to support it. If Timor-Leste truly desires an equal and 
effective working relationship with Australia-as it should-toning down the usual 
inflammatory rhetoric might prove to be a useful meaningful step toward a more 
sustainable relationship. 
With the International Stabilisation Force due to depart Timor-Leste in the 
second half of 2012, the overly ambitious goals the East Timorese authorities have 
outlined for their own military (proposed in the 2007 defense blueprint Force 2020 
report and later confirmed by the 2011 Strategic Development Plan and by the F-
FDTL 2011-15 Development Plan) do not appear to match strategic needs and are 
unlikely to come to fruition in the foreseeable future. Indeed, by proclaiming the 
need for a 3,000-person-strong armed forces, backed by a national conscription 
process and missile-equipped warships-including the purchase of the Chinese 
vessels previously mentioned25-Timor-Leste has only tended to reinforce the 
arguments of its critics, who often target the disparities and inconsistencies of the 
government's priorities, complaining that the government's grand schemes do not 
take into account the country's still underdeveloped status. Although presented in a 
long-term timeframe, the plans to build up the country's defense structures can thus 
be understandably hard to explain and justify to the local populace, which still faces 
many social and economic challenges after ten years of independence. 
Timor-Leste's eagerness to build up its defense forces also concerns the 
international community, and especially those countries and organizations invested 
in Timor-Leste's stability, which wonder about the current security apparatus the 
country requires, and the seriousness of the East Timorese government in providing 
the appropriate means, capabilities, and orientations for its sometimes only poorly 
controlled security sector. Even though the ongoing United Nations Integrated 
Mission on Timor-Leste (UNMIT) will end its mandate in 2012-coinciding with the 
country's own electoral calendar-calls for some kind of extended presence by 
22 Jose Belo, "Proud Tirnorese Are Fed Up with Canberra's Bullying," Sidney Morning Herald, 
June 15, 2010. 
23 Australian Department of Defence, "Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 
2030-Defence White Paper 2009" (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009). 
24 Damien Kingsbury, "The ADF and Timor-Leste: Looking Towards 2020," in A Reliable 
Partner: Strengthening Australia-Timar-Leste Relations, a special report from Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, April 2011, p. 20. 
25 Afterwards, on September 2011, Timor-Leste also received another three South Korean 
retired patrol vessels as part of Timor-Leste's growing naval contingent. 
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international security forces have already been heard.26 In that sense, though Tirnor-
Leste clearly has the right to provide for its own national defense, these overly 
ambitious designs and the apparent political will to pursue them may, in the short-
term, become counterproductive and complicate longer-term training and other 
military-to-military relationships. 
The next international partner to leave, after the withdrawal of the International 
Stabilisation Force, could well be Portugal. Given the long duration of its 
commitment to and involvement in the development of Timor-Leste, the Portuguese 
authorities must be wondering if the conditions on the ground are finally ripe for a 
low-profile withdrawal of their GNR forces. After several years of contributing 
physically to the country's security, and with the harsh effects of the global financing 
crisis in mind, Portugal will certainly prefer a diminished role in Timor-Leste, 
through which development aid will trump-if not substitute entirely-any "boots 
on the ground." Furthermore, as local stability in Timor-Leste becomes more 
consolidated, the chances of Portugal withdrawing its security forces will 
understandably increase. On the other hand, calls for Portugal's greater economic 
presence in Timor-Leste-made by President Ramos-Horta during his last trip to 
Portugal in October 2010 and again by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao in September 
2011-will face some obstacles before materializing as Portuguese investors will 
inevitably recall their past mistreatment. The experience with Timor Telecom 
remains a case in point. Even though the "introduction of competition in the 
telecommunications sector" and the attendant reduction in telecommunications 
costs27 represented a mainstay priority for the Gusmao cabinet, only in March 2012 
was it possible to reach an agreement that effectively ended Timor Telecom's 
monopoly.28 The lengthy negotiation process involved thus serves as a stark 
reminder that unless guarantees of a stable legal framework are provided, any future 
economic investor will most likely think twice before risking venturing into Timor-
Leste. 
Nevertheless, the country's cooperation with Portugal is likely to remain cordial 
as new joint ventures and opportunities continue to emerge. The latest, for example, 
concerned the East Timorese contingent that joined Portugal's own military 
assignment with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) at the 
beginning of 2012. Likewise1 the Lusophone domain will most certainly retain 
significance in Timor-Leste's agenda as the organization of the CPLP's third 
Parliamentary Assembly in Dili on September 21-23, 2011, clearly exemplifies. 
26 See, for example, "Presidente de Timor-Leste quer acordo bilateral com Portugal para 
manter GNR depois de 2012" (East Timorese president wants bilateral agreement with 
Portugal to maintain GNR after 2012), Lusa (October 4, 2011), available at www.pub 
lico.pt/Pol%C3%ADtica/presidente-de-timorleste-quer-acordo-bilateral-com-portugal-para-
manter-gnr-depois-de-2012-1515034, accessed October 5, 2011. 
27 Xanana Gusmao, "Address by His Excellency the Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao 
at the Chamber of Commerce & Industry of Timor-Leste Regarding Telecommunications 
Liberalization," August 18, 2011, available at http: 11 timor-leste.gov.tl I wp-content 
/uploads/2011/08/Telecom-Liberalisation-18.8.pdf, accessed October 5, 2011. 
28 Hugo Paula, "Timor Leste antecipa liberalizai;;ao do mercado de telecomunicai;;oes/Timor-
Leste anticipates the liberalization of the telecommunications market" Jornal de Neg6cios, 
March 27, 2012, available at http:l lwww.jornaldenegocios.ptlhome.php?template= 
SHOWNEWS_ V2&id=547321, accessed April 2, 2012. 
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With regard to its Southeast Asian strategy, Timor-Leste is equally and 
increasingly looking to Thailand and the Philippines as potential players in the 
region, in the hopes of gaining further support for Timor-Leste's ASEAN accession. 
Surprisingly enough, this objective was given new momentum with the 
organization's ministerial meeting in Hanoi in July 2010, in which a consensus 
appeared to emerge regarding Timor-Leste's candidacy.29 Indeed, in a rather 
politically ambiguous move, President Jose Ramos-Horta even welcomed Burma's 
Foreign Minister Nyan Win to Dili the following month, while professing the desire 
to encourage strong business ties and develop the once-stagnant bilateral relations 
with Burma-after the mandatory formal establishment of diplomatic relations back 
in2006. 
Given Ramos-Horta's past criticism of Burma's human rights record, many were 
left to wonder if he was ready to trade his internationally acclaimed activism for a 
full membership in ASEAN. As the accession process drags on, it will almost 
certainly be the case that Timor-Leste realizes that in order, finally, to elicit action 
regarding its aging bid, its leaders will eventually have to tone down their rhetoric 
and continue to engage Burma on a bilateral basis, before being able to work together 
in a common multilateral forum. 
However, the ultimate regional goal of joining ASEAN was also further 
advanced when on March 4, 2011, Timorese Foreign Minister Zacarias Albano da 
Costa delivered his country's formal membership application to his Indonesian 
counterpart, Marty Natalegawa, thus taking another step along the road to full 
accession. Still, although 2012 was mooted as the initial target date for final entry, the 
amount of work required by the Timorese government-in terms of human 
resources, English-speaking officials, coordination among various ministries, and 
overcoming the inherent difficulties in adapting and harmonizing the necessary 
legislation-as well as new doubts about Timor-Leste's application by some 
members like Singapore, inevitably forced a delay. Therefore, 2015 is increasingly 
being identified as the most probable date for a final resolution on Timor-Leste's 
entry. 
But a different consideration can be deduced from these latest developments. 
Indeed, although Timor-Leste's campaign to join ASEAN unequivocally 
substantiates its decision to adhere to the Southeast Asian preferential framework, 
these efforts also come at a time in which the country is not too coy in reaching out to 
other regional institutions. The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), for example, 
received ample attention from Timorese authorities throughout 2011 in exchange for 
group's agreement to grant Timor-Leste the status of observer.30 Likewise, Timor-
Leste continues to work steadily with the Pacific Island Forum in a similar fashion; 
Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao even attended the group's summit in Auckland on 
September 2011 with promises to "step up the engagement."31 In other words, 
29 Kavi Chongkittavorn, "Is an ASEAN 12 Possible-with Timor-Leste?" Nation, September 20, 
2010, available at www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/09 /20/ opinion/ls-an-Asean-12-
possible--with-Timor-Leste-30138306.html, accessed September 20, 2010. 
30 The MSG currently comprises Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. 
During Xanana Gusmao's last visit to Vanuatu, in September 2011, he pledged US$500 for the 
group's permanent secretariat, established in that country's capital, Port Vila. 
31 Xanana Gusmao, /1 Address by His Excellency the Prime Minister Kay Raia Xanana Gusmao 
to the Pacific Islands Forum 2011," September 7, 2011, available at http: I I timor-
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despite the manifested will to adhere to ASEAN, Timor-Leste has undoubtedly 
assumed the "inescapable impact of geography"32 in its foreign designs and is now 
trying to diversify its neighborly reach while awaiting the consecration of its primary 
regional objective. 
On the other hand, regarding Indonesia, the fact that such a country held 
ASEAN's rotating chairmanship during 2011 also helped to underscore the level of 
the current state of relations with its former twenty-seventh province. The timing of 
the presentation of Timor-Leste's membership application was not randomly chosen, 
as both parties sought to present an image of full reconciliation and affinity in 
common regional matters, while highlighting Indonesian support for the Timorese 
candidacy. Furthermore, the necessary cohabitation in the island of Timor has never 
looked more feasible, even with pending issues still looming in the rear view. 
Indeed, though worrisome, with regard to the aforementioned obstacles, the way 
may soon be cleared through political compromise. As the need for a stabilized and 
permanently defined border grows, so will national public pressure after more than 
ten years of indecision that has curbed the development and growth of the 
corresponding regions. Ultimately, it is a matter of common interest to resolve 
quickly the bilateral imbroglio, which stands in the way of full amicable relations. 
However, the possibility of further "incidents" cannot be simply cast aside, since 
local animosities and tensions hardly ever follow political dictates from the 
respective leaderships and are more susceptible to any triggering situations. The 
continuing unlawful construction just over the border and uncontrolled transit of 
people could very well serve as motives for local reaction and wilt therefore, require 
greater attention to keep tension levels at bay. But even if the border issue is 
eventually met with a swift resolution, the matter of undefined maritime borders-
probably even more intricate and complex than the territorial boundaries 
themselves-will surely provide enough reason for more prolonged talks between 
both countries' authorities in years to come. 
As for the matter of human rights violations and the persistent calls for justice, 
these issues will require an even more sensitive approach. It is clear by now that 
most of the Timorese leadership favors a controversial amnesty as an immediate 
"fix/' in order to turn over a new leaf-for example, President Ramos-Horta went as 
far as to pardon the people responsible for the assassination attempt in 2008 on his 
own life. Nonetheless, the political and public costs of taking and standing by that 
kind of far-reaching pardon are not easily dismissed. One can try to explain the 
benefits of focusing the country's energies on the future, and on a healthy 
relationship with Indonesia-with no "historic baggage" attached-but inevitably, 
the local population will always be left with a sense of disappointment if the 
perpetrators elude punishment, as well as with a growing feeling of dissatisfaction 
toward its government and state structures, with unpredictable social consequences. 
Likewise, international public opinion that supported and eventually assisted Tirnor-
Leste' s rise as an independent nation will also surely question the merits of any 
political decision to grant a generalized amnesty, as it involves overlooking atrocities 
that, in similar cases, would usually constitute grounds for the application of 
leste.gov.tl/ wp-content/ uploads I 2011/09 I Padfic_Islands_Forum_Speech-7.91.pdf, accessed 
October 5, 2011. 
32 Pedro Seabra, "A Road Far from Finished: Timor-Leste and ASEAN," !PRIS Lusophone 
Countries Bulletin 17 (2011): 4. 
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international justice. Either way, it is an issue that will surely continue to divide civil 
society and the international community. Given that a national reparations program 
or an "Institute for Memory"-two projects proposed both by the CA VR and the 
CV A reports-have been put on hold due to bureaucratic obstacles, calls for either a 
general amnesty, 33 or an international tribunal,34 are thus likely to continue as the 
only proposals on the table that could finally put the past to rest. 
Regarding China, the Asian juggernaut is set to play a major role in any future 
Timor-Leste foreign policy scenario. Initially, China's approach to the country was 
mainly understood as a preemptive measure, intended to block any possible 
Taiwanese influence, but China's response is increasingly viewed as part of a larger 
strategy that aims to insert Chinese influence in the remaining Portuguese-speaking 
countries and consolidate its influence in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the news disclosed 
on August 2010 that the Chinese government was preparing to give complete 
customs tax exemption to products from companies based in Timor-Leste only 
reinforced this view of a partnership that has grown closer, with China seeking a 
prominent role in the young nation's development. Likewise, a special interest in 
Timor-Leste's vast natural wealth is not to be completely ruled out, as China's 
energy needs appear unquenchable. One expects that China will, however, fall short 
of actually declaring an express wish to participate in the exploration of the 
untapped resources and instead opt for a low-profile posture, since it has no interest 
in directly confronting Australia in this matter-at least while the issues with 
Woodside are unresolved. 
Preferable economic relations, increasingly aid flows, and, of course, 
military/ security assistance are therefore likely to comprise the various components 
of the strategy the world's second largest economic power will undertake to 
formalize and consolidate its relation with Timor-Leste. This strategy is by no means 
novel if we consider the larger picture: Aware that its influence in Southeast Asia has 
to remain unchallenged in a fast-growing region, China will undoubtedly resort to a 
soft-power approach, courting several small and underdeveloped states-where it 
can easily establish a significant economic foothold-as a way to counter possible 
opposing or discordant influences. China's culture, diplomacy, businesses, and arts, 
rather than its rising military strength, increasingly figure as key features in its grand 
designs regarding Southeast Asia, and have proven irresistible for many countries.35 
For its part, Timor-Leste will welcome such interest, probably convinced that it 
can maintain an ambiguous foreign positioning, without any kind of political or 
economic fallout, especially from within its own region. In the name of its future 
growth and sustainable development, Timor-Leste will be more than willing to 
continue down such a road. Moreover, these growing ties and the public perception 
they imply will also be increasingly and skillfully brought into focus by the Timorese 
authorities whenever a regional dispute arises, especially with Australia, where 
officials are particularly sensitive to any semblance of Chinese presence in this area. 
The impact that such relationships can have in any regional diplomatic quarrel is 
33 Paulo Gorjao, "Timor-Leste: An Amnesty Is Needed Once and for All," !PRIS Lusophone 
Countries Bulletin 1 (2009): 5. 
34 Amnesty International report, "Timor-Leste: International Criminal Court: Justice in the 
Shadow," Amnesty International Publications, 2010. 
35 Josh Kurlantzick, "Chinese Soft Power in Southeast Asia (Part I)," Global List, April 2, 2007, 
available at www.theglobalist.com/Storyld.aspx?Storyld=6240, accessed September 25, 2010. 
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undeniable, and although Timor-Leste will definitely refrain from explicitly using 
the influence that comes from its growing ties with China-as doing so would signal 
the final passing to the other side of the diplomatic barricade-it is unlikely to refrain 
from indirectly employing the inherent advantages of such positioning as leverage 
with nearby regional powers. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the relatively complicated relationships between Timor-Leste and 
some of its major foreign partners are emblematic of underlying problems for every 
small state. Indeed, it is not uncommon that, instead of forging a long-term-foreign 
policy strategy, such states-frequently "new," "weak," or "fragile"-focus on 
"intensive bursts of crisis management."36 Their goals shrink and ultimately focus on 
the search for a neutral status, for an alliance with a greater power, or an emphasis 
on collective security. In Timor-Leste's case, none of these options has been that clear 
cut since its apparent diversification strategy does not currently enable analysts to 
discern-or Timorese leaders to follow-a clear and precise framework through 
which Timorese foreign policy could be easily categorized or evaluated. But by 
combining good neighborliness, engagement within regional frameworks, and the 
courting of international donors and traditional partners, the Southeast Asian nation 
has managed to maintain a considerable level of consistency in its foreign approach. 
However, in this context1 a range of voices have begun pointing to a growing 
detachment from previous policy positions, with Timor-Leste apparently seeking to 
exhibit a degree of autonomy that the predominant players in the region are simply 
not used to. Indeed, the willingness to demonstrate foreign policy maturity also 
carries the inherent risk of damaging Timor-Leste1s own external goals in the long 
run, many of which were designed and decided in the post-referendum euphoria. 
Certain political choices taken since independence have only helped to reinforce 
perceptions of disarray within the East Timorese leadership with regard to its foreign 
positioning, and to its relationship with crucial actors that remain instrumental in its 
independence and future. 
The need for greater freedom to establish independent policy is inherent in any 
state's growth, and, since Timor-Leste is a young nation, it is only natural that some 
hard choices and decisions have to be taken in the name of state survival and 
development. Nonetheless, it is a fact that the country not only remains considerably 
dependent on foreign assistance and goodwill from the international community, but 
also deeply intertwined with the fate of a necessary cohabitation with Indonesia and 
Australia. 
It is therefore difficult to understand why long-running territorial disputes are 
allowed to be drag on; why the choice for a full-blown amnesty for past crimes-if 
indeed, it is the choice to be taken-is not finally assumed by Timorese officials; why 
a country so in need of further international investments presents itself as an often 
inflexible negotiating party with little attention to the consequent fallout in terms of 
the business environment; and why the country appears keen on wooing political 
and economic giants when it most certainly knows it will risk damaging in return the 
delicate regional balance of stability upon which it unavoidably depends. 
36 Anthony Smith, "Constraints and Choices: East Timor as Foreign Policy Actor," New Zealand. 
Journal of Asian Studies 7,l (2005): 16. 
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Ultimately, it is expected that Timor-Leste will take these important variables 
into account when setting the course of its own future foreign policy. The impulse to 
address these challenges will only intensify as the end of the United Nation's mission 
draws near and as the country absorbs the impact of a new electoral cycle. Above all, 
despite an admirable and growing confidence in its future, Timor-Leste's leadership 
cannot ignore the fact that, in order to assume its rightful place as a credible and 
reliable suitor in the international and regional arena, the country has to adopt a 
stable foreign policy course that can simultaneously conciliate the nurturing of 
confidence ties with its international partners and the protection of its foreign 
interests. Accordingly, a careful evaluation of the country's agenda appears to be 
inevitable, so that the image and credibility of Timor-Leste abroad is not dealt any 
permanent damage in Timor-Leste's quest to assert itself as a nation in the making. 
DEMOCRACY OLD AND NEW: 
THE INTERACTION OF MODERN AND 
TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY 
IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Deborah Cummins and Michael Leach 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the evolving relationship between traditional and modern 
forms of political authority in local government in Timor-Leste.1 The ''clash of 
paradigms" between traditional and liberal democratic ideas of legitimacy in Timor-
Leste is widely considered to be an important issue for the stability of the nation-
state as a whole.2 Creating a durable balance for this relationship is also considered 
integral to engaging local communities in nation-building, peace-building, and 
democratization.3 Negotiating the interactions between local council administration 
and traditional authority has been a fraught task since 2002, particularly given the 
administration system inherited from the United Nations Transitional 
Administration for East Timor (UNTAET), which continued the same highly 
centralist approach as the former Indonesian and Portuguese authorities. There are 
also critical and ongoing issues for government authorities to consider in the 
continuing decentralization process, and in regulating aspects of customary law. 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as Deborah Cummins and Michael Leach, 
"Democracy Old and New: The Interaction of Modern and Traditional Authority in East 
Timorese Local Government," Asian Politics and Policy 4,1 (2012): 89-104. 
2 Tania Hohe, "The Clash of Paradigms: International Administration and Local Political 
Legitimacy in East Timar." Contemporary Southeast Asia 24,3 (2002): 569-90; Josh Trindade and 
Bryant Castro, "Rethinking Timorese Identity as a Peacebuilding Strategy: The Lorosa'e-
Loromonu Conflict from a Traditional Perspective," in Final Report for GTZ/IS (Dili: GTZ, 
European Union's Rapid Reaction Mechanism Programme, 2007), www.indopubs.com/ 
Trindade_Castro_Rethinking_Timorese_Identity.pdf, accessed June 18, 2012. 
3 Alexandre Gusmao and Anne Brown, "Polftika Komunidade no Harii-Dame iha Timar 
Leste," in Understanding Timor-Leste: Proceedings of the Timor-Leste Studies Association Conference, 
ed. Michael Leach, Nuno Canas Mendes, Antero da Silva, Alarico Ximenes, and Bob Boughton 
(Hawthorn: Swinburne Press, 2010), pp. 21-25. 
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Here we focus on the relationship between modern and traditional authority in 
local government,4 examining the ways elected chefes de suku (village chief) and chefes 
de aldeia (hamlet chief) interact with traditional authorities and communities at the 
local level. Fieldwork was conducted by the authors in various areas of Baucau, Los 
Palos, Viqueque, Venilale, and Ainaro in 2008-09.5 In general, our findings suggest 
that the interaction of modern and traditional systems at the local level has produced 
several hybrid models of local political authority and legitimacy. Specifically, we 
identify three hybrid modes of authority: two "co-incumbency" models and an 
"authorization" model, emphasizing a separation of power between traditional and 
modern authorities. 
BACKGROUND 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the concept of nation-building in post-colonial states was 
commonly premised on the notion of a transition from "pre-modern" local and 
traditional identities to a modern, unified national identity. In Timor-Leste in the 
1970s, for example, the architects of modern nationalism, while drawing on unifying 
traditional identities of "maubere," or common people, essentially saw traditional 
political systems and legitimacy as feudal and backward.6 More recently, the 
existence-and potential-of hybrid models of liberal and customary government 
have become the subject both of empirical attention and theoretical inquiry.7 In 
Timor-Leste, the tensions between modern and traditional administration and 
notions of political authority remain a key challenge for nation builders. As Josh 
Trindade and Bryant Castro argue, one broad background factor of the 2006 crisis lay 
in the imposition of a modern state, from Dili, without a supporting concept of the 
"nation" capable of resonating with collective visions of community and identity in 
the regions. For these commentators, many East Timorese "[felt] that they [were] 
lacking a sense of ownership of current governance processes. They mistrust[ed] the 
current government and [perceived] that the idea of the nation-state ... [was] 
imposed on them just as the colonial system [had been]."8 Ten years on from the first 
elections, this disconnection continues to be felt. For example one, elder stated: 
4 Konsellu de suku, or suku councils, are not officially regarded as part of the East Timorese 
governmental structure, but, rather, are legally defined "community authorities." Nonetheless, 
we refer to them here as part of the "government" in recognition of their key role in local 
administration. 
5 Fieldwork interviews in Venilale and Ainaro were conducted by Cummins from August 2008 
to February 2009. Interviews in Baucau, Los Palos, and Viqueque were conducted by Leach 
between January and March 2008. 
6 Jill Joliffe, East Timar: Nationalism and Colonialism (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 
1978). 
7 Deborah Cummins, "Democracy or Democrazy? Local Experiences of Democratisation in 
Timor-Leste," Democratization 17,5 (2010): 899-919; David Butterworth and Pamela Dale, 
"Articulations of Local Governance in Timor-Leste: Lessons for Local Government Under 
Decentralization," Justice for the Poor, World Bank, Washington, DC (2010), http:// 
documents.worldbank.org I curated/ en/ 2010/10/12836440 I articulations-local-governance-
timor-leste-lessons-local-development-under-decentralization, accessed June 18, 2012. 
8 Trindade and Castro, "Rethinking Timorese Identity," p. 14. 
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The democracy that we did in 2001, we chose the members of the parliament 
for the Constitution. Everyone raised their hands ... we closed our eyes and 
we supported [the Constituent Assembly] but we knew that this was wrong 
for our country ... why don't we use the [traditional] system from before?9 
Sentiments such as these were often repeated during the authors' fieldwork.10 
In the wake of the 2006 political-military crisis, then Prime Minister Ramos-
Horta's government promised to review local administration1 to allow traditional 
political authority mechanisms to be accorded greater status in local and regional 
administration, and to review the processes of district elections. This commitment 
did not1 however, make it into the 2009 konsellu de suku (Suco Council) legislation 
introduced by the AMP (Alian\'a Maioria Parlamentar, Parliamentary Majority 
Alliance) government to replace the previous 2004 legislation (Decree Law 3/2009). 
Despite this lack of formal recognition, an informal integration of traditional and 
modern spheres of administration continues to occur in suku level politics, evident in 
the migration of notions of legitimacy from the spiritual and traditional realms to the 
temporal and modern. Specifically, the findings suggest that those with liurai 
(political authority) or lia-na'in (ritual authority) heritage have proven more effective 
in modern local-government roles and have greater "speaking power" than those 
candidates from modern political parties without local traditional legitimacy. The 
challenges for those without customary "speaking power" are considerable, and both 
the appointed (district and subdistrict administrators) and elected officials (members 
of konsellu de suku, including chefe de suku and chefes de aldeia) from these backgrounds 
have commonly failed in their roles. 
The critical issues of decentralization and the reformulation of local and 
municipal administration are clear sites in which to examine the tensions and 
negotiations between modern and traditional authority in Timor-Leste.11 As the 
program of the Fourth Constitutional Government noted, these issues were to have 
priority over the 2007-12 term of the government: 
Decentralized participation is accepted as an essential condition for the 
exercise of citizenship, and, therefore, with the national limitations, local 
administrations will be ensured, in strict partnership with traditional 
administration, the means and resources needed for it to perform its 
attributions and competences.12 
While modified konsellu de suku election legislation was passed in 2009, the process of 
creating municipalities and reformulating district government-including district 
assembly elections-has been delayed until at least 2014. 
9 Interview with Venilale katuas, Venilale, Baucau district, November 21, 2008. 
10 Tensions between modern and traditional authority at the local government level are by no 
means an exclusively rural phenomenon. Nonetheless, the relative "distance" that citizens feel 
from the state in rural areas make these complex relationships especially salient in decision-
making processes. 
11 Butterworth and Dale, "Articulations of Local Governance"; Hohe, "Clash of Paradigms." 
12 Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste RDTL, Program of the Fourth Constitutional Government 
Program, 2007-2012, p. 5, www.laohamutuk.org/misc/ AMPGovt/GovtProgramEng.pdf, 
accessed June 18, 2012. 
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HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 
Contemporary local administration in Timor-Leste needs to be understood in 
context of the longer history of interactions between external power and traditional 
authorities. While some traditional Timorese kingdoms had suzerainty over 
extensive territories, 13 others were much smaller-often the size of a single suku. 
When the Portuguese consolidated their rule in the late nineteenth century, the 
larger kingdoms were broken up to better facilitate colonial rule, leaving many 
smaller, less powerful kingdoms intact (though sometimes with lesser nobles 
installed as liurai by the Portuguese in exchange for loyalty). The core locus of 
traditional power in Timor-Leste lies at the level of the suku, where the traditional 
house of the liurai continues to command authority and allegiance in most 
communities. In this context, traditional authority tends to be localized authority 
extending over recognized domains of the traditional house. 
Until the late colonial era (1910s), the colonial touch was relatively light, 
especially in the interior, leaving aside the military enforcement of loyalties against 
hostile liurai and the payment of fintas (tributes) to the Portuguese. Fintas were 
typically raised by the liurai themselves, leaving their internal authority largely 
intact. As Geoffrey Gunn notes, 14 the shift in the early twentieth century to a head-tax 
regime, collected directly by the Portuguese colonial authorities themselves, 
represented a fundamental intervention in traditional authority and lay behind the 
various uprisings of that era, most notably, the Dorn Boaventura rebellion of 1911-
12.is 
During the Indonesian interregnum, local Timorese structures were brought into 
line with those of other parts of Indonesia.16 The Indonesians largely adopted pre-
existing district, subdistrict, and suku boundaries, integrating them into Indonesian 
local government structures. In addition to this, the Indonesians formally 
incorporated the previously unrecognized governing unit at the level of aldeia. 17 On 
the other hand, the creation of security hamlets resulted in the wholesale relocation 
of numerous villages. Nominally democratic elections were introduced for suku 
chiefs in 1982. However, in line with the militarized administration of the territory 
throughout this period, the most powerful people at every level of administration 
continued to be the military commanders. 
Running parallel to the Indonesian local government were the clandestine 
structures introduced by the Timorese resistance, present in every suku across Timor-
Leste. As Andrew McWilliam relates, 18 key to the clandestine movement were the 
suku-based networks known as the nucleos de resistencia popular (nurep ). Nurep were 
popularly elected by aldeia representatives, with the election conducted by a Falintil 
(Forc;as Armadas de Libertac;ao Nacional de Timor-Leste, Armed Forces for the 
National Liberation of East Timor) commander. The clandestine subdistrict chief, 
13 Geoffrey C. Gunn, Timor Loro Sae: 500 Years (Macau: Livros do Oriente, 1999), pp. 17-28. 
14 Ibid., pp. 96, 124. 
15 See also Katharine Davidson, "The Portuguese Consolidation of Timer: The Final Stage, 
1850-1912" (doctoral dissertation, University of New South Wales, 1994), p. 19. 
16 James Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed (Milton: Jacaranda Press, 1983), p. 301. 
17 Joao Saldanha, The Political Economy of East Timar Development Qakarta: Pustaka Sinar 
Harapan, 1994), pp. 102-3. 
18 Andrew McWilliam, "Houses of Resistance in East Timor: Structuring Sociality in the New . 
Nation," Anthropological Forum 15,l, (2005): 27-44, 35. 
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secretario do zona, was chosen by Falintil commanders. These figures were often 
considered to have more legitimacy than those recognized by the Indonesians, and in 
many sukus the nurep went on to become the chefe de suku when Timor-Leste became 
independent. 
Throughout both Portuguese and Indonesian rule, traditional authorities and 
law continued to operate and guide the daily lives of most rural East Timorese. 
These administrative structures ran parallel with those of the external rulers, at 
various times being reinforced or undermined by the overarching structure of the 
state, which impacted upon local communities and their self-regulating practices (for 
example, when the Portuguese changed traditional suku boundaries for the sake of 
administrative convenience, or their insistence on dealing with "blood crimes"). 
These enduring structures received little recognition in the UNTAET period, and did 
not figure in their state-building agenda.19 This left the complex questions of local 
administration to the newly independent government of Timor-Leste in 2002. 
The coexistence of modern and traditional administration has a long history, and 
the set of political hybrids that have resulted remain an important context for 
understanding contemporary local governance in Timor-Leste. While "traditional" 
administration cannot be regarded as fixed or unchanging, it has never been 
subsumed or displaced by the various incarnations of the external state. The 
interpenetration of state-based and traditional modes of decision making and 
dispute resolution continue to generate hybrid models that impact upon the daily 
lives of people in the rural areas and hold important implications for the legitimacy 
of elected local leaders. 
THE CENTRALITY OF LISAN 
The place of traditional authority figures is defined in terms of their connection 
with lisan,20 or customary law. The ongoing importance of lisan, particularly in the 
rural areas, is well-recognized as an important facet of contemporary Timorese 
political, social, ecological, and spiritual life. From the perspective of most Timorese, 
traditional institutions, while unwritten, are highly formalized. Lisan is for many 
community members the central body of law through which their lives are guided 
and social structures understood.21 Traditional leaders are intimately connected to 
lisan, and hold spiritual and ritual responsibilities alongside temporal responsibilities 
to lead the community and resolve disputes. Lisan is implemented through complex 
hierarchical relationships that guide local dispute resolution, and also provide for 
other needs within and between family groups. 
The principle of maintaining communal balance through exchange is 
fundamental to lisan. The material world inhabited by living things, and the cosmos 
inhabited by the spirit and ancestors must be kept in balance through rituals of 
exchange. Failure to observe these rituals leads to imbalance, which can have serious 
consequences, such as the spread of disease, harvest failure, or natural disasters (e.g., 
earthquakes). Because of its importance, the principle of exchange for the Timorese 
19 Hohe, "Clash of Paradigms." 
20 Lisan is also commonly referred to by the Malay term adat. 
21 Tanja Hohe and Rod Nixon, Reconciling Justice: 'Traditional' Law and State Judiciary in East 
Timar (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), www.gsdrc.org/ go/ display 
&type=Document&id=813, accessed June 18, 2012. 
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people is described by Forman as "the idiom of life, symbolically, ideologically, and 
pragmatically."22 Disruption or imbalance can also be seen as a background factor to 
social conflict. 
It is in this local political environment that the actors and institutions of modern 
local government are interpreted and incorporated. This generates significant 
interaction and overlap between modern and traditional spheres of administration at 
the local level. Key examples include hybrid conceptions of legitimacy and practices 
of local political leadership in local settings. Political hybridity is also evident in the 
way state-based and customary institutional structures are used alternately to 
resolve different types of intracommunity disputes and in the way projects are 
coordinated within a suku. The composition and structure of local communities along 
family lines can also have important implications for how external resources are 
distributed. 
The significance of lisan lies, not only in the spiritual realm, but also in the 
temporal and practical ordering of intragroup relations. As has been noted in 
previous studies,23 while different in form from liberal democracy, lisan continues to 
enjoy legitimacy within the community because it displays many characteristics that 
people describe as "democratic." With its emphasis on maintaining balance in the 
community, lisan has helped maintain community cohesion in the face of massive 
social upheavals. With the lack of state penetration in rural areas as a perennial 
backdrop, customary institutions continue to provide opportunities for community 
participation in decision making over the issues that affect community members 
between elections, something liberal democratic institutions have been unable to 
provide. One elder in Venilale described the institution of nahe biti boot24 as the "old 
democracy" of Timor, designed to involve everyone affected in resolving an issue 
through reaching consensus. This, he argued, was preferable to the "new 
democracy," which he saw as disconnected from the Timorese who live in the rural 
areas and, the preserve of Dili-based elites. While there are distinct conceptions of 
democracy at play here, the ongoing popular legitimacy of customary institutions 
such as nahe biti boot underscores the need to take customary practices of dispute 
resolution seriously. Where the "new democracy" has often been equated with 
divisive conflict between different political parties, the "old democracy," embodied 
in rituals such as nahe biti boot, is seen to encourage consensus and communal 
cohesion. 
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN DEMOCRATIC TIMOR-LESTE 
Conversely, of course, there are clear limits to the extent that customary 
institutions can satisfy the requirements of a liberal, citizenship-based democracy. 
While lisan is central to a traditional understanding of political community, 
customary law must inevitably accommodate liberal democratic conceptions of 
22 Shepard Forman, "Descent, Alliance and Exchange Ideology Among the Makassae of East 
Timor," in The Flow of Life: Essays on Eastern Indonesia, ed. James Fox (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 153. 
23 For example, see Cummins, "Democracy or Democrazy?" 
24 Interview with Venilale ka.tuas, November 21, 2008. "Nahe biti-boot," or "spreading out the 
mat," is a customary method of resolving issues or disputes by consensus, presided over by a 
lia-na'in (traditional dispute resolution authority). 
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citizen equality. Notions of class, masculine authority, and hierarchical leadership 
are deeply embedded in lisan, privileging certain family lines that have access to the 
"ritual words" that are essential to holding traditional leadership. Equally, in 
patrilineal areas (the majority of Timor), women are normally not permitted to speak 
in a traditional ceremony. Certain aspects of the legislation that shapes modern suku 
administration are clearly designed to address these issues, including the 
requirement for women and youth representatives on konsellu de suku. However, a 
combination of factors, including the underresourcing of konsellu de suku and the 
norms of lisan1 have meant that women and youth representatives are rarely 
empowered by the other members of konsellu de suku to take active roles in local 
community decision making.25 The challenge of transforming gender and youth 
quotas into more than a political "numbers game" is clearly an important area of 
focus for the East Timorese government. Such a task will require particular focus on 
the distinct challenges that women face when exercising local leadership. 
For FRETILIN particularly-though by no means exclusively-modern 
citizenship rights were understood from the 1970s onward as the remedy1 not only to 
colonial domination, but also to "feudal" forms of traditional authority. Of course1 in 
the twenty-first century, few political parties can countenance the idea of gender and 
age inequality common to traditional institutions. But in rural communities, both 
lisan and "modern" democracy are often proudly proclaimed as the joint inheritances 
of the independence struggle. A common phrase, repeated to the authors throughout 
their fieldwork, was that lisan and democracy must "walk together." 
These engagements between traditionally legitimated and democratically elected 
leaders take place in the context of geographical local administration units that have 
changed very little since the Portuguese colonial era. The smallest geographical unit 
is the aldeia, led by the chefe de aldeia. A suku area comprises several aldeia and is 
headed by the chefe de suku. The chefes de aldeia and chefe de suku are directly elected 
positions. Moving geographically outward from the suku, the subdistrict comprises a 
number of suku, administered by an appointed subdistrict administrator, who is in 
turn accountable to Dili via the government-appointed district administrator. 
The principal institutions of local democracy are the konsellu de suku, established 
under Decree Law 5 I 2004. Since replaced by Decree Law 3 I 2009 (promulgated 
following consultations conducted around the country in late 2008), the legislation 
provides the legal basis for konsellu de suku in each of the 442 sukus across Timor-
Leste. Each konsellu is directly elected by eligible voting members of the suku using 
the pakote (package) system, 26 and is headed by the popularly elected chefe de suku. 
Other konsellu members include each of the elected chefes de aldeia in the suku area, 
one elder (jerik or katuas), two women's representatives, and two youth 
representatives, one man and one woman (Decree Law 3 I 2009). In addition to the 
elected suku elder, there is, since the 2009 law, a provision for one lia-na'in to be 
appointed by the konsellu de suku members at their first meeting following an 
election. This more recent development makes explicit the hybrid constitution of the 
konsellu de suku, discussed further below, as the lia-na'in sits by appointment rather 
than election, and in addition to the electedferik or katuas (elder). 
25 Deborah Cummins, "The Problem of Gender Quotas: Women's Representatives on Timor-
Leste's Suku Councils," Development in Practice 21,1 (2011), pp. 85-95. 
26 This refers to the system in which an entire council of candidates seeks to be voted in as a 
single block. 
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Notably, the 2009 law proscribed political parties formally running candidates at 
suku elections. This appears to be a response to concerns-well founded in many 
cases-over the divisive effect of political party campaigning in some local 
communities in the 2004-05 round of suku elections. The relationship between 
konsellu de suku and a proposed new level of municipal administration remains under 
review. 
HYBRID AUTHORITY IN LOCAL ADMINISTRATION 
While the democratically elected konsellu de suku is the principal local governing 
body recognized by the state, the reality of power relations within the suku is 
somewhat different. Fieldwork findings suggest that the establishment of 
democratically elected konsellu de suku has resulted in hybridized forms of local 
administration, with a strong traditional-authority presence on the councils, as 
communities endeavor to reconcile traditional notions of political legitimacy with 
modern institutions. Primarily, this takes the form of electing candidates who are 
either traditionally legitimated to rule, or who have the explicit support of traditional 
authorities. In addition, elected chefes de suku tend to share authority and work 
closely with non-elected traditional figures in the suku. These processes may be seen 
as a form of "re-traditionalization" of local government. Yet, while these new hybrid 
forms draw strongly on traditional sources of legitimacy, the interaction with state-
based institutions and central authorities is also potentially transformative, casting 
into doubt, for example, customary inequalities of gender and class, or, in the 
alternative tension, undermining formal notions of citizenship equality through the 
reproduction of customary power relations. 
Elected local leaders on the konsellu de suku are expected to fulfill many local 
government functions. Strictly speaking, these positions are defined under Decree 
Law 3/2009 as "Community Authorities," and council members essentially work as 
volunteers, being paid a small amount per month to offset expenses. Resources are 
scarce and it is a common complaint that project proposals rarely receive a positive 
response-an unsurprising outcome in a small developing nation with 442 sukus. 
State reach in rural areas is extremely limited and chefes de suku tend to act as a 
political "contact point" for the state, providing necessary statistics and information 
to the East Timorese government, subdistrict administrators, and other service 
providers. To fulfill these tasks, and the broader roles of resolving disputes and 
"administering" their populations, chef es commonly work in tight, networked 
arrangements with the non-elected traditional leaders of the community. Local 
authority and power is generally shared among elected chefes de suku and non-elected 
traditional authorities, and there are many instances where chefes de suku engage 
more closely with the traditional leadership than with other members of konsellu de 
suku, who are regarded locally as possessing less authority. These governing 
dynamics were common across all sukus in which fieldwork was conducted. 
For chefes de suku, a key relationship is with the subdistrict administrator-an 
appointee of the Dili-based government who coordinates activities and works closely 
with all the chefes de suku in the subdistrict.27 Alongside their other duties, the 
27 Also commonly referred to by the Portuguese term "posto"-the subdistrict administrator is 
often referred to as Chefe de Posto, and in some places referred to by the Indonesian term 
"camat." 
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subdistrict administrator ensures that government policy agendas are carried out 
smoothly within the suku, which may involve "reminding" chefes of their 
responsibilities as an elected official. In most cases, the subdistrict administrator does 
not have direct contact with the Dili-based government-these communications 
occur via the district administrator, who is also a government appointee. 
MAPPING THE LOCAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Unlike sukus, aldeias are not officially mapped. Accordingly, while they may 
correspond with particular geographical areas, aldeias tend to be defined by 
traditional understandings of community, which are in turn based on family 
relations and uma lulik. 28 Beneath the aldeia level of administration are a number of 
extended family groups referred to as uma kain, related to each other via uma lulik in 
a structured system of Wife Giver and Wife Taker houses. Even in aldeias where there 
are new family groups (often due to resettlement in Indonesian times), respect for 
the traditional owners and of the local uma lulik in guiding social relations continues 
to be important 29 
The various uma kain are governed by complex social norms that regulate 
relations within and among them in any single aldeia. 30 It is these family networks 
that form the first layer of communal governance experienced by individuals. The 
state-recognized layers of local administration (aldeia, suku, and subdistrict) thus 
overlap with those that have significance through lisan: the uma kain, aldeia, and suku. 
It is rare for an average community member to have direct interaction with the 
subdistrict administrator in his or her official capacity, with most interaction between 
suku and subdistrict levels occurring via the chefe de suku. 
These relationships are best illustrated by tracking how local disputes are 
resolved. In the hierarchy of local authority, conflict is first addressed at the level 
closest to the disputants. When a person commits an offense, he or she is pushing the 
community out of balance; the role of lisan is to restore balance to the community.31 
As such, it is important that the offense is dealt with quickly. Depending on the issue 
and the community, there are accepted hierarchies to follow in resolving disputes, 
involving three levels: the traditionally legitimated chefe de uma kain and lia-na'in at 
the uma kain level; the elected chefe de aldeia and traditionally legitimated lia-na'in at 
the aldeia level; and the elected chefe de suku and appointed lia-na'in at the suku level. 32 
The exact mode of dispute resolution varies. Some aldeias follow a strict 
hierarchy, described as "climbing a ladder" from one level to the next if the 
resolution process proves difficult. Other aldeias may approach disputes with a 
variant but accepted hierarchy. For example, in village Telega in suku Ainaro, the 
28 
"Uma lulik," or sacred house, is both a physical construct and a spiritual focal point through 
which people relate to each other and to the ancestors. 
29 For example, lia-na'in from the Wailacama aldeia of Vemasse are still invited to speak at the 
chefe de aldeia inauguration ceremonies in Ostico, despite having no formally shared territory 
since Portuguese times, following a relocation of the population in 1979. 
30 Mc William, "Houses of Resistance in East Timar." 
31 Dionisio Baba-Soares, "Nahe biti: The Philosophy and Process of Grassroots Reconciliation 
(and Justice) in East Timor," Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 5,1 (2004): 15-33. See also Hohe 
and Nixon, "Reconciling Justice"; Trindade and Castro, "Rethinking Timorese Identity." 
32 Since 2009, a lia-na'in from each suku may be specially appointed to the konsellu de suku. It is 
worth noting that some suku have more than one lia-na'in. 
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chefe de aldeia and aldeia lia-na'in resolve disputes together as a council. If they are 
unable to resolve the dispute, it is then taken to the chefe de suku to resolve in 
conjunction with the chefe de aldeia and the suku lia-na'in. If it is a civil matter, and 
remains unresolved at the suku level, it may then go to the subdistrict administrator 
for mediation. This particular pattern often occurs in complicated land disputes. 
Similarly, if it is a criminal matter and remains unresolved, the authorities may refer 
the matter to the police. In this way, the disputants move simultaneously "outward" 
from the uma kain to the aldeia, suku, or subdistrict, and ideologically from customary 
to state law. Elected and non-elected leaders work together in a structured fashion 
that signals the central role of lisan but also recognizes the elected local leadership. 
Significantly, certain konsellu de suku members (for example, women's 
representatives) are rarely integrated in this local "hybrid" hierarchy. 
Communal administration starts with the uma kain, where spiritual obligations 
are maintained, disputes are settled, economic patron-client relations sustained, and 
family policing is carried out. Relationships among family groups are maintained at 
the aldeia level, involving the resolution of disputes and the collection of information 
and statistics for the chefe de suku. As community needs become more complex at the 
suku level, the extent of external involvement increases, in the form of police, health 
centers, schools, the church, NGOs, and other actors. New power bases and 
networks become available to chefes de suku, outside their usual remits. Managing 
these networks requires leadership skills, and the ability to coordinate modern and 
traditional authorities in developing community responses. For example, it is 
commonly accepted that police are required to deal with criminal matters where 
"blood is spilled," and in practice police will often work closely with the local 
leaders. As effective police authority is somewhat constrained in rural areas, 
however, police often rely on and sometimes participate in nahe biti boot ceremonies 
rather than formally address disputes under the criminal code. The limited capacity 
of the police and the courts is therefore an important context for the ongoing 
importance of customary dispute resolution. 
OBTAINING AUTHORITY 
While traditional ritual and spiritual authority is conferred via lisan, local 
political authority in post-independence Timor-Leste is conferred through the state-
regulated process of suku elections. The democratization of local administration 
requires traditional leaders to engage with the electoral processes of the state if they 
wish to exercise political power. Interview findings suggest that as a result of this 
engagement, a hybrid system has formed at local government levels, particularly in 
relation to patterns of candidature. Those candidates with traditional authority are 
more effective in local-government roles and have greater "speaking power" than 
those from political parties who lack traditional legitimacy. The challenges for those 
without traditional "speaking power" are considerable, and such appointees (district 
and subdistrict administrators) and elected officials (konsellu de suku, chefes de suku 
and aldeia) have commonly failed in their roles. 
Though successful candidates for chefes de suku are elected because they are 
considered capable of performing a "modern" governing role, local leadership 
involves the ability to command, coordinate, and resolve disputes within the 
community-tasks that are significantly easier if one is a recognized traditional 
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leader. Chefes de suku must also work closely with non-elected traditional leaders, 
which is likewise significantly easier if one is also a recognized traditional authority. 
The influence of traditional notions of legitimacy varies significantly from one 
suku to the next, depending on patterns set by the local history of traditional-external 
relations. Below we identify three models characterizing the relationships between 
traditional and modern authority at the local level: two "co-incumbency" models, 
and an "authorization" model emphasizing a "separation of powers." 
Two types of "co-incumbency" models can be identified: a strict co-inheritance 
approach, and a "traditional house candidate" approach. An example of the first 
approach may be found in suku Uai Oli in the subdistrict of Venilale, where the liurai 
is required by his community to stand for election as chefe de suku. Many in the 
community believe that if they are not led by the liurai the spiritual balance will be 
upset and the community will become "sick." When the liurai's father and older 
brother died in 1999, the new liurai was required to leave a lucrative job in Dili to 
return to the suku to take on the role of chefe. This community has effectively created 
a hereditary chefe de suku system that is legitimated through elections and parallels 
the traditional inheritance of authority in the liurai family line. However, this mode 
of "co-inherited" traditional and modern authority appears to be fairly rare. Indeed, 
in this suku community expectations appear to be shifting. In the 2009 elections, the 
liurai was reelected with just 49 percent of the vote, narrowly beating another 
candidate from the same liurai house, but not immediately in the line of succession, 
who received 43 percent. For the role of chefe de aldeia, however, the "co-inherited" 
traditional and modern authority model was far more common. For example, all 
chefes de aldeia within suku Ainaro openly described their position as one that is 
inherited, but legitimated through popular election. 
For the role of chefe de suku, the more common "co-incumbency" model is the 
"traditional house candidate" practice of selecting "modern" local leaders from the 
liurai house. Relative to the co-incumbency model, this approach opens the field to a 
wider range of candidates with traditional legitimacy and allows scope for the 
position to change hands frequently. A common way communities seek to secure 
legitimacy within both spheres is by electing the most capable and "savvy" 
candidates from the liurai house, thus incorporating an element of meritocratic 
competition within the traditional leadership pool. There are interesting variations 
on these hybrid arrangements, with sometimes surprising outcomes. For example1 in 
the suku of Soro in the subdistrict of Ainaro1 the chefe de suku was one of the few 
women in this position in Timor-Leste.33 As she explained, traditionally she would 
have been required to "stay in the kitchen" and considered an unsuitable candidate 
for the role of suku leader. However, the political party she belonged to viewed her 
as a good candidate, in part because she came from the liurai house. This highlights 
the importance of traditional considerations in the candidate-selection processes of 
political parties themselves-and, equally, the potential (though rarely realized) 
influence of modern institutions on traditional notions of political leadership. As she 
explained, beyond her perceived ability to perform the requirements of the role, it 
was important that she came from the right family and enjoyed the necessary 
support and connections: 
33 She has since (in the 2009 elections) been voted out of office. 
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From our ancestors they say that the biggest uma lulik in this suku is this one 
[so] I became chefe de suku partially because of my uma lulik. As I said before, 
my family, in terms of the traditionat is the most important in this suku. But 
it was not only because of the culture that I could be chefe de suku. It is based 
on my behavior and the behavior before, the connection with the 
community, who the people trust to be chefe de suku.34 
There are variations throughout local communities in Timor-Leste, often unique 
to the history of each suku. The nature of the allegiance to liurais has also turned on 
the expectation that they deal fairly with the people. Through the early twentieth 
century, and particularly in the late colonial era, there were suku in which the liurai 
had "lost" his authority, and the subject population had transferred their allegiance 
to another liurai or become independent.35 With the new pressures and opportunities 
that arose as the Portuguese prepared to decolonize, and an emerging Timorese 
political elite prepared for independent rule, the authority of the liurais was further 
undermined, particularly in sukus where the liurai had been more brutal in the 
enforcement of labor provisions.36 Later, under Indonesian occupation, many 
children of the liurai became active in the Timorese resistance, and the leadership of 
many liurai was critically important in maintaining community cohesion and 
resilience. As one lia-na'in from the village of Teliga in suku Ainaro put it, "self-
determination and democracy was why we fought ... [but] we only came out on top 
because of lisan and the ancestors, and the spiritual guidance of the liurai. "37 In other 
cases, liurai authority was challenged by the mass mobilization and literacy 
campaigns of the early FRETILIN era. This complicated relationship with the 
authority of the liurai continues in post-independence Timor-Leste and varies 
significantly from one suku to the next. 
While membership of the liurai house remains a highly influential factor in 
determining legitimate candidature, communities across Timor-Leste are also 
creatively interpreting traditional requirements in order to confer legitimacy upon 
local leaders who do not emerge from the "right" house. In some sukus, elected chefes 
without traditional authority have nonetheless satisfied traditional requirements by 
obtaining the symbolic support of the old liurai. This may be termed an 
"authorization" model of hybrid local administration. As the subdistrict 
administrator of Los Palos explained: 
Culturally they believe that to be a liurai you rule people and have a rota. 38 
And they say the rota is heavy. Someone holding the rota must be a liurai, 
because it's too heavy otherwise. It will cause lot of problems if a leader 
34 Interview with chefe de suku Soro, subdistrict Ainaro, December 19, 2008. 
35 Kevin Sherlock, "East Timar: Liurais and Chefes de Suco: Indigenous Authorities in 1952" (an 
unpublished study of indigenous political units in Portuguese Timar in the mid-twentieth 
century, 1983), online at http:/ /trove.nla.gov.au/work/17827299?selectedversion= 
NBD23589452, accessed June 18, 2012. See also Davidson, "Portuguese Consolidation of 
Timar." 
36 See, for example, Jose Ramos-Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timar (Trenton, NJ: 
Red Sea Press, 1987), pp. 32-34. 
37 Interview with lia-na'in Teliga, suku Ainaro, January 2, 2009. 
38 
"Rota," or rattan stick, is symbolic of the liurai's rule. 
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cannot carry it. When they elect the chefe de suku, they have a ceremony, and 
they invite these old liurai to come and to give support, to speak. Here it's 
very important to speak because of the verbal culture. So the chefes de suku 
have a shadow placed behind them by old liurai.39 
The "shadow" cast by the liurai over the chefe is especially important in relation to 
any responsibilities that overlap with traditional administration or the spiritual or 
ritual life of the community. Some chefes explicitly portray the relationship with the 
liurai as one of principal and agent; they act for the liurai, except perhaps in relation 
to a very narrow band of modern administrative tasks. This "authorization" is 
reflected in the ceremonies that follow suku and aldeia elections. As the chefe de aldeia 
of Caicua village in Vemasse put it, when he was elected, the liurai and lia-na'in came 
to speak to legitimize his authority: 
They spoke at the ceremony. Because we want keep the old system. We still 
respect them. The chefe de aldeia was elected to do a government job, but 
traditional matters will be in their hands. The chefe de aldeia is just like the 
"hands and legs" of the liurai. I am only a servant.40 
This "authorization" of modern chefe power by traditional authorities is a key 
feature of political hybridity in the rural areas of Timor-Leste. As noted above, in 
some regions-for example, the aldeias in suku Ainaro-traditional authorization of 
modern local government is implicit in "co-incumbency" models, in which the 
traditional leader is routinely elected to the chefe de aldeia position. This is felt to be an 
obligation of traditional leaders, and is not always welcomed. For example, the chefe 
de aldeia of Hatumera, in suku Ainaro, felt the role was "too heavy," 41 with 
insufficient recognition or support from the government. Nonetheless, he stood 
again in the 2009 suku elections, noting that until the community decided to vote for 
someone else, he would not be relieved of this obligation. 
In cases of the traditional "authorization" of elected leaders, there are 
nonetheless many areas of ritual communal life in which the elected chefe de suku 
cannot play a role. As such, the balance between modern and traditional authority is 
often expressed in terms of a strict separation of powers. This is the case in the aldeia 
of Caicua, Vemasse: 
I was elected as chefe de aldeia only, and my job is to deal with the 
administrative matters to bridge people and government ... In regard to the 
traditional matters, I call the descendants of liurai to deal with matters. I 
considered them as a rotan-na'in. They are lia-nain. The chefe de aldeia is only 
administrative position. I organize all the activities in relation to state 
matters, and the traditional matters I leave to the descendants of liurai to deal 
with.42 
39 Interviw with Jacinto da Costa, subdistrict administrator, Los Palos, January 29, 2008. 
40 Interview with Geraldo da Silva; chefe de aldeia Caicua, Vemasse, Baucau, March 3, 2008. 
41 Interview with chefe de aldeia Hatumera, Ainaro, January 31, 2008. 
42 Interview with Geraldo da Silva; chefe de aldeia Caicua, Vemasse, Baucau, March 3, 2008. 
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Even so, in some important symbolic matters regarding the relationship between a 
local community and the state, the traditional authorities take the fore. As chefe de 
aldeia of Caucui explained, when the village received its national flag from Dili, it 
was the liurai who represented the aldeia in receiving it, not the chefe de aldeia. The fact 
that flags are often sasaan lulik may be a strong factor in this practice.43 
While traditional sources of legitimacy are critical, the modern local-government 
structure itself opens up networks and resource bases that can bestow legitimacy on 
those who "deliver." For example, during the 2004-05 suku elections, affiliation to 
political party became an important consideration as it was generally felt that those 
allied to the party leading the national government would have a better chance of 
securing resources for the suku. Equally, an individual's involvement in the 
resistance offers an important source of "modern" political legitimacy in Timor-
Leste-especially at the national level of politics. Indeed, as one interviewee noted, it 
is possibly an irony that where the "modern" political legitimacy enjoyed by 
resistance veterans would assist someone to become prime minister, it would often 
be insufficient to ensure their election as a chefe de suku. While involvement in the 
resistance is one important source of legitimacy at the local level, it must also be 
balanced against the requirements of lisan and customary sources of legitimacy.44 
It is clear that local people are negotiating the two systems in ways intended to 
confer legitimacy through both worldviews. This act of negotiation is a pragmatic 
one, seeking to find local leaders who will be able to fill a diverse range of 
community needs that encompass the temporal and the sacred. However, this act of 
negotiation carries internal tensions that become increasingly important when 
considering how authority is exercised. 
MAINTAINING AUTHORITY 
While suku elections are an important moment in the negotiation between 
customary and state-based authority, the more critical test lies in the day-to-day 
exercise of authority between elections. Experience since independence suggests that 
those chefes de suku without traditional legitimacy have struggled in their roles. 
Almost without exception, interviewees noted that the responsibilities of the chefe de 
suku in coordinating and leading the people within the suku are significantly easier if 
the elected leader is of liurai heritage. Traditionally, it is important that leaders know 
"how to speak" the ritual forms of language that command authority. In a culture in 
which the oral tradition has primacy, and authority is often measured against 
eloquence, a traditionally legitimated leader has a much better chance of being 
viewed as an effective leader than one who does not. Those with liurai heritage as the 
holders of ritual words clearly possess greater "speaking power" than those lacking 
traditional legitimacy. One respondent referred to this as the "secret voice" 
possessed only by traditional authorities, which authorizes and gives the protection 
of the lia-na'in to the new chefes. 45 As the district administrator of Viqueque explains, 
this is an important issue for chefes de suku who are elected on grounds other than 
their traditional legitimacy: 
43 
"Sasaan lulik" means "sacred items. 
44 Interview with the subdistrict administrator, Los Palos, January 29, 2008. 
45 Interview with Carlos Rodrigues, lia-na'in and chefe de aldeia of Wailacama, Vemasse, Baucau, 
March 2, 2008. 
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We have suku here who elected the chefe de suku from the liurai house. And 
experience tells us that these suku don't have a problem. But those who 
elected people from outside, elected some people because they think they are 
clever-they can read, they can write-or have tradition in politics-those 
suku have problems all the time. It doesn't matter what they do-even if they 
do the same thing. The chefes de suku, if not descendants of the liurai, have a lot 
more problems. So I think this needs to be put into consideration, the 
psychology-I say that we need change to be gradual.46 
More broadly, the interviewees suggest that traditional leaders elected to chefe 
positions face lower expectations, particularly in terms of their ability to connect 
with external networks. By contrast, chefes de suku without traditional legitimacy 
need to demonstrate successes to justify their continuing position. Success or failure 
is often measured against the ability to deliver communal resources such as schools, 
medical services, or better roads. However, such successes are heavily dependent on 
the capacity and willingness of external actors, such as the government or NGOs, to 
invest in the suku. This remains a constant challenge, given the generalized lack of 
state investment in rural areas. As chefe de suku of Uma Ana Icu, in subdistrict 
Venilale, explains, the chefe is often held to account for these failures, rather than the 
Dili-based government. As the perceived failures of the chefe de suku accumulate, the 
community's faith in the chefe as an effective leader diminishes.47 In effect, chefes who 
cannot claim customary authority through lisan must perform in a manner more 
analogous to the "Big Men" leaders of Melanesia, and demonstrate material success 
in a manner not necessarily expected of traditional leaders. 
Other difficult issues for chefes include negotiating the boundaries between 
traditional and modern forms of dispute resolution. As chefe de aldeia of Caucui 
explains, local communities alternate between different modes, depending on the 
context: 
We solve most problems using traditional way, even political problems. If 
there is a fight, police will come and make the situation calm. Sometimes the 
police have to detain those who are involved. After police normalize the 
situation, they will hand over the case to lia-na'in. For example, in this aldeia, 
when the militants of some political parties fought each other during the 
campaign, they were detained. But later on I took them from the detention 
center and brought them back to our village. Then I gathered lia-nain and 
leaders of political parties to come together to fix the problem using the 
traditional method. 48 
A similar pattern was also evident in the aftermath of a murder involving two sukus 
in Venilale, which caused violence among youths that lasted almost a week. 
Throughout this time, the chefes de suku, chefes de aldeia, the police, the parish priests, 
and other local leaders worked together to restore peace. The chief offender was 
detained by the police and formally charged, while the "smaller" offenses of assault 
46 Interview with Francisco da Silva, district administrator, Viqueque, January 30, 2008 
(emphasis added). 
47 Interview with chefe de suku Uma Ana Icu, Baucau District, October 10, 2008. 
48 Interview with Chefe de aldeia, Caicua, Vernasse, Baucau, March 3, 2008. 
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were dealt with first by the police and then resolved through lisan, with the offenders 
being restored to their communities. As the parish priest of Venilale explained,49 this 
murder represented payback for another murder that had occurred many years 
before and the challenge was to break the cycle of violence. While resolution via lisan 
allowed for the offenses to be put in historical context, the modern legal system 
could only deal with the offense at hand. The focus in resolving the "smaller" 
offenses of assault via lisan was to promote reconciliation by acknowledging this 
historical context and restoring balance to the community, with the hope that this 
would avoid similar murders occurring in the future. 
IMPLICATIONS OF A HYBRID POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
This article has examined the interaction of traditional and modern authority in 
suku administration in rural Timor-Leste, identifying three hybrid modes of 
authority at the local government level: two "co-incumbency" models and an 
"authorization" model emphasizing a separation of powers. Clearly, the third model 
offers scope for leaders who cannot claim authority through lisan to play effective 
roles in suku administration, though it was noted that the challenges facing these 
leaders are considerable. It was also noted that for the role of chefe de aldeia, 
possessing traditional authority appears to be even more critical. In general, the 
scope for nontraditional leaders to exercise authority appears to increase with the 
distance from local traditional communities, offering increased scope for other 
sources of political legitimacy, for example, participation in the resistance to the 
Indonesian occupation. 
As with previous systems of local administration instituted in the Portuguese 
and Indonesian colonial eras, traditional administrative structures have continued to 
be adapted to externally imposed requirements in the post-independence era, while 
maintaining core aspects of the traditional practices of suku administration. The "co-
incumbency" and "authorization" models of local authority outlined here are an 
inherent feature of contemporary local politics and need to be understood in the 
context of limited state reach into rural communities. The new nation of Timor-Leste 
is also, however, in a state of rapid change. Just as the last ten years have seen 
substantial change in social and political structures, particularly in the urban center 
of Dili, so, too, it is likely that the next decade will see further significant 
development across the rural areas of Timor-Leste. The potential role of the East 
Timorese state as an agent of development means that the existing balance 
negotiated through local politics could change very quickly, creating new challenges 
and opportunities for different actors at the local level. The challenge for the East 
Timorese government is to shape local politics within this changing political 
environment by acknowledging the centrality of lisan in rural communities, while 
also working to address those areas where gender and class inequalities are 
reproduced through the "re-traditionalization" of modern local administration. 
49 Interview with parish priest, Venilale, November 10, 2008. 
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SECURITY-SECTOR REFORM 
Bu V. E. Wilson 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter considers security-sector reform in Timor-Leste from 2006 to 2011, 
including both the broader security-sector reform "project" and the process of 
reforming the police. The political and security crisis of 2006, with its origins found 
in conflicts within and between the uniformed forces, evidenced the necessity of 
reforming Timor-Leste's police and military and their respective oversight ministries. 
Yet the reform project-premised on cooperation between international and national 
actors-has stumbled, faltered, and, arguably, even failed. In this chapter, I examine 
how an ill-defined project, contests over sovereignty, shortcomings in capacity, and 
incompatible international and national agendas have worked to produce poor 
outcomes for long-term security in Timor-Leste. I also discuss how these opposing 
agendas and stances have worked synergistically, in an expression of regulatory 
ritualism, to obscure the lack of progress made, with all actors having a stake in 
appearing to reform the security sector in Timor-Leste. 
THE POST-CONFLICT SECURITY-SECTOR REFORM PROJECT 
Security-sector reform (SSR) is now regarded as a cardinal component of post-
conflict state-building and stabilization efforts. This acknowledgment recognizes that 
particular states may not be able to provide basic security for their citizens, that the 
apparatus of those states may be the cause of that insecurity, and that both the 
welfare and human rights of a state's citizens are integral to any calculation of 
security.1 Although the term SSR is comparatively new, most of the component parts 
of SSR, such as military and police reform or development of civilian oversight 
capacity, were already part of donor development programs before the term SSR was 
first used in 1998.2 
1 Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN SSR), A Beginner's Guide to 
Security Sector Reform (Birmingham: GBN SSR, 2007). 
2 Michael Brzoska, Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform, DCAF 
Occasional Paper, no. 4 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Contol of the Armed Forces, 
2003). 
180 Bu V. E. Wilson 
A range of benefits is claimed to result from SSR, including that it facilitates 
holistic thinking about a set of interrelated issues and enables coordination of reform 
efforts both within a country and with external donors. It is also claimed to be a 
necessary prerequisite for achieving both development and stability in post-conflict 
states.3 Achieving or sustaining success in SSR undertakings has, however, proved 
particularly elusive. SSR is complex, and achieving consistency and coordination 
within a multifaceted program is difficult. It is also an expensive and human-
resource-intensive process, and maintaining donor interest and commitment over the 
long time frames required is challenging.4 SSR efforts have also suffered from a 
shortage of institutions and personnel familiar with the complexity of such an 
undertaking. In addition, a small number of commentators have raised concerns 
about the capacity of international actors who carry out SSR, with Gordon Peake, 
Eric Scheye, and Alice Hills noting that: 
The organisations charged with implementing reform usually lack 
appropriate structures and capacity, while many of the international 
personnel engaging in field-based activities-the link between policy goals 
and policy achievement-do not possess the necessary skills.5 
In addition to these practical considerations, SSR is often criticized for being an ad 
hoc process, lacking in coherent definition and strategy, manifesting as a "grab bag" 
of previously separate activities repackaged as an SSR program.6 SSR is sometimes 
characterized as a "modernizing" project informed by Western liberal values, 
seeking to introduce the concept, and model, of security organizations subject to 
democratic civilian control. This modernizing project carries with it an assumption 
that reforming the security sector will produce broader cultural, governance, and 
societal change.7 The SSR project also carries other assumptions about the way 
change is effected in institutional settings. SSR programs tend to be rationalist in 
nature, having an outcome that implementers want to achieve and a series of 
activities planned in advance for achieving that outcome. Programs assume that the 
implementing agencies and personnel will wield a high degree of influence. 
Characteristically, however, those engaged in efforts to implement SSR have not 
anticipated what will happen to those programs when introduced into the 
particularly unpredictable context of a post-conflict environment.8 Ultimately, SSR is 
about engineering change and rearranging power relationships within the most 
3 Sean McFate, Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008); Heiner Hiinggi and Vincenza 
Scherrer, "Recent Experience of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector Reform (SSR)," in 
Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Kosovo, ed. Heiner Hanggi and Vincenza Scherrer (Geneva: Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces [DCAF], 2008). 
4 GFN SSR, A Beginner's Guide. 
5 Gordon Peake, Eric Scheye, and Alice Hills. "Conclusions," Civil Wars 8,2 (2006): 251. 
6 R. Egnell and P. Halden, "Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious: Security Sector Reform 
Meets State Formation Theory," Conflict, Security & Development 9,1 (2009): 27-54. 
7 E. Scheye and G. Peake. "To Arrest Insecurity: Time for a Revised Security Sector Reform 
Agenda," Conflict, Security and Development 5,3 (2005): 297-99. 
8 V. Piotukh and P. Wilson, Security Sector Evolution: Understanding and Influencing How Security 
Institutions Change (London: Libra Advisory Group, 2009), pp. 4-5. 
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sensitive areas of governance, and, characteristically, such reform efforts must 
contend with resistance from individuals and institutions. 
Although donor agendas commonly revolve around governance and 
accountability issues, their agendas may be very different from those of ordinary 
people, for whom tangible improvements in everyday security may be far more 
pressing. It is often overlooked that very different programming will be required to 
achieve these disparate outcomes and that one cannot assume that security will 
"trickle down" from "good governance." 9 Additionally, in situations where the reach 
of the state is (and may always have been) incomplete, human, logistical, and 
financial capacity is limited and the legitimacy of state security institutions is 
compromised. Thus, it will also often be the case that most security (and justice) 
services will be provided principally by nonstate actors.10 In these circumstances, 
focusing primarily on strengthening state-based institutions will not deliver 
improved security outcomes to most of the population.11 
IDENTIFYING THE NEED FOR SSR IN TIM OR-LESTE 
In April and May 2006, Timor-Leste experienced a major political and security 
crisis. This included widespread fighting between, and within, the two uniformed 
security forces, the almost complete cessation of government functionality, the 
resignation of multiple government ministers, widespread violence, the 
displacement of approximately 150,000 people, extensive destruction of housing 
stock, and the deaths of at least thirty-eight people.12 By late May 2006, the situation 
became so serious that the government of Timor-Leste called for international 
military and police intervention from Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, and 
Malaysia. Initially, 2,200 personnel were deployed. Subsequently the government 
requested the establishment of a new UN mission. 
The proximate cause of the crisis was the sacking of 591 members (or 
approximately one-third) of Timor-Leste's military (the FALINTIL-Forc_;:as Defesa de 
Timor-Leste, or F-FDTL) in March 2006, a group that came to be known as "the 
petitioners." The petitioners were almost exclusively from western districts, and they 
alleged that members of the organization from the east of the country had 
discriminated against members of F-FDTL from the west. Failures of the security 
institutions were central to this crisis. Members of both Timor-Leste's police force 
(Polfcia Nacional Timor-Leste, PNTL) and F-FDTL and their respective oversight 
ministries, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence, were directly 
involved in the violence of April and May 2006. Problems within the police force and 
the Ministry of the Interior had been apparent for some time, but the crisis served to 
bring to international attention major developmental, legitimacy, and performance 
issues. It also highlighted the divisions within and between PNTL and F-FDTL. 
9 Scheye and Peake, "To Arrest Insecurity," pp. 300-301. 
10 Finn Stepputat, Louise Andersen, and Bj0rn M0ller, "Introduction: Security Arrangements in 
Fragile States," in Fragile States and Insecure People? Violence, Security, and Statehood in the 
Twenty-First Century, ed. Louise Andersen, Bj0rn M0ller, and Finn Stepputat (Houndsmill and 
New York, NY: Palgrave McMillan, 2007), pp. 8-9. 
11 Ibid., pp. 6-8. 
12 United Nations, Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry (2006), 
p.3. 
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Subsequently, many PNTL officers and the Minister of the Interior were 
recommended for prosecution or further investigation by a UN commission of 
inquiry (COI). The PNTL general-commander was not recommended for 
prosecution, but the COI found that he had bypassed institutional procedures by 
irregularly transferring weapons and had committed a serious dereliction of duty by 
deserting his post.13 Members of the F-FDTL-including Brigadier General Taur 
Matan Ruak, 14 Chief of Staff Colonel Lere Anan Timor,15 Colonel Rate Laek Falur, 
and Major Mau Buti-and the then Minister for Defence Roque Rodrigues were 
recommended for prosecution by the COI for illegal weapons transfer. Seven other F-
FDTL officers were recommended for prosecution for murder, six of them for the 
murder of unarmed PNTL officers. 
The failures of PNTL and F-FDTL were inextricably connected. This was 
recognized in the report of Special Envoy Ian Martin, who had been sent by the UN 
secretary-general to Timor-Leste in June 2006 to explore the scope of tasks that could 
be carried out by a mission that would follow the United Nations Office in Timor-
Leste (UNOTIL) mission. Martin recommended a comprehensive review, which 
would include a threat assessment and options for development of the sector that 
would address the tensions between the PNTL and F-FDTL, as well as options for 
addressing the relationship between the two institutions.16 The United Nations 
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) commenced on August 25, 2006, with a 
broad mandate that included restoring and maintaining public security, providing 
assistance to further develop the PNTL, and providing support for a security-sector 
review. 
However, in the process of developing the UNMIT mandate, a number of things 
began to be lost in translation. The proposal to review the security sector as a whole 
and the need to reform the police-processes that should have been integrally 
connected-became separated. In addition, addressing the problems inherent in the 
F-FDTL completely fell by the wayside. The United Nations had existing "policing" 
capacity in the form of United Nations Police (UNPOL), but no personnel, 
bureaucratic units, or strategy dedicated to security-sector reform. There were no 
personnel within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations detailed to military 
development.17 Furthermore, Timor-Leste's political leadership made it clear very 
early in the process that the F-FDTL would not be subject to the same kinds of review 
and accountability as it was prepared to contemplate for the PNTL. 
13 Ibid., p. 75. 
14 Taur Matan Ruak was subsequently elected president of the Republic in Timor-
Leste' s 2012 presidential elections. 
15 Brigadier General Lere Anan Timor became commander of F-FDTL in September 
20lt after Taur Matan Ruak resigned to run for the post of president. 
16 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1690 (2006), S/2006/628 (2006). 
17 Gordon Peake" A Lot of Talk but Not a Lot of Action: The Difficulty of Implementing SSR in 
Timor-Leste," in Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, ed. Hans Born and 
Albrecht Schnabel (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces 
[DCAF), 2009), pp. 213-38. 
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RECONSTRUCTING THE PNTL 
Under the UNMIT mandate, UNPOL reassumed the role of executive policing 
normally reserved for the sovereign state, something it had previously done in 
Timor-Leste until 2004. This placed Timor-Leste's police under UN control. The goals 
of restoring public security and reconstructing the police were premised on the 
presence of UNPOL. Yet, as with other UN missions, UNPOL was slow to arrive. 
The organization's officers did not arrive until November 2006, UNPOL was not 
properly functioning until the following year, and it took almost a year to reach 80 
percent of authorized strength.18 As with its previous attempt to construct the PNTL 
between 2000 and 2004, UNPOL had difficulty recruiting officers of adequate caliber 
in sufficient numbers and in a timely fashion. The "national balance" model of 
deploying forty or more different nationalities of police to supervise an already weak 
and poorly structured police institution was once again found to be wanting. Once 
again, it became apparent that "cops on the beat" alone do not have the capacity to 
establish a public-service organization. 
At the heart of UNMIT's plan for reconstruction of the police was a process for 
vetting PNTL members, to be followed by provisional certification, training, and 
mentoring, and, then, final certification. Vetting is most frequently used in security-
and justice-sector institutions where human rights abuses have diminished the 
legitimacy of state institutions.19 However, vetting processes carry inherent risks. If 
vetting is not done well, it can undermine or unnecessarily complicate other 
transitional justice processes, and the vetted institutions may end up with an even 
more compromised legitimacy than they had prior to the process.20 
The greater detail outlining how the public security and reform tasks were to be 
carried out was contained in a Supplemental Arrangement (SA) that was concluded 
between UNMIT and the Timor-Leste government in late 2006.21 In January 2007, 
UNPOL completed an assessment of the technical and administrative competencies 
of the PNTL, including internal accountability mechanisms.22 This formed the basis 
for preparing an Organizational Strategic Plan for Reform, Restructuring, and 
Rebuilding the PNTL (hereafter the RRRD plan). UNPOL completed several versions 
of the RRRD with little or no input from the PNTL. None of the versions was 
translated into any language that would have made it accessible for East Timorese 
recipients. None of the versions was ever agreed to by the government. Rather, then 
minister of the interior, Alcina Barris, in a letter to UNPOL Commissioner Rodolfo 
Tor dated April 24, 2007, extensively criticized the plan. Minister Barris noted, 
18 United Nations, Report of the Expert Mission to Timor-Leste on Policing, 17 to 27 March 2008, 
S/2008(329 Annex (2008), p. 8. 
19 Roger Duthie, "Introduction," in Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional 
Societies, ed. Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Grieff (New York, NY: Social Science 
Research Council, 2007), p. 21. 
20 Pablo De Greiff, "Vetting and Transitional Justice," in Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public 
Employees in Transitional Societies, ed. Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo De Greiff (New 
York, NY: Social Science Research Council, 2007), 527-28. 
21 UNMIT and Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Arrangement on the Restoration and 
Maintenance of Public Security in Timor-Leste and on Assistance to the Reform, Restructuring and 
Rebuilding of the Timorese National Police (PNTL) and the Ministry of Interior Supplemental to the 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on the Status of 
the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), 2006. 
22 United Nations, Report on Policing. 
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among other things, that the plan lacked costings; had considerable duplications, 
inconsistencies, and weaknesses; and was not oriented to the local context. Perhaps 
most damningly, he alleged he had found extensive plagiarism in the plan. He 
demonstrated that parts of the plan were taken, without acknowledgement, from 
sources as diverse as Wikipedia and documents of the Feinberg School of Medicine, 
Northwestern University, in the United States.23 The RRRD was also criticized 
extensively by members of an expert UN policing mission, who noted that the plan 
did not reflect the SA. The mission also expressed concern regarding "national 
ownership of the plan, since it had not been prepared with the active participation of 
local stakeholders" and concluded that "the document [could not] be used as a basis 
for the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of the national police in its current 
format and [would] require substantive changes."24 The SA anticipated that 
benchmarks for the staged handover of policing from the UN, back to Timorese 
authorities, would be determined by the RRRD plan. As the government never 
approved any versions of the plan, it was not clear for a number of years how 
various benchmarks and performance targets would be recognized. 
Despite being responsible for supervising the PNTL, UNPOL struggled to exert 
any day-to-day command and control over the PNTL1 particularly within the 
"special units" such as the UIR (Unidade Intervern;ao Rapida, or Rapid Response 
Unit), URP (Unidade de Reserva da Polfcia1 or Police Reserve Unit) and UPF 
(Unidade Patrulhamento Fronteira1 or Border Patrol Unit).25 These units were all 
significantly involved in different ways in the unraveling of the security forces and 
associated violence in 2006.26 However, rather than making reforming these units a 
priority, the suspect organizations received a "hands off" treatment by UNMIT, with 
no UNPOL officers co-located with any of them. 
This lack of effective command and control was also evidenced in the many 
critical decisions that were taken by PNTL from 2006 onward without the agreement, 
or sometimes even the knowledge, of UNPOL. This included the development of the 
Dili Task Force in 2007 and, more critically, the creation of the Joint Military Police 
Command in February 2008. The ability of UNPOL to supervise PNTL was 
undermined by factors including a failure to co-locate UNPOL and PNTL, resulting 
in parallel command structures; the variable-and sometimes high-turnover of 
UNPOL officers; language and other communication difficulties; and failure to 
deploy UNPOL officers to most subdistricts due to harsh living conditions. 
In addition to the challenges posed by the UN' s lack of practical control over the 
PNTL, it also appears that the executive policing function of UNPOL and, 
23 Minister of Interior, Alcino de Araujo Barris, Letter to Mr. Rodolfo Tor, Police Commissioner, 
UNMIT, Office of the Police Commissioner, Dili, 24 April 2007 (2007). 
24 United Nations, Report on Policing, p. 9. 
25 Under Decree Law 9 /2009, Organic Law of Timor-Leste's National Police (PNTL), the URP 
became the Special Police Unit (Unidade Especial de Policia) and the UIR became the Public 
Order Battalion (Batalhao Orden Publico, BOP). Although this law was promulgated in 
February 2009, the original special units were still in evidence in July 2009. 
26 The Special Commission of Inquiry (COi) recommended both named and unnamed UIR and 
URP officers for prosecution and further investigation. The COI also noted that members of 
the UIR and URP deserted with Alfredo Reinado, members of the URP were involved in 
supporting east-west confrontations and subsequent attacks in Fatu Ahi, members of the UIR 
were involved in the attack at the Comoro Market, and that significant irregular distribution of 
URP weapons also occurred. 
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consequently, their supervision of PNTL had no legal basis. On December 9, 2008, in 
a little-publicized Court of Appeal decision, it was found that because the SA was 
not ratified by parliament and promulgated, as required by the constitution of 
Timor-Leste, with publication in the official gazette, Journal da Republica, the SA did 
not have the force of law.27 Curiously, it appears to have suited both the Timor-Leste 
government and the United Nations to ignore the court's decision and ignore the 
legal limbo that this decision created. How this squares with the UNMIT mandate to 
promote the rule of law, or Article 1(1) and 6(d) of the RDTL constitution that 
determines that Timor-Leste is a rule-of-law state, is unclear. 
The cornerstone of the police-vetting process, as determined by the SA, involved 
screening and certifying individual PNTL officers. This was to prove challenging. 
Initially, there was confusion about who was carrying out the processes of 
registering and screening members of the PNTL. The poor communication between 
the government and UNMIT was highlighted when it became apparent that serving 
PNTL members were required to register both with UNPOL and the Ministry of the 
Interior. For quite some time, senior UN officials would not believe their own staff 
who told them the government was running a parallel process. Following initial 
certification, PNTL members were required to undergo five days of training. This 
was to be followed by six months of mentoring by UNPOL. Although UNPOL 
handled some of the five-days' training sessions, during 2007 the training was 
subcontracted to the Australian-based Timor-Leste Police Development Program 
(TLPDP), as UNPOL did not have the capacity to carry out the program. There was 
initial difficulty in getting PNTL members to attend the course, and absenteeism was 
high. Ambivalence about the screening and certification process from then minister 
of the interior Alcina Barris contributed to the difficulty of getting PNTL members to 
attend training. It goes without saying that serious limitations are inevitable in any 
course that is limited to five days. 
UNPOL originally intended that PNTL members who had undergone police 
training would each be allocated an UNPOL mentor on a one-to-one basis, but this 
proved impossible to implement. The mentoring program suffered from serious 
problems, and there is every indication that it ultimately amounted to a "box 
ticking" exercise. The failure to recruit UNPOL officers who had training and 
mentoring experience undoubtedly contributed to this problem. In 2007, the practice 
of mentoring was described by UN officials and bilateral advisers I interviewed as 
"the weak link in the chain," "a bit dysfunctional," and "hit and miss." It is apparent 
that, for a considerable part of the mission period, much effort went into creating the 
impression that the police-reform process was proceeding better than it really was. In 
interviews with the UNPOL commissioner in 2007, he claimed that every PNTL 
member was being mentored every day with a daily written summary, something 
that clearly was not happening. 
In 2007 and 2008, these observations regarding the poor state of UNPOL's 
training and mentoring program were confirmed during two important visits from 
New York-based UN officials, who were sent to assess the realities on the ground in 
Timor-Leste. Members of a Security Council mission visited Timor-Leste in 2007 and 
expressed disquiet about the effectiveness of UNPOL. Subsequently, the 2008 expert 
27 Bu V. E. Wilson, "Timor-Leste: The Curious Case of the Fake Policemen," East Timor Law 
Journal (February 2009), www.Eastimorlawjournal.Org/ Articles/2009 /Timor_Leste_the_ 
Curious_Case_of_the_Fake_Policemen_Bu_ Wilson_2009.Html, accessed June 26, 2012. 
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police miss10n noted in relation to PNTL that "tremendous institutional gaps 
[persisted], including weak management and command and control, lack of core 
capacities (e.g., investigations), and an almost total absence of logistics and systems 
maintenance capacity."28 The expert mission also expressed "reservations about the 
mentoring process ... in particular the qualifications of UNMIT personnel deployed 
in such a capacity and the lack of advisers at the sub-district level," and concluded 
that the process was "relatively unsystematic." 29 
Sustained pressure from the Timor-Leste government, eager to see UNPOL hand 
over policing responsibilities to the PNTL, culminated in a letter from the Timor-
Leste secretary of state for security to the UN deputy special representative of the 
secretary-general (SRSG) dated December 16, 2008, outlining a proposal for 
advancing a full resumption of responsibility by the PNTL, commencing on March 
27, 2009. Although the letter indicated a wish to advance the process, it also 
proposed a comprehensive independent assessment to gauge the administrative, 
institutional, and operational readiness of the PNTL. The independent assessment 
would then be used to determine whether the PNTL was "fully reconstituted." The 
secretary of state's proposal for an independent commission was predicated on an 
acknowledgement that "the United Nations and Timorese authorities have both been 
deeply involved in the reform process, which [meant] that neither [enjoyed] the 
necessary remove to look at the readiness of the PNTL in a dispassionate manner." 30 
However, there was no enthusiasm within UNMIT for an independent 
assessment, and UNMIT representatives reiterated their preference for joint 
UNMIT /PNTL assessments. A joint technical team (JTT) and joint field assessment 
teams (JFATs), comprising equal representation from UNMIT, UNPOL, PNTL, and 
the government of Timor-Leste, were set up to evaluate the readiness of the 
districts/units based on jointly agreed upon criteria: (a) ability of PNTL to respond 
appropriately to the security environment in a given district; (b) final certification of 
at least 80 percent of the eligible PNTL officers in a given district/ unit slated to be 
freed from UNPOL's supervision and granted its own authority; (c) availability of 
initial operational logistical requirements; and (d) institutional stability, which 
included the ability to exercise command and control, and community acceptance. 
During this time, it became apparent that senior United Nations personnel and 
Timor-Leste government personnel viewed the handover process, and the basis upon 
which the handover process was proceeding, very differently, and that tensions were 
building as a result. When interviewed, the UN Police commissioner, Luis Carillho, 
said that the handover was being carried out according to the RRRD plan-a plan 
described by the UN policing mission as unfit to be used as a basis for the reform, 
restructuring, and rebuilding of the national police in its current format. The 
secretary of state for security, Francisco Guterres, expressed a contrary view. He said 
the handover was not being carried out according to the RRRD plan but according to 
the government's Five-Year Plan. He added that, if they followed the RRRD plan, 
"what would be the point of having independence?" Empirically, however, the 
handover did not proceed according to either plan. 
28 United Nations, Report on Policing, p. 2. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Secretary of State for Security, Francisco Guterres, "Letter to Mr. Takahisa Kawakami, 
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for Security Sector Support and Rule 
of Law, United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, December 16, 2008" (2008). 
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Ultimately, the course of the handover was determined by political rather than 
technical considerations. Interviews carried out in Timor-Leste between 2008 and 
2010 suggested that commencement of the handover came about not because the 
PNTL had been reconstructed or because it fully met the criteria, but due to the fact 
that the government of Timor-Leste was tiring of the relationship with UNMIT; 
consequently, the government had pressed UNPOL for more than a year, asking for 
handover to commence. On May 14, 2009, the district of Lautem was the first district 
to be handed back to Timorese authorities for 11everyday policing," with the 
handover of full executive policing responsibilities and authority to occur at an 
undetermined date in the future. Lautem was perceived as an "unproblematic" 
district, although it was still dependent on UNPOL resources to function. With the 
United Nations having worked its way through the less challenging districts and 
police units, the handover process became increasingly difficult for the United 
Nations, as more problematic and dysfunctional districts and the special units were 
considered. Pressure upon the United Nations, from Timorese authorities, to bring 
forward the handover of executive policing authority resulted in what could be 
considered unseemly haste-characterized by less and less evidence-based decision 
making. One senior UN official told me that he asked the SRSG, Ameera Haq, if she 
really wanted to be photographed with the Liquica police when that district was 
handed over, as it comprised so many uncertified officers and officers with criminal 
charges pending against them. 
By the end of March 2011, the PNTL celebrated the eleventh anniversary of the 
founding of the organization, and full executive policing responsibility was handed 
back to the Timorese authorities. Unfortunately, despite a UN mandate that was 
supposed to be primarily focused on police reform, the PNTL had not been 
reconstructed since the crisis. The extensive vetting process of individual police 
officers that took more than four years was effectively abandoned, as was a 
comprehensive process for determining when individual districts had met criteria 
enabling them to be handed over. The final handover appeared to be based on 
nothing in particular. 
The vetting process, which focused on individual officers rather than the 
institution as a whole, was of minimal benefit in addressing institutional issues. The 
four criteria that were used to evaluate later-stage trainees prior to final certification 
were not well suited to evaluating the capacity or integrity of individual police 
officers, and indicated nothing about the capacity and integrity of the institution. The 
ineffectiveness of the vetting process is evidenced by the continuing lack of 
accountability that PNTL enjoys concerning human rights violations and abuses of 
authority, a sorry condition that worsened during and following the operations of 
the February 2008 Joint Command.31 The excesses of the Joint Command were 
replicated in a special police operation in 2010 to deal with putative "ninjas" in 
Bobonaro and Covalima districts, which resulted in widespread human rights 
abuses, leading a prominent human rights organization to question the authorization 
31 Bu V. E. Wilson, "Joint Command for PNTL and F-FDTL Undermines Rule of Law and 
Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste," East Timar Law Journal (February 2008), 
http:/ /easttimorlawjournal.wordpress.com/2012/05/24/joint-command-for-pntl-and-f-fdtl-
undermines-rule-of-law-and-security-sector-reform-in-timor-leste /,accessed June 19, 2012. 
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process for, and the necessity of, the extended paramilitary operation involving both 
the police and the military.32 
The disciplinary mechanisms within PNTL are still unsatisfactory and ad hoc in 
nature.33 The disciplinary regulation, copied from its Portuguese equivalent, contains 
complex formulae running to several pages that even for a Western-educated 
science/ math graduate is almost impossible to understand. Professional Standards 
and Discipline Office (PSDO) officers34 in each district are appointed by the district 
commander and are frequently low-ranking agents who have little real authority and 
are beholden to the district commander.35 
A credible and fair (but complex) career regime with transitional provisions has 
been legislated for, promulgated, and ostensibly "socialized." However, rank-and-
file PNTL members are either unaware of its existence or don't understand it. 
Considerable anxiety exists among PNTL members about forthcoming changes in 
relation to career structure, with concern expressed that the new arrangements "will 
make trouble in the future." This reflects a broader problem within the institution: 
that is, in the absence of regular, credible internal communications about what is 
going on within the PNTL, members are left to assume the worst. 
UNPOL has had two opportunities now to (re)construct the PNTL, and many of 
the mistakes that marred the first attempt were repeated the second time around. 
Many of the important tasks, identified by the special envoy in 2006, necessary to 
reform and reconstruct the PNTL have not been completed (or, in some cases, 
commenced). It also appears that many of the serious shortcomings of both UNPOL 
and PNTL, identified by the expert policing mission in 2008, were not addressed. 
REVIEWING THE SECURITY SECTOR 
In addition to reforming, restructuring, and rebuilding the PNTL, UNMIT was 
also mandated to provide assistance to the Timor-Leste government to carry out a 
security-sector review. As noted above, this undertaking initially had no obvious 
"home" in the mission, and in response the Security Sector Support Unit (SSSU) was 
established with responsibility for the review. UNMIT's difficulty in recruiting and 
deploying sufficient numbers and caliber of UNPOL officers also affected civilian 
deployments. It took two years for the SSSU to fill the positions it had identified. 
This made the work of setting a direction for the unit and establishing critical 
relationships with government interlocutors very difficult. 
When the author met with SSSU staff more than a year after commencement of 
the mission, in November 2007, it was clear that the staff felt excluded from any real 
processes having to do with the security sector. The staff members were approaching 
the review with some trepidation and sense of pointlessness, as they felt that the 
government was acting independently, preempting the review and not informing 
32 Perkumpulan Hak, "HAK Report: Human Rights Situation in Covalima and Bobonaro," 
February 15, 2010 (English-language edited version of HAK Association's report), available at 
http: I I fundasaunmahein.word press. com I 2010 I 02 I 23 I hak-report-h uman-rights-situation-in-
covalima-and-bobonaro, accessed April 30, 2012. 
33 Interviews conducted with UN officials July 2009, Timor-Leste. 
34 Now referred to as "Department of Justice," not to be confused with the Ministry of Justice 
within the Government of Timor-Leste. 
35 Interviews conducted with UN personnel and bilateral advisers, Dili, July 2009. 
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them of what was being done. SSSU advisers responded by refocusing their role on 
sourcing advisers to be placed within the F-FDTL and ministries of interior and 
defense, assistance that had been previously requested by then-president Jose 
Ramos-Horta. 36 However, the decision to focus on this task posed a serious 
"sequencing" problem, as the SSSU staff was sourcing advisers when there was no 
clear process or policy framework to establish what these recruits should be advising 
upon or what skills they should have. Given that the SSSU staff seemed to be so 
lacking in confidence about their role, it was interesting that they described 
themselves as being involved in a process of "confidence building" for the 
government that included the convening of educational seminars. In 2007, three of 
these seminars were convened on the topic of SSR. During these seminars1 East 
Timorese leaders expressed skepticism about the United Nations' capacity to assist 
with reform, given its track record on building security institutions to date. 37 
Meanwhile, the United Nations reported back positively on the outcomes of the 
seminars.38 
It was not until June 2008, almost two years after the beginning of the UNMIT 
mission, that the prime minister signed a project document worth 05$1,223,226 in 
support of a review of the security sector. Until this stage, the project document had 
been through at least three iterations. The Security Sector Review Project1 under the 
joint auspices of UNMIT and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
included the following activities: (a) a functional analysis of governance institutions 
and state and nonstate security institutions, (b) a gap analysis of institutional and 
regulatory gaps relevant to the security sector, (c) a threat analysis, and (d) a 
strategic environment review. 
In interviews in July 2009, both the head of the SSSU and the UNDP project 
manager for the review agreed that the review, as such, would not happen. 
However, in 2010, a short ritualistic review was produced, with factual assistance 
and corrections contributed from other parts of the mission but no input from Timor-
Leste' s authorities. The draft review, produced only in English, was then passed 
from hand to hand through the Office of the Secretary of State for Security, then 
languished a while in the president's office. 
In January 2011, the report of the secretary-general effectively put the security-
sector review to rest: 
The finalisation of the draft document on the comprehensive review of the 
security sector has been delayed. Currently, the Government and the Office 
of the President are reviewing the document, in consultation with UNMIT. 
While it appears unlikely that the document will be finalized in the near 
future, many of the elements identified in the draft document have already 
36 Interviews conducted with UN personnel, Dili, November 2007. 
37 International Crisis Group (ICG), Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform (Dili and Brussels: ICG, 
2008). The ICG also recounts how a high-level East Timorese official, in a subsequent 
interview, was "explicit in his distaste" about the utility of the United Nations in relation to 
the security sector review. In an interview with ICG Roque Rodrigues, presidential adviser on 
SSR, he was critical of UNMIT, claiming it was displaying arrogance in the way that it was 
allocating its security-sector advisors to East Timorese bodies. Ibid., p. 11. 
38 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in 
Timor-Leste, for the Period from 27 January to 20 August 2007, S/2007/513 (2007). 
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been addressed . . . and, once finalized, it will serve as a useful reference 
document.39 
In May 2012, the review was finally presented to the Council of Ministers, who 
described it as "the first phase of an ongoing process."40 Given the difficulties that 
staff members of the SSSU had in establishing relationships with the Timor-Leste 
government, it is likely that the review bears little correspondence to the 
considerable and significant process of decision making that has been carried out by 
Timorese structures of power and networks not visible to international actors. 
One of the difficulties facing the SSSU in relation to the review was that it had 
always been clear that the review itself was the responsibility of the Timor-Leste 
government and that the role of the UN mission was to "assist." As long as the 
government was unwilling to commit to the process of a review and to involve the 
United Nations, the "assistance" framework was always going to encounter 
obstacles. The 2006 crisis further sensitized the political elite to security issues, and 
they became very reluctant to engage in the review. However, several factors made 
the government want to seem to be committed to security reform, despite evidence 
to the contrary. One of these factors was the severity of the crisis, which included the 
unraveling of the security forces and security in general and led to the necessity to 
invite international forces to restore order and to ask the United Nations to 
reestablish a mission. That the Timor-Leste government needed help and needed it 
quickly in May 2006 is something upon which all parties would probably agree. 
Whether the Timor-Leste government was quite as enthusiastic about an SSR 
process that was unfamiliar and implied a further loss of control and effective 
sovereignty is more doubtful. However, the government was in no position to reject 
the package of measures that was being offered. The agreement, however, has 
proved to be particularly unstable and arguably superficial, and the gap between 
design and implementation was substantial. 
On the international side, UNMIT, generally, and the SSSU, more specifically, 
were unsure how to proceed, how to establish the difficult relationship with a 
sovereign government that had to play a fundamental role in order for the review to 
commence. To compound these issues, UNMIT and the SSSU did not have enough 
people with the right skills to actually carry out the work.41 In addition, the SSSU had 
no money in its 2007-08 budget to support the review. Further reasons for difficulties 
in getting the security-sector review to "take hold" in Timor-Leste have been 
highlighted by Gordon Peake: 
The phrase "SSR" has little traction within Timor-Leste. Profound 
uncertainty remains as to what the phrase actually means. The phrase may 
39 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in 
Timor-Leste, for the period from 21 September 2010 to 7 January 2011, S/2011/32 (2011), p. 10. 
40 Press Release, Government of Timor-Leste Council of Ministers, May 2, 2012. 
41 Jim Della-Giacoma, "The UN's Lame Security Review for Timor-Leste," The Interpreter, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, February 17, 2009, www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2009/02/ 
17 /The-UNs-tame-security-review-for-Timor-Leste.aspx, accessed June 19, 2012. 
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be intimately familiar to headquarters-based policymakers, but it is still 
somewhat alien to those on the ground actually engaging in reform.42 
Previous UN failures in Timor in the area of security development have similarly 
made UNMIT feel a need to seem to be getting on with the job of carrying 
out/ supporting a security-sector review in the same way that the Timor-Leste 
government feels compelled to appear to be doing so. As the UN-sponsored review 
foundered, a range of parallel security-sector-reform structures established by the 
East Timorese government also produced little. 
POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Although surveys indicate that very few people regard police as being primarily 
responsible for maintaining law and order, 43 there is, historically in Timor-Leste, an 
inordinate interest among the political elite and associated aspirants in gaining 
control of various parts of security institutions such as the police and the army. The 
political elite are suspicious of the motives and capacities of internationals charged 
with assisting with police-building and security-sector reform, and are nervous 
about the incursions into sovereignty that international assistance represents. Timor-
Leste' s leadership across the political spectrum has been reluctant to work with the 
United Nations. Timor-Leste leaders have been reluctant to cooperate not only 
because they are suspicious of the process, but also because successive Timor-Leste 
governments have had no experience in constructing state-based security systems or 
in carrying out processes that lead to formal institutional change and accompanying 
policy and legislative development. 
From the beginning of the UNMIT mandate, there have been tensions between 
successive Timor-Leste governments' purported support of police reconstruction and 
security-sector review and those same governments' desires to demonstrate 
sovereignty and independence around such a flagship issue. Consequently, 
reconstruction of the PNTL has not run smoothly, with both technical and political 
challenges evident. Similarly, the mandated security-sector review did not really run 
at all. During these processes, it became clear that the Timor-Leste government had 
tired of the international security presence, with Secretary of State for Defence Julio 
Pinto stating that "what we do know is that if we compare the character, self-
confidence and performance of some PNTL members with some UNPOL members, 
ours are much better." 44 Similarly, in 2009, then-chief of the F-FDTL, Brigadier 
General Taur Matan Ruak, Chief of the F-FDTL, stated that foreign forces should 
have left Timor-Leste by now.45 
42 Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, "SSR in Timor-Leste," SSR Bulletin 
20 (2008): 2. 
43 The Asia Foundation, Law and Justice in East Timar: A Survey of Citizen Awareness and Attitudes 
Regarding Law and Justice in East Timar (Dili: The Asia Foundation, 2004); Silas Everett, Law and 
Justice in Timor-Leste: A Survey of Citizen Awareness and Attitudes Regarding Law and Justice (Dili: 
The Asia Foundation, 2009). 
44 Julio Tomas Pinto, "SSR in Timor-Leste-Reforming the Security Sector: Facing Challenges, 
Achieving Progress in Timor Leste," Tempo Semanal, August 18, 2009, http: I I temposemanal 
timor .blogspot.com.au I 2009 I 08 I ssr-in-timor-leste .html, accessed June 22, 2012. 
45 Lusa News Agency, August 27, 2009. 
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The profound ambiguities in the SA contributed to a range of power struggles 
around the contested nature of who would own and control such an intrinsically 
political process as police reform, and who, ultimately, would decide about who 
stays and who goes. This ambiguity, together with the significant incursion into the 
boundaries of the sovereignty of the Timor-Leste government that the SA 
represented, contributed to the palpably poor relationship between the UN mission 
and the government, and between UNPOL and PNTL. Through the course of the 
mission, there were pressures on UNMIT and UNPOL from the government to have 
PNTL deployed "back on the street" with little regard for the certification process. 
Both UN headquarters and the Timor-Leste government have expressed 
concerns about the reform process, including the methods and the integrity of the 
process of reconstructing the Timor-Leste security organizations. Although many 
problems with the international police reconstruction process were identified by both 
UN headquarters and the Timor-Leste government, this shared recognition of the 
problems appeared to occasion little change to the trajectory that the poorly 
conceived and executed project was taking. Most mistakes made in the first 
construction of the PNTL were rigorously reproduced in the second attempt. 
Increasingly, international actors have been sidelined in police reconstruction 
and security-sector development processes. One of the most obvious manifestations 
of this state of affairs is the emerging divide between an international agenda that 
favors the separation of the police and the military and the practice and policy 
development of the Timor-Leste government that demonstrates an increasing 
blurring of the roles of the police and military, something familiar to East Timorese 
from both the Indonesian occupation and the Portuguese colonial period. This 
development marks both an East Timorese preference for an organizational model 
that has police and military working closely together, and it has emerged as a point 
of resistance by the East Timorese political leadership against international control. 
From the beginning, there has been conflict between the East Timorese police 
and army. The way each institution recruited its members contributed to the 
perception that F-FDTL carried the mantle of the armed resistance, whereas PNTL 
was associated with the Indonesian occupation. The predominance of easterners in 
the first F-FDTL battalion and a perception that westerners were dominant in the 
PNTL accentuated this perceived division. Since the formation of PNTL and F-FDTL, 
there have been attempts by F-FDTL officers to interfere in police investigations 
involving their members and serious assaults by F-FDTL officers on PNTL officers.46 
In January 2004, following a dispute between an F-FDTL soldier and civilians, F-
FDTL stormed a police station and a hospital, fired shots, destroyed property, and 
took ten PNTL officers hostage, detaining them at an F-FDTL base.47 
Initially, PNTL were much better resourced than the F-FDTL, causing tensions 
that were exacerbated by an unclear division of responsibilities between the police 
and the military. Although the Timor-Leste constitution is clear on the different 
46 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World-Situation of Human Rights in Timor-Leste, Report 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, E/CN.4/2003/37 (March 2003), 
p.4. 
47 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights on Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights in Timor-Leste, Report of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, E/CN.4/2005/115 (March 2005),. 
p. 7. 
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responsibilities of the PNTL and the F-FDTL, subsequent developments have made 
this division much less clear. Although international actors have been keen to 
differentiate the role of the police from that of the military, this idea has not been so 
compelling for successive East Timorese governments. Rather, the police have 
become increasingly militarized, the military are increasingly involved in everyday 
policing, and the two organizations are now regularly deployed together for 
everyday policing. 
Although former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato was the first to develop 
heavily armed paramilitary units within the police, the attacks on the president and 
prime minister in February 2008 marked a significant new direction for how the 
PNTL and F-FDTL would work together in future. Following the attacks, the 
government established a joint military-police command that placed the PNTL 
under the control of the F-FDTL at a time when the PNTL was ostensibly under the 
control of UNPOL. The Joint Command was established in the first instance to hunt 
down those involved in the attacks, but after that task had been completed, there was 
considerable reluctance to wind up the new arrangements. An odd assortment of 
tasks was found for the group, including resettling IDPs (internally displaced 
persons), searching for weapons, and controlling martial arts groups, although these 
activities appeared to have been invented in order to provide justification for the 
Joint Command after the fact. Extraordinarily, even when the Joint Command had 
been formally wound up, it continued to operate for many months. The period of the 
Joint Command was notable for an escalation of human rights abuses by the 
uniformed forces and a corresponding expansion of impunity for abuses committed 
by the police and military. 
It became apparent that the Joint Command fulfilled a number of functions apart 
from chasing rebels. The government hoped that collaboration between the two 
institutions would enable some reconciliation of previous enmities, a point made 
explicitly by the secretary of state for security. However, of possibly more 
significance was that the creation of the Joint Command reasserted East Timorese 
control of the uniformed forces and the accompanying security reform agenda. The 
Joint Command became valorized by many politicians and even found its way into 
the new security legislation as a point of nationalistic pride. 
THE EMERGENCE OF REGULATORY RITUALISM 
In examining the police reconstruction and security-sector review process, it is 
apparent that issues of relationship and capacity and contests over sovereignty have 
affected the processes of police reconstruction. The process has also been gripped by 
a peculiar torpor. In this section of the chapter, it is suggested that the paralysis that 
has gripped the process can be understood in terms of "regulatory ritualism." This 
ritualism serves to obscure a vast gulf between the parties. The United Nations has a 
stated commitment to importing a Weberian model of state security, although it has 
a manifest incapacity to carry out such a venture even if the Timor-Leste leadership 
were a willing partner. Timor-Leste's leadership is committed to the personalized 
exercise of power and is suspicious of models of impartial security forces. As a result 
of this impasse, both sides have merely pretended to carry out police and broader 
security-sector reform. 
The phenomenon of pretending to do something rather than actually doing it has 
been referred to as regulatory ritualism. This concept was initially developed by John 
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Braithwaite, Toni Makkai, and Valerie Braithwaite in relation to nursing home 
regulation.48 In developing their analysis of regulatory ritualism, the authors use 
Robert Merton's typology of individual adaptation to a normative order-which 
may include conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion.49 Rather 
than carrying out a process of security-sector review I reform and police 
reconstruction, both the Timor-Leste government and the United Nations have been 
engaged in a mutually reinforcing process of regulatory ritualism. It is not only in 
Timor-Leste that postconflict governments say what they think donors want to hear. 
They do this in order to be accorded the status of a "functioning" rather than a 
"failed" state, which in tum ensures that the state in question will receive continued 
diplomatic and financial support. Alice Hills has noted, in relation to Rwanda, that 
The regime consistently used the language donors wanted to hear . . . and 
provid[ ed] training courses on subjects such as stress management, trauma 
counselling, and gender-based violence, while tolerating extrajudicial 
killings by government soldiers, the deaths of thousands of unarmed 
civilians.50 
Evidence of this form of regulatory ritualism in relation to police reconstruction 
and SSR in Timor-Leste is found in the way the United Nations has ignored an 
increasing failure to distinguish between the role of the police and that of the 
military, in the decision to hand back responsibility from the United Nations to an 
unreconstituted PNTL, and in the failure to produce a meaningful review of the 
security sector for more than five years-despite the allocation of more than one 
million and possibly as much as four million dollars to support the process.51 
The alternating use of ritualism and rebellion by the Timor-Leste government, 
and ritualism and retreatism by the United Nations, has served to obscure the 
ambivalence of all parties regarding a security reform agenda in Timor-Leste. The 
government has gone through the ritualism of publicly expressing support for the 
SSR process and setting up various security-related bodies. It has also participated, 
albeit tepidly, in the evaluation of the PNTL as part of the reconstruction process. 
The ritualism of the United Nations follows the same path. 
Where the organizations diverge is in the "rebellion" or hostility toward the UN 
presence and role that is intermittently displayed by Timor-Leste figures such as the 
prime minister, the secretary of state for security, the secretary of state for defense, 
and the former and current commander-general of the PNTL. This hostility will 
sometimes manifest in decisions taken, and decisions thwarted by, the Timor-Leste 
government. It also manifests in the steady stream of negative statements about 
foreign forces, including UNPOL and the International Stabilisation Force. 
48 J. Braithwaite, T. Makkai, and V. Braithwaite, Regulating Aged Care: Ritualism and the New 
Pyramid (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007). 
49 Robert King Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York, NY: Free Press, 1968). 
50 Alice Hills, Policing Post-Conflict Cities (London and New York, NY: Zed Books, 2009), p. 145. 
51 Republica Democr.itica de Timor-Leste, UNMIT, and UNDP, "Project Document: Security 
Sector Review in Timor-Leste" (Dili: June 2008). This figure should, however, be viewed in the 
context of the larger expenditure on UNMIT, with one of its central mandated activities being 
the security sector review. 
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For the United Nations, it can be argued that, in addition to engaging in the 
ritual of merely appearing to be carrying out a support role to the security-sector 
review and police reconstruction, UN agents are also engaging in retreatism. The 
United Nations' frequent invocation of "local ownership" allows it to avoid 
responsibility for failing to advance outcomes and allows UN personnel to respond 
passively when the Timor-Leste government behaves in ways contrary to the 
mandates of the mission and the ideals of the United Nations. This retreatism was 
manifest when the United Nations failed to insist on seeing through the disciplinary 
and legal processes that should be visited on errant PNTL-theoretically under UN 
control-or when UN staff members defer to local ownership in expressing approval 
for the establishment and conduct of the Joint Command, although its establishment 
contravened the terms of the SA. UN retreatism was also evident in the reluctance of 
the UNMIT mission to speak out in protest when Timor-Leste's authorities released 
indicted war criminal Marten us Bere in August 2009. His extrajudicial release 
violated international law and undermined the rule of law and the constitution of 
Timor-Leste, all things that should be at the forefront of UNMIT's agenda. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have described how, rather than cooperating in a reform 
process, both the Timor-Leste government and the United Nations have carried out a 
process of mutually reinforcing ritualism designed to obscure a lack of engagement 
with, or capacity to carry out, police reform and reform of the security sector. I 
describe how three of Merton's identified responses to a normative order-ritualism, 
rebellion, and retreatism-are used in particular combination by actors in Timor-
Leste' s police reform. Although the agendas of the government and the United 
Nations differed they had congruent interests in the enactment of a police reform 
ritual, sustained by believable fictions. 
Timor-Leste's authorities are mostly keen for international forces to leave, as 
evidenced by the rebellious stances they have adopted and criticisms they have 
leveled in reaction to an international presence. Their resistance was tempered, 
however, by the fact that Timor-Leste needs continued access to the material 
resources that accompany international intervention and that its leaders wish their 
nation to be considered a successful rather than failed state. Timorese leaders have 
exhibited great ambivalence toward the notion of impartial and accountable state 
institutions, evidenced by the ongoing personalized exercise of power in 
contravention of Timor-Leste's constitution and laws. The United Nations was 
mindful of the need to address its own shortcomings in building the PNTL the first 
time and was, consequently, highly focused on producing a police-reform success 
story. By using the rhetoric of local ownership and engaging in retreatism, the 
United Nations sought to absolve itself of failure to reform the PNTL. 
The consequences of such an enactment of regulatory ritualism are serious. All 
poorly executed reform attempts leave legacies of suspicion and disengagement that 
are difficult to undo. The ritualism has served to institutionalize fragility further in 
an already weak sector. Meanwhile, extensive resources that could have been used in 
more creative ways to improve public safety and security have been misallocated. 
INFORMAL SECURITY GROUPS AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
James Scambary 
INTRODUCTION 
In the years since the intense conflict of 2006-07, there has been a widespread 
hope that the death of Alfredo Reinado, 1 the demobilization of the Petitioners, and a 
change in government would bring an end to an almost Wild West era of violence 
and vigilantism in Timor-Leste. That hope is now looking increasingly fragile. In 
May 2010, an unidentified armed group exchanged fire with a unit of the national 
police in the mountainous western district of Ermera. After a comparative lull in the 
eighteen months following the joint attacks on the president and the prime minister 
in February 2008, there was also a marked rise in informal security-group-related 
violence nationally, particularly among martial arts groups, peaking in the period 
just before Christmas 2011. While such levels of conflict could in no way be 
compared with the intensity of 2006 and 2007, this renewed violence serves to 
demonstrate the troubling persistence of informal-security-group conflict in Timor-
Leste today. 
Informal security groups have long been part of Timor's cultural and political 
landscape, dating back to the Portuguese era. There are more than three hundred of 
these groups in contemporary Timor-Leste, which include rural-based millenarian 
groups, protest movements and veterans groups; mass-scale, national martial arts 
groups; political-front groups; and street-corner gangs. Predominantly male, these 
groups span a wide range of ages and often transcend ethnolinguistic boundaries. 
Their hybrid nature and often overlapping memberships with other groups makes 
categorization both difficult and contentious.2 
Most of these groups were formed under the Indonesian occupation and it 
would be expected that with independence these groups would have largely 
1 Major Alfredo Reinado deserted the F-FDTL in May, 2006 to lead a paramilitary group 
comprising former police, soldiers and civilians opposed to the FRETILIN government. 
Although the precise circumstances of Reinado's death are still unclear, he was killed during 
an attack in February 2008 while at the residence of the then-president, Jose Ramos Horta. 
2 James Scambary, "Groups, Gangs, and Armed Violence in East Timor," Issue Brief No. 2, 
Geneva Small Arms Survey, April 2009, available at www.timor-leste-violence. 
org/pdfs/Timor-Leste-Violence-IB2-ENGLISH.pdf, accessed June 6, 2012. 
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disbanded. Unfortunately, past experience in other post-conflict states, like South 
Africa, Guatemala, and Angola, has proved that this is rarely the case. In Timor-
Leste, a series of political and social upheavals in the post-independence period has 
served to reopen old wounds (or created new ones) and to ensure that these groups 
have both reemerged and remobilized. 
The diversity and endurance of these groups in contemporary Timor-Leste also 
reflects the challenges faced by wider East Timorese society in adapting to a number 
of rapid transitions from war to peace, dictatorship to parliamentary democracy, and 
perhaps tradition to modernity, among many other changes. These transitions are 
reflected in the transformation of some of these groups, as they have changed their 
structure, objectives, and tactics to suit a changing political and social landscape. 
These groups have often been reductively portrayed as products of poverty, 
social disintegration, or a weak state, but they are much more complex than that. 
Each has its own unique provenance, and each plays an integral role within East 
Timorese society, history, and politics. Renewed activism by these groups, or 
intensified conflict among them, has always occurred at critical junctures in East 
Timor's post-independence history. It is therefore vital to understand the nature and 
origins of these groups, as they can serve as important barometers of popular 
discontent and social tensions. Focusing on the nationally based and overtly 
politicized informal-security groups, this chapter will examine the origin and nature 
of these groups, their impact on the independence-era political landscape, and their 
interactions with contemporary political parties in Timor-Leste. 
THE VETERANS GROUPS 
The first of the post-independence upheavals was the demobilization of the old 
resistance army, the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor 
(FALINTIL), and the creation of the new national army (F-FDTL) and the national 
police force (PNTL). On February 1, 2001, FALINTIL was officially disbanded and 
the F-FDTL was born. About 650 FALINTIL members were selected to constitute the 
first battalion of the F-FDTL, while the remaining 1,300 were demobilized under the 
FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Programme (FRAP).3 
Inevitably, there were many genuine applicants to this program who missed out 
and who felt that the process was neither fair nor transparent. By its own admission, 
FRAP did not adequately distinguish between actual FALINTIL veterans, numbering 
around thirteen hundred-from FALINTIL/OPS (operations), FALINTIL FBA 
(Forcas Bases De Apoio or support)-and clandestine resistance operatives 
numbering around eighteen thousand.4 There were many who served bravely in the 
clandestine resistance and saw their schooling and family life destroyed, and who 
hoped for some reward or recognition for their sacrifice through employment in the 
new national army. In addition to this perceived affront, in a devastated, war-torn 
economy, secure state-sector employment was a highly contested resource. 
3 Edward Rees, "Under Pressure FALINTIL-Forc;;as De Defesa De Timor Leste: Three Decades 
of Defence Force Development in Timar Leste, 1975-2004" (Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces [DCAF] Working Paper, No. 139, Geneva, 2004). 
4 World Bank, "FALINTIL Re-Insertion Assistance Program Evaluation" (Dili, 2002), internal 
document. 
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Many of those who were not selected for F-FDTL then turned their attention to 
being recruited into the new police force, only to be rebuffed again. Frustration 
turned to anger with the revelation that around three hundred former police under 
the Indonesian regime had secured posts, and the stage was set for confrontation, 
which was not long in coming. In response, small autonomous groups of veterans1 
sometimes referred to as "isolados," led by former guerrilla leaders, began to appear 
in remote areas of the rural districts, confronting and sometimes attacking the police. 
Many of these groups were loosely connected under the umbrella of the Association 
of Ex-Combatants 1975 (AC75), under the leadership of Rogerio Lobato (later to 
become FRETILIN Minister for the Interior).5 
CPD-RDTL 
In addition to the veterans' groups, there were also a number of larger, more 
organized groups, formed during the resistance period, that mobilized this 
disaffection into substantial national movements. The most militant, and arguably 
the largest of these groups, was the Council for the Defence of the Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL). Like many of the groups to emerge in this 
turbulent period, the CPD-RDTL had a long history. The CPD-RDTL claims their 
group was founded back in 1974 at the birth of the Asosiasaun Social Democratica 
Timorense (ASDT)6• Others claim it was more recent, around the time of the May 5, 
1999, accord between Indonesia and Portugal to hold a referendum in East Timor.7 
The group's stronghold is the Viqueque area (the natal region of two of its founders, 
Cristiano Da Costa and Olo-Gari Asswain), and parts of the neighboring Baucau 
district, but members of the group can be found throughout the country1 especially 
in the border regions of Bobonaro and Cova Lima districts in the west. The CPD-
RDTL general coordinator, Antonio Da Costa (aka Ai Tahan Matak), 8 claims that the 
group has about fifty-two branches nationally, is represented in all thirteen districts, 
and has around five hundred members.9 
The CPD-RDTL's main platform is that the original declaration of independence 
of November 28, 1975, and the original Constitution be reinstated. Given that its 
members feel that the original independence declaration still stands, they also claim 
that UNTAET's mandate to implement independence was illegitimate, as Timor was 
already independent. They also claim that the CPD-RDTL is the only true umbrella 
body for all the different parties and resistance groups, not FRETILIN or the CNRT. 
They maintain that FRETILIN itself is merely a party and that the CPD-RDTL is the 
real FRETILIN movement. They consistently use the national flag and other 
FRETILIN emblems as their own, drawing denunciation from FRETILIN leaders and 
harassment from FRETILIN supporters.10 
5 Dionysio Babo Soares, "Branching from the Trunk: East Timorese Perceptions of Nationalism 
in Transition" (PhD dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra, 2003), p. 295. 
6 Interview with CPD-RDTL Coordinator Antonio Da Costa, Ai Tahan Matak, Dili, November 
16, 2006. 
7 Babo Soares, "Branching from the Trunk," p. 175. 
8 Referred to hereinafter as Ai Tahan Matak to avoid confusion with Cristiano Da Costa. 
9 Interview with Ai Tahan Matak. 
10 Baba Soares, "Branching from the Trunk," p. 167. 
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Although CPD-RDTL may officially have been founded around the time of the 
May 5 accord, it has its historical roots in what is often referred to as the "Hudi Laran 
tragedy." In May 1977, FRETILIN changed from a nationalist movement into a left-
wing movement, the Marxist-Leninist Front (MLF), resulting in acrimonious 
divisions within FRETILIN. When, at a meeting of the FRETILIN Central Committee 
(CCF) in Hudi Laran, Manatuto District, in 1984, the MLF changed its name to the 
Conselho Revolucionario da Resistencia Nacional (CRRN), a new division appeared. 
One faction in favor of the change, which included Xanana Gusmao, opposed 
another led by Reinaldo Freitas Belo (aka Kilik Wae Gae), then FALINTIL chief of 
staff, and Commander Paulino Gama (aka Mauk Moruk). Belo and Gama were 
dismissed from their positions at the conference.11 
Belo and some of his friends then disappeared. Xanana' s opponents have 
accused his faction of having killed them, although it is equally possible they were 
killed by Indonesian forces. Gama, who became CPD-RDTL vice president, escaped 
to the Netherlands and Olo-Gari Asswain, CPD-RDTL leader and a member of the 
opposing faction, was later captured by the Indonesians. While circumstances of the 
actual event remain obscure, this incident has certainly bred a deep antipathy among 
the CPD-RDTL to the FRETILIN leadership and Xanana.12 
The CPD-RDTL's propensity for violence is probably exaggerated. During the 
period 2000-01, serious clashes erupted among CPD-RDTL and FRETILIN 
supporters when the CPD-RDTL tried to raise the flag in a number of districts, but 
such violence has generally occurred only on a sporadic and limited basis since 2001. 
Nonetheless, the CPD-RDTL effectively marshaled the anger of disaffected ex-
guerrillas over their exclusion from the new defense forces, and their mass public 
rallies drew thousands of supporters. This group had such a following that, for at 
least three years, CPD-RDTL celebrations of national holidays were better attended 
than government celebrations. A CPD-RDTL-organized independence rally on 
November 28, 2002, for example, attracted three thousand supporters, humiliating 
the prime minister at the official ceremony, which only about three hundred people 
attended.13 
Press reports and public statements by then Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato 
invariably blamed the CPD-RDTL for incidents that were later proved to be the work 
of other groups. Having earlier supported the CPD-RDTL and other such groups, the 
relationship soured once he became minister; there is a widespread belief that the rift 
arose from a conflict over shares of illegal logging proceeds, in which Lobato was 
widely believed to be heavily involved. One such incident was the Molotov cocktail 
attack on a Baucau police station on November 12, 2005. Initially blamed on the 
CPD-RDTL, members of a martial arts group were later found to be the 
perpetrators.14 The coordinator of CPD-RDTL, Ai Tahan Matak has been a victim of a 
number of attacks, including one in Venilale on December 7, 2000, in which CPD-
RDTL members were attacked by FRETILIN supporters. Ai Tahan Matak was 
stabbed in the melee and spent several weeks in a hospital.15 CPD-RDTL members 
11 Ibid., p. 183. 
12 Ibid., p. 186. 
13 Dennis Shoesmith, "Timor-Leste: Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System," Asian 
Survey XLIII,2 (March/ April, 2003): 245. 
14 Timar Sun, "Baucau Case: Lobato Condemnation of New Group," November 14-20, 2005. 
15 Baba Soares, "Branching from the Trunk," p. 195. 
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were also attacked in Vemasse on June 21, 2002, by a group paradoxically named 
Youth Against Violence.16 Ai Tahan Matak has consistently alleged arbitrary police 
violence toward his group in the Viqueque district, a claim backed up by other 
sources.17 The Dili riots of December 4, 2002, have sometimes been blamed on CPD-
RDTL, following the group's earlier Independence Day rally on November 28. 18 The 
group Colimau 2000 and others have made highly credible claims that the CPD-
RDTL has attempted to force people to join or donate to its group. 
Currently, the CPD-RDTL hardly seems to constitute a threat. Largely driven 
underground by intimidation and harassment, it has also been overtaken by events. 
It has been thirteen years since the referendum, and UNTAET has finished its 
mandate; most of the trappings of the original independence declaration have been 
assumed, including the celebration of November 28 as Independence Day. Once 
CPD-RDTL could attract thousands to parades and demonstrations. By comparison, 
its demonstrations in Dili in the 2010 to 2012 period rarely attracted more than about 
a hundred people at most. The reduction in their militancy can partly be attributed to 
one of the group's founders and a driving force, Cristiano Da Costa, joining 
UNDERTIM (Unidade Nacional Democratica da Resistencia Timorense, National 
Democratic Unity of Timorese Resistance National Democratic Unity of Timorese 
Resistance), the new party set up by Cornelio Gama (aka L-7), which is part of the 
AMP coalition government. Ai Tahan Matak claims Da Costa still supports CPD-
RDTL' s ideals, but his absence has undoubtedly curbed the CPD-RDTL's militancy. 
While being largely dormant during the 2006-08 period, the CPD-RDTL 
reappeared in 2009 with a number of small public demonstrations in Dili and small 
bands of its members erecting road blocks in Bobonaro district. According to one 
source, a group of CPD-RDTL members still occupy a former FALINTIL 
encampment in a remote area of Bobonaro.19 In the first half of 2010, a joint police 
and military operation was carried out against the CPD-RDTL in the western border 
region, where members have been accused of being ninjas and responsible for two 
murders, although this was never proved.20 This operation bears a remarkable 
resemblance to persecution of the group under the Lobato regime, when they were 
inevitably blamed for any social unrest and harassed and hunted down by police. 
Still, the CPD-RDTL continues to cleave to the same issues, especially that it is 
the true FRETILIN and resistance umbrella body and that Timor is not yet ready for 
a multiparty electoral system. Ai Tahan Matak believes that the party system should 
in fact be closed down until Timor is ready-that Timar should first develop its 
agriculture system and all its institutions-and that an interim government of 
national unity composed of eminent people including veterans, academics, and 
16 
"Antonio Ai Tahan Matak: Youth Against Violence Threaten CPD-RDTL Members," Suara 
Timor Lorosae, June 21, 2002. 
17 
"Justice Demanded in Viqueque Case," Timar Sun, November 21-27, 2005). 
18 Shoesmith, "Divided Leadership," p. 251. 
19 Interview with RTTL District Coordinator, Dili, June 7, 2009. 
20 During the Indonesian occupation, ninjas were the black-clad masked intruders, many of 
them drawn from the criminal underworld, hired by the Indonesian military to harass and kill 
independence supporters. Nowadays, they are feared criminal gangs with reputed magical 
powers that help them evade detection or capture. 
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political leaders (in which he includes Xanana, Fransisco Amaral, and even Mario 
Carascalao) should be formed. 21 
Ai Tahan Matak also believes that the semi-presidential-style system adopted by 
Timor has contributed to the 2006 crisis through indecision and conflict between the 
president and the prime minister, which is not an isolated viewpoint.22 Dennis 
Shoesmith, for example, argues that this system has institutionalized the friction 
between Xanana and Alkatiri.23 Ai Tahan Matak says he would prefer to see a system 
by which the president has executive power. Despite this difference, he claims that 
the CPD-RDTL has warm relations with Xanana, Alkatiri, and the F-FDTL, and that 
although he rejects elections as premature and wants to see a reunification first, he 
says he still respects the institution of government.24 
Sagrada Familia 
Another group to reemerge as a consequence of dissatisfaction over the F-FDTL 
recruitment process was Sagrada Familia. Like the CPD-RDTL, Sagrada Familia has 
been portrayed as a dangerous sect-like anti-government group. Like the CPD-
RDTL, Sagrada Familia had its genesis in the Hudi Laran incident. Paulino Gama 
(aka Mauk Moruk) is the brother of Sagrada Familia's Cornelio Gama (more 
popularly known as L7, or Elle Sete). A junior FALINTIL commander at the time, 
Elle Sete was briefly ousted from F ALINTIL following Mauk Moruk' s fall from favor 
with the FALINTIL leadership. Despite being later reintegrated into FALINTIL, Elle 
Sete consistently clashed with FALINTIL High Command, finally breaking away in 
1985 to form an independent armed movement in the hinterland of Baucau, which 
became known as Sagrada Familia.25 
Elle Sete claims to have been given a "fita mean" (red ribbon) by the Holy Family, 
to protect him from danger. All Sagrada Familia members wear this, although some 
are also said to wear amulets containing a potion that gives them magic powers. 
Although the group claims to have members all over Timor-Leste, the bulk of its 
support is in Elle Sete's birthplace of Laga, in the Baucau district. 
After the arrival of international peacekeeping forces in September 1999, some 
1,000to1,300 FALINTIL forces, by agreement with FALINTIL High Command, were 
confined to a cantonment in Aileu district.26 Angered by his exclusion from the new 
national army, and its dominance by Xanana and Taur Matan Ruak loyalists, Elle 
Sete left the cantonment in February 2001. Like his brother Mauk Moruk in exile, Elle 
Sete expressed his resentment of the F ALINTIL High Command by calling for the 
investigation into the wartime activities of Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, Chief 
of Staff Colonel Lere Anan Timor, and First Battalion Commander Lieutenant 
Colonel Falur Rate Laek.27 
21 Interview with CPD-RDTL coordinator, Antonio Da Costa, Dili, November 16, 2006. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Shoesmith, "Divided Leadership," p. 250. 
24 Interview with Ai Tahan Matak. 
25 Shoesmith, "Divided Leadership," p. 248 
26 Rees, "Under Pressure FALINTIL," p. 45. 
27 Ibid., p. 42. 
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From his power base in Laga, Baucau, beginning in August 2000, Elle Sete 
organized a series of mass demonstrations and, like the CPD-RDTL, his group 
became a focal point for many disaffected veterans. Recognizing the political 
influence wielded by Sagrada Familia (at least in its power base in Baucau), 
FRETILIN courted its members in the run-up to the October 2001 general election. A 
number of younger Sagrada Familia activists were elected to the FRETILIN Central 
Committee in August 2001, one of whom was appointed national security adviser to 
the chief minister. 28 
It was, however, the minister of the interior, Rogerio Lobato, who would actually 
win their allegiance. Lobato was at the time also president of one of the main 
veterans associations, the Association of Ex-Combatants 1975, and a spokesperson 
for disaffected veterans.29 Lobato moved to appoint Cornelio Gama as his 
department's security adviser in July 2002, in an attempt perhaps to counterbalance 
Xanana FALINTIL loyalists and at the same time strengthen his own faction within 
FRETILIN against Alkatiri.30 It was probably this alliance that prompted charges of 
Sagrada Familia involvement in the December 4 Dili riots that targeted Alkatiri 
properties. 
Sagrada Familia members then became involved in a series of clashes, most 
notoriously, an attack on a Baucau police station in November 2002, where Elle Sete 
himself was sighted. Sagrada Familia members were also involved in a series of Dili 
street brawls-although these could have been over private matters or part of 
ongoing east-west tensions. In addition to the security concerns raised by such 
aggressive behavior, Sagrada Familia was identified as an eastern group, and it has 
been argued that this helped spark the rise of other geographically based "security 
groups" in reaction, especially those based around former guerilla leaders in the 
west.31 
Little has been heard of Sagrada Familia since 2004. According to most accounts, 
it was not involved in the 2006-07 violence crisis, at least not as an organization, 
although many people expressed fear that Sagrada Familia's "Laga boys" would one 
day be unleashed. However, there were renewed tensions between the veterans and 
the PNTL after the confiscation of Elle Sete's truck in July 2010, on suspicion of 
smuggling tires from Indonesia.32 
This decrease in militancy could be partly attributed to the creation by 
presidential decree, in response to growing agitation and debate around the veterans 
issue, of three commissions-the Commission for the Issues of Former Combatants 
(CAAC) in 2002 and, later, the Commission for the Issues of Veterans of FALINTIL 
(CA VF) and the Commission on Cadres of the Resistance, both in 2004-and 
associated nationwide public discussions around the issue.33 These initiatives, plus a 
law passed in 2006 to award pensions to veterans, undoubtedly took a lot of the heat 
out of the ex-combatants question. 
Another reason for the decreased militancy is that Sagrada Familia appears to 
have opted for a more peaceful, political approach. In June 2005, Sagrada Familia set 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p. 47. 
30 Shoesmith, "Divided Leadership," p. 249. 
31 Baba Soares, "Branching from the Trunk," p. 297. 
32 
"L-7 Calls on PNTL to Explain Motive of Seizing His Car," Timar Post, July 13, 2010. 
33 World Bank, "FALINTIL Re-Insertion Assistance Program Evaluation." 
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up a political party, UNDERTIM. Among the founders are former guerrilla leaders 
Samba Sembilan and Renan Selak and, from the CPD-RDTL, Cristiano Da Costa. 
UNDERTIM could almost be described as a veterans' party, although UNDERTIM 
spokesperson Andre da Costa Belo argues that UNDERTIM' s mission is to represent 
the districts' needs, which he felt had been ignored by the overcentralization of the 
FRETILIN government. 34 
Da Costa Belo is keen to dismiss the notion that UNDERTIM was merely 
Sagrada Familia in another guise, saying Sagrada Familia, although it still exists, is 
just a resistance movement, implying it is a thing of the past.35 Despite its historical 
antipathy to Xanana, however, UNDERTIM is part of the current AMP government 
coalition, although the relationship has not always been harmonious. 
Colimau 2000 
While the overall security climate in the period 1999 to early 2006 was relatively 
stable, there were numerous small security incidents. The arrival of families trickling 
back from West Timor, for example, proved a common trigger for communal 
conflict: In many cases, the land of returnees had been assumed by other families, 
who often justified this as "compensation" for alleged involvement in militia 
activities or pro-autonomy allegiances. 36 There were also numerous cases of small 
bands of former militia crossing the border to harass border communities, frequently 
in reprisal, over just such land disputes. 
One such case was the Atsabe incident of January 4, 2003. On that night, armed 
groups simultaneously attacked Tiarlelo and Laubuno villages in the Atsabe area of 
Ermera district, leaving seven people dead. The F-FDTL was called in, in a policing 
role (and in contravention of their constitutional mandate), and apprehended fifty-
nine people, including some children, with very little investigation and without 
warrant, and handed them over to the police. As it turned out, nearly all of the adults 
arrested were members of Colimau 2000. Twenty-eight out of the thirty-one 
presented in court were later freed for lack of evidence.37 
There is considerable evidence that militia were responsible for these killings. 
One news report even claimed it was a coordinated militia attack planned by rogue 
members of the Indonesian Army, the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia). This claim 
is supported by the group's use of automatic weapons and the discovery 
immediately after the incident of bullet casings from Indonesian-issue SKS rifles. 38 
Another source claimed the assailants were wearing TNI uniforms (without 
insignia). The Atsabe incident was followed by an attack on a bus on February 24, 
involving a smaller group of armed men, with another group attacking a PKF patrol 
34 Interview with Andre da Costa Belo, Dili, November 30, 2006. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Daniel Fitzpatrick, "Mediating Land Conflict in East Timor," in the report Making Land Work, 
vol. 2 (Canberra: Australian National University, USAID, 2008). 
37 Jill Jolliffe, "Threatened Timorese Town Seeks Troops," Sydney Morning Herald, February 1, 
2003, available at www.smh.eom.au/ articles/2003/01/31/1043804520387.html, accessed June 
11, 2012. 
38 Ibid. 
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on February 27, 2003. There were numerous (though unofficial) reports of similar 
incidents in Bobonaro and Cova Lima districts. 39 
Nonetheless, the Atsabe incident became etched in public memory as the work of 
Colimau 2000, and has made it an object of fear and mystery ever since-a mystique 
compounded by its reputation for syncretic ritualism. This incident also, however, 
created a bitter grudge among Colimau 2000 members against both the F-FDTL and 
FRETILIN. The grudge was to find its outlet in the April 2006 riots, where Colimau 
2000 members were prominent in the anti-government demonstrations and riots that 
ensued. Many of the Petitioners, including their leaders Gastao Salsinha, are said to 
be Colimau members.40 
Except for two journal articles, by Andrea Molnar and Douglas Kammen,41 there 
is very little historical information on this group beyond their own account. 
According to Kammen, Colimau 2000 (Colimau is a compound abbreviation of 
Comando Libertasaun Maubere) had its origins in a religious group called Sagrada 
do Cora<;ao de Jesus (Sacred Heart of Jesus). The group was formed in the mid-1980s 
by Martinho Vidal, in the Hatu Builico area of Ainaro district.42 According to 
anthropologist Mathew Libbis doing field work in the Manufahi area, Colimau is the 
name of a Bunak village in Bobonaro. In Kammen' s account, it was a name given to 
the clandestine resistance by the Bobonaro District Military Command. The number 
2000 is derived from a dream Martinho had that Indonesian occupation would end 
in the year 2000. According to Kammen' s account, while the founding members 
became inactive, a new generation arose in 2000.43 This new generation is led by 
Osorio Mau Lequi, Gabriel Fernandez, and Bruno da Costa Magalhaes, who attained 
a master's degree in theology in Indonesia.44 
Colimau 2000's followers have been characterized as poor, illiterate peasants 
from rural areas and some ex-guerrillas. Colimau has strongest local support in its 
power base around the Kemak suco of Leimea Kraik in Hatolia, in the district of 
Ermera, Gabriel Fernandez's natal area. It also has branches in the neighboring 
district of Bobonaro, where Mau Lequi was born, and in Turiscai, Manufahi district, 
where Magalhaes was born, but maintains a presence throughout all the western 
districts. Although itself a distinct group, Colimau 2000 also claims to have members 
throughout the other clandestine groups such as Seven-Seven, Five Five, Bua Malus, 
and ORSNACO (which claims to be an umbrella organization for these groups). 
While Colimau 2000 is still the main organization, since independence it has 
formed a number of offshoots. In 2003, according to Mau Lequi, after a violent clash 
with the martial arts group PSHT (Persaudaraan Setia Hati Terate, Faithful Fraternity 
of the Lotus) in Maliana, Colimau decided it needed to enter the political 
mainstream, to launch itself as a political movement instead of a clandestine group.45 
39 Damien Kingsbury, "The Political Economy of Cross-Border Relations: The TNI and East 
Timar," South East Asia Research 11,3 (2003): 284. 
40 Interview with Colimau 2000 leader, Osorio Mau Lequi, Dili, December 1, 2006. 
41 Andrea Molnar, "An Anthropological Study of Atsabe Perceptions of Colimau 2000," 
Anthropos 99 (2004): 365-79; Douglas Kammen, "Fragments of Utopia: Popular Yearnings in 
East Timar," journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40,2 (June 2009): 385-408. 
42 Kammen, "Fragments of Utopia," p. 400. 
43 Ibid., pp. 400-402. 
44 Interview with Colimau 2000 leader, Osorio Mau Lequi, Dili, December 1, 2006. 
45 Ibid. 
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It formed the Colimau Communication Forum in 2003 and then registered its party, 
the Democratic Party of the Republic of Timar (PDRT), in September 2004. Gabriel 
Fernandez, listed by Colimau as its coordinator for the Ermera and Bobonaro 
regions, is the PORT president.46 
In 2006, Colimau 2000 launched the Movement for National Unity (MUN, 
Movimento Unidade Nasional-MUN),47 which Mau Lequi describes as a sort of 
promotional vehicle for Colimau's principles of justice, unity, democracy, and 
peaceful change through elections. The main demand of the MUN is that the national 
flag be changed as, according to the MUN, it should not be the flag of FRETILIN, a 
political party, but should promote recognition of all political parties involved in the 
independence movement, the Church, and East Timorese cultural emblems.48 
Colimau 2000 has also established an NGO, Maromun, the goals of which are to 
"increase agricultural production through capacity building, to improve water and 
sanitation and implement a plantation based logging industry ."49 Mau Lequi, who 
has previously worked for a number of international aid agencies, is the prime 
author of this initiative.50 
Colimau 2000 has been variously described as a millenarian movement and an 
animist cult. One source of this reputation for animism, is the belief of some of its 
members that fallen independence fighters, in particular slain resistance leader 
Nicolau Lobato, will be reborn to lead them. One of Colimau' s leaders, Bruno 
Magalhaes, espouses such a view, claiming that in 1982 Xanana lied to Bishop Belo 
that Nicolau Lobato was dead. According to Magalhaes, Lobato was seen as a 
communist, so if the United States thought he was dead, it would take their planes 
back and would support Timor-Leste in the post-independence period. According to 
Magalhaes, Nicolau Lobato is hiding in a secret mountain city, bigger than Dili, with 
an international airport, waiting, along with representatives from MIS, the CIA, and 
Mossad, until the time is right for his reemergence. Magalhaes also claims that 
people deliberately created the 2006 crisis to "bring back the Australians" so as to 
create greater political freedom and prosperity.51 
Another of Magalhaes's claims is that Colimau ruled all Timor until it lost power 
to the Portuguese in 1512. He claims to still have some of the sacred objects from this 
time and that they have been moved from one place to another for safety. Now 
Colimau wants to bring them to Dili, build an uma adat (house of culture) to store 
them, and show people the greatness of the "people of Maubere." Magalhaes 
maintains that the west of Timar Leste is the center of the world and all the problems 
of the world can be solved there.52 
46 
"Democratic Party of the Republic of Timor (PDRT) Political Manual," Dili, 2004 (limited 
printing). 
47 The Movement for National Unity is unrelated to the Movement for Justice and National 
Unity (MUNJ). 
48 Interview with Osorio Mau Lequi. 
49 
"PDRT Political Manual," p. 96. 
50 One Colimau 2000 member, Domingos Gomes, has also written and self-published a cultural 
and political history of East Timor; see "Budaya Dan Tradisi: Dale Timar Leste" (Culture and 
Traditions of Timor-Leste), limited printing. 
51 Interview with Dr. Magalhaes, conducted together with interviewer Douglas Kammen, Dili, 
November 2006. 
52 Ibid. 
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This last belief is a central tenet of Mambai cosmology; the Mambai believe Mt. 
Tatamailau, in Ainaro, is at the center of the world, and all other countries are 
founded by descendents of the original uma lulik (sacred house) built there.53 The 
belief in the dead coming back to life is a common feature of Melanesian millenarian 
or revitalization movements, as is a belief in restoring lost traditions from an 
imagined golden era and an attempt to effect the return of perceived former 
benefactors, in this case, the UNTAET Administration.54 Certainly, Colimau 2000 
would not be the first such movement. As Andrea Molnar points out, there have 
been three other significant movements in Timor Leste since the end of the 
nineteenth century taking the form of religious sects, and these, too, were primarily 
political movements against dominant authority.55 
Osorio Mau Lequi, however, dismisses the idea that Lobato or any other dead 
resistance heroes will come back to life. Mau Lequi distinguishes between the old 
animist Colimau 2000 by referring to it as the "Old Testament Group" and the new 
Colimau 2000 as the "New Testament Group." He says that the new, "official" 
Colimau 2000 members wear crucifixes, that they support the Roman Catholic 
Church, and that they no longer practice their ancestors' syncretic ritual belief 
systems. They now call for "peace, love, and unity." According to Mau Lequi, 
FRETILIN's policies take Timor back to its past, to 1975 and disunity, and are thus 
also "Old Testament." 56 This belief in breaking with past tradition to formulate a new 
social order is also an aspect of millenarian belief, although this label is too reductive 
for a movement as diverse as Colimau 2000. 
Colimau is often accused by its detractors of links to former militia. 
Anthropologist Andrea Molnar conducted fieldwork on Colimau in Atsabe, in 2002 
and 2003. She remarks that the main composition of Colimau 2000 in Atsabe is 
former resistance fighters. She believes there are a number of reasons for this 
identification of Colimau with militia. One reason is that members of criminal or 
former militia may use Colimau's name when involved in extortion and violence. 
Another is that Colimau might have hired former militia from time to time to carry 
out petty extortion, in the same way as the Indonesians did and local politicians 
sometimes do during elections. She argues that people knew that Colimau 2000 
members were innocent of the charges, but nevertheless identified Colimau 
followers to the army to be rid of Colimau's petty theft and extortion activities. 
According to Molnar, many other attacks are blamed on Colimau, when, in fact, they 
are really just family disputes or payback enacted on returning former militia or their 
families. 57 
Molnar also argues that Colimau is not homogenous, that in Atsabe it is only 
loosely organized at the local level. According to Molnar, fringe elements attach 
themselves to Colimau, including criminals and disaffected former guerrillas; and it 
is mainly these groups that carry out violent acts in Colimau's name.58 Colimau is 
53 Elizabeth Traube, Cosmology and Social Life; Ritual Exchange among the Mambai of East Timor 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
54 Roger Keesing, Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective (New York, NY: Holt, 
Rhinehart and Wilson, 1981). 
55 Molnar, /1 Atsabe Perceptions," p. 371. 
56 Interview with Osorio Mau Lequi. 
57 Molnar, /1 Ats a be Perceptions," p. 37 4. 
58 Ibid., p. 376. 
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also said to engage in the issuing of identification cards1 forcing people to join and 
pay a membership fee. While this does not excuse Colimau1 it is not the only group 
to indulge in this behavior, and this was a standard tactic of the major political 
parties as far back as 1975.59 
Osorio Mau Lequi himself is described in the 2006 UN Commission of Inquiry 
(COI) Report as having made inflammatory anti-government and anti-eastern 
speeches on April 28 that year, implying some responsibility for the ensuing 
violence.60 Mau Lequi disputes this, maintaining that he only stated the Petitioners' 
case alleging discrimination. He further claims that he wanted to be on the list of 
those recommended by the COI report for investigation or prosecution, so that he 
could then argue his case in court.61 
Colimau 2000's involvement in that protest was as part of a larger anti-
government movement known as the National Front for Justice and Peace (FNJP), 
which later became the Movement for Justice and National Unity (MUNJ), led by 
Vital Dos Santos. Dos Santos became a Democratic Party (PD) member of parliament 
in the 2007 election. The FNJP split after then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri stepped 
down, with one faction pushing for the collapse of the government and the other 
faction wanting to give the interim prime minister, Ramos-Horta, a chance and 
awaiting the outcome of democratic elections. Thus, when the FNJP led a pro-
Alfredo protest outside the International Forces Detention Centre in Caicoli, which 
turned violent on July 27, 2006, Colimau 2000 members camped close by in 
Matadouro remained uninvolved. As a sign of Colimau 2000's disaffection with that 
movement and the involvement of opposition parties and, perhaps, of his own 
mercurial nature, Mau Lequi endorsed FRETILIN' s claim to government in the 
August 2007 elections. 62 
Colimau, however, then became involved in a number of subsequent violent 
incidents. On November 15, 2006, fighting between Colimau and the martial arts 
group PSHT killed four people in Estado, in the Atsabe subdistrict of Ermera, 
resulting in a conflict that rapidly spread from village to village before flowing to 
Bobonaro and Cova Lima districts, leading to the deaths of seven people. 63 
Molnar argues that tension between Colimau' s stronghold of Leimea Kraik and 
neighboring sucos such as Estado has been simmering since Portuguese times, due to 
historic antagonisms between the former kingdoms of Tiar Lelo and Lemia. 
According to Molnar, various attacks attributed to Colimau 2000 have been against 
villages aligned with the former kingdom of Tiar Lela and its allies, which she claims 
usurped the kingdom of Lemia and its lands when the Portuguese apportioned parts 
of Atsabe, Ermera, into the new district of Ainaro. The Lemia region, along with the 
Boboe region, has traditionally been the heartland of Colimau. Molnar claims that 
those aligned with the Tiar Lelo ruling house have also received the highest 
proportion of jobs in the local administration and the local police force, most of the 
productive farming land, and the biggest coffee plantations. Molnar believes, 
59 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CA VR), The History of the Conflict, Part Three, Dili, 
2005, p. 29. 
60 UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) for Timor-Leste, 2006, Geneva, p. 23. 
61 Interview with Osorio Mau Lequi. 
62 Jamal Nacional Didrio, Dili, June 6, 2010. 
63 
"Kolimau 2000 Group Attacks Martial Arts Group," Suara Timar Lorosa'e, from UNMIT 
Media Monitoring Service, November 17, 2006. 
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therefore, that the Atsabe conflict is to some degree a power struggle for authority 
and economic advantage.64 
It seems plausible that this conflict has been replicated in contemporary divisions 
in Dili. One resident of Bebonuk, a site of constant tensions and intense fighting in 
2007 between Seven-Seven65 and PSHT, claims that conflict between the two groups 
started when his own father was killed in an ambush by PSHT in Lemia Kraik, in 
November 2006, then spread to Dili. According to that resident, his family belonged 
to the vanquished family and the opposing family still enjoyed superior social 
standing and privileges.66 
Whether this historical tension has simply been reproduced in a contemporary 
division between Colimau 2000 and PSHT warrants further study. A number of 
sources have suggested that the conflict between these two groups that began in 
Estado village was actually a land dispute between two extended families over a 
coffee plantation. There is certainly substantial evidence to suggest that purely local 
communal disputes, sometimes over a century old, often assume the form of a 
political conflict when rival communities appropriate the names of rival political 
parties or martial arts groups to further their cause, or as security against attack. For 
example, as Molnar points out, the most feared Atsabe militia leaders came from 
villages and houses that had historically challenged the authority of the Atsabe king 
or had some grievance with the ruling families. This suggests that in some cases 
residual communal antipathies or class antagonism are as much, or more, a 
motivation in militia violence than any strongly held political belief.67 
According to press reports, however, in an incident in Maubisse on November 
20, 2006, Colimau 2000 members actually fought each other, which resulted in one 
death and a number of injuries.68 Unconfirmed news reports attributed the clash to 
Colimau 2000 trying to get residents to join its group. One source claimed that this 
was due to antagonism between Julio Metamalik, a Colimau founding member, and 
the faction led by Mau Lequi.69 Mau Lequi himself claims that this region is not 
under the control of his central organization but, rather, under a faction of Colimau 
2000. Mau Lequi contends that there is another faction led by Ameu van Damme in 
Ermera that he can't control, and that these groups, including small splinter groups 
in Atabae, Bobonaro, Same, and Ainaro, are predominantly anti-government, 
whereas the "official" Colimau 2000 is committed to stability and peaceful change 
through the electoral process. 70 
64 Molnar, "Atsabe Perceptions," p. 373. 
65 Seven-Seven is one of a number of former clandestine groups; the other main ones are Five-
Five, Twelve-Twelve, and Bua Malus. These groups' members are distinguished by a series of 
scars on their arms corresponding to the number of the group. The scars are caused by a 
potion they insert under their skin that members believe will give them magical powers. 
Seven-Seven is the only group still active, although the other networks may still be reactivated 
sometimes, as they were in 2006 violence and anti-government protests. 
66 Interview with Bebonuk resident, Dili, December 3, 2008. 
67 Molnar, "Atsabe Perceptions," p. 373. 
68 
"One Killed, Two Injured in Fresh E Timor Violence," Agence France Presse, November 22, 
2006. 
69 Interview with UN Political Affairs, January 21, 2008. Individuals requested anonymity. 
70 Interview with Osorio Mau Lequi. 
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Another group that incorporates elements of all these groups and associated 
disaffected clandestine groups is ORSNACO (Organisasaun Resistencia Social 
Nacional Cooperativa). This group, formerly called the Former Combatants of the 
Orsnaco Base (ACBO), was a movement of former FALINTIL combatants and their 
families, originally said to have about a thousand members led by former guerrilla 
leader Marcos Da Costa (aka Ruin Falur). After demobilization of FALINTIL in 2000, 
the group established itself as an agricultural cooperative in the village of Orsnaco, in 
the Turiscai subdistrict of Manufahi.71 
ORSNACO members say they used the name of the village, Orsnaco, as an 
acronym for the organization. This group also claims to include all the clandestine 
groups such as Fitar Bua Malus, Five-Five, Seven-Seven, Twelve-Twelve, and others. 
Marcos Da Costa is the local leader, but a man called Ananias da Calma (also known 
as Sanamear), one of the leaders of the Seven-Seven group, appears to be the leader 
of the clandestine groups. Like other veterans' groups, ORSNACO members were 
angry with the FRETILIN-led First Constitutional Government, especially former 
president, Xanana Gusmao, for not awarding veterans benefits for former military 
service, and felt that the government did not look after them. When Gusmao went to 
visit ORSNACO for the inauguration of its community hall in September 2003, it was 
feared that he would be attacked and even killed, but the visit proceeded without 
incident.72 
Although a USAID Conflict Assessment listed this group as a potential threat to 
national security,73 little has been heard of this group since 2003 (although there are 
occasional rumors that the ORSNACO base still remains on its original site). Given 
that the base is at least three-days walk from the nearest road, the rumors are hard to 
verify. Most of the members seem to have either left or joined other groups such as 
Colimau 2000. Nonetheless, this mountainous region, in the west of the country-
and also a stronghold for Alfredo and his followers and a number of other key 
leaders in the 2006 violence-has been a hotbed of rebellion and millenarian and of 
syncretic belief systems since Portuguese times, and is likely to produce similar 
groups in the future. The appearance of a new group in Ermera is testament to the 
volatility of this region and its tradition of rebellion. 
A host of new organizations have appeared since 2009, in both the city and rural 
areas, such as the Asociac;ao dos Combatentes no Veteranos da Luta de Libertac;ao 
Nacional (Association of Veterans and Combatants of the National Liberation 
Struggle), claiming to represent veterans and demanding benefits of some kind. 
Some have also been accused of extorting membership fees from local populations, 
much as the groups described above once did. Whether these groups will, in time, 
become more militant and violent will depend on the government's skills in 
negotiating such demands and effectiveness of the national security forces. 
71 Babo Soares, "Branching from the Trunk," p. 308. 
72 Ibid. 
73 USAID, "Timor-Leste Conflict Vulnerability Assessment," MSI Assessment Team, produced 
for USAID /East Timor and USAID Office of Conflict, 2004. 
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MARTIAL ARTS GROUPS 
While veterans' groups have largely faded from view, violence among opposing 
martial arts groups (MAGs) has continued to present substantial security challenges 
in Timor-Leste. While periodic violence has occurred between almost all informal 
security groups, conflicts among MAGS appear to be the most prevalent. Based on 
data from the Ministry of Interior, prior to the 2006 violence, between the period 
2002-04, registered cases of violence increased from seven to thirty-seven, spreading 
from four (out of thirteen) districts in 2002 to eleven districts in 2004.74 Most districts 
in East Timor continue to suffer from sporadic violence to some degree, particularly 
Dili. 
The violence continues to be prevalent in five districts: the three western 
highlands districts of Bobonaro, Ermera, and Ainaro and the eastern districts of 
Baucau and Viqueque. The figures give no indication of the seriousness of the 
clashes. A riot among martial arts groups in March 2001, for example, almost entirely 
destroyed two villages in Viqueque, 75 and in August 2004, fifty houses were burned 
down in Ainaro district. 76 On November 14, 2006, in Ermera district, local conflict 
between PSHT and Colimau 2000 claimed the lives of seven people and destroyed 
up to one hundred houses. 77 This conflict then rapidly spread from village to village 
in Ermera district, to Bobonaro and Suai districts, and then to Dili, where it sparked a 
larger conflict that was to last for over a year. 
The prime minister's office negotiated a peace agreement among the warring 
groups that lasted almost until late November 2006,78 at which time renewed conflict 
flared between the largest MAG, PSHT, and the largest of the clandestine groups, 
Seven-Seven. This conflict was to rage for most of 2007. Then, after a lull lasting some 
eighteen months, MAG conflict reemerged in both the capital, Dili, and in outlying 
rural districts. Most recently, MAG violence in 2011 claimed the lives of about a 
dozen people and the destruction of over one hundred houses, leading to an official 
government ban on MAG training in December that year. As the violence of 2006-07 
showed, MAG conflict always has the capacity to flare into a wider conflagration. 
MAGs in Timor-Leste have a mixed provenance. They are certainly not a new 
phenomenon, or a product of youth alienation or unemployment as they are often 
portrayed. Martial arts practices could have been originally inherited from China, 
which has long had its own strong MAG culture, via contact with Chinese traders or 
Malay traders influenced by Chinese martial arts traditions. Some of the names of 
contemporary East Timorese MAGs bear strong similarity to the names of Chinese 
martial arts groups or sects, such as the sixteenth-century White Lotus sect.79 There 
74 Lene Ostergaard, "Timor-Leste Youth Social Analysis Mapping and Youth Institutional 
Assessment" (Dili: World Bank, 2005). 
75 
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2001. 
76 
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77 
"Kolimau 2000 Group Attacks Martial Arts Group," UNMIT Daily Security Briefing, 
November 17, 2006. 
78 
"Martial Arts Leaders Pledge to End Gang Violence," TL Government Media Release, 
November 25, 2006, available at www.etan.org I et2006 I november I 25 I 25mrtial.htm, accessed 
June 11, 2012. 
79 Daniel Overmyer, "Alternatives: Popular Religious Sects in Chinese Society," Modern China 
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212 James Scambary 
is, however, little evidence to suggest that there were any organized groups or 
competitions until the Indonesian occupation, during which time the establishment 
of such groups became a feature of the Indonesian military's counter-insurgency 
strategy. 
In Indonesia, the practice of martial arts, or pencak silat, became increasingly 
associated with the military and nationalism, especially after the end of the Japanese 
occupation in 1945.80 The association of MAGs with the state and the military became 
most pronounced under the New Order regime of Suharto, whose family as well as 
the military were strong patrons of the Indonesian MAG national governing the 
Indonesian Pencak Silat Association. 81 
In East Timor, as in Indonesia, sport-in this instance, martial arts-was 
implicitly viewed by the New Order regime as a tool of social control.82According to 
one account, the Indonesian military began to recruit and train East Timorese youth 
into martial arts groups as early as 1975, the year Indonesia invaded East Timor.83 
The strategy, by most accounts, continued throughout the Indonesian occupation, 
complemented by an associated strategy of organizing youth sporting clubs, much as 
they had in Indonesia. 
The strategy of organizing Timorese youth into martial arts groups for the 
purposes of indoctrination is undoubtedly the main reason for the sheer size and 
variety of MAGs currently in existence in Timor-Leste. Another reason for being a 
member of one of the MAGs associated with the Indonesian military was the 
prospect of benefiting from patronage networks. Membership in a MAG was a 
pragmatic step to gain access to scholarships, jobs, and, most importantly, protection 
from the military and militias. 84 
Although dominated by two major groups, Kmanek Oan Rai Klaran (KORK, 
Wise Children of the Hinterland) and PSHT, there are some fifteen to twenty martial 
arts groups. The number of registered members is probably around twenty 
thousand, with as many as forty-five thousand unregistered members. Although 
most of the groups were established during the Indonesian period as part of larger 
Indonesian national or regional organizations, they have since become autonomous, 
local organizations. Several organizations have members in all thirteen districts, with 
branches down to the village and hamlet level. 85 
There is considerable demographic variation in martial arts groups. While the 
bulk of MAG members would certainly be young, unemployed males, membership 
appears to transcend age, gender, and class boundaries. High-ranking leaders are 
often highly educated and employed in senior positions in government (some are 
ministers) and international NGOs, including UN agencies. Group members can also 
be found throughout civil society organizations, including human rights and 
conflict-resolution NGOs. Many of their members can be found on rosters for 
security companies, the police force, and the army, as well. 
80 Ian Wilson, "Continuity and Change: The Changing Contours of Organized Violence in 
Post-New Order Indonesia," Critical Asian Studies 38,2 (2006): 204. 
81 Ibid., p. 212. 
82 Ibid., p. 213. 
83 Interview with former clandestine resistance leader, Dili, May 23, 2010. 
84 Interview with senior PNTL member, Dili, January 23, 2008. 
85 Ostergaard, "Timor-Leste Youth Social Analysis Mapping," p. 41. 
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For young, unemployed men, especially migrants new to a city, martial arts 
groups provide a welcome source of structure in the absence of family support, 
protection, sport, and companionship. Many people also say that being a member of 
a group is part of Timorese male identity, which may explain these groups' broader 
and continuing popularity. As a consequence, martial arts groups have become an 
entrenched and ubiquitous feature of the Timorese social and political landscape. 
The infiltration of martial arts groups into the security forces is a major concern. 
Abilio Massoko, for example, was a police commander, as well as a leader, or warga, 
of PSHT. Massoko (aka Abilio Mesquito or Abilio Audian) was arrested for 
distributing guns during the 2006 crisis and subsequently named in the UN 
Commission of Inquiry Report as having initiated the attack on F-FDTL Brigadier 
Taur Matan Ruak's house on May 24, 2006.86 Police are often accused of siding with 
one group against another during martial arts clashes and, unsurprisingly, given 
policemen's access to firearms, a number of shootings in gang fights have been 
committed by serving police officers who are members of MAGs. In one martial arts 
clash just before Christmas 2011, which resulted in two fatalities, as many as twenty 
PNTL members were accused of being involved in the skirmish.87 
Particular MAGs are popularly perceived as being allied with particular political 
parties. While alliances do exist, they are organic and informal and rely on 
traditional clan-based ties or other allegiances between individual MAG leaders and 
politicians. PSHT, for example, is often linked to the Democratic Party (PD). Jaime 
Lopes, the leader of PSHT during the 2006-07 period (before his imprisonment), is 
the blood cousin of the PD leader Fernando Lasama de Araujo. However, there are 
FRETILIN PSHT members, too, including at least one Dili village chief, but such 
linkages between FRETILIN and PSHT are unusual. 
The most widely known link, however, is that between KORK and FRETILIN. 
Nuno Soares, appointed as KORK leader after the imprisonment of Naimori in 2005 
for arson, hails from Ainaro in the west. Soares was responsible for affiliating KORK 
with FRETILIN, and although this alliance is much cited as being proof of political-
party-gang alliances, this decision to affiliate was highly unpopular with large 
sections of KORK's membership. In KORK's heartland, Ainaro, for example, 
FRETILIN received only 10 percent of votes cast in the first round of the 2007 
presidential election.88 After Naimori was released from prison, he promptly 
expelled Soares from KORK and disaffiliated KORK from FRETILIN.89 
Like Colimau 2000 and Sagrada Familia, many MAGs, particularly those of 
Indonesian origin influenced by Javanese mysticism, incorporate ritual as part of 
their practice. Some members believe these rituals give them magic powers, such as 
invincibility, invisibility, and healing abilities. There is also a certain element of 
syncretism in MAG rites. Even PSHT, whose members often scorn other self-
proclaimed "indigenous" MAGs, such as KORK, as backward bush-dwellers, 
believed that the wall at their former headquarters, destroyed during the fighting in 
86 UN Commission of Inquiry (CO!) for Timor-Leste, p. 49. 
87 
"Twenty PNTL Officers May be Sacked over Martial Arts Conflict," Daily Media Monitoring 
Service, December 22, 2011. 
88 
"Presidential Election Results a Worrying Portent for East Timar," Canberra Times, April 20, 
2007. 
89 Declaration by KORK leadership, obtained January 2008. 
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2007, is imbued with sacred significance. The KORK leader Naimori believes he has 
invented a secret language and script, passed down to him through a dream.90 
This appropriation of traditional East Timorese animist belief systems has 
therefore further enmeshed these groups into East Timorese society. Indeed, in rural 
areas and some urban areas with a history of communal conflict, MAG membership 
runs along kinship lines, so conflict becomes a family affair, with whole villages 
sometimes being members of or allied to a particular MAG, and opposed to a 
neighboring village allied to another MAG. Sometimes a whole village is affiliated 
with the same political party as well, so that frequently there are conflicts among 
PSHT /PD villages and KORK/FRETILIN villages, or other MAG/political party 
symmetries. The dovetailing of family disputes with MAG disputes and political 
affiliations has rendered some communal conflicts particularly intractable and has 
considerably complicated mediation efforts. 
CONCLUSION 
The range of informal security groups still active in contemporary, post-
independence Timor-Leste is potent testament to a multitude of unresolved current 
and historical issues. However, the complexity and adaptability of these groups, as 
they have emerged at different points in time, in response to different social and 
political upheavals, demands a deeper understanding than those represented by 
reductive portrayals of the groups as "gangs" and as threats to security. 
In little over a decade, between 1999 to 2012, a number of these groups changed 
from resistance movements to protest vehicles and, sometimes, into political parties. 
For many, such movements are the only way to influence a centralized development 
and political process they feel they have little participation in or control over. As 
Sahlins contends, such movements should be considered as patterns of resistance 
within societies that are confronted with rapid and drastic social change. 91 Rooted in 
East Timorese cultural traditions and history, rather than being fringe elements 
alienated from society, they play an integral role within their communities as a 
means of voicing the demands, aspirations, and identity of community members. In 
the absence of an effective police force, especially in remote mountain villages, they 
are often their community's sole source of security. 
While some groups may fade with time as they reshape their identity, their 
leaders grow old, or the issues become redundant, new issues will certainly breed 
new groups. The recent appearance of a number of new urban and rural-based 
protest movements is testament to this. The combination of an inefficient justice 
system with an ineffectual and divided police force means that communities will 
continue to look to informal security groups for protection, and for "summary 
justice" or retribution. Their utility to political parties as "rent-a-crowds" during the 
2006-07 violence has also further entrenched their popularity and power. Rather 
than disappearing with the onset of the "modernizing" forces of economic 
development and democracy, informal security groups are therefore likely to remain 
a feature of life in Timor-Leste for quite some time to come. 
9() Interview with UN Political Affairs former Gang Task Force member, Dili, January 21, 2008. 
91 Marshall Sahlins, "The Economics of Develop-man in the Pacific," in The Making of Global and 
Local Modernities in Melanesia, ed. Joel Robbins and Holly Wardlow (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 
pp. 23-42. 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
Tim Anderson 
Development strategies have consequences. They affect socioeconomic 
relationships, the priorities of government budgets, and views of the future. For 
those reasons, it is worth reflecting on the general approach a country takes to 
development. 
Since independence, Timor-Leste has formed its own hybrid development 
strategies, through a National Development Plan (NDP) and the distinct practices of 
two different governments. These hybrids incorporate mixed ideas from economic 
liberal, developmental state, and human development traditions. Yet the language 
and practice of development strategy have not always matched, and both are 
changing. This chapter identifies the main contemporary approaches to development 
strategy, then links those to experience in Timor-Leste since independence. It 
concludes with some observations on the neglected sectors of education, health, and 
agriculture. 
Timor-Leste faced enormous challenges at independence. As well as the 
violence, infrastructure destruction, and mass dislocation of 1999, the little country 
was left with environmental degradation, the flight of professional classes, virtually 
no effective governmental institutions, and a variety of international agencies and 
experts with their own ideas on development. In this context, administrations had to 
formulate their own approach to development. This chapter suggests that the 
strategic differences between the FRETILIN-led (Frente Revolucionaria do Timar 
Leste Independente, Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timar) and AMP 
(Aliansa Maioria Parlamentar, Parliamentary Majority Alliance) administrations 
cannot be determined by their policy statements alone but, rather, require a study of 
their respective practice. 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
Three broad development strategies can be defined: the private-investor-led 
"market economy" approach, the "developmental state" model; and those 
approaches that emphasize human development. This section identifies the distinct 
underpinning ideas and views on sectoral development (education, health, 
agriculture, infrastructure, the economy), some notable international experiences, 
and the challenges facing each approach. 
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The Private "Market Economy" Approach 
The private investor led "market economy" approach to development-
commonly advocated by Western powers-often expresses a unified economic goal, 
such as "broad-based growth." It draws on the notion of "comparative advantage," 1 
which encourages specialization and trade, and the "open market" ideas of the 
nineteenth-century European neoclassical economists,2 supplemented by mid-
twentieth-century ideas on the "macroeconomy" and its management.3 These 
"economic liberal" ideas are promoted by the international financial institutions. The 
World Bank,4 for example, developed the ideas of "pro poor growth" and "inclusive 
growth," in response to criticisms that the poor do not benefit and are excluded from 
growth strategies; but the World Bank's emphasis remains on economic growth. 
Broad-based growth arose in recognition of the dangers of extreme 
specialization, as in the so-called banana republics, which had faithfully followed 
comparative-advantage strategies but suffered economic crisis when prices for their 
single cash-crop fell. So the need for some diversification was accepted by economic 
liberals. However, they continue to emphasize trade, suggesting that specialization 
in competitive markets indicates enhanced potential economic gains. Nevertheless, 
the developmental prospects of comparative advantage are limited, as the idea is 
based on comparative statics and only addresses a short-term opportunity. It does 
not explain how a country might actually improve its productive capacities. 
Economic liberals speak of a minimal economic role for the state and oppose 
public investment that might crowd out (compete with) private investment.5 
Community or customary land should be registered and commercialized, according 
to this view. This approach has led to calls for the state to merely create an "enabling 
environment" of laws, security, and infrastructure to suit the needs and interests of 
private investors. 
The economic liberal view of education, health, and social security is that the 
state should minimize its commitments and introduce "user pays" and privatized 
services to encourage consumer participation and market formation. Social services 
might be offered as a minimal safety net, in recognition of the exclusion of poor 
people; but open market ideas oppose systems of social guarantees or 
comprehensive public welfare systems.6 Increasing commercialization of services 
1 David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London: John Murray, 
1817). 
2 William Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy (London: MacMillan, 1871); Carl 
Menger, Grundsatze der Volkswirtschaftslehre [Principles of Economics] (Vienna: Wilhelm 
Braumiiller, 1871); Leon Walras, Elements d'economie politique pure [Elements of Pure 
Economics] (Paris: Corbaz, 1874-1877). 
3 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 1936). 
4 World Bank, "What Is Inclusive Growth" (2009), http:/ I siteresources.worldbank.org I 
INTDEBTDEPT /Resources I 468980-1218567884549 /WhatlsinclusiveGrowth20081230.pdf, 
accessed May 24, 2012. 
5 For example, Roger W. Spencer and William P. Yohe, "The 'Crowding Out' of Private 
Expenditures by Fiscal Policy Actions," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (October 1970): 
12-24. 
6 For example, Charles W. Calomiris, The Post-Modern Bank Safety Net: Lessons from Developed 
and Developing Economies (Washington, DC: AEI Press, American Enterprise Institute, 1997). 
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leads to employment and economic growth. Free services, on the other hand, are said 
to create among individuals laziness and a dependent mentality. The behavioral 
assumption here is that it is good for people to feel some pressure to participate in 
markets, so that they may value and more effectively use the goods and services that 
they purchase (relative to those who are handed goods and services for free). 
A major problem with this approach is the unaffordability of (or uneven access 
to) basic services for large sections of the population, particularly children. Reliance 
on open markets always favors wealthy people and, in developing countries, 
excludes large sections of the population. Aid programs aim to fill this gap, but bring 
their own problems, including inflationary bubble economies, dependency, and "aid 
trauma" through failures in capacity-building and great inequality.7 
In more recent times, the market economy approach has insisted that the state 
should assist the most dynamic sections of the economy, in particular, the export 
sector, as these sectors can contribute much to the growth of the formal economy 
and, so, stimulate (create spin-off benefits for) other private investors. Successful 
private investment creates employment, the principal means by which benefits are 
said to trickle down to wider sections of the community. An important implication is 
that infrastructure improvements, such as roads and ports, paid for by the 
government, are prioritized to encourage export enterprises to expand. Also, 
preferential (e.g., tax free) treatment for private investors, including foreign 
investors, is a by-product of a market-economy approach. 
States that engage in social-infrastructure development, public enterprise, and 
provision of free services are moving outside the bounds of the economic liberal 
view of what used to be called sound economic policy, but is now often included in 
notions of good governance. Such public institution-building may compete with 
private investment, which is said to be "more efficient."8 
Despite being a hallmark of powerful economies, open market strategies have 
never led to the industrial development of any country. Such a model was not used 
in the industrialization of Europe, North America, or Japan. There have been some 
economic liberal attempts to prove the contrary,9 but the evidence is very poor. 
Development in Europe was backed by a substantial economic surplus from 
colonialism and slave-based economies, absorbed into commerce and industry.10 
European, North American, and Japanese capitalist development then grew their 
human resources and technologies with state sponsorship and financial assistance, 
public-private collaborations, and little competition.11 After World War Two, the 
United States suggested that Japan pursue its "comparative advantage" as a provider 
of cheap labor in basic industry. The Japanese, building on their strength in human 
resources-in a war-devastated, resource-poor, and disempowered nation-
7 Neil Middleton and Phil O'Keefe, Disaster and Development: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid 
(London: Pluto Press, in association with ETC [UK], 1998); Tim Anderson, "RAMSI: 
Intervention, Aid Trauma, and Self Governance," Journal of Australian Political Economy 62 
(December 2008): 62-92. 
8 World Bank, "Bureaucrats in Business" (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
9 Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960). 
10 Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1944). 
11 Nancy Ettlinger, "The Roots of Competitive Advantage in California and Japan," Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers 81,3 (September 1991): 391-407. 
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preferred to upgrade their productive capacities, building a successful industrial 
economy within a relatively short space of time.12 
Open market ideas these days suit, and are promoted by, those nations that have 
already achieved some degree of "market" dominance. But it may also be said that 
the failure of open market models is what drives the principal alternatives, that is, 
developmental state and human development (or human-resource-focused) 
approaches. 
The principal challenges for a market economy strategy are how to prevent: a 
collapse in basic services; the leakages (overseas and in elite consumption) in 
investment and income generation; and widening inequality and social exclusion. 
Some formal-sector industries may boom (e.g., natural-resource extraction), but 
international experience suggests that the benefits of such industries will be poorly 
distributed. The best evidence of this can be found in resource-rich developing 
countries, such as Nigeria and Bolivia. Yet inequality does not concern economic 
liberals; rather, it is seen positively, as a spur for market participation. 
The "Developmental State" 
East Asian versions of the "developmental state" represent the most prominent 
and successful examples of developing countries (and in some cases former colonies) 
upgrading their productive capacities. We can see capitalist and socialist variants, 
looking at Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Venezuela, and the Peoples' 
Republic of China. In both the capitalist variant (where private investors dominate) 
and the socialist variant (where social investment dominates), strong political will is 
required, so that the state has a degree of autonomy with respect to private investors. 
A developmental state implies that the state leads the process of development, 
whether by forming councils to coordinate the production and trade strategies of 
large, private companies (as in Japan), by developing long-term plans beyond the 
agenda of existing industries (as in Singapore), or by building strong public 
enterprises (as in Venezuela). As this requires struggling with large private 
corporations, it has been said that an authoritarian state is required. 13 Indeed, 
authoritarianism was prominent in militarized South Korea and civilian-led 
Singapore. However, developmental states have been described in relatively strong 
democracies, too, such as contemporary Venezuela, and in small island nations, such 
as Mauritius.14 
12 A. Johnson Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1982). 
13 A. Johnson Chalmers, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-
Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Japan, in The Political Economy of the New 
Asian Industrialism, ed. F. C. Deyo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Eun Mee 
Kim, Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South Korean Development, 1960-1990 
(New York, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997). 
14 Thomas Meisenhelder, "The Developmental State in Mauritius," Journal of Modern African 
Studies 35,2 (June 1997): 279-97. 
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The World Bank's "East Asian Miracle" report gives some idea of the 
developmental state's challenge to the open market model.15 It raised a huge 
controversy in the United States, amongst economic liberal opponents of state 
"intervention" in the economy. The report drew attention to the coordination 
required in industrial development and the key economic role of East Asian states. 
However, as Joseph Stiglitz reminds us,16 this report was watered down due to 
resistance from the United States, and only appeared at all because Japan funded the 
report. 
Institutional ideas help explain the conventional success of the developmental 
state model, including in the United States. Economist John Kenneth Galbraith saw 
the key features of North American capitalism as little to do with markets and more 
to do with the planned sector, where large corporations backed by states administer 
systems and prices.17 The idea of comparative advantage was challenged by that of 
competitive advantage, where it was recognized that local advantages were created 
and not static.18 The technical-industrial centers of both Japan and California have 
been described as developing under long-term influences of joint ventures, a strong 
human-resource base, linkages with other states, state-corporate coordination, and 
"complementary strategies of import substitution and export promotion."19 
In a similar way, the institutional idea of "circular and cumulative causation," 
with its discussion of the development and decay of institutional linkages, 20 has been 
used to explain industrial "cluster development" in developing countries. The 
United Nations Commission on Trade and Development has discussed criteria for 
regional clusters, including technological development, innovation and trust, 
cooperation as well as competition, and the learning involved in industrial clusters. 
The most successful subregional example of this model is the engineering and 
information-technology cluster in Bangalore, India. This large industrial zone was 
built on strong central-government investment in colleges and defense industries, as 
well as on coordination with and among private firms. 21 
Many of the examples of developmental states have been large, strong countries. 
However, examples also include small island states such as Singapore22 and 
Mauritius.23 In the latter case, the former colony managed to escape dependency on 
plantation sugar and moved into a diversified, capitalist model, with strong 
15 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, World Bank Policy 
Research Reports (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993). 
16 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York, NY: Norton and Co., 2002). 
17 J. K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1967). 
18 For example, R. J. Johnston, "Extending the Research Agenda," Economic Geography 65 
(1989): 338-47; and Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York, NY: Free 
Press, 1990). 
19 Ettlinger, "Roots of Competitive Advantage." 
20 Philip Toner, Main Currents in Cumulative Causation: The Dynamics of Growth and Development 
(London: MacMillan, 1999). 
21 UNCTAD, "Promoting and Sustaining SMEs, Clusters, and Networks for Development," 
Issues Paper, UN Conference on Trade and Development, New York, NY, 1998. 
22 Kevin Grice and David Drakakis-Smith, "The Role of the State in Shaping Development: 
Two Decades of Growth in Singapore," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 10,3 
(1985): 347-59. 
23 Richard Sandbrook, "Origins of the Developmental State: Interrogating Mauritius," Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 39,3 (2005): 549-81. 
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development of education and health. The process was said to require a "capable 
and relatively autonomous state bureaucracy."24 However, the role of the state in 
planned institutional development and the various linkages within a developmental 
state do not of themselves provide the full picture. This process also depends on the 
substantial development of human resources and, in particular, a firm basis in 
education and health. Challenges for a developmental state approach include a clear 
vision, a well-educated population, and political will alongside popular support. 
Human Development 
Focusing on education and health sits alongside the emphases on other human 
capabilities in what might now be called a human development approach. To the 
extent that this can be called a distinct strategy of development, it requires emphases 
on core capabilities such as education, health, and gender equality and participation. 
In development this should be seen as strong and sustained efforts to build not just 
human resources but a healthy, well-educated population. In this approach, 
education and health are key goals of development, not just the means to create 
skilled workers. 
It is notable that several resource-poor island states have made great advances 
through building their human resources. Japan, for example, became an industrial 
power despite being crushed by war, and despite the absence of energy resources. 
Singapore, a former colony with hardly any physical resources (it even has to import 
fresh water), is now a high-income country. Likewise Cuba, with few physical 
resources, has the best health indicators in the developing world and is the major 
provider of health-aid programs to other developing countries. These three very 
different countries have one thing in common: They built a distinct future by 
investing in their own people. 
While the human development concept is relatively new, the approach is not. 
Sweden, for example, led the world in maternal care in the late nineteenth century, 
through its network of midwives. Though a fairly poor country at that time, its well-
organized and well-distributed system of birth assistants gave it better maternal 
mortality outcomes than other European countries.25 Sweden's early success in 
maternal health was not due to economic wealth. Indeed, research commissioned by 
the World Bank tells us that, across all developing countries, the education of women 
has a more powerful impact on critical health indicators (adult and child mortality, 
fertility rates) than does earning a high income.26 Yet market economy approaches 
always stress high incomes. 
24 Thomas Meisenhelder, "Developmental State in Mauritius." 
25 Wim Van Lerberghe and Vincent De Brouwere, "Of Blind Alleys and Things that Have 
Worked: History's Lessons on Reducing Maternal Mortality," Studies in Health Services 
Organisation and Policy, no. 17 (Antwerp: ITG Press, 2001), www.jsieurope.org/ safem/ collect/ 
safem/pdf/s2929e/s2929e.pdf, accessed May 24, 2012. 
26 Jia Wang et al., Measuring Country Performance on Health: Selected Indicators for 115 Countries 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999). 
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Table 1 
Development Strategies 
Private Market Developmental Human 
Economy State Development 
Ideas, Open markets, State-led planning, Participation, 
strategies, broad-based growth, competitive advantage, human 
emphases comparative advantage institution-building capabilities, 
human resources 
Sectoral Minimal free services, Coordination of human Strong push in 
implications safety net, resources and industry, education, health, 
(education, export infrastructure, state investment, and equality 
health, privatization, capitalist or socialist 
infrastructure, enabling environment versions 
economy) 
International Wes tern model East Asia (Japan, Japan, Kerala, 
experience (selectively applied), South Korea, China, Cuba, Venezuela, 
favored by corporations Singapore), Venezuela Singapore 
Challenges Weak strategic plan, Human resources, Coordination, 
excludes the poor political will, and mobilization of 
popular support human resources 
The focus on human capabilities and improved outcomes allows for a wide view 
of development. For example, it seems likely that customary or community land, in 
some countries, serves as a powerful basis for food security, employment, and social 
security. Where land is widely distributed, as in the Melanesian countries (Papua 
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu), it serves as a great "hidden" reserve of 
wealth, nutrition, and potential income. The land also provides the distribution 
mechanism for those benefits.27 Market economies, by contrast, will always demand 
the commercialization of land.28 This will be followed by land rationalization and 
greater reliance on cash economies, with all their distribution problems. 
A human development emphasis faces challenges of effective coordination and 
mobilization of its human resources. Nevertheless, the focus remains on building 
human capacity for the future. 
27 J. Fingleton, ed., "Privatising Land in the Pacific: A Defence of Customary Tenures" 
(Canberra: Australia Institute, 2005), https:/ /www.tai.org.au/index.php?q=node%2F19 
&pubid=SO&act=display, accessed on April 30, 2012; and Tim Anderson, J/Land Registration, 
Land Markets, and Livelihoods in Papua New Guinea," in In Defence of Melanesian Customary 
Land, ed. Tim Anderson and Gary Lee (Sydney: Aid/Watch, 2010), http:/ I aidwatch.org. 
au/ publications I publication-in-defence-of-melanesian-customary-land, accessed April 30, 
2012. 
28 For example, S. Gosarevski, H. Hughes, and S. Windybank, "Is Papua New Guinea Viable?" 
Pacific Economic Bulletin 19,1 (2004): 134-48. 
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STRATEGIES IN TIMOR-LESTE 
The post-independence development strategy in Timor-Leste began with a 
National Development Plan (NDP), launched upon independence in May 2002. Since 
then we have seen the differing approaches of two main administrations: the 
FRETILIN-led government of 2001-06, and the AMP coalition of 2007-10. We must 
have regard to the language of strategy, but we also have to look at practice. Let's 
start with the NDP. 
The National Development Plan, 2002 
Timor-Leste's National Development Plan29 is a complex document and is 
difficult to characterize because the process of its development required that it 
contain a variety of influences. It is necessarily a hybrid. In the first instance, the 
process of developing the NDP added elements of a human development character: 
inclusiveness and participation. Economic liberal approaches see economic policy as 
a "technical" matter, best left to the experts. As in any elitist process, programs are 
formulated "from on high" and delivered. Yet, in the formulation of Timor-Leste's 
NDP, then chief minister and chair of the planning commission, Mari Alkatiri, 
pointed to 
the open, participatory and inclusive nature of our planning ... we invited 
representatives of the Church and members of Civil Society, national and 
international NGOs, the private sector and public interest groups ... to help 
debate and formulate policy options, program priorities and implementation 
strategies for the National Development Plan.30 
The president-elect, Xanana Gusmao, agreed: 
The process of preparing the Plan [NDP] gave thousands of East Timorese, 
from school children to elderly people, the opportunity to think about the 
kind of future they want for themselves and for future generations.31 
This level of participation helps include a wide range of voices, adding both 
relevance and ownership to the development process, thus enhancing human 
capabilities. The human development emphasis is present, but more muted, in the 
rest of the document. There is some emphasis, in education and capacity building 
(skills development)1 on "reducing imbalances in education" and addressing urban-
rural gaps.32 This emphasis on eliminating inequalities takes the NOP beyond the 
more limited market economy commitments to publicly funded basic education, 
usually followed by a push to privatize secondary and technical education. 
29 Planning Commission, East Timar: National Development Plan (Dili: Planning Commission, 
May 2002). 
30 Ibid., p. xvii. 
31 Ibid., p. xvi. 
32 Ibid., pp. 4, 9, 31. 
Development Strategy 223 
There are other hints of a human development emphasis, through the NDP' s 
commitment to ongoing participation in governance-to the "participation of all 
citizens in economic, social, and political processes and activities" and to promoting 
"gender equality and the empowerment of women." 33 The plan's commitment to the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) maintains this same emphasis, as the first 
few MDGs are based on human development measures. There is an emphasis on 
institution-building in the NDP, as one might expect of a new nation that requires 
the basic institutions of a new state, that is, law, policy, and infrastructure. 
Institution-building in itself would not reflect a developmental state approach unless 
it was preparing a leading role for the state, especially in investment planning and 
resource management. 
A market economy approach would focus institution-building on creating an 
enabling environment of law and institutions for private economic activity. Indeed, 
the NDP does this repeatedly.34 It thus incorporates some of the market economy 
approach into its institution-building. However, it goes further than that. Despite the 
market economy language on institutions, the NDP is heterodox in maintaining a 
strong role for state planning, state involvement in resource control, and some hints 
of greater planning in the areas of agricultural development and rural 
development.35 These provide hints of a modest developmental state approach. 
Despite the fact that the NDP is said to cover eighteen years (2002-20), Mari 
Alkatiri, in his introduction, suggests that the plan relates mainly to "the next five 
years." 36 The plan itself refers to an ongoing monitoring and evaluation process that 
includes 11most importantly, improvement in the plan in itself." 37 As such, both 
participation and state direction are to be maintained. 
A market economy, or economic liberal, approach to resource management 
would leave this to the private sector, with the state simply collecting taxes and 
license fees. This is indeed the case in Australia, for example, where the state has no 
equity at all in natural-resource or processing industries. The NDP, by contrast 
(building on Article 139 of the Constitution, which requires the state to own and 
fairly manage natural resources), calls for strong state management and, in 
particular, for "sound administration and sustainable utilization of the oil and gas 
revenues to benefit present and future generations" and to "curb the temptation to 
squander the windfall in ostentatious consumption." 38 This contrasts with the strong 
tendency of market economy approaches to "discount the future value" of assets 
(e.g., environmental assets) and to emphasize current market transactions. 
However, the NDP has other strong economic liberal elements, to some extent, 
due to outside influences such as the World Bank. This plan was created before 
independence, at a time when Timor-Leste did not quite have its full sovereign voice, 
and when development banks and international donors had a stronger say. The 
language of economic liberal institutions (particularly the World Bank) is apparent, 
and has been incorporated into this sovereign document. The NDP repeatedly 
emphasizes the themes of private-sector-led development, with a diminishing 
33 Ibid., pp. 20-24. 
34 Ibid., pp. 2, 20, 22, 24, 28, 29. 
35 Ibid., pp. 10, 20, 31. 
36 Ib'd .. 1 ., p. xvu. 
37 Ibid., p. 5. 
38 Ibid., pp. 24, 30. 
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economic role for the state. It is notable, though, that the "private sector" of the NDP 
is a wide concept, mixing informal farming with private-formal-sector businesses, 
domestic or foreign. 
The NDP suggests that "successful private sector development will be a key 
driver of economic growth and poverty reduction ... the Government has committed 
itself to a market-based economy ... [including] an open approach to foreign 
investment and foreign trade."39 It calls for "an open market system but with 
important strategic and regulatory roles for government,"40 saying that Timor-Leste 
will develop: 
a market economic system with strategic and regulatory roles for 
government, including the provision of social safety nets ... [and] a strong 
role for the private sector in development ... [as well as] an enabling 
environment ... and [will arrange] for the delivery of essential support 
services for the private sector to gain confidence and strength ... [and will] 
provide a growth enabling policy and legal environment ... 41 
There are many emphases on private investor led growth, including an openness to 
foreign investment.42 The market-based economy approach is also applied to 
agricultural development, although here the private sector is said to include 
informal-sector farmers. 43 An outside reader of the NDP might say that, in terms of 
economic development strategy, economic liberal influences are strong to dominant, 
but moderated by some developmental state influences in the areas of planning and 
natural resource management and by some human development emphases in terms 
of participation and a more equitable approach to education, women, and rural 
development. However we must look at practice to better understand national 
strategy. 
FRETILIN-Led Heterodoxy, 2001-06 
The practice of the first post-independence government, a coalition led by 
FRETILIN, built on the NDP, but was, in practice, more heterodox. What follows is 
not an assessment of that government, but, rather, some illustrations of its distinct 
themes in the fields of agriculture, fiscal autonomy, and education and health. 
With very little money in the first budget and with the task of constructing the 
institutions of a new state-a parliament, criminal and civil law, a police service, 
public services, language policy-there was much to address. Prime Minister 
Alkatiri stressed the need to construct democratic institutions but also to address key 
human development objectives, such as nutrition, health, and education. Poverty 
would be reduced by "rapid, integrated, equitable and sustainable economic 
39 Ibid., p. 11. 
40 Ibid., p. 6. 
41 Ibid, pp. 22, 28-29. 
42 Ibid., p. 31. 
43 Ibid., p. 24. 
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growth," 44 to help meet the people's basic needs. He noted the objective of creating 
an enabling environment for the private sector, but this included "farmers, fishers, 
investors, micro-enterprise ... traders and others."45 The government would maintain 
a market economy but with "a strategic and regulatory role" for government, which 
would in particular create "the networks and mean by which to guarantee social 
security during the most difficult times."46 
One of the first conflicts with international agencies came over agriculture, 
before independence, and illustrates the challenges that would be faced by 
FRETILIN and the NDP. In 2000, a World Bank team that included AusAID officials 
had rejected proposals by the United Nations Transitional Administration 
(UNTAET) and East Timorese leaders that aid money be used for agricultural service 
centers, a public abattoir, and public grain silos. The agencies did not support the 
move to rehabilitate irrigated rice fields, either. This opposition was evidently 
ideological, motivated by a prescriptive economic liberalism: "Such public sector 
involvement [in agricultural services] has not proved successful elsewhere,"47 and 
"the government should not own revenue generating enterprises, such as meat 
slaughterhouses, warehouse facilities, grain storage facilities ... [This] would be 
costly and would inhibit private entrepreneurship."48 Given that these proposals 
were linked to concerns arising from the country's prior food crises, the World 
Bank's interventions were acts of extraordinary insensitivity, and a denial of self-
determination. 49 
After independence, the government proceeded with its planned rehabilitation 
of rice fields, but without World Bank or Australian help. Australia, a major grain 
exporter, had made clear that its assistance with food security would focus on export 
crops and agribusiness.50 With some assistance from the United Nations' Food and 
44 Mari Alkatiri, Timor Leste: a Caminho do Desenvolvimento: os primeros anos de governar:;iio (East 
Timor: The path of development: The first years of government), 2a edi<;ao actualizada 
(Lisboa: Lidel, 2006). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., p. 45. 
47 World Bank, "Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Trust Fund for East Timor Grant 
in the Amount of US$6.8 Million Equivalent and a Second Grant of US$11.4 Million to East 
Timar for an Agricultural Rehabilitation Project," Rural Development and Natural Resources 
Sector Unit, Papua New Guinea/Pacific Islands Country Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region, 
Report no. 20439-TP, June 14, 2000, p. 14. 
48 IDA, "Agriculture in East Timor: A Strategy for Rehabilitation and Development" (Dili: 
International Development Association/World Bank Mission Report, May 2000), pp. 3-4. 
49 See Tim Anderson, "Self-determination after Independence: East Timor and the World 
Bank," Portuguese Studies Review 11,l, Special Issue on East Timor (July 2003): 176-77. 
so DFAT, "Food Security and Trade: A Future Perspective," Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (Canberra, 1996), Summary (vii-xi). Despite Australia's economic liberal approach to 
food security ("rely on trade, not self-sufficiency"), the country did offer support for a "Seeds 
of Life" program, which was aimed at developing appropriate domestic seeds (including rice) 
for Timor Leste's conditions; see: ACIAR, "Seeds of Life-East Timor," http: I I aciar.gov.au 
/project/cim/2000/160, accessed May 24, 2012; see also E. L. Javier, G. San Valentin, P. 
Kapukha, B. Monaghan, B. Palmer, C. Piggin, F. Tilman de Benevides, D. Da Silva, and A. De 
Oliveira, "Selection of Better Rice for East Timor," in Agriculture: New Directions for a New 
Nation - East Timar (Timar Leste), ed. Heida Da Costa, Colin Piggin, Cesar J. da Cruz, and 
James J. Fox, ACIAR Workshop Proceedings, No. 113 (2003), pp. 79-83,http://aciar.gov.au/ 
files/node/512/pr113.pdf, accessed May 24, 2012. 
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Agriculture Organization (for grain silos) and Japan (in rice production), Timor-Leste 
maintained an independent course. By 2004, rice production (mostly irrigated fields) 
had increased strongly from the very low levels of 1998-99 (from 36,000 to 65,000 
tonnes), though possibly at the expense of maize and cassava production.51 
In 2005, a food security policy was introduced that emphasized a fair degree of 
independence from market economy orthodoxy in agriculture. This policy focuses on 
support for existing small-scale farming, rather than (as advocated by the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank) a push into large-scale cash cropping, aimed 
at export markets. It proposed a range of extension services (e.g., seeds, technologies, 
livestock services), support for farmers' organizations, rural credit, and marketing 
and infrastructure support for both local and export markets. It speaks of a land use 
policy, support for community organizations and cooperatives, and roads to provide 
"market access for isolated sucos [villages]."52 The food security policy goes beyond 
agriculture into "early warning systems," grain storage, and relief assistance, 
"preferably established and managed at community levels through Suco councils.'' 53 
There was no talk of alienation of land to large agribusiness investors. Nevertheless, 
a proposed biofuel industry, using contracted East Timorese Jatropha farmers, was 
initiated in mid 2005.54 
Little of the proposed wide-ranging support to small farmers was achieved. This 
was in part because of limited budgets, and also due to competing demands on those 
budgets. The commitment to agriculture in the 2004-05 combined-sources budget 
was 8.8 percent,55 down from the 11 percent that had been promised in the Sector 
Investment Program. 56 
The first government maintained its resolve to pursue cautious and autonomous 
fiscal policy, carefully managing small budgets and, despite the lack of resources, 
avoiding debt. Conscious of the debt-based political leverage introduced in the 1980s 
and 1990s, which had been resisted strongly by many other developing countries, a 
public campaign backed this move for a "debt free" future. 57 So, despite the virtual 
absence of oil and gas revenues in the first few years, the government took out no 
loans.58 Nor were there significant private takeovers of key services. 
The government developed a series of Sector Investment Programs (SIPs), 
though these tended to be more comprehensive than focused. For example, the 
private-sector SIP committed itself to the support of "agri-business" and "private 
51 UNDP, "The Path Out of Poverty," Timar Leste Human Development Report 2006 (Dili: United 
Nations Development Programme, 2006), p. 84. 
52 MAAF, "National Food Security Policy for Timor Leste," Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries (Dili: Republica Democratica de Timor Leste, November 16, 2005). 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ortlan Bennett, "Timor Link to Region's Biggest Biofuel Industry," Sunday Times, Perth, 
October 2, 2005. 
55 RDTL, General Budget of the State 2004-05, Budget Paper No. 1 (Dili: Ministry of Planning and 
Finance, Democratic Republic of Tim or Leste, 2004), p. 44. 
56 UNDP, "Path Out of Poverty," p. 38. 
57 ETAN, "The World's Newest Country Must Start Debt-Free!" (2003), http:/ /etan.org/ 
action I action2 I 06alert.htm, accessed May 24, 2012. 
58 IMF, "Staff Report for the 2006 Article IV Consultation, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste" 
(Dili: International Monetary Fund, December 27, 2006). 
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participation in infrastructure, including perhaps power and water supply."59 There 
were, however, no large agribusiness projects nor private-investor moves into power 
or water. Water and electricity, though very limited, were kept in public hands. 60 
Telecommunications was handed to a foreign company, but on a build-operate-
transfer (BOT) basis, through which the government maintained some equity and 
future rights.61 
This was not a market economy approach but, rather, a state-managed effort to 
retain strategic control and avoid leverage by foreign financiers. Nevertheless, those 
financiers were managed tactfully. Timor-Leste joined the World Bank, but did not 
borrow its money. The Bank maintained an advisory role, as well as helping 
coordinate foreign assistance.62 At a conference in 2005, the prime minister explained 
why his government had not engaged in the World Bank's "Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper" (formerly Structural Adjustment Programs) process of conditional 
loans: 
The PRSP with its concessional loans program increasingly places more 
burdens on developing nations because they are not based on real feasibility 
studies ... we have adopted a policy of avoiding such debts because we 
recognise that our capacity to absorb these funds is still limited, as is our 
labour force productivity.63 
The conflict over agriculture and food security provides one example of the leverage 
Alkatiri' s government sought to avoid. The constant demand for foreign investor 
"participation" in key services was another.64 
In education and health, the FRETILIN government built on the country's 
constitutional commitment to education and health as rights, rather than 
commodities. In this sense, the 2001 Constitution had established and the 
government had maintained some "human development themes," opposed to the 
"pay for service" ethos of market economies. The government began with strong 
commitments, pledging "more than 35 percent of resources" to education and health 
in its first budget.65 However, it delivered only 27 percent and 25 percent in the 2004-
05 and 2005-06 budgets, respectively (see Table 2 below). 
59 Ministry of Development, "Private Sector Development: Priorities and Proposed Sector 
Investment Program" (Dili: Private Sector Development Sector Investment Program, April, 
2006), pp. ix-x. 
60 IMF, "Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste" (Dili: 
International Monetary Fund, January 9, 2007). 
61 Alkatiri, Timar Leste: a Caminho, p. 53. 
62 IMF, "Staff Report for the 2006 Article IV Consultation, Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste," Annex, pp. 5-6. 
63 Alkatiri, "Keynote remarks at the International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the 
Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States," 
January 13, 2005, www.un.org I smallislands2005 /coverage/ statements I sids050113timor-leste 
.pdf, accessed May 24, 2012. 
64 For example, IMF. "Selected issues and Statistical Appendix," p. 8. 
65 Alkatiri, Timar Leste: a Caminho, p. 48. 
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Table 2 
Public Spending in Key Sectors, Timor-Leste 
Spending as a percentage of 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2008 2010 
combined sources (CS) and 
state budget 
Education(% of CS budget) 14.9 ... 13.4 ,,, 10.7 11.7 "' 11.3 
Education(% of state budget) 15.3 15.1 11.1 13.0 10.2 
Health(% of CS budget) 12.2 11.3 9.2 . 8.2 .. 6.9 
Health(% of state budget) 9.0 11.9 8.1 6.9 5.4 
Agriculture(% of CS budget) 8.8 4.6 5.8 5.9 3;7 
Agriculture(% state budget) 1.5 3.7 4.4 4.8 2.5 
Infrastructure n.a. n.a. 8.8 13.2 26.6 
(%of CS budget) . 
-
Infrastructure n.a. n.a. 15.8 12.8 28.5 
(% of state budget) 
Notes: "Combined sources" is the state budget plus contributions from outside 
agencies; the Ministry of Education was the Ministry of Education and Culture 
before 2008; the Ministry of Infrastructure was the Ministry of Public Works in 
2006-07 and chrior to that was part of transport and communications; prior to 2005, 
the state bu get was divided into CFET (Consolidated Fund for East Timor) and 
TFET (Trust Fund for East Timor); autonomous agencies are included in combined 
sources, but not in state budgets. 
Sources: RDTL, General Budget of the State 2004-05, Table 8.1; RDTL, General 
Budget of the State 2005-06, Table 6.5; RDTL 2007, Table 8.5; RDTL, General 
Budget of the State 2008, Table 7.3. 
There were some modest education and health achievements in those first years. 
Combined school enrollment rates rose from 59 percent in 1999 to 66 percent in 2004, 
and under-five (years) mortality (deaths per thousand) was said to have fallen from 
159 in 1999 to 136 in 2004.66 Lack of capacity and resources constrained educational 
development. Nevertheless, a school feeding program was introduced in some 
districts, again, representing a strong human development theme. The first draft of 
the food-security policy included reference to the school feeding program, backed by 
the United Nations' World Food Program, which would both "encourage school 
attendance and improve nutrition of school age children."67 For some reason this 
reference was dropped from the final food-security policy;68 but the school feeding 
program itself was maintained. 
A significant human development move in health occurred in early 2003, when 
the country's leadership chose- against the opposition of the United States and 
Australia-to take on a health-cooperation program with Cuba. This "south-south 
cooperation" program rapidly became the backbone of the country's primary health 
care and medical training, dwarfing all other health aid programs in the country, 
indeed, in the entire region. By late 2005, there was an offer of one thousand medical 
scholarships, and by 2008 almost nine hundred of the scholarships had been 
awarded. By 2006, there were almost 300 Cuban health workers in the country, many 
66 UNDP, "Path Out of Poverty." 
67 MAAF, "DRAFT National Food Security Policy for Timor Leste" (Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, Dili, Republica Democratica de Timor Leste, July 7, 2005). 
68 MAAF, "National Food Security Policy for Timor Leste." 
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of them in remote rural areas. Building on the Cuban-model's success with health 
care, a substantial literacy program, based on a Cuban method, was introduced in 
2005.69 These programs gave strong practical support to the constitutional 
commitment to health and education as basic human rights, and represent a strong 
human development emphasis, contrasting with market economy ideas. 
The FRETILIN-led government built on the National Development Plan and its 
Sector Investment Programs, both of which had some strong economic liberal 
language. Nevertheless, the government pursued some key heterodox policies: in 
agriculture, finance, education, and health. This was a strong human development 
approach, at odds with the "user pays" and private-investor "participation" ethos of 
market economy programs. As the stated economic strategy was wide ranging and 
had a fair degree of economic liberal language, it attracted support of the 
international agencies. But in 2006, when a political crisis destabilized the 
government, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressed for stronger measures 
to support private-sector-led growth, including private investment in agriculture, 
fisheries, and tourism. It warned of rising wages and, to contain this, urged /1 greater 
labour market flexibility ."70 These market economy ideas found greater resonance 
with the AMP coalition government elected in 2007. 
The AMP and Big Money, 2007-2010 
The AMP coalition government, led by Xanana Gusmao, introduced some 
economic liberal emphases. Once again, what follows is not an attempt to assess the 
AMP government but, rather, a characterization of some important elements of its 
strategic approach in the fields of fiscal policy, infrastructure, land use, and 
education and health. 
The AMP coalition had access to larger budgets relative to 2001-06, mostly 
thanks to petroleum revenues, and was also inclined to spend more freely. The state 
budget almost tripled, from US$120 million in 2005 to $348 million in 2008; by 2010, 
the budget had risen to US$660 miIIion. 71 Despite rising revenues from the Petroleum 
Fund, in 2009, the government overdrew the nominal "sustainable" amount (ESI) by 
US$104 million, taking $512 million instead of $408 million. 72 In that same year, 
further overspending of the Petroleum Fund, in the name of an Economic 
Stabilization Fund, was blocked when the courts found such overspending to be 
unconstitutional.73 This sharply increased level of spending, justified by references to 
poverty reduction and a /1 stimulus" to the economy,74 identifies the AMP 
government with a "big money" approach most consistent with economic liberalism. 
69 Tim Anderson, "Solidarity Aid: The Cuba-Timar Leste Health Program," International 
Journal of Cuban Studies, Issue 2 (December 2008), pp. 53-65, http: I I cubanstudies.plutojournals 
.org/Portals/8/Issues/ sissue_2_bw.pdf, accessed May 24, 2012. 
70 IMF, "Staff Report for the 2006 Article IV Consultation." 
71 RDTL, General Budget of the State 2005-06, Budget Paper No. 1, Dili, Ministry of Planning 
and Finance, Democratic Republic of Timor Leste, 2005; RDTL, General Budget of the State 
2008, Budget Paper No. 1, Dili, Ministry of Finance, Democratic Republic of Timor Leste, 2007; 
RDTL, 2010 State Budget, Dili, Republica Democratica de Timor Leste, Book 1, 2009. 
72 World Bank, "East Asia and Pacific Economic Update 2010," Vol. 1, Timor Leste, 2010, p. 71. 
73 RDTL, 2010 State Budget, p. 8. 
74 Ibid. 
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Some foreign advisers and economic liberal agencies75 had urged this stimulus 
spending, especially on infrastructure and on improving conditions for foreign 
investors. "Ramp up public spending/' the IMF said.76 The aim was to "lift 
Ieconomic] growth to a higher sustainable path." 77 The emphasis here is on current 
spending, consistent with the market economy approach to development, in which 
"future value" is discounted. Government spending can stimulate waves of new 
income and consumption in an economy. Such spending may be more useful if 
linked to the creation of valuable infrastructure, such as roads and schools, but can 
also be carried out in a wasteful manner. 
The chief stated aim of Timor-Leste's 2010 budget was infrastructure: 
The 2010 budget prioritizes investment in infrastructure. The future of our 
country depends upon the building of basic infrastructure. We need 
infrastructure to develop a modern and prosperous Timor-Leste.78 
Indeed, there was a very strong budget commitment to infrastructure. Planned 
expenditure rose from US$44.5 million in 2008 to $229 million in 2010, representing a 
jump from 15.8 percent to 28.5 percent of the state budget (see Table 2). However, the 
potential for waste and corruption is reinforced by the idea that the "stimulus" 
provided to private businesses is as much a legitimate policy aim as the 
infrastructure development itself. For example, under the August 2009 "Referendum 
Package"-comprising some $70 million of mostly infrastructure projects-the aim 
was to subcontract projects so that private companies would make a profit while 
constructing public facilities. However, dozens of projects were allocated outside 
normal government procedures, mostly to private companies, and many complaints 
of waste and corruption ensued.79 The secretary of state for public works1 Domingos 
Caero, rapidly acknowledged that "about 60 percent of the Referendum Package 
Projects are of bad quality" and said he was taking steps to penalize the companies 
involved.80 However, it seems likely that a similar pattern of subcontracting will be 
employed in the 2010-11 infrastructure budget, marked for roads, bridges, power 
generation, and other facilities. 81 
The concept of a stimulus was developed in wealthy countries with strong 
formal sectors. The idea was that weak consumer demand in a previously active 
75 For example, Jeffrey Sachs, "General Taur Matan Ruak Questions Jeffrey Sachs on 
International Aid," Tempo Semanal, April 5, 2010, http:/ /temposemanaltimor.blogspot.com 
/2010 /04/ general-taur-matan-ruak-questions.htrnl, accessed on April 30, 2012. 
76 IMF, "Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix," pp. 2, 5. 
77 Ibid., 2, 8; IMF, "Staff Report for the 2006 Article IV Consultation," pp. 10, 12, 21. 
78 Xanana Gusmao, in RDTL, 2010 State Budget, Dili, Republica Democratica de Tirnor Leste, 
Book 1, 2009, p. 15. 
79 Tempo Semanal, "Pakote Referendum Timor-Leste: Exclusive Major Government Document 
Leak," March 28, 2010, http:/ /temposemanaltimor.blogspot.com/2010/03/pakote-
referendum-timor-leste-exclusive.html, accessed April 30, 2012. 
8° FRETILIN.Media, "Government Admits 60% of Public Works Projects of 'Bad Quality,"' 
Media Release, Dili: Frente Revolucionaria do Timar Leste Independente, June 7, 2010, 
http:/ I fretilinmedia.blogspot.com/ 2010 I 06 I media-release-government-admits-60-of.html, 
accessed April 30, 2012. 
81 RDTL,2010 State Budget, pp. 15, 29. 
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formal economy could be reactivated by new spending. 82 However, this was not a 
developmental concept aimed at building new capacity. Indeed, such demand 
management was unable to address the structural changes of the 1970s in wealthy 
countries. Additional problems with such stimulus spending in less developed 
economies may include the money being captured by elites in the cities and formal 
sector, leaving little to "trickle down" to those in the rural, informal sector; large 
leakages to offshore accounts and wealthy consumption spending, which weakens 
any spin-offs or trickle down to other sectors; and a lack of coordination, 
undermining new capacity and the creation of new job-creating enterprises, 
especially when the so-called stimulus is carried out through private contracts. A 
developmental state emphasis would maintain greater control and coordination of 
infrastructure development. 
An unusual feature of Timor-Leste's fiscal policy in 2008 was the decision to cut 
a range of taxes, in particular, service taxes, income tax, and tariffs. This was a 
unilateral, economic liberal move, welcomed, but not really called for, by 
international agencies. In 2007, the IMF had discussed possible "tax reform" in 
Timor-Leste1 generally favoring tax reductions but admitting there was no strong 
evidence to indicate benefits. Indeed1 the IMF recognized that cuts to the non-oil tax 
system would "remove a useful discretionary fiscal policy instrument" and that 
retaining "some level of non-oil tax revenue would be prudent."83 Nevertheless, 
President Ramos-Horta called for the country to be "almost tax free1 " in a bid to 
attract foreign investment.84 A law along these lines was passed by the parliament in 
mid-2008 and was subsequently praised by the World Bank.85 The immediate effect 
was to narrow, even further, the "tax base" of the country, making the state even 
more dependent on the Petroleum Fund. There do not appear to be any offsetting 
investment dividends from this move. Political stability and improvements in 
infrastructure and public health would likely do more than the tax cuts did to attract 
investment in, say, the tourism sector. 
In agriculture, the major initiatives of 2008 were proposed biofuel projects. One 
of these extended the earlier proposal for subcontracted Jatropha farming, near 
Baucau.86 The other involved a proposed lease to a foreign company of 100,000 
hectares, about 20 percent of the country's arable land.87 It was argued that a 
sugarcane plantation on this land would create jobs. FRETILIN spokesperson 
82 For example, John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment. 
83 IMF, "Selected issues and Statistical Appendix," pp. 19-24. 
84 ABC, "Ramos Horta Calls for Timor to Be Tax Free," May 26, 2008, www.radioaustralia.net 
.au/ international I radio I onairhighlights I ramos-horta-calls-for-timor-to-be-tax-free, accessed 
May 24, 2012. 
85 World Bank, "Paying Taxes 2010: The Global Picture," 2010, www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-
taxes/pdf/paytax-2010.pdf, accessed May 24, 2012. 
86 RDTL-EDA, "Deed of Agreement for Carabella Bio-Oil Facility, Republica Democratica de 
Timor Leste and Enviroenergy Developments Australia" (ten-page agreement signed by 
Avelino da Silva, Secretary of State for Energy Policy and Edian Krsevan, Director EDA, 
February 13, 2008). 
87 MAP-GTLeste Biotech, "Memorandum of Understanding [concerning proposed sugar cane 
industry and lease of 100,000 hectares of land]," Dili, Ministerio da Agricultura e Pescas, MOU 
signed by Mariano Sabino, Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries and Gino Sakiris, Chairman 
of GTLeste Biotech, January 15, 2008. 
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Estanislau da Silva (the former agriculture minister) strongly criticized the large 
lease proposal: 
They say they are going to plant sugarcane ... [This] goes against what we 
are doing in terms of development and increasing food production and food 
[self-] reliance ... Two thousand jobs means nothing to me when you give 
away 100,000 hectares.88 
This was, indeed, a shift away from an autonomous agricultural and food security 
policy-based on domestic crops as the core of food security-toward a market 
economy approach, which emphasizes formal-sector industry, export-oriented 
cropping, and food security through cash-for-food exchanges. Yet the dangerous 
volatility of rice markets from 2006 onward should have warned against such an 
approach. The government sale of subsidized rice imports is said to have created 
hoarding, speculative markets, and corruption, as well as economic damage to local 
growers.89 This is an unstable "solution." 
The AMP government's commitment to education and health sounds good, but 
has not been matched in practice. The prime minister's 2010 Strategic Development 
Plan presents the admirable goal of "school construction and teacher training to 
ensure universal secondary school completion through Grade 12 by the year 2020."90 
This would be an achievement above that of most wealthy countries-and is 
possible; but those developing countries that have made strong advances in 
education have only done so after many years of strong and consistent investment in 
education and training. 
In contrast, the proportion of both Timor-Leste's state budget and total budget 
("combined sources," i.e., state plus donors, especially outside agencies) dedicated to 
education has fallen steadily since 2004-05. The 2010 state budget dedicates only 10.2 
percent to education, down from 15 percent five years earlier (see Table 2). Although 
the total budgets have grown larger and the absolute dollar amounts spent on 
education and health have also increased, the relative spending on education and 
health has fallen. In UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) terms, 
reducing the percentage being spent represents a weak commitment to education 
and health. 91 
The Strategic Development Plan (SOP) itself presents as a successor to the 
National Development Plan of 2002. It is an ambitious and optimistic document, 
88 Agence France-Presse, "Massive East Timor Land-for-Biofuel Plan Raises Hackles," Dili, 
June 24, 2008, http:/ /www.spacedaily.com/reports/Massive_East_Timor_Land_For_ 
Biofuel_Plan_Raises_Hackles_999.html, accessed April 30, 2012. 
89 Douglas Kammen and S. W. Hayati, "Crisis and Rice in East Timor," 2007, 
http:/ /www.etan.org/news/2007 /03food.htm, accessed April 30, 2012; Steve Holland et al., 
"East Timor PM Accused of Corruption," Radio Australia, June 26, 2009, 
http: I I www .radioaustralia.net.au I asiapac I stories I 200906 / s2610077.htm, accessed April 30, 
2012. 
90 OPM, "From Conflict to Prosperity: Timor Leste's Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030," 
Dili, Office of the Prime Minister, April 7, 2010. 
91 UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008-Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a 
Divided World (New York, NY: United Nations Development Programme, 2008), pp. 247-50, 
265-68, http:/ /hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf, accessed June 11, 
2012. 
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suggesting that Timor-Leste is set for huge increases in per capita income, that 
petroleum revenues will "provide substantial revenues for decades," and that the 
big-spending approach-including "withdrawing in excess of the ESI" and 
additional borrowing-is desirable and necessary.92 The SDP has some strong 
human-development language and, in contrast to AMP government practice, is less 
strong on economic liberal ideas. Nevertheless, it does see private investment as the 
key element in the petroleum sector, telecommunications, and agriculture.93 This 
document does not have the legitimacy of the earlier NDP, being basically a missive 
from the prime minister's office. After it was published, Prime Minister Gusmao 
sought "dialogue."94 In view of this genesis, it seems unlikely that this plan will 
survive the next change of government. 
International financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank) 
seem to have influenced AMP government policy and practice. The IMF took its 
typical narrow view of development in Timor-Leste, insisting that everything 
depends on economic growth: "To promote human development and reduce 
poverty, the growth rate of Timor-Leste's economy will need to accelerate 
markedly." 95 The AMP government's practical approach has been broadly consistent 
with this theme. That means that despite enhanced spending, there is less emphasis 
on those factors or sectors that do not contribute to apparent economic growth: a 
strong, informal, rural sector and development of human capabilities through 
participation, education, and health. 
MANAGING PETROLEUM FUNDS 
Both the FRETILIN-led and the AMP governments have demonstrated strong 
national will in struggles with the Australian government and Australia-based 
mining companies over petroleum revenues. There have been drawn-out disputes 
over maritime boundaries, royalty shares, and a gas refinery location. This political 
will shows the capacity to support development plans, but the impact of this is 
undermined, more recently, by reversion to market economy practice. This latter 
theme has become more pronounced in the AMP government's practice than in that 
of the former FRETILIN-led government. 
We can see this greater AMP government reliance on economic liberal 
arguments in the 2010-11 debates over changes to Timor-Leste's Petroleum Fund. 
This crucial fund began as a cautious mechanism for managing anticipated one-off 
flows of funds from oil and gas fields. Principles established by the Petroleum Fund 
Law 2005 (in turn, based on Article 139 of Timor-Leste's constitution) require the 
nation's natural resources to be owned by the state, "prudently managed," and used 
"in a fair and equitable manner" for the needs of "both current and future 
generations." 96 The law set up a governance structure for the fund, a regulated 
92 Office of the Prime Minister, "From Conflict to Prosperity: Timor Leste's Strategic 
Development Plan 2011-2030, Summary, pp. 4, 22, www.scribd.com/ doc/29934804/TIMOR% 
E2%80%90LESTE% E2 % 80% 995-Strategic-Development-Plan-2011-% E2%80% 93-2030, accessed 
May 24, 2012. 
93 Ibid., pp. 16-18. 
94 Ibid, p. 24. 
95 IMF, "Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix," p. 12. 
96 Article 11.4 of the Petroleum Fund Law 2005. 
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investment regime for its financial assets (mostly US-dollar bonds), and a process for 
"sustainable" withdrawal of revenues. 
Those basic principles enjoyed broad support when there was no money in the 
fund, but discontent grew as several billions of dollars accumulated. The AMP 
government drew strongly on the fund for a range of projects, but at a time of global 
recession when there were limited actual returns on the fund's mainly US-dollar 
bond investments. Particular risk factors for the fund include the state's extreme 
dependence on fund revenues. In the 2010 budget, the fund provided more than 90 
percent of local revenues.97 In addition, local financial management capacity was 
limited and, consequently, there were moves to contract less accountable external 
managers. In 2010, consulting firm Towers Watson, contracted by the Ministry of 
Finance, proposed a substantial shift of fund assets into externally managed 
equities. 98 Later, former World Bank official Jeffrey Sachs backed AMP government 
moves to draw down and spend more from the fund-a proposal questioned by then 
armed forces chief, General Taur Matan Ruak.99 
FRETILIN claimed credit for the initial conservative Petroleum Fund strategy, 
saying that it had protected the country's assets during the 2008 financial crisis.100 It 
continued to criticize the high-spending budgets of the AMP government. In late 
2010, the AMP released its proposal for amending the Petroleum Fund Law. 
Prominent was the enhanced role for the Minister of Finance, the use of external 
managers, and allowing up to 50 percent of the fund to be invested in stock markets, 
with the aim of nmaximizing the risk-adjusted financial returns" of the fund. 101 
FRETILIN opposed this plan, as well as the government for "non-transparent" and 
excessive spending, especially on infrastructure programs.102 
Greater spending (which would put at risk long-term revenue streams from the 
fund) is consistent with an economic liberal emphasis on stimulating the economy 
(e.g., through infrastructure projects) to produce new rounds of economic activity. 
This approach heavily discounts future returns in favor of supposed near-term 
benefits from current spending. It is less consistent with developmental state and 
human development strategies, which would place greater emphasis on education 
and training and institutional development, both of which are long-term projects 
with little short-term economic impact. Going for high-risk investments, hoping for 
high returns, is also consistent with economic liberalism, with its focus on greater 
"market participation." 
Timor Leste's fund is small, and its managers have limited levels of financial 
expertise. Nevertheless, the state has rapidly developed an extreme dependence on 
fund revenue. Countries with higher levels of skilled personnel relative to Timor-
97 RDTL, 2010 State Budget. 
98 Peter J. Ryan-Kane, "Timar Leste Petroleum Fund: From Oil to Financial Assets: Planning 
for a Sustainable Future for Timar Leste," public presentation by Towers Watson to Finance 
Ministry, Dili, March 2010. 
99 Sachs, "General Taur Matan Ruak Questions Jeffrey Sachs on International Aid." 
10° FRETILIN, "Fretilin Investment Strategy Protects Timar Leste's Petroleum Fund," Media 
Release, Dili, Frente Revolucionaria do Timar Leste Independente, October 15, 2008. 
101 Ministry of Finance, "First Alteration to Petroleum Fund Law No. 9 I 2005 of 20 June," 
Legislation Proposal, October 20, 2010, Article 14. 
102 For example, FRETILIN, "Timar Leste Government Raids Petroleum Fund Ignoring the 
Law," Media Release, Dili, Frente Revoludonaria do Timor Leste Independente, January 27,· 
2011. 
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Leste' s might better manage exposure to risk in volatile financial and equity markets, 
but the particular developmental features of Timor-Leste otherwise suggest a more 
cautious approach. Given the poor returns of US bonds and the steady depreciation 
of the US dollar, a change to the law was necessary. However, rather than an anxiety 
to maximize returns and spend even more, a move into diversified bonds-along 
with cautious expansion of direct investment options, while slowly building 
domestic financial management capacity-would retain most of the prudential 
aspects of the initial regime. 103 
THE NEGLECTED SECTORS 
Development of the key sectors of agriculture, education, and health remains 
fragile. There are gaps between rhetoric and commitment, such as in the area of 
agriculture. With most of the population dependent on informal-sector farming-
and with the entire population affected by failures in staple-food production-every 
government has stressed the importance of support for rural farming communities. 
Yet no government has matched this concern with substantial investment. This 
sector, which engages and employs as much as 80 percent of Timor-Leste's 
population104 has never received more than 5 percent of the state budget (see Table 
2). Small farmers have been mostly left to their own devices. 
Why is small farming so undervalued? For one thing, it is not "counted" well by 
economists, nor by those who rely on market economy information. Subsistence 
production and a great deal of informal work and exchange are simply not added to 
the national accounts. Even the UNDP-generally more heterodox in economic 
matters-adopts this misleading approach. For example, in the 2006 Human 
Development Report for Timor-Leste, the country is said to need "sustained 
economic growth" for "tackling rural poverty." The report goes on to note: 
Growth will have to start with agriculture, which employs around three-
quarters of the labour force. Most farmers are engaged in subsistence 
cultivation . .. average landholdings are around 1.2 hectares. Currently 
productivity is low: output per worker is less than one-tenth of that in 
industry and services and, as a result, agriculture generates only one-fifth of 
GDP.105 
This is a basic misreading of the agricultural sector. The confusion comes from 
conflating a large informal sector with formal sector macroaggregates. To put it 
another way, they have not included proper estimates of subsistence and informal 
sector production. Production in rural subsistence sectors is often underestimated.106 
103 See Tim Anderson, "The Petroleum Fund and Development Strategy in Timor Leste" (a 
Report for Timor Leste's Petroleum Fund Consultative Council, Dili, June, 2010). 
104 ACIAR, "Rebuilding Agriculture in East Timor," Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research, 2011, http: I I aciar.gov.au/ files I node I 665 /Rebuilding%20Agriculture 
%20in%20East%20Timor.pdf, accessed April 30, 2012. 
105 UNDP, "Path Out of Poverty," p. 3. 
106 John Gibson, "The Economic and Nutritional Importance of Household Food Production in 
PNG," in Food Security for Papua New Guinea, ed. M. Bourke, G. Allen, and J. Salisbury, 
Proceedings for the Papua New Guinea Food and Nutrition 2000 Conference (Lae: PNG 
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It seems likely that agriculture contributes the major part of Timor-Leste's national 
production, given that more than 75 to 80 percent of the population rely on it for 
their food and livelihoods.107 
Understating the economic value of small farming contributes to the logic of 
governments pushing small farmers from their lands to make way for large export 
crop plantations. This is precisely what happened with the oil palm developments in 
Indonesia after the Asian Financial Crisis. The big plantations may increase GDP, but 
the displacement impact on small farming could easily lower total production, as 
well as dislocate large communities. Rural poverty could very well increase. 
The alternative is to more decisively support rural communities, to help them do 
better in their current farming and expand their domestic market opportunities, 
while backing up these communities with essential services. Better estimates of 
subsistence production can strengthen government commitments to deliver on their 
promises of extension services, local market facilities, food storage, and improved 
local roads. Export markets can come second. 
Closely related to support for small farming is the recognition of customary land 
rights, and resisting the temptation to give over alienated or "unused" land to large 
export crop plantations. Timor-Leste's 2002 Constitution, at section 54.4, specifies 
that only East Timorese "natural persons" can own land-neither corporations nor 
foreigners can. There was good reason for this. Community and family control of 
land for small farming provides the basis for livelihoods, food security, social 
security, and environmental protection. Export capacity would better build on this 
basis rather than displace it. The multiple benefits of small farming have only 
recently been more widely recognized. 108 Large plantations, on the other hand, bring 
the particular dangers of dispossession, displacement, environmentally damaging 
monocultures, and food insecurity. The experience of Haiti is one the best recent 
examples of this.109 
Another neglected sector under the AMP government has been health care. The 
apparent decline in commitment to health care-from 12 percent of the state budget 
in 2005-06 to less than 6 percent in 2010-is alarming, given the health care needs of 
the country. The Ministry of Health's Mid Term Expenditure Framework, developed 
in 2007, expected that 12 percent of the state budget would be earmarked for 
health;110 clearly, there has been a retreat from this position. The AMP may have 
become complacent over its commitment to health care, by relying on the huge 
Cuban health program. While there have been some investments in health, these will 
have to be scaled up substantially to make good use of the hundreds of medical 
students returning from Cuba. Failure to do so will risk losing many of those highly 
trained young people to emigration or other careers. The big surge in trained 
doctors, expected between 2010 and 2013, is a rare opportunity that needs careful 
management, and significant investment. 
University of Technology, 2000), pp. 37-44; and Anderson, "Land Registration, Land Markets, 
and Livelihoods in Papua New Guinea." 
107 ACIAR, "Rebuilding Agriculture in East Timor"; and UNDP, "Path Out of Poverty," p. 3. 
108 For example, Marcel Mazoyer, "Protecting Small Farmers and the Rural Poor in the Context 
of Globalization," Rome, United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization, 2001, 
http:/ /www.fao.org/DOCREP /007 /Y1743E/Y1743EOO.htrn, accessed April 30, 2012. 
109 Georges, Josiane, "Trade and the Disappearance of Haitian Rice," TED Case Studies No. 
725, June 2004, http:/ /www1.american.edu/TED /haitirice.htm, accessed April 30, 2012. 
110 Rui Araujo, personal communication, May 2010. 
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The steady decline in the budget commitment to education is also alarming, 
given Timor-Leste's rapidly growing and relatively young population. Despite 
expanding budgets overall, and despite Prime Minister Gusmao' s commendable goal 
of universal secondary school enrollment by 2020,111 the state's commitment to the 
education sector has fallen from 15 percent to 10 percent of the state budget. This 
level of funding is inadequate for the stated goal. 
Although Timor-Leste's relative performance in education is better than its per 
capita income would suggest-we have to look thirty places up the HDI (Human 
Development Index) rankings to South Africa to find another country that has a 
similar (above 70 percent) combined gross enrollment rate112-Timor-Leste's 
commitment to education is weak and compares poorly to other countries. 
Moreover, the country's literacy deficit falls more heavily on women than men. In 
2004, only 43.9 percent of adult females in Timor-Leste were literate, compared with 
56.3 percent of adult males. 113 Developing countries on average commit 14 to 15 
percent of their government budgets to education. Those that want rapid progress in 
human development must do much better than this. Twenty-two developing 
countries dedicate more than 20 percent of their government budgets to education; 
and a couple allocate more than 30 percent.114 Against its low education commitment, 
Timor-Leste has the fourth highest rate of natural population growth on earth, at 3.1 
percent per year.115 This should prompt a greater commitment to education, not a 
diminished one. Meeting the universal secondary schooling goal of the 2010 Strategic 
Development Plan in the next decade would likely require that something closer to 
30 percent of the total budget be committed for education. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter explained three competing approaches to development strategy: 
those that emphasize the market economy, those that emphasize the role of the 
developmental state, and those that emphasize a human development approach. It 
has been argued that the market economy approach is counterproductive to a 
genuine development process and, instead, represents the preferred model of large 
corporations and those countries that have attained a fair degree of market 
dominance in international trade and investment. The latter two approaches, on the 
other hand, represent contemporary currents of genuine development strategy, 
directing the transformation of country capacity and building human resources for 
such change. 
All three strategies are embodied to varying degrees in the various hybrids of 
Timor-Leste's National Development Plan, the practice of the FRETILIN-led 
government of 2001-06 and the AMP coalition of 2007-11. The NDP was a necessary 
hybrid, with distinct influences from international agencies. It has strong economic 
liberal influences, moderated by some developmental state influences in the areas of 
planning and natural resource management, and some human development 
111 OPM, "From Conflict to Prosperity," p. 14. 
112 UNDP, Human Development Report 2007-08 (New York, NY: United Nations Development 
Programme, 2008), p. 231. 
113 UNDP, "Path Out of Poverty," p. 15. 
114 UNDP, Human Development Report 2007-08, Table 11. 
115 UNDP, Human Development Report 2009, Table L. 
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emphases in terms of participation and a more equitable approach to education, 
women, and rural development. 
The adopted strategies of the two post-independence governments were inferred 
more from their practice than from policy statements, due to the increased 
inclusiveness of policy language. The Fretilin-led government built on the National 
Development Plan, but pursued more heterodox, human development policies, with 
elements of development state ideas in agriculture, finance, education, and health. 
The AMP coalition had strong market economy influences, consistent with IMF 
advice. While the AMP asserted some human development themes in its 2010 
Strategic Development Plan, its big spending stimulus approach coupled with weak 
investment in education and health was more indicative of economic liberalism. 
There are serious implications of such an approach, particularly for the neglected 
sectors of agriculture, education, and health. It is hoped that this discussion 
encourages further debate on development strategy, particularly within Timor-Leste. 
BETWEEN EARTH AND HEAVEN: 
THE POLITICS OF GENDER 
Sara Niner 
In this chapter, I will discuss the central issues surrounding gender in the 
contemporary post-conflict environment of Timor-Leste. Understandings of what it 
is to be a man or a woman are central to these issues and underlay the everyday 
experiences of people's lives. At the heart of the many challenges surrounding 
gender in Timor is how understandings of female and male in indigenous culture 
have evolved throughout Timorese history to shape the modern gender roles and 
relations that exist today. One illustration of indigenous understandings comes from 
a central myth of the Mambai people, who recount the beginnings of humankind 
from a union between Mother Earth, or Ina Lu, and Father Heaven, represented by 
the sun, the god-like Maromak, the Shining One.1 In this myth, Ina Lu first gave birth 
to Tata Mai Lau, the highest and most sacred of mountains, and then to all other 
natural elements and living things. She came to rest with her feet firmly pressing 
back the waters in the north, calming and controlling the female sea but leaving her 
back to the unrestrained and wild male sea, which is feared and treacherous. 2 This 
and other such beliefs provide insight into the complementary relations between 
men and women that permeate indigenous Timorese thought and what this means 
for women and men today. 
nGENDER" IS ABOUT WOMEN AND MEN 
The concept of gender has been much misunderstood in Timor-Leste and is often 
perceived to be associated with aid and development programs that target and favor 
women, sometimes at the expense of men. The use of the word culture is similarly 
1 Elizabeth Traube, "Mambai Perspectives on Colonialism and Decolonization," in East Timar 
at the Crossroads, ed. Peter Carey and Carter Bentley (London: SSRC & Cassell, 1995), p. 46. 
2 Elizabeth Traube, Cosmology and Social Life: Ritual Exchange among the Mambai of East Timar 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 39; Patricia Thatcher, "The Timor-Born in 
Exile in Australia" (master's thesis, Melbourne, Monash University, 1993), p. 64; Elizabete Lim 
Gomes, "Birth in the Great Mountain Tatamailau," in Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timar, 
Indonesia and the World Community, ed. Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Shalom (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), p. 105. 
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laden with confusion but, here, refers to the beliefs, customs, practices, and social 
behavior of a people, which are understood to change over time. Education is 
required to foster better understandings of "gender" as a term referring to the roles 
and responsibilities ascribed to men and women across different cultures and 
societies. To implement such an educational program will necessitate much debate 
and the addressing of different understandings about which human behaviors are 
"natural," or biologically determined by sex, and which are learned and prescribed 
by family, society, culture, or religion. Within the field of gender theory, it is 
generally accepted that gender roles and relations between the sexes are socially 
constructed and negotiated in those specific environments. Many people will not 
even be aware of how much their behavior is learned and influenced by the 
unwritten rules of gendered behavior that influence their particular social group. 
The term "gender relations" refers to the hierarchical relations of power between 
men and women that, all over the world, usually favor men. Social systems that 
privilege men are called patriarchal, and those that give women social and political 
power are called matriarchal (these are less common). Traditional gender roles and 
relations differ enormously throughout the world and across cultures and are forever 
changing and evolving. Traditions, described simply as "repetitive cultural 
patterns/' are "constantly prone to innovations reflecting specific presents and 
anticipated futures." 3 Some theorists believe traditions are, essentially, inventions 
and reinventions based on power hierarchies,4 and this is particularly true for gender 
relations. These ideas too need much wider discussion in Timor-Leste.5 
The contemporary interest in the social construction of gender, both masculine 
and feminine, has largely been a consequence of the feminist movement and its 
attempt to make the world a fairer place for women. This interest in improving the 
lives of women has been broadened to focus not just on women and the inequities 
they suffer, but on gender roles more generally and how gender relations are created 
and reproduced. It takes conscious effort to entrench and maintain power and 
gender hierarchies and cultivate the preferred types of masculinity and femininity 
that accomplish this process of entrenchment. The success of these efforts can be 
measured by the outcomes, such as access to political power and resources. New 
studies, too, have not just focused on the negotiated relationships between men and 
women but also on those among groups of men and among women, and the 
crosscutting influences of class and race. 
There is no universal form of masculinity or femininity-differences in what 
constitutes "the masculine" or "the feminine" are determined by a range of variables, 
including class, ethnicity, age, religion, disability, and sexual orientation. However, 
one important idea that has developed in this regard is the idea of a "hegemonic 
masculinity," described as an idealized, dominant, heterosexual masculinity 
constructed in relation to women, and also in relation to subordinated masculinities 
such as those marking homosexual men or less powerful men. According to Raewyn 
3 Jill Forshee, Between the Folds: Stories of Cloth, Lives, and Travels in Sumba (Honolulu, HI: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2001), p. 8. 
4 Cf. Anthony Giddens, Runaway World (London: Profile Books, 2002), p. 40. 
5 CEDA W, "Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women [CEDAW], Timar Leste, 44th Session," July 20 to August 7, 2009, 
http: I I daccess-ods. un.org I access.nsf I Get?Open&DS=CEDA WI C /TLS I CO I l&Lang=E, 
accessed June 13, 2012. 
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Connell, this idea of hegemonic masculinity has become a If significant critique of the 
often negative expressions of men's power around the world."6 It is understood that 
many men take their privileges (such as access to work and higher incomes, capacity 
to own land, access to domestic services from women, and decision-making power) 
for granted, ignorant that these privileges are not natural but are sustained through 
cultural practices.7 The analysis of such cultural practices is therefore crucial. 
These analyses of gender relations and hierarchies within the broader 
dimensions of power and social difference are used as tools to challenge inequality. 
The overriding goal both of feminism and of gender and development programs is 
gender equity, whereby men and women have similar opportunities-equal access 
to resources, education, and work and the ability (and freedom) to direct their own 
lives. The establishment of gender equity usually requires reforms to legislation, 
equal opportunity advocacy, and programs and economic empowerment initiatives, 
but it also requires deep-seated changes to culture, a process that has proven much 
more difficult to induce. New approaches and interventions are more inclusive of 
men and multifarious, a condition that highlights the need to challenge existing 
hierarchies and relations and foster the empowerment of oppressed and 
marginalized groups. 
GENDER IN POSTWAR SOCIETY AND TIMOR-LESTE 
Observing that violence and war has profound social and psychological impacts 
on the survivors and the society that emerges from the conflict appears an obvious 
point to make. Yet these circumstances are now often forgotten in discussions about 
post-conflict Timor-Leste, as more than ten years have passed since the conclusion of 
the long and brutal Indonesian occupation (1975-99).8 It is clear from studies of post-
conflict environments that violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, 
does not conform to "the timelines of peace treaties and ceasefires but endures past 
them." Those who have fought and committed violence are rarely formally 
counseled nor are "the deep imprinting of violent masculinities ... and the effects of 
militarism on the society overall" charted or addressed.9 This is substantially the case 
in Timor-Leste. 
6 R. W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the 
Concept," Gender and Society 19,6 (2005): 832. 
7 Oxfam, Gender Equality and Men: Learning from Practice, ed Sandy Ruxton (Oxford: Oxfam, 
2004), p. 8. 
8 J. Modvig, J. Pagaduan-Lopez, J. Rodenburg, C. M. D. Salud, R. V. Cabigon, and C. I. A. 
Panelo, "Torture and Trauma in Post-conflict East Timor," Lancet 356,9243 (2000): 1763. It is 
safe to assume that this type of trauma affects most families. A study carried out in 2000 
documented that nearly all Timorese had experienced at least one traumatic event during the 
Indonesian occupation. Three-quarters had experienced combat and more than half had come 
dose to death; 12 percent had lost children to political violence; 57 percent had been tortured; 
and 22 percent had witnessed the murder of relatives or friends. One-third of the population 
was classified as having post-traumatic stress, and 20 percent of these people believed they 
would never recover. 
9 Naomi Cahn and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, "Gender, Masculinities, and Transition in Conflicted 
Societies," New England Law Review (2010), George Washington University Law Schoot Public 
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 481, pp. 116, 118, http:/ /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1516709, accessed June 13, 2012. 
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The Indonesian occupation of East Timar and the associated trauma have 
resulted in a brutalized and more violent society. One of the 2005 findings of the East 
Timorese National Commission for Truth, Reception, and Reconciliation (or 
Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconcilia<;ao, CAVR) was a causal link 
between the period of armed conflict and current high levels of domestic violence 
and sexual assault: Male survivors of detention and torture, now perpetrators of 
violence themselves, reported this directly to the Commission.10 Henri Myrttinen too 
describes the "domestication" of the violence of the conflict.11 Outbreaks of national-
level violence will be discussed later. 
While conflict has profound negative impacts on society and affects women and 
men differently, war has also often empowered women. The conflict in East Timor 
shifted women's economic, social, and political roles, as war has done repeatedly 
around the world, and many women were challenged to act more independently 
than they had previously. In East Timar, the war forced many women to take up 
roles outside the domestic sphere for the first time. Not only did women lose 
husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons to the war, making it necessary for them to 
provide for their families by entering an economic sphere previously closed to them, 
but women also played a major part in the resistance fronts: military, political civil, 
and diplomatic. 
In 2001, leading Timorese feminist Milena Pires explained that male combatants 
were returning home to a changed society. While they had been fighting and hiding 
in the mountains, Timorese women had been "holding the fort at home" and, in 
some cases, furthering their education overseas. She continued, "Women were 
involved at every level ... they helped run the camps, sent supplies, smuggled 
information. And now as men come out of hiding, the women don't want to return 
to their traditional roles. It is a very traditional Catholic society which has been 
frozen by years of war."12 The war also meant that any modern ideas of gender 
equity were muted, although not altogether absent. 
The pressure in postwar societies for women to return to their prewar status and 
roles often becomes a site of conflict between men and women, both privately and 
publicly. A pertinent example of this is the 1950s backlash against women in postwar 
America.13 Today in Timor-Leste, in the postwar environment, gender roles are now 
being renegotiated, creating a tension between the "traditional" role for women and 
ideas of a more modern, dynamic1 and public role for women. This situation is 
complicated by the facts that the occupation lasted for so long and the population is 
10 CA VR, Chega! Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East 
Timar (Dili: CAVR, 2006), http:/ /www.etan.org/news/2006/ cavr.htm, accessed May 1, 2012. 
11 Henri Myrttinen, "Masculinities, Violence, and Power in Timar Leste," Revue Lusotopie XII, 
1-2 (2005): 233. Henri Myrttinen also asserts that the post-conflict period has benefited women 
more than men, although this may be pure perception on the part of men. He argues that the 
availability of more jobs for women, in a climate of underemployment, has created men who 
are "jealous of the non-traditional role of a female breadwinner, or feel threatened in their 
masculinity as they are not able to fulfil their perceived duties as men." Henri Myrttinen, 
"Poster Boys No More: Gender and Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste," Policy Paper No. 
31, Geneva, Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2009, p. 13. 
12 Mary O'Kane, "Return of the Revolutionaries," Guardian, January 14, 2001, www.guardian. 
co.uk/world/2001/jan/15/indonesia.gender, accessed June 13, 2012. 
13 Cahn and Ni Aolain, "Gender, Masculinities, and Transition." 
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so young, so that it is hard to define what this somewhat idealized "traditional" role 
for women was before 1975. 
"Culture" is often given as the reason why women cannot participate in politics 
or why it is difficult to implement gender equity in Timor-Leste. Although women 
activists protest against this "cultural relativism," the resistance to change is strong.14 
Moreover, a portion of the senior male political leadership has patriotically 
promoted a "traditional" indigenous culture while denigrating international 11gender 
equity" policies as foreign irnpositions.15 Regarding comparable post-conflict 
situations, some have argued that a desire for normalcy and healing can make "the 
certainties of patriarchal institutions and tradition seem therapeutic."16 Carolyn 
Graydon documents similar processes of "retraditionalisation" and a backlash 
against women in contemporary Timor-Leste.17 One Timorese woman, who was part 
of the emerging women's movement in the 1970s, states that the claim that the 
concept of equality for women arrived only with the United Nations in 1999 is 
simply "an attempt to discredit [gender equality] as a foreign and imposed notion." 18 
The view that gender equity is incompatible with traditional culture is disputed not 
only by Timorese feminists, but also by cultural activists who are offended that some 
use Timorese culture to justify discrimination and violence against women.19 
THE EVOLUTION OF GENDER IN TIMOR 
Babel 
The fixed, "traditional" role for women that I have cited bears closer 
examination, with an investigation of gender roles in indigenous society. Here an 
important observation was made in 1944 by the anthropologist Mendes Correa, who 
described the Portuguese colony of Timar as a "Babel ... a melting pot," referring to 
the diverse mix of traditions that are still strongly apparent today. Original neolithic 
peoples were joined by waves of Papuan migrants and Austronesian migrants from 
Southeast Asia over a period of centuries, so that today approximately eighteen 
different languages are spoken in Timor-Leste. Although there are many cultural 
differences between the distinct ethnolinguistic groups-for example, various groups 
14 Irena Cristalis and Catherine Scott, Independent Women: The Story of Women's Activism in 
Timor-Leste (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 2005), p. 101-2. 
15 Hilary Charlesworth and Mary Wood, "Women and Human Rights in the Rebuilding of 
East Timor," Nordic Journal of International Law 71 (2002): 334-36; Nina Hall, "East Timorese 
Women Challenge Domestic Violence," Australian Journal of Political Science 44,2 (2009): 309-12, 
318-19. 
16 Mike Kesby, /1 Arenas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerrilla Struggle and 
Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe 1972-1980," Journal of Southern African Studies 22,4 
(1996): 561-84. 
17 Carolyn Graydon, "Time to Get Serious about Women's Rights in Timor-Leste: Wrestling 
Change from the Grassroots Up," in Timor-Leste: Challenges for Justice and Human Rights in the 
Shadow of the Past, ed. William Binchy, Asian Law and Human Rights Series (Dublin: Trinity 
College 2009), pp. 386, 416. 
18 Safi Ospina, "Participation of Women in Politics and Decision-Making in Timor-Leste: A 
Recent History" (Dili: UNIFEM, 2006) p. 19. 
19 Jose "Josh" Trindade, '"Feta Mak Maromak': Traditional Concepts of Gender in Timor-Leste," 
paper delivered to "Understanding Timor-Leste: Timor-Leste Studies Association 
Conference," Dili, University of Timor-Leste, July 2-3, 2009. 
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may consider themselves as either autochthonous or migratory, or as favoring 
matriarchal or patriarchal systems-most share similar cosmological beliefs and 
social structures. According to the 2010 Timor-Leste Government Census, the largest 
Malayo- or Austronesian-language speaking groups are the Tetun Praca (385,269 
individuals), Tetum Terik (63,519), Mambai (131,361), Tokodete (39,483), Kemak 
(61,969), and Baikenu (62,201). The main groups of Papuan or Melanesian mother-
tongue speakers include the Bunak (55,837t Fataluku (37,779), and Makassae 
(101,854). 20 
Timorese indigenous societies lived according to an ancient animist belief system 
referred to as Lulik. The local hereditary king, or liurai, was regarded as having 
divine attributes. Both women and men of the liurai class were, and still are, very 
powerful. Members of the liurai's extended family were part of the data, the nobility; 
below them were the common farming people and, lower still, a caste of slaves.21 
These kingdoms were linked in complex political alliances renewed by ritual 
exchange and marriage. A modern or hybrid patronage system that appears to 
operate in Timor-Leste today has been referred to as liurai-ism.22 
These indigenous societies share qualities, too, in their social and political 
organization, which revolves around concepts of complementary dualism such as 
feto-mane (male-female), tasi feto-tasi mane (north-south), rai ulun-rai ikun (east-
west), ema laran-ema liur (insider-outsider).23 These dualisms are woven through the 
hierarchical social system and a social order that establishes precedence and 
hierarchy. Social status is attributed in continually recurring patterns to persons and 
groups in relation to one another. In this way, women can be socially superior to 
men depending on the complementary category to which they are assigned. In 
cosmology, the visible and tangible secular world, rai, lies on the earth's surface and 
is dominated by men, while the sacred world, rai laran (the world inside), is 
dominated by female ancestral ghosts. 
Anthropological accounts confirm the prominence given to women in ritual 
practices and the centrality of fertility as a powerful and sought after asset, with 
female symbology of womb and mother earth significant.24 Jose Trindade highlights 
the sacredness accorded women across Timorese cultures and the prominence of the 
divine female element in much indigenous belief. 25 There is very little feminist 
analysis present in these anthropological works, and the characterization by 
20 
"Population Distribution by Mother Tongue-Urban, Rural, and District," Timor-Leste 
Ministry of Finance, Timor-Leste Census 2010, Vol. 2, Table 13, pp. 205-6, www.mof.gov.tl/ 
about-the-ministry I statistics-indicators I statistics-and-census I ?lang=en, accessed June 13, 
2012. Note that Tetun Praca is a local lingua franca. The full range of languages spoken in 
Timor-Leste is shown on maps in Frederic Durand, East Timar, A Country at the Crossroads of 
Asia and the Pacific: A Geohistorical Atlas (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2006), pp. 46-48, 95. 
21 Thatcher, "The Timar-Born in Exile in Australia," p. 48. 
22 Geoffrey Gunn and Reyko Huang, New Nation: United Nations Peacebuilding in East Timar 
(Macao, Tipographica Hung Heng, 2006), p. 123. 
23 Jose 'Josh' Trindade, "Feta Mak Maromak: Traditional Concepts of Gender in Timor-Leste," 
paper delivered to Understanding Timor-Leste: Timor-Leste Studies Association Conference, 
Dili, University of Timor-Leste, July 2-3, 2009. 
24 James Fox, ed., The Flow of Life: Essays on Eastern Indonesia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1980); Traube, Cosmology and Social Life; David Hicks, Tetum Ghosts and Kin: 
Fertility and Gender in East Timar (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2004). 
25 Trindade, '"Feta Mak Maromak.'" 
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anthropologists of the roles of male and female as complementary does not imply 
symmetry. While myth and belief make up fertile ground for the imagining (or 
reimagining) of a powerful place for women in Timorese society, today roles are not 
equal or equitable as we understand these terms in a more prosaic, modern sense 
(see section on Women and Men's Contemporary Status). Furthermore, while a 
woman's fertility determines and can extend her social status within both family and 
society, it appears today that women are severely limited to and by that primary 
role. 
The mythological inner world is feminine, maternal, and sacred, while the outer 
world is masculine, paternal, and secular, and, according to this indigenous logic, 
women and girls are consigned to this internal or domestic sphere rather than the 
external or public sphere. Therefore, women generally have not had a strong public 
or political voice in Timar but may hold power in a deeper, less obvious way, such as 
in social exchanges and rituals.26 Domestic duties, including care of children and 
preparation of food for private and public events, are the sole domain of women, and 
men would suffer a loss of status if seen carrying out such tasks. While this may 
explain the formidable positions many women hold within households, it also means 
the full burden of domestic chores and childrearing falls to them. 
Society in Timor-Leste remains very hierarchical and senior or elite women hold 
powerful positions, therefore any gender analysis with respect to Timor must be 
modified with this class awareness. Class, or caste, is so strictly observed in the more 
traditional sections of Timorese society that elite and middle-class women are 
invested with much more power and privilege than non-dominant men. Even 
though there are numerous powerful elite women in Timorese public life today, this 
does not mean that they all act to increase the power, rights, and authority of 
Timorese women more generally, or address the deeper structural patterns in society 
that oppress women. Further implications for political leadership and the women's 
movement will be discussed later. 
Bar lake 
Indigenous kinship and alliances systems are maintained through marriage. 
These relations are focused in the Timorese ritual, or sacred, houses (uma lulik), 
which represent the social hierarchies of origin, ancestry, and descent.27 Customary 
practices that regulate marriage and relations between the families or clans of the 
bride and groom are called barlake (or barlaque), and these are integral to a wider, 
complex system of social action and ritual exchange that creates social bonds and 
harmony. Barlake customs demonstrate the central importance of women and their 
fertility in Timorese indigenous society and are another way of reimagining a 
powerful place for women in society. 
Barlake creates relationships involving a lifelong commitment to provide mutual 
support between the families of the bride and groom and an ongoing exchange of 
goods and duties in the context of ritual life and death ceremonies. The value of the 
26 Sofi Ospina and Tanja Hohe, "Traditional Power Structures and Local Governance in East 
Timor: A Case Study of the Community Empowerment Project (CEP)" (Geneva: Graduate 
Institute of Development Studies, 2002), p. 110. 
27 Andrew McWilliam, "Houses of Resistance in Timor-Leste: Structuring Sociality in the New 
Nation," Anthropological Forum 15,l (2005): 27-44. 
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barlake exchange is in accordance with the status of the uma lulik and that class of the 
families involved, and, more pragmatically, what they have the capacity to offer. 
Marked differences exist in barlake between rnatrilineal and patrilineal groups, with 
the value of exchanges and associated rituals being less in matrilineal cornrnunities.28 
Today there are significant changes to these practices, based in part on a shift in 
gender roles and criticisms that they contribute to domestic violence. 
The exchange of goods between a bride's and groom's families is made up of a 
number of elements of equal value, but this appears, for the most part, to be on a 
symbolic level only (as the gifts from the bride's family are viewed as symbolically 
more valuable because they are associated with fertility). Nowadays the bride and 
groom's families can exchange money (of equivalent value) in place of goods. 
Such commodification, along with an asymmetrical exchange of goods, favoring 
the bride's family, encourages the perception that women and their fertility are being 
paid for. A central criticism of barlake by the modern women's movement is that this 
exchange, often now reduced and referred to as a dowry, or bride-price, creates in 
the groom and his family a sense that they own the woman who has joined their 
family through marriage, a condition cited as a major factor in domestic violence and 
undue pressure on married women to produce children. These processes of 
commodification have happened in other parts of the world, such as India, and have 
had negative effects on women's lives. Yet many women in Timor still speak in favor 
of barlake; they say it values them and is an important part of their culture.29 One 
hears women defend the barlake particularly in any context that notes its degradation 
during the Indonesian occupation-a period when women experienced a profound 
loss of security and status. A key distinction in this debate is between the use of the 
terms value and price, and this needs to be explored further. A focus on the original 
principles of barlake, rather than the amounts exchanged, may improve the outcomes 
for women. 
Some recent research reports that domestic violence is as prevalent in matrilineal 
communities (where barlake exchanges are low) as in patrilineal communities, 
suggesting that barlake is only one of several factors that may lead to increased 
domestic violence. 30 A deeper analysis may be needed to disengage customary 
practices, like barlake, from entrenched socialized practices that have developed in 
Timor-Leste. However these factors are so interwoven that separating them out will 
be difficult. Allowing that cultural practices evolve and transform over time, a more 
fruitful approach may be to work with customary authorities to improve how 
women are regarded and treated within those systems. 
Caravels 
The process of studying and understanding what a "traditional" role for women 
is in Timor-Leste must also take into account the effects of Portuguese colonialism. 
Xavier do Amaral, one of the original leaders of FRETILIN, the modern nationalist 
28 Sofi Ospina, draft report with author, 2009. 
29 Alola Foundation, "Weaving Women's Stories," unpublished booklet, Dili, 2002. 
30 These findings are based on an August 2010 interview conducted in Dili by the author with 
a researcher from Fokupers (the local and oldest women's NGO in Timor-Leste), who carried 
out the research into the relationship between barlake practices and the prevalence of domestic 
violence. For various reasons the research report is not available. 
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movement of the 1970s, attributes a feminist agenda to the most famous rebel against 
Portuguese colonialism, Dom Boaventura.31 Boaventura led an armed rebellion 
against the Portuguese in 1911. While it was far too early in the century for 
Boaventura to have developed a fully feminist consciousness, Amaral argues that 
one of Boaventura' s grievances was the sexual abuse and exploitation of Timorese 
women by the Portuguese. The idea of protecting women and keeping them safe at 
home must have become more firmly entrenched as a result of Portuguese 
colonialism and Timorese resistance to Portuguese abuse of women. 
For most of the twentieth century, eastern Timor was ruled directly from 
Portugal by the fascist dictatorship of Salazar. The colony remained neglected and 
closeted from any modern liberal ideas. Colonial society was strictly hierarchically 
ordered, with the upper echelons peopled by the Portuguese military and civilian 
officers. Beneath them, Timorese society was ordered according to three main social 
classes: an upper class of the old, elite, mixed-race persons, mesticos, and the liurai 
families; a middle class of mestico and educated native Timorese; and a lower class of 
the mass of uneducated native Timorese. The colonial administration was 
overwhelmingly maintained by an urbanized and "Portugalized" mestico elite. These 
socially prominent, "white collar patricians" believed it was their duty and right to 
lead the community, and their attitude toward the native Timorese was "both aloof 
and paternalistic." One anthropologist commented that most in Timor had "what can 
only be described as an obsession with social rank."32 Education was key to class 
mobility and generally limited to a privileged minority, typically the sons of liurais 
and mesticos. However1 elite girls too could be educated1 typically by orders of nuns, 
with a heavy emphasis on the students' domestic skills. 
Rosa Muki Bonaparte was another founder of FRETILIN and the only woman to 
hold a position within the central structure of a political party in the 1970s.33 She was 
also leader of FRETILIN' s Organiza<;ao Popular Mulher Timorense (Popular 
Organization of Timorese Women, OPMT). A statement from her from the 1970s 
reads, "The creation of OPMT has a double objective: firstly, to participate directly in 
the struggle against colonialism, and second, to fight in every way the violent 
discrimination that Timorese women had suffered in colonial society."34 Another 
OPMT member, Domingas Coelho, recollected in 1991 that "OPMT also encouraged 
the women to take part in meetings. The Portuguese never encouraged women to 
work outside the home-they were expected to stay at home all the time." 35 Current 
female parliamentarian Bi Soi recalled the early days of OPMT, "During Portuguese 
times and because of Timorese culture, East Timorese women were not allowed to 
express their ideas and say what they [wanted]. It was a challenge for me to 
contribute to and fight for women's rights."36 
31 Ospina, "Participation of Women in Politics," p. 16. 
32 Thatcher, "Timar-Born in Exile in Australia," pp. 60-95. 
33 Ospina, "Participation of Women in Politics," p. 18. 
34 Helen Hill, "FRETILIN: The Origins, Ideologies, and Strategies of a Nationalist Movement in 
East Timor" (master's thesis, Monash University, 1978), p. 192. 
35 E. Franks, "Women and Resistance in East Timor: 'The Centre, as They Say, Knows Itself by 
the Margins,"' Women's Studies International Forum 19,1/2 (1996): 158. 
36 This comment was made in an interview held with Bi Soi by the author in 2010, in Dili. It 
should appear more fully in a forthcoming chapter, "Bisoi-A Veteran of Timor-Leste's 
Independence Movement," in the book Nationalist Women in South East Asia. 
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Catholicism also had an enormous impact on Timorese culture. The colonial 
society was heavily influenced by the missionary zeal of the Catholic priests who 
commanded "god-like" respect.37 Harris Rimmer explains the nature of the Catholic 
Church in recent times: 
The Church in Timor Lorosa'e was cut off from the outside world at the 
same time as the changes introduced by the second Vatican Council (1962-
65) were beginning to percolate through the Church on a global level. Some 
trappings of the pre-Vatican II era still remain ... The Church is itself a 
patriarchal institution wedded to ideas of hierarchy and obedience and has 
supported the patriarchal structure of East Timorese society.38 
The paternalism of the Portuguese colonial administration, when combined with its 
attendant Catholic Church, has had a great effect on women's strength and power in 
East Timor.39 No one can measure precisely to what extent Catholicism degraded 
women's sacred power within the Timorese indigenous religion and replaced it with 
its own, more demure, version of femininity. I would argue that the late colonial-era 
status of women, which OPMT was fighting to improve, was inferior to the status 
Timorese women commanded prior to the advent of the Portuguese and their 
influence; certainly it was not a better one. 
Today Rosa Bonaparte and other women important to the early struggle seem 
like ghosts: They appear in documents and occasionally in photos but, mostly, they 
are invisible in the telling of East Timorese history. They do not make an appearance 
in the Resistance Museum in Dili, where women are startlingly absent. Most of the 
writing on East Timar is fully focused on the men: the leaders and guerrilla fighters. 
War 
During the Indonesian occupation (1975-99), the military and police deliberately 
used violence, including the rape and torture of women and girls, to achieve political 
and psychological advantage over the population.40 Peter Carey goes so far as to say 
that some of these acts of sexual violence appear to have been ritualistic and 
"designed to eradicate the sexual potency of entire elite families." 41 These abuses 
have been methodically documented, most comprehensively by the national 
37 Geoffrey Hull, "East Timor: Just a Political Question?" Occasional Paper No. 11, North 
Sydney: ACSJC, 1992, p. 5. 
38 Susan Harris Rimmer, "The Roman Catholic Church and the Rights of East Timorese 
Women," in Mixed Blessing: Women, Religion, and the Law in Southeast Asia, ed. Caroline Evan 
and Amanda Whiting (Leiden: Brill Press, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), pp. 164, 173. 
39 Cristalis and Scott, Independent Women, p. 24. 
40 Mario de Araujo, '"Liberation for Everyone, Not Just Men': A Case Study of the Men's 
Association against Violence (AMKV) in Timor Leste/' in Gender Equality and Men: Learning 
from Practice, p. 141. 
41 Peter Carey, "Challenging Tradition, Changing Society: The Role of Women in East Timor's 
Transition to Independence," Lusotopie (2001): 258. See also Sara Niner, "Hakat klot, Narrow 
Steps: Negotiating Gender in Post-Conflict Timor-Leste," International Feminist journal of 
Politics 13,3 (2011): 413-35, for a discussion of how women who were sexually abused during 
the war have been rejected by communities and unrecognized in post-war programs; and 
Graydon, "Time to Get Serious," pp. 389-91, on these same issues. 
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Commission for Truth, Reception, and Reconciliation.42 I have noted here previously 
the brutal effects of such armed conflict and will extrapolate further on how this can 
affect gender in a postwar society. 
Few people have studied and documented a perhaps more surprising effect of 
the Indonesian occupation: how the Indonesian civilian administration also offered 
opportunities to women that had never existed under the Portuguese. More women 
were able to work under Indonesian, as opposed to Portuguese, rule: in the public 
service sector, a few women rose to senior positions and became involved in NGOs 
and state-sponsored women's organizations, such as the Dharma Wanita1 for wives 
of civil servants, and the Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, which worked to build 
the capacities of rural women and improve their living conditions. Many current 
female political leaders worked with the Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, which 
also allowed them to disguise their work for the clandestine resistance. By the later 
years of the occupation, women also had greatly increased access to basic education 
and to tertiary education.43 
However, human rights abuses overshadowed any such development and the 
national women's council, Rede Feto, estimated that 45 percent of women lost their 
husbands during the Indonesian occupation, so women were also forced to head 
households. 44 Women also took up new roles in the resistance structures, with one 
reliable source quoting a figure estimating the percentage of women among 
resistance cadres as high as 60 percent.45 The Rede Feto statement to the United 
Nations Security Council in 2000 reads: 
From the invasion of 1975, Timorese women have contributed to all aspects 
of the resistance in the mountains: Timorese women were at once mothers, 
responsible for basic household duties and taking care of children. We 
assisted FALINTIL (the armed resistance of East Timor) in the preparation of 
food and other natural resources for combat rations, in the making of 
backpacks from palm-leaves for carrying munitions and for washing the 
clothes of FALINTIL as well as being fighters ourselves. Women functioned 
as a security watch in the free zones, taking combat rations in the free zones 
to be transported to the operational zones as well as taking munitions out of 
the operational zones into the free zones. Women also developed literacy 
campaigns and cultural interchanges in the free zones. In Clandestine 
Operations women acted as the link between the resistance inside and the 
Diaspora, we searched for means to obtain munitions from our husband or 
brothers to increase the munitions of F ALINTIL; we wove tais and made 
sandals to sell them to Indonesian soldiers as a form of exchange for fatigues 
or shoes for FALINTIL, we prepared the combat rations to take to the armed 
resistance and during periods when there was no water, we looked for 
means to provide water to F ALINTIL, and thus encountered dangerous 
42 CAVR, "Timor-Leste Women and the Conflict: National Public Hearing, April 28-29, 2003," Dili, 
2005, at http: I I www.cavr-timorleste.org I phbFiles I 02_ women_eng_ WEB.pd£. 
43 Ospina, "Participation of Women in Politics," p. 21. 
44 Rede Feto, "The Role of Women in Maintaining International Peace and Security: Statement 
by Rede Peto," United Nations Security Council Special Session, Dili, 2000. 
45 Cristalis and Scott, Independent Women, p. 39. 
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situations. During the military sweeps under Indonesia, we hid members of 
the FALINTIL in our house and in difficult situations, took messages or 
urgent letters inside our clothing or hair to aid the leadership or F ALINTIL. 
We contributed a monthly allowance and when captured by the Indonesian 
military, we resisted and thus suffered twice as much, either by being raped 
or by giving our life. 46 
Women were prominent in the political campaigning around the independence 
ballot, and we can assume (as no gender-disaggregated data was forthcoming) that 
women made up approximately half of the 78.5 percent of East Timorese who voted 
for independence in 1999. The early years of the FRETILIN-led struggle explicitly 
worked toward the emancipation of women, but the subsequent more pluralist 
leadership did not give a high priority to this element. Women are proud of their role 
in the resistance, but for twenty-four years, the struggle for women's rights was 
subsumed by the broader national struggle for independence. 
WOMEN AND MEN'S CONTEMPORARY STATUS 
While most Timorese live in rural poverty-a life devoted to subsistence 
farming-indicators for the health and well-being of women and children are worse 
than for men. There is substantial gender inequity in Timor-Leste, illustrated by the 
2004 Human Development Index (HDI) (0.426) and Gender Development Index 
(GDI) (0.369), which show that women had a 13 percent lower standard of living 
than men.47 Disparity between men and women exists across the domains of land 
ownership, political participation, access to education and economic activities, and 
domestic1 including reproductive, decision making. 
Women, overall, are less likely to participate in the salaried workforce, 
representing around 36 percent of non-agricultural-sector employees and, usually, 
occupy lower-level positions, which means they earn lower salaries, receive fewer 
benefits, and are less likely to be promoted.48 In 2005, women represented around 25 
percent of the civil service but held only 2 percent of the highest positions. 49 The 
gender wage-gap is great, with women earning one-eighth of what men earn.50 In 
2010, Timor-Leste received a rating of 55 in the Gender Equity Index (GEi) published 
by Social Watch (higher than Indonesia, at 52, and South Korea, at 54). This reflected 
an improved rating in education for females, but, overall, Timor's rating was pulled 
46 Rede Feta, "The Role of Women in Maintaining International Peace and Security: Statement 
by Rede Feto," United Nations Security Council Special Session, Dili, 2000, at 
http: 11 etan.org I et2000cl october l22-3ll24ther.htm 
47 Vanda Narciso and Pedro Henriques, "Women and Land in Timor-Leste: Issues in Gender 
and Development," Indian Journal of Gender Studies 17,1(2010):58. 
48 Monica Costa, Rhonda Sharp, and Diane Elson, "Gender-Responsive Budgeting in the Asia-
Padfic Region: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Country Profile" (Adelaide University of 
South Australia, 2009), p. 5, http:l lw3.unisa.edu.aulhawkeinstitute/researchlgender-
budgets I documents I timor-leste.pdf, accessed July 3, 2012. 
49 Ospina, "Participation of Women in Politics." 
50 Asian Development Bank (ADB) IUNIFEM, "Gender and Nation Building in Timor-Leste: 
County Gender Assessment," 2005, p. 23, at http:/ /www.adb.orgldocuments/gender-and-
nation-building-timor-leste-country-gender-assessment, accessed June 2012. 
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down by low indicators for the economy and for women's empowerment due to the 
small percentage of women in technical, management, and government positions. 
Women also face other problems: They have an average of eight children, with 
only 19 percent of those births being attended by a skilled health worker, meanin~ 
infant and maternal mortality is high, although this situation is improving. 
Children and growing families are very welcome in a country that has been through 
such a brutal conflict, and many more traditionally minded rural parents believe 
children are their greatest wealth and a valuable asset in their subsistence farming 
lifestyle. Nevertheless, the high mortality figures speak for the negative impacts of 
this birthrate on mothers and their children. Equally, considerable child rearing and 
domestic duties limit women's educational and economic opportunities and political 
participation. 
Anecdotally, many women express a desire for fewer children, yet they 
commonly are given few opportunities to make decisions about their fertility and 
sexual health, for those choices are often dictated by husband and family. 52 It is 
difficult for women to gain access to family planning services, and abortion is 
common, even though it now carries severe criminal penalties. The Catholic Church 
strongly opposes any changes to the abortion laws, even in cases of rape and incest, 
and the government is heavily influenced by church dogma. Women activists who 
speak out on these issues are fearful of being excommunicated. 
Today the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Timor-Leste remains conservative, 
stressing women's roles as wives and mothers, roles characterized by maternalism 
and sexual purity. While the Vatican has opposed and attacked rights perceived to 
challenge traditional family structures by increasing women's control over 
reproduction and sexuality, this does not necessarily reflect the position of all church 
personnel, some of whom have more pragmatic strategies to assist the poor people 
they serve. Giving women the right to choose how many children they have and 
when they have them are life-and-death choices in Timor. Understanding the 
cultural and religious influences on women and men in this regard is crucial.53 
It is estimated that domestic violence accounts for 40 percent of all reported 
crime in Timor-Leste, yet a 2004 report found that formal justice systems dismally 
failed women attempting to pursue justice for such crimes. 54 Mild forms of domestic 
violence are viewed as normal and even as an educative tool in families. In response 
to these conditions, a concerted national campaign against domestic violence is well 
underway, which includes appearances by national leaders, suggesting a 
51 Some preliminary figures released in 2010 by the Ministry of Health indicate that the Total 
Fertility Rate (TFR) is decreasing and now may be as low as 5.7 children per woman (although 
an advisor to the Ministry of Health contends that this figure is based on statistics for a much 
wider survey group than used in previous surveys and includes unmarried women). Also 
reported are new figures for the maternal and infant mortality rates, and an increase in births 
assisted by health professionals. Presentation by Ministry of Health of the "Strategua Nacional 
Saude Reproductiva Timor-Leste," May 29, 2010, Baucau. 
52 D. J. Soares, "A Gender and Generational Perspective on Disunity," seminar paper, Crisis in 
Timor-Leste: Options for Future Stability Seminar, Development Studies Network, Australian 
National University, June 9, 2006. 
53 Esther Richards, '"Not with Fear': Understanding the Role of the Catholic Church in 
Reproductive Healthcare in Timor-Leste," paper delivered to "Understanding Timor-Leste," 
Timor-Leste Studies Association Conference, Dili, University of Timor-Leste, July 2-3, 2009. 
54 JSMP 0udicial System Monitoring Programme), "Women in the Formal Justice Sector: 
Report on the Dili District Court" (Dili: JSMP, 2004). 
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countrywide dialogue on this serious issue has begun. The campaign has been 
driven by strong pressure from the Timorese women's movement; many of the 
women involved are ex-resistance veterans. It is argued that these women 
strategically used the post-conflict moment and the international presence to 
legitimate and fund this campaign. This illustrates the crucial need to create "a 
locally grounded discourse of gender equality" that does not prompt political elites 
to respond by claiming that such reforms are simply "a western imposition."55 
Every four years, beginning in 2000, the National Women's Congress in Timor-
Leste has met to discuss priorities and concerns contained in a national platform of 
action. Out of the first congress emerged Rede Feto Timor-Leste, the national 
women's network. It has seventeen member organizations, including the oldest and 
largest groups-the OPMT, founded in 1975, and the Organiza<;ao Mulher 
Timorense {Organization of Timorese Women, OMT), founded in 1998; both are 
nationally aligned to the two main political factions. Rede Peto' s main programs are 
concerned with advocacy for gender equality and women's rights, and with 
strengthening members' organizational capacities. Rede Feta and its member 
organizations work together with the government and international agencies, such 
as the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) to elevate and reinforce the status of women in 
Timor.56 Much has been done, but considerable work remains. 
The East Timorese women's movement has been particularly successful at 
advancing the more formal or "strategic" interests of women, while the more 
"practical," or grassroots, needs of women have not been dealt with so 
dynamically.57 A tension between these priorities has been noted within the women's 
movement, indicated, in part, by a corresponding divide between middle-class, 
urban women, who are inclined to advocate a more feminist agenda, and less-
educated, rural women.58 Here we see, again, that class intersects with and has an 
impact upon gender. The elite women who, for the most part, form the leadership of 
the women's movement in the capitol of Dili have been responsible for advancing 
the "strategic" level initiatives (in partnership with international agencies) very 
successfully, while practical programs are less developed. 
Political parties and campaign events are dominated by men due to women's 
low rate of public political participation. Women do turn out to vote in large 
numbers, however, which bodes well for the future. In the first National Parliament, 
an impressive 26 percent of members were women, yet this may not have much 
effect on decision making, as voting is broadly along party lines and parties continue 
to be dominated by men, although the UN-funded Women's Caucus and the Gender 
Resource Centre in the parliament are making inroads by supporting women 
parliamentarians. Women's inequality in Timor-Leste is also being addressed by 
programs of national government gender mainstreaming and budgeting. These 
programs have been held back by weak political will, poor technical skills, 
inadequate funding, and a generalized blindness, on the part of Timorese politicians, 
55 Halt "East Timorese Women," p. 323. 
56 Cristalis and Scott, Independent Women; Ana Trembath and Damien Grenfell, "Mapping the 
Pursuit of Gender Equality in Timor-Leste," Globalism Institute, RMIT University, 2007. 
57 Helen Hill, paper delivered to the Australian Association for the Advancement of Pacific 
Studies Conference, Easter 2010, private correspondence with author. 
58 Hall, "East Timorese Women," p. 310. 
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to gender inequities. An essential resistance to change in the male-dominated 
hierarchies tend to marginalize gender equality concerns and reforms. 59 
How a post-war society treats its female veterans is a significant indicator of the 
status and future of women in that sodety.60 In Timor-Leste, women who served 
either directly in the guerrilla army F ALINTIL as combatants or by filling military-
support roles have not been recognized and rewarded as male veterans have. Many 
of the women engaged in armed conflict acted as the partners of their guerrilla-
fighter husbands in carrying out duties in the military camps, and they sometimes 
took up arms if their husbands were disabled or killed. Some of these women have 
been rewarded by programs for widows, but no female combatants have been 
included in any formal demobilization programs. This pattern is common in other 
post-conflict societies.61 Safi Ospina tracks the process: 
[Women] did not hold positions of power in the revolutionary structure or 
in the male dominated Falintil hierarchy. Falintil's registers, created by two 
independent commissions established by the President of the Republic 
[Xanana Gusmao] in April 2003 (for veterans and ex-combatants, 
respectively), did not include a single woman among the 37,472 people 
listed. Women, it was reasoned, were civilian cadres not combatants. Women 
interviewed for this study said they wanted to register but were advised by 
the President of the Republic to wait for the third commission, listing civilian 
participants. This commission, established in September 2004, registered 
39,000 civil cadres (quadros civis), political prisoners, and members of the 
clandestine front, 30 percent of whom were women. 62 
Female ex-combatants were sidelined more or less completely.63 The current 
veterans' law covers Timorese citizens who engaged in warfare full time for at least 
three years between 1975 and 1999. There are different levels of qualified veterans-
one' s level is assigned according to the length of one's proven service-and benefits 
include ceremonial recognition, medical assistance, education, access to social 
programs, and housing. In 2010, there were 12,540 beneficiaries, of whom only 392 
are women.64 This program discriminates against women because a veteran's 
military service needs to have been continuous and full time, while most women 
provided part-time or intermittent support due to pregnancies, and to their 
responsibilities for raising families and caring for the sick, injured, and elderly. 
Cynthia Enloe has critiqued how postwar societies so often define "veteran" in a 
manner that privileges male combatants, saying, "Assignments of significance or 
triviality-that is, visibility or invisibility-are typically based on the gendered 
presumption that what men did must have been more important than what women 
59 Costa, "Gender Sensitive Budgeting," p. 6. 
6° Cf. Cynthia H. Enloe, The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004). 
61 Cahn and Ni Aolain, "Gender, Masculinities, and Transition," p. 115. 
62 Ospina, "Participation of Women in Politics." 
63 Myrttinen, "Poster Boys No More," p. 10. 
64 UNMIT (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste), presentation on Women Veterans, July 
2010. 
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did in determining how the war was fought." 65 As female combatants did not serve 
the armed struggle in ways that have been recognized by male leaders, or by 
international agencies involved in postwar reconstruction, women became invisible 
in the demobilization process and were not recognized or rewarded for their service. 
In what can be described as a campaign for the recognition of women's actions 
during the struggle for independence, a series of documents has been published by 
Timorese women and their international supporters.66 Like other issues of profound 
importance to women, this task has fallen to a few underresourced women who are 
"active in overworked local women's groups," allied with a "handful of feminists 
inside international agencies." 67 This work is being continued today by women 
concerned that their experiences are unrecognized, crimes against them have gone 
unpunished, and their current needs and rights are unmet. In August 2010, OPMT 
launched a history project. Women organizers were able to co-opt the support of 
elite, male political leaders-the president, prime minister, and leader of the 
opposition-to leverage donations from the local business community (while also 
taking credit for bringing these estranged leaders together on this issue and 
strengthening their relations with one another). Due to these laudable efforts, this 
issue-that women must be acknowledged for their significant contributions to the 
resistance-has been receiving more attention, and the recognition of women's roles 
is slowly progressing, though much more work is yet to be done. 
In the contested world of modern Timorese history, the lack of acknowledgment 
of the crucial role of women in the resistance denies them a full and active role in the 
post-conflict society. This discrimination is being contested by women activists, but 
they need more assistance. Not only should female combatants be extended the same 
privileges as their male counterparts, but the categories of combatants need to be 
broadened to ensure that women who have provided unique support roles to 
military are included among those who have received acknowledgment and 
benefits. 68 
MILITARIZATION AND MASCULINITY 
The dominance of men in contemporary Timorese society has been examined 
here. This contemporary situation is reinforced by a continuing and persistent 
militarization that has endured even after the Indonesian occupation ended. Cynthia 
Enloe, a feminist international political analyst, argues that militarization in post-war 
65 Enloe, Curious Feminist, p. 196. 
66 Rebecca Winters, Voice of East Timorese Women (Darwin: East Timor International Support 
Centre, 1999); Micato D. F. Alves, Laura. S. Abrantes, Filomena. B. Reis, Hakarek no ran: Written 
in Blood (Dili: Office for the Promotions of Equality, Prime Minister's Office, Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste, 2003); Cristalis and Scott, Independent Women; APSC-TL (Asia Pacific 
Support Collective-Timar Leste) with SEPI and MSS (published in Dili, 2008), Segredu: Xdve ba 
Ukun Rasik-an [Secrecy: The Key to Independence] (Dili: Rede Feto [with Fokupers and APSC-
TL], 2012); Rede Feto (with Fokupers and APSC-TL), Hau Fa Midar; Hau Simu Moruk [I give 
sweet; I get sour] (Dili: Rede Feto [with Fokupers and APSC-TLJ, 2007); and Jude Conway, 
Step by Step: Women of East Timar, Stories of Resistance and Survival (Darwin: Charles Darwin 
University Press, 2010). 
67 Enloe, Curious Feminist, p. 225. 
68 Cahn and Ni Aolain, "Gender, Masculinities, and Transition," p. 120. 
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societies reentrenches the privileging of masculinity.69 In East Timar, we can trace the 
militarization of society throughout the occupation by the Indonesian military and in 
the reactions of the armed and clandestine resistance organizations. Moreover, 
militarization did not stop at the end of the Indonesian occupation but continued 
with the arrival of around ten thousand UN peacekeeping forces. Vijaya Joshi 
describes this effect and also the 11masculine nature" of the first UN administration.70 
The predominantly male leadership of East Timor's armed struggle was engaged 
in a brutal and bloody war for most of their adult lives and suffered a variety of ill-
effects, including displacement, imprisonment, torture, and loss of family and fellow 
soldiers, close friends, and colleagues. Just as disturbingly, their mothers, wives, and 
daughters have often been victims of sexual abuse at the hands of the Indonesian 
military or its militias, as Timorese women were often targeted because of their male 
associates, as noted. It is these male elites who now head up the government, 
military, and police, and the society they have shaped is heavily influenced by 
military thinking and behaviors and their own personal traumas. These influential 
men have become part of creating a dominant, or hegemonic, form of masculinity in 
Timor-Leste today that is not a positive one in terms of gender equity. Enloe reminds 
us that a militarized masculinity requires a 11feminine complement" that excludes 
"women from full and assertive participation in post-war public life." 71 This analysis 
of gender relations applies accurately to Timor-Leste, as it does to many post-conflict 
societies. 
An aggressive conflict within this male political leadership led to the 2006 
national political crisis that shattered the process of reconstruction.72 Graydon 
attributes some of the conflict to the "testosterone-charged question of 'Who is the 
biggest hero?'" and notes that local women commented that they wished male 
leaders could overlook their differences for the sake of the country.73 While these 
events are common to post-conflict societies, such ongoing cycles of trauma, 
violence, and conflict are also attributable to persistent militarization in Timor-Leste. 
The fact that women played such a small part in the 2006 crisis-not only in causing 
it, but also in solving it-illustrates the reality that women lack an influential role in 
political and security affairs. Although it was largely members of the male political 
elite who caused this crisis, few analyses have held them responsible for it; security 
69 Enloe, Curious Feminist, pp. 217-18. 
70 Vijaya Joshi, "Building Opportunities: Women's Organizing, Militarism, and the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timar" (doctoral dissertation, Clark University, 
Worcester, MA, 2005). 
71 Enloe, Curious Feminist, pp. 217-18. 
72 The national political violence of 2006 can be explained by complex internecine conflicts 
between male political elites and their agents, including divisions within the army, F-FDTL 
(between ex-guerrilla commander brigadier-general Taur Matan Ruak and rebels ultimately 
led by "Major" Alfredo Alves Reinado), and between the army and police force, PNTL, led 
until 2006 by Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato. The politicization of both forces was the result 
of the inept processes of selection and training of candidates under the auspices of the United 
Nations. These disputes opened old personal and political divisions between the then-prime 
minister, Mari Alkatiri, and his FRETILIN political party and then-president (now prime 
minister) Xanana Gusmao and his supporters. These dynamics played out a further, and some 
hope final, chapter in February 2008 with armed attacks on President Ramos-Horta and Prime 
Minister Gusmao by the rebel forces of Reinado, which led to Reinado being fatally shot 
during the coup. 
73 Graydon, Women's Rights in Timor-Leste, pp. 400-401. 
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and political analysts who are insensitive to gender issues rarely note the roles 
played by these leaders. 
Another issue that is common across postwar societies with regard to 
demobilization is how it has failed to deal with the deep imprinting of violent 
masculinities in former combatants. We can see an illustration of this in Timor-Leste 
in the hypermasculine figure of deceased rebel leader Alfredo Reinado (see footnote 
6), who was extraordinarily popular with young urban men, including some soldiers 
and police1 many of whom aped his action-hero style. Connell highlights how this 
type of masculinity, shaped by and inclined to violence, is not just individualistic, 
"but is collectively defined or institutionally supported, whether in informal peer 
groups, formal armies, or militias or somewhere between the two."74 To combat the 
creation of future Reinados, the Timorese should focus on addressing the causes and 
consequences of such negative masculinities within institutions, particularly the 
police and armed forces. The continuing expansion of military and police forces 
(whose members perpetuate fierce attitudes developed under the occupation) and 
the substantial purchase of military arms and hardware since 2007 appear excessive 
in such an underdeveloped economy. The ceremonies marking the ten-year 
anniversary of the police-with celebrations of weaponry-were distasteful to many 
observers. Even more distasteful is a new national insignia featuring crossed guns. 
Today, military-style marching groups and martial arts groups throughout East 
Timorese society are pervasive. Since the early 1980s, Indonesian military strategy 
included the establishment of civilian militias, which by 1999 had developed into the 
national network of armed militias that fought the resistance in the bloody battle for 
independence. This plethora of groups, gangs, and militias gained strength again in 
2006, and it remains strong in Timorese society. James Scambary notes, "While the 
Indonesian army and the militias may have retreated back across the border, they left 
behind the volatile, living legacy of a deeply militarized society with multiple, highly 
organized militant groups." 75 These gangs too must be engaged in programs that 
examine their own histories and related ideas, perspectives that underpin their 
actions today. 
Yet the gender politics discussed here, particularly concerning perceptions of 
masculinity, are little monitored or addressed in contemporary gender programs. 
Most research on gender issues is instigated by donor agencies, while academics 
writing on Timor-Leste have shown less interest in gender than the NGOs have.76 A 
national dialogue on masculinities and the legacy of the war is urgently needed, as is 
an affirmation of "a different and positive masculinity."77 One model for this kind of 
campaign is the Men's Association Against Violence (AMKV), founded by twenty 
concerned Timorese men in 2002. They explain their work: 
Using a popular education approach, we focus on domestic violence and 
problems related to the tradition and customs that influence our perceptions 
of gender. We use common situations that would be familiar to the 
participants, and we talk about our own personal experiences of change. We 
74 Oxfam, Gender Equality and Men, p. 9. 
75 James Scambary, "Trapped in the Legacy of the Past," Inside Indonesia 96 (April-June 2009): 
1, available at http: I I insideindonesia.org I content/ view I 1193 I 47 I, accessed May 1, 2012. 
76 Costa, "Gender Sensitive Budgeting," p. 6. 
77 Cahn and Ni Aolain, "Gender, Masculinities, and Transition," pp. 120-21. 
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always promote examples of practical and realistic behaviour-change, so that 
on leaving the forums participants have the knowledge to make immediate 
change in their own lives. There are often heated debates during the 
discussions, but there is also a lot of humour and goodwill as participants 
reflect on the origins of their traditions, beliefs, and behaviour around 
gender differences. At the community level, there are men who are 
responsive and willing to be involved. However, at all levels of Timorese 
society, there is still a high level of disinterest and apathy around issues of 
gender and gender-based violence.78 
This small group of men and other individual men have begun to challenge the 
widely accepted norms of male privilege, power, and use of violence, but such an 
important job should not be left up to underresourced NGOs and a few individuals. 
CONCLUSION 
Veteran and parliamentarian Maria Paixao clearly stated in 2009, "Patriarchal 
systems and male-biased traditional power structures within our society that impede 
women's leadership and equal participation in decision making still exist." 79 We 
know that women are profoundly important within indigenous Timorese society, 
that women can be powerful within their own domestic sphere, and that elite women 
too wield power and are very privileged. These powers and types of authority that 
have been granted to women traditionally, and earned by women more recently, 
must be built upon to improve the social situation, health, and political status of 
Timorese women generally. 
Understanding the status and power women hold in indigenous systems is 
crucial, first because such an understanding can help and guide those who seek to 
resist contemporary pressure for women to take on a more subservient traditional 
role. In addition, any improvements in status for the majority of women must be 
made through an engagement with indigenous, or traditional, society, as this model 
remains culturally dominant in Timor and continues to engender a sense of identity 
and meaning to most people.80 We must seek to understand how, in a strong and 
resilient indigenous culture like that in Timor, women's status, power, and income 
are maintained by traditional relations or customary practices, and how these 
relations can be strengthened. For instance, many rural women see barlake as 
protecting and valuing them within indigenous social systems, but the complexity 
and variability of the barlake system is little understood by scholars, international 
organizations, or Tirnorese politicians, and research about its everyday impact on 
women's life is sorely inadequate. Graydon outlines some promising strategies that 
could be used in this regard. 
78 Araujo, "Liberation for Everyone," pp. 143-44. 
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Issues of masculinity in Timor also remain unaddressed, and militarization as an 
ongoing social phenomenon is unmonitored. Enloe reminds us that "if we lack the 
tools to chart postwar militarization, we will almost certainly be ill equipped to 
monitor the subtle ways in which-democratic rhetoric notwithstanding~ 
masculinity continues to be the currency for domination and exclusion."81 Research 
on gender roles in Timor-Leste is sparse, and a locally grounded debate on gender 
roles and relations between men and women is still in its infancy. Most male 
academics and analysts have been gender-blind in their research on Timar, 
particularly in political and security analysis, and Enloe rates such analysis as not 
just incomplete but unreliable.82 
There are, however, reasons to be optimistic about gender equity in Timor-Leste: 
The statistics show a difficult situation for women but not a hopeless one, and the 
crucial indicators relating to women's education and health have been improving 
over the last five years. The local women's movement is strong and stoic, women are 
well represented in parliament and the cabinet, and the current campaign against 
domestic violence shows the strategic strength of Timorese women leaders and their 
international alliances who seek to spark a cultural transformation using locally 
grounded debate. Moreover, the young population is not as closely bound by the 
conservatism of the past. 
Women and men must live and work within the patriarchal systems that 
dominate human societies all over the world, and, acknowledging this situation, we 
grant the last word to a man, Mario Araujo from AMKV. 
AMKV recognizes that we have a long way to go both as an organization 
and as men working in the field of gender. We too are susceptible to the 
cultural norms of the society we live in, and it is a constant battle to be 
questioning long-held beliefs and customs against strong opposition. Even 
with the guidance and support of a Timar Leste women's movement, it will 
be a long and difficult journey to be accepted by both men and women alike. 
However the history of resistance in Timar is strong, and in a new era of 
nationhood we are optimistic, and determined that liberation will be for 
everyone, not just for men! 83 
In concert with every county and community around the world on the journey 
toward the ideal of gender equity, men and women in Timor have myriad 
perspectives that often jar and clash in a difficult post-conflict environment, making 
their journey a particularly difficult and bumpy one. 
81 Enloe, Curious Feminist, pp. 217-18. 
82 Ibid., p. 94. 
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DECENTRALIZATION 
Damien Kingsbury 
In a country as linguistically complex, historically geographically divided, in 
which services are best delivered locally, and in which there have, more recently, 
been real tensions over linguistic and geographic origins, the idea of devolving key 
state functions to the local level has always made sense. It is also a requirement of 
Timor-Leste's constitution. However, the process of developing a clear idea of what 
such decentralization should look like, how it could work, and when and how to 
implement it has been far from straightforward. Importantly, too, while Dili is the 
source of political authority and government expenditure and is the site of most 
development, more than 80 percent of Timor-Leste's population live elsewhere, 
mostly in rural village settings. For Timor-Leste to function as a coherent state, it 
requires a mechanism to bring the state and its services to the people. 
Although it is a tiny country, Timor-Leste's mountain ranges have historically 
divided its people. Situated between Southeast Asia, Melanesia, and Australia, its 
people have migrated from neighboring areas, bringing with them their languages 
and customs, the latter of which have over time found increasing commonality 
across the island. The traditional stories and rituals of Timor-Leste are remarkably 
similar, indicating a relatively high degree of nonlinguistic cultural fusion. Its 
languages, however, reflect the two principle sources of migration: Papua and 
Southeast Asia. These two chief language phyla are further divided into distinct 
languages and then subdivided on the basis of dialect, forming a complex linguistic 
patchwork of eighteen languages and sixteen distinct dialects. The preponderance of 
Papuan languages tends to be toward the east of the country, with Austronesian 
languages tending to be more located in the west, although there is a high level of 
mixing of these language groups across much of the country. 
Geographic and linguistic groups were also traditionally divided by area among 
polities based on hierarchy, kinship, allegiance, and obligation. Reflecting the impact 
of European colonial reorganization, of Indonesian repression, political culture, and 
institutions, and, finally, of independence, the people of Timor-Leste have come 
together as a more or less politically bonded group. However, the older language 
divisions, kinship groups, and allegiances remain. 
Also reflecting their origins, most of the people of Timor-Leste still live in rural 
and often quite remote areas. Despite being a relatively short physical distance from 
major centers, some rural communities are quite isolated from the still-limited levels 
of development found in the larger towns. Further reflecting the geography of the 
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country, communication with the capital, Dili, is often difficult and inconsistent, 
while the people and government of Dili have limited access to the countryside. 
Especially given the limited resources and capacity available in Dili, there is potential 
for-and considerable evidence of-an urban-rural or a center-periphery divide. 
Given that linguistic distinctions also remain, there is also capacity for linguistic and, 
to some extent, geographic divisions, which came to be identified with the political 
violence of 2006. As a result of these factors, the government of Timor-Leste was, as 
this was written, in the process of establishing decentralized forms of government. 
In light of the above circumstances, many political leaders have argued in favor 
of decentralizing the state's processes, to bring them closer to the people. There were 
also some strong arguments against decentralization, both in terms of practicality 
and vested interest. But despite these competing concerns and interests, at bottom 
was a commitment to this process that was articulated in the constitution of the state. 
Section 5.1 of the Constitution of Timor-Leste states that "the State shall respect the 
principle of decentralization of public administration."1 In many respects, this 
constitutional requirement reflected what was already known about the linguistic 
and geographic make-up of Timor-Leste prior to its drafting, rather than try to 
impose a more common uniformity on its peoples; accepted their regional difference; 
and prefigured a potential contributing factor to the type of violence that 
characterized the events of 2006. Interestingly, the Ministry of State Administration, 
which was overseeing the decentralization process, had over its entrance the motto: 
"Adeus Conjlitu, Benvindu Dezenvolvimentu" (Goodbye Conflict, Welcome 
Development), in recognition of the link between resolving conflict in order to allow 
development and development itself contributing to a lessening of conflict. 
This chapter will consider the rationale for and strengths and weaknesses of 
decentralizing a developing state, and some of the specific issues that pertain to 
Timor-Leste. It will explain the rationale for decentralization as one principally 
concerned with creating greater responsiveness between the state and its citizens by 
devolving a degree of political and economic authority from the capital to the district 
level, as well as recognizing the diversity of Timor-Leste's society. The process of 
decentralization in Timor-Leste began in 2003 and, as this was being written, was 
scheduled to be implemented, at least in its initial stages, by 2014.2 Section 5.2 of the 
constitution noted, however, that the laws intended to establish the characteristics of 
different territorial levels and administrative competencies were still to be 
determined. 
In a normative sense, given their proximity to and often local familiarity with 
citizens, locally elected officials can be reasonably expected to be more directly 
representative of and accountable to electors. In a state in which there are structural 
blockages to the absorption of economic capacity, devolving greater fiscal 
responsibility to the districts also implies a greater flow of capital from the center to 
the districts, which, in turn, leads to greater capital liquidity in the districts and, 
hence, more equitable economic opportunity. The devolution of at least some 
authority to the districts also reduces pressure on what is sometimes still a poorly 
1 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2002. See also Section 157h, 
www.constitution.org I cons/ east_timor I constitution-eng.htm, accessed June 11, 2012. 
2 Susanne Kuehn, "Briefing Note on the Decentralization Process in Timor Leste," UNDP 
report, Dili, UNDP-UNCDF Local Governance Support Program, 2010. 
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understood or developing sense of state-based national identity, while reaffirming 
the legitimacy of a sense of the local in a still-evolving political framework. 
In most prior development models, centralization, which paralleled 
modernization theory in development processes, was initially thought to be the most 
rational use of state resources, especially where those resources were limited. 
According to those who proposed this model, the center would be able to distribute 
appropriately and evenly the goods and services available, while at the same time 
helping ensure loyalty to a state, often recently constructed around a still-developing 
political identity, as opposed to devolving the available stock of allegiances to locat 
separate, and potentially antistate entities. For developing states that had developed 
a Soviet-bloc model of state administration, centralized control also ensured full state 
authority over political matters, notably through the omniscience of the party of 
government's central committee. In Western-bloc-aligned states, centralization was 
seen as a rational bureaucratic allocation of limited resources in areas of state 
responsibility. However, as with the "modernization" paradigm implied in both 
these models, centralization was often bureaucratically inefficient and insensitive to 
or unaware of local needs; it privileged centralized and sometimes ethnically specific 
elites; and it bred corruption and unproductive political competition over control 
and allocation of limited resources. 
Following the failure of development of many centralized developing states (of 
both Western and Soviet camps), from the 1980s, there was turn toward 
decentralization, along with the diminution of high levels of government 
expenditure-often the main or only source of capital-and attendant moves toward 
the privatization of what were once government activities. There was also a parallel 
move on the part of many developing states to limit overall government expenditure, 
not least under International Monetary Fund "structural adjustment" programs. 
Under such programs, large central bureaucracies were often dramatically reduced, 
with responsibility for (often reduced) state services being allocated locally. These 
changes toward a more local model of state service delivery were increasingly 
promoted as a method for ensuring a more ''authentic" path to development.3 It 
should be acknowledged that some proponents of decentralization had been arguing 
in favor of this model since the early 1960s.4 Like most ideas in development, the 
practice rarely matched the theory, and the experience of decentralization in the lives 
of people in developing countries was, therefore, mixed. 
In Indonesia, the state decentralized in 2001, in response to regional tensions 
following the collapse of the Indonesian economy in 1997 and the fall of the highly 
centralized New Order administration in 1998. Indonesia's restructuring of its 
government was, at the time, regarded as the most radical decentralization program 
to have been undertaken in the Asia Pacific region.5 No clear rationale was ever 
given for Indonesia's decentralization process, although it was widely understood to 
3 Philip Mawhood, "Decentralisation in the Third World in the 1980s," Planning and 
Administration 14,1 (1987): 10-22; Dennis Rondinelli, "Decentralisation in Comparative 
Perspective," International Review of Administrative Science 47,2 (1981): 133-45; Diane Conyers, 
"Decentralization: The Latest Fashion in Development Administration," Public Administration 
and Development 3,l (1983): 97-109. 
4 For example, Henry Maddick, Democracy, Decentralisation, and Development (London: Asia 
Publishing House, 1963). 
5 Mark Turner and Owen Podger, Decentralisation in Indonesia: Redesigning the State (Canberra: 
Asia Pacific Press, Australian National University, 2003), p. xii. 
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be in response to an explosion of militant separatist claims, on one hand,6 and a 
considerable sense of disenchantment with Jakarta's excessively centralized 
economic and political failure, on the other.7 The Indonesian model of 
decentralization, then, gave renewed life to the idea of decentralization, not least as a 
means of quelling regional tensions. 
Despite its relative popularity in recent years, decentralization does, however, 
have potential and actual weaknesses. These weaknesses include greater 
opportunities for patronage and nepotism, typically lower levels of organizational 
capacity among local (as opposed to central) government offices, the potential to 
weaken central planning, and reduced efficiencies of scale. In the short term, 
decentralization can also fragment national identity by reinforcing local ethnic 
identity relative to a state-oriented "national" identity. In the longer term, however, 
decentralization can strengthen national identity by appealing to and strengthening 
common democratic process through greater opportunities for participation, more 
direct representation1 and greater accountability. 
Through this shift toward greater representation and accountability, there is the 
potential for citizens to cohere around sets of values that reflect a reciprocal and 
equitable relationship between the citizenry and the state. From this development, a 
nation's citizens, initially understanding themselves as local and specific, further 
derive the potential to progress toward understanding themselves in common with 
others who share their civic values, which, in turn, creates stronger and more 
sustainable national bonds between citizens over diverse geographic and cultural 
spaces. 
STRENGTHS OF DECENTRALIZATION 
One of the biggest problems facing recently independent and other developing 
states, especially those with limited capacity,8 is their tendency toward the 
centralization of what are often limited government services and resources.9 This is a 
result of the need to concentrate the state capacity that is available close to the source 
of political authority so as to ensure the maximization of benefit from limited human 
and other resources. Timor-Leste was a good example of this centralization at work, 
6 In 2000 and 2001, when the decentralization policy was being planned and introduced, 
Timor-Leste had just separated from Indonesia; the separatist war in Aceh was at a peak of 
violence, and continuing at a lower level of violence in West Papua, Ambon, and other parts of 
Maluku; central and north Sulawesi were devoured by religious conflict, some of which 
religious violence had origins in separatist claims; there had been recent ethnic violence in 
Kalimantan; Riau was making noises about wanting separation; and even some Balinese were 
expressing discontent with what they saw as being shackled to a Java-dominated state, as 
represented by Jakarta. 
7 This observation is based on numerous discussions with Indonesians in Jakarta, as well as 
across much of the rest of the archipelago, in the period between 1997 and 2004. 
8 The limits upon or reduction of state capacity in post-colonial states is discussed in relation to 
sub-Saharan African states in Englebert Pierre, "Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, 
and Economic Development in Topical Africa," Political Research Quarterly 53,l (2000): 7-36; 
Richard Cornwall, "The End of the Post-Colonial State System in Africa?" African Security 
Review 8,2 (1999): 82-96; and David Hirschmann, "Early Post-Colonial Bureaucracy as History: 
The Case of the Lesotho Central Planning and Development Office, 1965-1975," International 
Journal of African Historical Studies 20,3 (1987): 455-70. 
9 Damien Kingsbury, East Timar: The Price of Liberty (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2009), p. 107. 
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especially under the newly independent state's first government, which through its 
central-committee-dominated political structure had a centralizing tendency in any 
case, 10 and which, under its prime minister, Mari Alkatiri, micromanaged much of 
government business. This micromanagement was intended to reduce waste within a 
limited budget and reduce the corruption that had been endemic under the 
Indonesian administration and that tended to decrease in the culture of the post-
Indonesia administration.11 
Despite the underlying good sense of the close control/ micromanagement policy 
pursued by Alkatiri, it had two negative impacts. The first negative impact was that 
the degree of micromanagement meant that processing the numerous requests for 
expenditure created a financial bottleneck. This meant that desperately needed funds 
were often not made available in a timely manner for a range of projects, particularly 
those in the districts outside the capital of Dili, nor were basic government services 
always available. 12 The second negative impact was that Dili received a 
disproportionately higher degree of government revenue than the districts, creating 
increased competition for access to those resources within Dili and greater 
competition for political patronage beyond Dili. This then set up a situation in which 
underemployed people in the districts would come to Dili seeking work and 
services, creating an unsustainable growth in Dili's population and a large pool of 
unemployed persons, especially youths, in this urban area. According to former 
World Bank-appointed advisor to Timor-Leste's first government: 
Ramos-Horta [said] a 50 percent increase in housing investment last year 
marks a significant act of faith by the community in the country's future, 
despite its lack of secure land title. But these comments reflect the Dili 
economy, ignoring the one million or more people who live in rural areas, 
largely dependent on tilling small plots of land. The lack of public-sector 
investment outside Dili is blindingly obvious, forecasting a serious 
development trap. A booming Dili economy will draw more people from the 
districts, leading to more youth unemployment, more gangs and more 
crime.13 
The disproportionate allocation of resources in Dili also meant that the restricted 
resources available in the districts outside Dili increased the numbers of needy 
potential clients and relatively more powerful patrons who controlled scarce 
government resources. This outcome both militated against democratic outcomes 
that were said to be desired by the government and which were enshrined in the 
constitution and facilitated corruption and nepotism on the part of local officials. 
10 Helen M. Hill, Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor-FRETILIN 1974-1978: The Origins, 
Ideologies, and Strategies of a Nationalist Movement (Sydney: Otford Press, 2002), p. 3, regarding 
its earlier phase. 
11 Kingsbury, Price of Liberty, p. 108. 
12 Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management, MSATM Develops Joint 
National Programme to Support the Decentralization Process, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 
Dili, 2010. 
13 Paul Cleery, "Timer's Poor in Peril amid Plenty," Australian, June 26, 2010, p. 12. 
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The move towards decentralization, then, was intended to reduce or resolve 
funding bottlenecks, to provide a wider and more equitable allocation of access to 
government services in rural areas, 14 to increase the state's overall absorptive 
capacity, and to increase financial liquidity in areas that had little cash flow. 
Decentralization was also intended to soften the process of nation formation, in 
which alien concepts could be introduced too quickly or jarringly and thus lead to 
misunderstanding and sometimes rejection. The decentralization program was, 
importantly1 also intended to recognize that while there is a sense of common 
identity in Timor-Leste, based primarily around a common struggle for 
independence, there was also a sense of specific difference between various language 
and geographic groups. The issue of absorptive capacity was particularly troubling, 
in that the state was often unable to spend the full allocation of the still relatively 
limited funds that it had available. That is, despite there being relatively little money 
to spend, ministries responsible for the spending of funds in order to implement 
state policy were not even able to allocate and spend the amount that was available. 
This meant that the limited economic stimulus that might have been available, 
especially for the majority of the population living outside Dili, was missing due to 
an inability of the state to "absorb" the finances that were available. 
One of the key aims of decentralization was to promote transparency15 through a 
more directly and locally accountable political process. However, there were some 
concerns that handing the allocation of funding projects to the district level would 
increase localized nepotism, corruption, and waste. There was already a tendency for 
officials to allocate spending on local projects to family members, sometimes through 
the districts in which the work, such as road building or maintenance, was to be 
undertaken. Given the relatively small size of local communities and the limited 
opportunities for advancement and, particularly, the small number and often 
interconnectedness of business and political elites, nepotism was not always overtly 
intentionat even if there was an awareness of the closeness of the contracting 
process. Similarly, notions of conflict of interest were not so much poorly understood 
as simply not understood at all. Corruption in its more formal sense was better 
understood, even if, in many respects, as an acculturated business practice. Many 
local citizens attributed corruption among local officials to the negative influences of 
the Indonesian occupation, during which corruption was indeed rife (and still is in 
much of Indonesia). However, this assumed that corruption did not exist in Timor 
prior to the Indonesian interregnum, an assumption challenged by the scanty 
evidence from before 1975, which tends to indicate that both Portuguese officials, as 
well as lower level indigenous employees, all engaged in varieties of corruption, 
contract rigging, favoritism in official employment, and skimming from the very few 
services that were provided by the Portuguese colonial administration. This is not, of 
course, to mention the numerous ways in which patron-client relations allow for 
nepotism, profit taking1 and extortion in ways that did not even have the most 
distant relationship to notions of good governance. In that there was potential for 
waste, this possibility then raised the sometimes troubled issue of value judgments 
concerning the best use of money or the standards of goods or services acquired; 
14 Ministry of State Administration, Decentralisation and Local Government in Timor-Leste: Policy 
Orientation Guideline for Decentralisation and Local Government in Timor-Leste, Government of 
Timor-Leste, March 2008, Section 1.2. 
15 Ibid., p. 2. 
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what was "waste" to people with certain perspectives was "value" for money or 
appropriate disbursement to others. In short, the often poor standard of goods or 
services provided, the poor quality of workmanship, the (failure of) completion 
schedules, and very often the general disinterest in paid work (as opposed to support 
payments that require no work) were issues that could be found in developing 
countries all over the world. However, they were very evident in Timor-Leste, where 
common practices ranged from "fixing" something so that it always existed on the 
edge of again breaking down, to seeking a job in an office, particularly a government 
office, principally for its status and the opportunity to use computers to play 
games.16 All too commonly, jobs were half done or done so poorly they were either 
abandoned or needed to be done again or recognized as having been unnecessary 
and badly planned in the first place. 
In some senses, such concerns about the mismanagement of funds-important 
though this mismanagement undoubtedly remained-was less important than the 
fact that funds were being allocated into areas where the resident officials and 
citizens would, one way or the other, spend them on local goods and services. This 
was then intended to help produce fiscal liquidity and stimulate local economic 
activity in areas that had previously been economically stagnant and in which cash 
was a rare commodity, thus cutting off local people from all but bartered goods. In 
that funding would be allocated on a needs basis, it was hoped that the closer 
relationships between the funding body and the recipients and (externally applied) 
appropriate accountability mechanisms would help ensure the more nuanced and 
detailed allocation of funding to where it was most needed. 
Finally, the state comprises peoples of diverse ethnic identities who in 2006 
appeared to divide along broad geographic lines and also along language group 
lines. While there was a high degree of political manipulation in the conflict of 2006, 
based on political divisions that arose during the resistance, they did highlight the 
need for a devolution of politics and the economic decision-making authority 
intended to accompany national politics that might alleviate some of the strain from 
a still nascent sense of national identity. This reaffirmation of the local, as opposed 
the putatively "national," was expressed more positively as "the maintenance of 
ethno-linguistic homogeneity and local cultural identity."17 
WEAKNESSES OF DECENTRALIZATION 
The process of decentralization is not especially new as a means to allocate 
resources more effectively, to devolve administrative responsibility away from a 
sometimes remote center, and to place greater and more direct political control in the 
hands of local people. However, the experiences of decentralization have not always 
been successful, for a range of reasons. As Paul Smoke, Eduardo Gomez, and George 
Peterson have noted: 
16 The author had the experience, in Dili in 2008, of asking a young university graduate what 
he wanted to do. "Get a job with the government," was the answer. "Why?" the author asked. 
"So," came the reply, "I can have a computer and play games." To be fair, however, there are 
many conscientious government employees who work long and hard hours with few 
resources and limited reward. 
17 Ministry of State Administration, Decentralisation and Local Government in Timor-Leste, p. 3. 
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During the 1990s it became clear that the normative expectations of 
decentralization had often exceeded its actual performance. Subnational 
deficits, debt, corruption, and inefficient resource allocation emerged in 
many countries, in a few cases threatening national fiscal stability ... In effect, 
normatively justified decentralization had met political and institutional 
reality. 18 
In this, Smoke, Gomez, and Peterson were primarily concerned with economic 
managerial capacity. Mark Turner and Owen Podger expressed similar concerns: 
In theory, decentralized systems of government are better able to address 
poverty because of their familiarity with the local situation, the greater 
accessibility of the poor to decision makers, and the more rapid response 
rates of local government. These assumptions begin to unravel if 
bureaucratic forms of organisation remain characteristic of regional 
government, if local elites monopolise the benefits of devolution, and if 
popular accountability is poorly articulated or implemented.19 
However, at least as great a concern, and possibly a greater one, has been that by 
taking away financial accountability from a coherent center that is able to be 
scrutinized, decentralization can provide greater opportunities for patronage and 
nepotism. As noted by Turner and Podger, "Local democracy might tend to favor 
local elites, and the emergence of 'money politics."' 20 In particular, the experience of 
decentralization in Indonesia often meant that a state that had experienced a high 
level of centralized corruption had, through the process of decentralization, in effect, 
decentralized the already high levels of corruption and arguably increased overall 
levels of corruption.21 
While Timor-Leste is now independent, the administrative processes that most 
East Timorese have experienced and learned to use are those introduced by 
Indonesian bureaucrats during the period of the occupation. This administrative 
style has left a deep imprint on notions of how to administer both local and national 
government, along with notions of the privileges that can be claimed by those who 
wield administrative and bureaucratic authority. Parallel to this, as is true in 
Indonesia, has been the dilemma that faces government employees who receive low 
levels of income relative to their high costs of living and who, at the same time, enjoy 
greater access to sources of official funds. Recognition of corruption in Timor-Leste22 
has led to the establishment of an anti-corruption commission and a state-wide anti-
corruption campaign. The question is whether this relatively new and, at the time of 
18 P. Smoke, E. Gomez, and G. Peterson, "Understanding Decentralization: The Need for a 
Broader Approach," in Decentralization in Asia and Latin America, ed. P. Smoke, E. Gomez, and 
G. Peterson (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), p. 3. See also R. Sukma, "Conflict Management 
in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia," in Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia, ed. D. Kingsbury 
and H. Aveling (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 71. 
19 Turner and Podger, Decentralisation in Indonesia, p. 141-42. 
20 Ibid., p. xiv. 
21 T. Rinaldi, M. Purnomo, and D. Damayanti, Fighting Corruption in Decentralized Indonesia 
{Jakarta: World Bank, 2007). 
22 USAID, Corruption Assessment: Timor-Leste (Washington, DC: United States Agency for. 
International Development, 2009), pp. 2-11. 
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writing, untested anti-corruption commission would be effective against significant 
vested interests and have the scope and capacity to reach beyond Dili and into the 
districts. 
One of the further issues experienced when Indonesia underwent 
decentralization was that, in many cases, there was a dearth of administrative 
capacity at the local level. As Dennis Rondinelli noted, the lure of the metropolis, 
including national ministries, state corporations, and other agencies, also tended to 
attract away the most talented and best-educated officials from the regions, leaving a 
chronic shortage of talent at the local level.23 Ismet Fanany also noted this 
phenomenon in Indonesia, whereby "the highly centralized system of administration 
in Indonesia has tended to draw capable administrators to the centre as they moved 
up through the administrative hierarchy, leaving what is perceived as a talent 
vacuum at the regional level."24 According to Shabbir Cheema and Rondinelli, 
"Decentralization can only be effective when agencies and actors at the regional and 
local levels have developed the capacities to perform effectively the planning, 
decision-making and management functions that are formally granted to them." 25 
Such studies demonstrate that the effectiveness of decentralization depends on the 
capacity of local institutions to identify problems, solutions, and opportunities to 
define and resolve development issues, decision making and conflict resolution, 
organization of resources, and management skills. 
Although the government of Timor-Leste has significantly developed since the 
tabula rasa of 1999, there is still little administrative capacity within the state, and 
what capacity exists is often very shallowly rooted and-descending beyond the 
senior layers of bureaucratic management-quickly reveals low levels of 
understanding and performance in government administration. This is especially the 
situation at the district level. 
DELAYED DECENTRALIZATION 
While a lack of local capacity and localized corruption have been shown to be 
critical problems with at least some cases of decentralization, poor initial planning 
has also hampered the ability of a number of states to put in place an adequate, 
proper, functioning decentralized political system. The process in Timor-Leste was 
intended to be rolled out in two stages so as to test the process initially with just four 
districts-Dili, Bobonaro, Oecussi, and Baucau-before bringing the remaining nine 
districts into the program. However, even this plan was a modification of the 
original plan, according to which four districts were to be decentralized, followed by 
five, and then another four. 26 The plan to revert from a four-five-four rollout model 
to a four-nine model followed the extended delay in the process of drafting and 
approving the three pieces of requisite legislation, with the planned drafting and 
legislative process running over a year behind schedule and the initial date of 
23 Dennis Rondinelli, "Decentralization of Development Administration in East Africa," in 
Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries, ed. G. Shabbiir 
Cheema and D. Rondinelli (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983), pp. 77-126. 
24 Ismet Fanany, "The First Year of Local Autonomy: The Case of West Sumatra," in Autonomy 
and Disintegration in Indonesia, p. 178. 
25 Cheema and Rondinelli, Decentralization and Development, p. 299. 
26 This is based on discussions with senior state administration officials in September 2008. 
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implementation pushed back from 2009 to 2014.27 The three pieces of requisite 
legislation included legislation on defining the districts that would be granted 
greater political power (Law on Administrative and Territorial Division, approved 
June 2009), the composition of the new local legislatures (Local Government Law), 
and the competencies of the new local legislatures (Municipal Elections Law).28 
Having passed through the council of ministers, the legislation in question was 
initially expected to be passed quickly, but is almost immediately ran into problems. 
Despite the fact that the government held a majority in parliament, it was clear from 
the outset that sifting through the eighty-four pages of Portuguese legal text that 
comprises the legislation would take time and require Timor-Leste's representatives 
to do more than simply rubber-stamp the document. There were problems from the 
outset, not least a statement in the draft legislation determining that the new district 
mayors would be both directly elected and elected by their councils and that a 
directly elected mayor could be removed by a vote of the council. Such glaring 
problems required a detailed reappraisal of the proposal. Beyond these problems 
there was some concern that the existing subdistrict administration, which appeared 
to serve communities relatively well, would disappear, to be replaced by municipal 
branch offices. 
Delays in the drafting and legislative schedule, caused by efforts to address 
internal inconsistencies and weaknesses in the draft legislation, meant that the 
decentralization process was traveling well behind its original schedule. In 
particular, while there was little debate about the boundaries for the electoral 
districts given that they were based on existing districts, there was considerable 
debate about what powers should be devolved to district legislatures. In part, this 
reflected concern with local competencies, and in part, it reflected concern by some 
ministers over the devolution and, hence, loss of their own ministerial authority. 
The draft laws call for a strong central government with nominal powers for 
local government and give the central government control over everything 
the local government does, including the legislative assembly. And the 
central government proposes to retain the power to review all the legislative 
assembly1s decisions. 29 
Finally, delays were caused by inadequacies in the national parliamentary system, in 
which the relevant parliamentary committee was unable to finalize its approval of 
the legislation to go to parliament. The deadlock in this committee was due, in part, 
to the constructed pedantry of some of the elected representatives who continued to 
disapprove of the formation of the government, which had carriage of the legislation. 
The deadlock also reflected a genuine weaknesses in the legislation as it was initially 
27 J. Coa, '1Municipal Elections Postponed Until 2014," Dili Weekly 91, Year III, June 2010, p. 1. 
28 S. Kuehn, Briefing Note on the Decentralization Process in Timar Leste, UNDP-UNCDF 
Local Governance Support Program report, Dili, 2010, www.estatal.gov. 
tl/Documents/DNDLOT /LGSP /BriefingNoteDecen2011.pdf, accessed May 20, 2012. 
29 Silas Everett and Juan Mayo Ragragio, "Decentralisation in Timor-Leste: What's at Stake?" 
East Timar Law and Justice Bulletin, June 26, 2009, http://asiafoundation.org/in-
asia I 2009 I 06 / 24 I decentralization-in-timor-leste-whats-at-stake I, accessed May 1, 2012. 
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proposed.30 Delays were also caused by the committee often being unable to 
assemble a quorum. This was the result of two principal factors: (a) there were no 
party or parliamentary whips to ensure that members attended committee meetings 
and parliamentary sessions, and members of smaller parties sometimes had to attend 
different committee meetings at the same time, and (b) to help ensure that 
parliamentarians did not ignore areas outside Dili, there were financial incentives to 
spend time in the districts that exceeded financial incentives to remain in Dili.31 
By way of comparison, in Indonesia the decentralization process was quickly 
conceived and implemented. The Indonesian decentralization process also showed 
that, despite a systematic and participatory regulatory process, the process of 
establishing regulation for decentralization was "disorderly," according to Turner 
and Podger, who further note that "Top level political support was lacking, central 
agencies were sometimes uncooperative, and regional stakeholders were rarely 
consulted." 32 While the Timor-Leste experience of decentralization was, in a number 
of senses, different from that of Indonesia, including the extent of the powers 
available to the local assembly, and the differences in scale, as Timor-Leste's 
government was so much smaller than Indonesia's, there were also clear parallels 
between the two. The main parallel was that both states regarded decentralization as 
a mechanism that would enable the state to better serve local communities, on one 
hand, while, on the other, reducing pressure arising from local groups that had 
political and cultural identities that were distinct from those of the political center. 
Indonesia came to this position more than five decades after independencei Timor-
Leste had this requirement written into its constitution from the outset. Timor-Leste 
enjoyed another advantage over Indonesia with respect to decentralization; the 
extended delays that postponed the implementation of Timor-Leste's program meant 
that, although there was a degree of inadequate consultation with district-level 
stakeholders, lawmakers had more time to insure that requisite regulations would be 
in place before the program commenced. 
In light of the slowness of implementation of decentralization, and following a 
national tour of Timor-Leste's districts, in May 2010, the prime minister, Xanana 
Gusmao, authorized direct payments of up to US$50,000 to each of the 442 suco-level 
(village-level) administrations.33 This had the effect of injecting funds directly into 
local communities while the decentralization program issue was being resolved and 
of lessening the districts' reliance on central administration to disburse funds 
regionally. This move toward allocating funds directly to the suco level was resisted 
to some extent by ministers who saw a diminution of the funds thus available to 
them for disbursement. However, the total fund allocated was not great and did not 
have a meaningful impact upon ministers' departmental budgets. Rather, there was a 
feeling that this experience was a foretaste of the subsequent diminution of the 
ministers' political power, which they did not like. From the perspective of the prime 
30 According to a senior FRETILIN parliamentary source who said the original drafts 
contained numerous weaknesses that needed to be resolved (personal communication, July 
2010, Dili). 
31 Based on discussions with Government of Timor-Leste advisors during 2009. 
32 Turner and Podger, Decentralisation in Indonesia, p. xiii. 
33 
"Xanana Resist against Indonesia Used Strategic Guerilla Warfare and to Develop the 
Country with PEDN," Tempo Semanal, May 31, 2010, http: I I temposemanaltimor.blogspot.com 
I 2010 I 05 I xanana-resist-against-indonesia-used.html, accessed May 1, 2012. 
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minister, however, his tour of the districts, combined with the allocation of funds, 
helped shore up his personal popularity and, hence, that of his political party, the 
Council for Timorese National Reconstruction (Congresso Nacional Reconstruc<;ao 
de Timor, CNRT), ahead of the 2012 elections. Indeed, such was the boost given to 
the prime minister's political standing by this gesture that it was widely thought that 
he could capitalize on it and call an early election. Such was the power of appealing 
directly to voters, and offering them even modest funding, where they lived. 
One of the potential problems with decentralization, however, that was, to some 
extent, experienced also in Indonesia, was that the process had the potential to 
weaken national planning. Effective national planning can be disrupted if different 
districts embark on distinct and uncoordinated development programs, in particular 
regarding infrastructure and cross-boundary resource programs. This potential 
dilemma, in part, explained the limitations that lawmakers and analysts expected 
would be imposed upon districts, both in their initial start-up periods of 
decentralization as well as later in the process, when they would still be held 
accountable to the central government. In Indonesia, following decentralization, local 
economic disputes became commonplace and potentially destabilizing, in particular, 
in relation to access to local resources.34 There was one case, in particular, in West 
Sumatra, in which one district administration halted the flow of a river that, 
downstream, supplied the water needs of another administration. This dispute did 
not last long but was indicative of the lack of planning that could go into such 
decision making, or the improper purposes to which these various, regional 
development plans could be put. The disputes that did arise concerning transport 
and water-basin management in Indonesia were finally resolved through 
interregional cooperation; it was in the interests of all parties to cooperate to achieve 
shared outcomes otherwise not individually available. Even where there was 
interregional cooperation, in Timor-Leste there remained potential for the central 
government to have to negotiate with each of the thirteen districts in order to achieve 
consensus on which development projects should be initiated across the state, and 
the coordination for that process.35 
One of the advantages of centralization of resources is that a central government 
can achieve greater efficiencies of scale in planning, time, and expenditure by saving 
on replication and being able to purchase goods and services in larger quantities, 
hence, more cheaply. By way of contrast, smaller planning units would not be able to 
achieve such efficiencies, would tend to replicate a range of services that need 
implementation only once to be effective, and would buy goods and services in 
relatively small quantities, at less competitive prices. Fiscal management can also be 
weakened by economic decentralization in cases where regions have responsibility 
for raising, allocating, or forwarding taxes.36 However, those who have shaped and 
implemented Timor-Leste's decentralization process do not envisage fiscal 
decentralization but, rather, expect that the central government will manage the 
economy and allocate resources to the districts on a per capita basis. 
34 Turner and Podger, Decentralisation in Indonesia, p. 142. 
35 See, for example, Sukma, "Conflict Management in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia," p. 70, on 
the Indonesian experience. 
36 V. Gandhi, "Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Economic Performance," in 
Macroeconomic Management and Fiscal Decentralization, ed. J. Roy (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 1995). 
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Finally, in the short term, and noting that decentralization is at least in part 
intended to preserve and enhance local cultural identity, decentralization can have 
the potential to fragment national identity by reinforcing rather than resolving 
distinct and sometimes competing ethnicities. In a country in which a sense of state-
based national identity had not yet been fully formed, that is weak or under 
challenge, strengthening the citizenry's local as opposed to the national allegiances 
may reinforce regional differences rather than commonalities. Given the regionally 
distinct character of political allegiances in Timor-Leste, this stood as a real problem, 
if in the planning stage it was still only a potential problem. In all, then, where 
decentralization has been attempted in developing countries, "in most cases, central 
governments initiated, introduced, and heavily publicized decentralization policies 
only to see them falter during implementation."37 That is to say, decentralization has 
a number of theoretical advantages to offer a highly centralized state with limited 
capacity and resources, but it also presents a number of new challenges, many of 
which have not been adequately addressed in a number of decentralization projects 
that have been implemented elsewhere. 
DOES DECENTRALIZATION STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY? 
There are two key normative features of decentralization, which are inter-
related. The first normative feature of decentralization is the allocation of resources 
closer to the source of receipt to help ensure the more precise delivery of those 
resources to the citizens. The second normative feature of decentralization is that it 
brings accountability for such allocation closer to the people for whom it is intended. 
As Peter Aucoin and Ralph Heintzman noted, "Accountability is the cornerstone of 
public governance and management because it constitutes the principle that informs 
the processes whereby those who hold and exercise public authority are held to 
account." 38 Decentralization is intended to achieve its intended outcomes by 
strengthening the relationship between citizens and public authority, through the 
state's local manifestations. 
The key element of Timor-Leste' s decentralization process is the establishment of 
local municipal councils that were intended to have responsibility for overseeing 
local planning and the allocation of resources.39 For many people in Timor-Leste, 
despite improvements in transport and communications, the center of the state in 
Dili remained physically and conceptually remote from their daily lives. Indicative 
surveys had shown that, short of the forced migration that characterized the 
Indonesian period, most Timorese never traveled more than forty kilometers from 
their place of birth. The localness of life-while not necessarily a factor in the success 
or failure of decentralization-was compounded by the often very poor 
infrastructure that made extensive travel difficult, if not impossible, and the 
prohibitive costs associated with travel. Further, Timor-Leste's use of a proportional 
37 Cheerna and Rondinelli, Decentralization and Development, p. 297. 
38 Peter Aucoin and Ralph Heintznman, "The Dialectics of Accountability in an Era of 
Reform," International Review of Administrative Sciences 66,1 (2000): 45. 
39 The extent of the allocation of resources was, at the time of writing, not finalized, but 
appeared to have been reduced from extensive allocations to, at least initially, the allocations 
of health care, as per Section 57 of the Constitution, and water. 
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representation electoral systemf 40 intended to ensure the greatest representation of 
disparate political viewsf meant that local citizens did not have locally elected 
representatives; politicians did travel to the districts, but there was a sense that, for 
most Timorese, these representatives were remote and not directly accountable or 
responsive. The establishment of local councils was, thenf intended to establish a 
system of representation closer to where people actually lived and empower 
representatives who would be potentially better able to include local people in the 
political process, in terms of consulting and commenting on, and contributing to 
policy development. This then would help ensure accountability, as well as 
participation in the political process, for local citizens could potentially run for a seat 
on the municipal council. 
The councils themselves were intended, potentiallyf to be better able to 
understand and reflect the concerns of local citizens in their policy prescriptions, and 
be directly accountable for the successes and failures of implementing such policies. 
As noted by Leena A vonius, in relation to Indonesia's process of decentralization, 
"The laws on regional autonomy were seen as an opportunity for establishing a new 
kind of local government which would be more democratic and transparent."41 It 
may well be that there were a number of organizational difficulties in the 
implementation of decentralization in Indonesia, and there is little doubt that this 
particular process decentralized and thus dispersed previously highly centralized 
corruption along with political and economic capacities. But decentralization did 
give ordinary Indonesians greater and more direct access to government services and 
was a key component in helping to lessen regional tensions at a time when 
opposition to the political center, exemplified by the Jakarta bureaucracy, was at its 
highest point since the late 1950s. In terms of corruption, by way of comparison, in 
Timor-Leste some ministers who had already received kick-backs from promised 
contracts not yet awarded were frustrated by the reduction of their budgets for the 
2010 suco funding program. However, even the suco-level direct funding was 
hamstrung by a number of Dili-based companies setting up district-level offices and 
applying for local contracts, with much of the money from the contracts that were 
won simply returning to Dili. This, then, explained at least some of the reluctance of 
Timor-Leste's central government representatives to embrace fully the 
decentralization program, even though decentralization in Timor-Leste took place in 
political terms and much less so in economic terms. 
More positively, while decentralization is explicitly intended to enhance local 
cultural identity, general agreement that local identities can and should be supported 
in effect constitutes agreement on the principle of pluralism, or the acceptance of 
difference within a varied community. Further, while local communities might 
refocus their immediate attentions on local matters if encouraged to do so by 
decentralization, increased engagement with and participation in political processes, 
including direct representation and greater accountability, enhances the process of 
embedding democratic principles across the state. Accountability, in particular, 
further implies notions of social fairness, justice, and rule of law. Each of these 
40 The proportional representation electoral system is where candidates are elected from party 
lists across the state rather than on a seat-by-seat, direct representational basis. 
41 L. Avonius, "Indonesian Adat Communities: Promise and Challenges of Democracy and 
Globalisation," in The Politics of the Periphery in Indonesia, ed. M. Sakai, G. Banks, and J. Walker 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), p. 232. 
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qualities is a key marker of civic political development, and general subscription to 
such values implies, not a replacement of local identity, but the addition of a 
consensus around civic values. 
CONCLUSION 
If we accept that the term "nation" refers to a state that has been founded upon, 
among other things, a common cultural or ethnic identity,42 Timor-Leste faced 
serious challenges to national cohesion, as a consequence of the ethnic distinctions 
that characterized its peoples. These differences were widely claimed to have 
contributed to the breakdown of political order that wracked the state in 2006 and 
led to a situation perilously close to civil war. However, the citizenry's growing 
commitment to such civic values provided an alternative site of national unity that 
did not rely on primordial loyalties but to a growing sense of engagement in and 
identification with the state. This, then, was the glue that would, it was hoped, bond 
the nation as it continued to develop. 
The benefits of decentralization in Timor-Leste, as elsewhere, were not at any 
point a given, and the process has continued to face significant challenges. The 
critical criterion in determining its success or otherwise appeared to be the extent of 
care in the design and application of the process. To that end, the plan to introduce 
decentralization first to four districts and later to others seemed sensible, as did the 
scrutiny being given to the legislative process (even if other factors also had an 
impact upon its progress). As noted by Smoke, Gomez, and Peterson: 
"Decentralization could be beneficial under appropriate political and institutional 
circumstances and if properly designed and applied." 43 
The success of decentralization also depended on whether it was linked to a 
genuine process of increased or enhanced democratization, in which citizens found a 
new and substantive outlet for their political voice. If this was not the case, as Rizal 
Sukma noted, "There has been a general consensus that regional autonomy would 
not work if it [were] not carried out within the context of democratisation." 44 The 
experiment of decentralization in Timor-Leste had gotten underway slowly; it was 
hoped that it would be a positive process, but it faced a number of challenges. As 
such, the outcome of this political experiment would not be known for some time to 
come. 
42 A. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986), pp. 13-18; and E. 
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 44. 
43 Smoke et al., "Understanding Decentralization," p. 4. 
44 Sukma, "Conflict Management in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia," p. 72. 
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